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Abstract 
 
Climate change is one of the most significant problems facing humanity today. As scientific 
evidence continues to accumulate, it is becoming increasingly apparent that climate change 
requires an urgent global response. Without such a response, rising sea levels, severe 
weather patterns, and the spread of deadly diseases threaten the lives of both present and 
future generations. And yet, action on climate change has been characterized by lack of 
progress and break downs in communication. It is widely assumed that the global response 
to climate change has so far been inadequate. Alarmed by this lack of progress, the thesis 
aims to explore exactly why we should consider current global climate change action as 
inadequate, and what normative principles must underwrite a more just global response to 
climate change.   
More specifically, the thesis will conduct a global justice based assessment of multilateral 
and networked climate change governance. This normative assessment of current practice 
is not only urgently needed in order to clarify the inadequacies of the climate change 
response, but also serves the purpose of bridging the gap between political theorists who 
concern themselves with the ethical dimensions of climate change, and scholars who focus 
on climate change governance practice. The thesis aims to illustrate that climate justice 
theorists can provide normative insights into current practice, which can inform the field of 
climate change governance and ultimately contribute to assessing how the response to 
climate change can become more just. In this way, the thesis provides a starting point for a 
discussion between two fields, which have traditionally been concerned with 
complementary, yet separate, research agendas. The thesis demonstrates that the bridging 
of these two fields can underwrite future thinking about a more just global response to 
climate change. 
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Introduction 
 
Climate change is one of the most significant threats facing humanity today. As scientific 
evidence continues to accumulate, it is becoming increasingly apparent that climate change 
requires an urgent global response. Without such a response, rising sea levels, severe 
weather patterns, and the spread of deadly diseases threaten the lives of both present and 
future generations. And yet, action on climate change has been characterized by lack of 
progress and break downs in communication. It is widely assumed that the global response 
to climate change has so far been inadequate. Alarmed by this lack of progress, the thesis 
aims to show exactly why global climate change action should be considered inadequate, 
and what normative principles must underwrite a more just global response to climate 
change.   
In order to achieve this, the thesis will conduct a global justice based assessment of climate 
change governance. This normative assessment of current practice is not only urgently 
necessary in order to clarify the inadequacies of the climate change response, but also 
serves the purpose of bridging the gap between political theorists who concern themselves 
with the ethical dimensions of climate change, and scholars who focus on current climate 
change governance practice. An investigation of the climate change justice field reveals 
that political theorists do not often concern themselves with the assessment of climate 
change governance.1 At the same time, the ethical dimensions of current practice remain 
underexplored by scholars who specialize in climate change governance. 2  This is 
problematic, because climate change ethicists have the potential to provide normative 
insights into current practice, which could inform the field of climate change governance 
research and ultimately contribute to assessing how the response to climate change can 
become more just. For this reason, the thesis aims to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice, and provide an insight into what normative principles of climate justice can reveal 
about current climate change governance processes. This provides a starting point for a 
discussion between two fields, which have been traditionally concerned with 
complementary, yet separate, agendas. Overall, the thesis will demonstrate that the 
bridging of these two fields can underwrite future thinking about a more just global 
response to climate change. 
                                                          
1 Vanderheiden, S., ‘What Justice Theory and Climate Change Politics Can Learn From Each Other’ in Political 
Science and Politics, 46 (2013), p. 18  
2 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 68 
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The thesis is based on the assumption that an ethical discussion of the climate change 
problem is valuable and important, because climate change is arguably an ethical problem 
by its very nature and requires thorough normative assessment to be properly understood. 
This is largely because empirical realities of the climate change problem raise complicated 
distributive implications at almost every turn.3 For one, climate change results in an 
unequal distribution of burdens. Although climate change will have global consequences, 
the most detrimental effects are expected to occur in less developed countries, which have 
done least to contribute to the climate change problem.4  Developed countries, who are 
widely considered to be the main cause of climate change, are predicted to suffer least 
from the effects of climate change.5 At the same time, it is predicted that some of the 
richer, more advanced less developed countries will contribute 45% of global emissions by 
2050.6 This raises complex questions about how much developed countries owe to less 
developed countries, and to what extent countries at different stages of development 
should be involved in climate change action. On top of this, climate change raises 
intergenerational distributive issues, because the most dangerous effects of climate change, 
which will cause widespread damage to the human population, are not predicted to occur 
for another fifty to one hundred years.7 This raises questions about what action present 
generations should take, which necessarily requires considering what future generations 
deserve.8 In this sense, climate change is arguably an ethical problem of determining the 
just distribution of burdens, and the thesis therefore aims to treat it as such. 
Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis aims to normatively assess the climate change problem from a global justice 
perspective and illustrate what this perspective can reveal about the current response to 
climate change. In order to achieve this, the thesis is split into three parts: Part I, ‘Defining 
the Climate Change Problem,’ Part II, ‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change 
Position’, and Part III, ‘Assessing Current Institutional Practice.’ Part I aims to provide an 
overview of the climate change problem and the climate ethics literature which has 
emerged as a response to it. The review of scientific evidence in Chapter One provides an 
insight into the main causes and consequences of climate change. This ensures that the 
                                                          
3 Held, D., Cosmopolitanism – Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 208 
4 World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2010 – Development and Climate Change’ 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2010 [accessed 28.03.2012], p. xx 
5 Shue, H., ‘Global Environmental and International Inequality’ in International Affairs, 75 (1999), p. 537 
6 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  13 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 8 
8 Caney, S., ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’ in Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 18 (2005), p. 749 
9 
 
climate change problem is properly understood before it is assessed. Chapter Two then 
provides a critical assessment of four approaches found within the climate change ethics 
literature: statist, pragmatic, utilitarian, and cosmopolitan. It is in this chapter that the 
thesis defends the use of a cosmopolitan climate justice approach. Once it has been 
established that the cosmopolitan position is useful for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem, the thesis moves onto Part II: ‘Developing a Global Justice and 
Climate Change Position.’ 
 
Part II aims to develop normative principles which can be used for the assessment of 
current practice. It is split into three chapters, each of which considers past work on global 
justice and climate change, and builds on this in order to advance and solidify a unique 
cosmopolitan climate justice approach. Chapter Three concerns defining the scope of 
justice, and defends an approach which combines non-relational and relational elements in 
order to capture the normative demands which stem from the climate change problem. 
Chapter Four concerns defining the grounds of justice, and defends the idea that the right 
to health should ground the climate justice position, because this right arguably 
encompasses the basic human interests threatened by climate change. Chapter Five then 
uses the scope and grounds of climate justice developed in Chapters Three and Four to 
examine three main issues associated with the empirical conditions of climate change: 
what is owed to future generations, how to include less develop countries in climate 
change action, and who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in collective action. In doing 
so, Chapter Five puts forward three demands of justice which must be met in order to 
achieve a condition of justice in the case of climate change. These three demands are 
considered normative principles which must underwrite a more just global response to 
climate change. Once these normative principles have been defined, the thesis moves onto 
its third and final part: Part III, ‘Assessing Current Institutional Practice.’ 
Part III aims to illustrate what normative principles of justice can reveal about the global 
response to climate change, and is split into three chapters. Chapter Six provides a 
conceptual introduction for the evaluation of current practice. This chapter clarifies what is 
meant by current institutional practice, and outlines how this practice will be assessed. 
Chapter Six puts forward that both actors under the United Nations Framework for the 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and actors involved in networked climate change 
governance processes have a moral responsibility to act on climate change because of their 
capacity to create a context within which the three demands of climate justice defined in 
10 
 
Part II can be met. The chapter also provides a methodological framework which is used for 
the assessment of current practice in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
The assessment of the UNFCCC, in Chapter Seven, and networked climate change 
governance, in Chapter Eight, is considered exploratory, and does not purport to make 
definitive claims about the practice of the actors within these processes. Rather, the thesis 
aims, in these chapters, to illustrate how the climate justice framework developed in Part II 
can be used to assess current practice. A comprehensive assessment of the UNFCCC and 
networked climate change governance would not be possible within the scope of this thesis, 
which places an emphasis on both the development of a climate justice position and the 
application of this position. This allows somewhat limited space for the assessment of two 
complex processes of governance. Nevertheless, the assessment conducted in these 
chapters aims to tentatively illustrate what the application of the climate justice position 
developed in this thesis can reveal about climate change governance practice. The 
assessment in Chapters Seven and Eight will explore both normative commitments and 
current practices of climate change governance actors, and aims to point to positive 
trajectories as well as hindrances facing the global response to climate change. This climate 
justice focused assessment reveals actors in the UNFCCC and networked climate change 
governance have created a context in which the demands of climate justice could be met, 
but that these actors are falling short of addressing climate change in a just manner. These 
findings indicate that there is more work to be done in terms of pursuing a just response to 
the climate change problem. 
 
Although the findings made in Chapters Seven and Eight may be intuitive in the sense that 
it is well known that actors under climate change governance are not adequately 
addressing the climate change problem, it is nevertheless valuable to systematically 
evaluate global climate change governance. This evaluation allows for research to go 
beyond intuition and assumption and provide specialized and detailed knowledge on the 
current situation. The importance of this cannot be understated, because intuitive thinking 
may not be adequate for explicating normative suggestions for reform toward a better 
condition of justice. A thorough examination of current practices provides a denominator 
from which to begin suggesting what is needed to ensure a just response to climate change. 
In this vein, Chapter Nine will summarize the main findings of the thesis and illustrate that 
the normative assessment conducted in Part III can be used to underwrite future thinking 
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about a more just global response to climate change. This concluding chapter will also 
discuss potential research directions which can be taken as a result of the main findings of 
the thesis. 
Key Contributions of the Thesis 
The thesis aims to make four key contributions. First, the thesis develops an original 
climate justice approach. Although assessing the climate change problem from a 
cosmopolitan perspective is not unique to the thesis, the thesis takes an original approach 
to climate justice. Chapter Three defends a unique scope of climate justice which is both 
relational and non-relational. This has previously not been attempted within the climate 
justice field. Furthermore, Chapter Four defends the idea that the right to health is 
sufficient to ground climate justice, a conception of the grounds of climate justice which 
has previously not been defended. These distinctive scope and grounds of justice are used 
in Chapter Five to develop three demands of justice, all three of which are unique to the 
thesis. In this way, the climate justice position developed in Part II of the thesis constitutes 
an original contribution to the climate change and global justice debate.  
 
The second original contribution of the thesis can be found in Chapter Six, which specifies 
two types of actors who have a responsibility to act in the case of climate change: those 
under the UNFCCC and those involved in networked climate change governance. Although 
Simon Caney, a climate justice scholar, has recently discussed why actors with certain 
capabilities should be held responsible in the case of climate change, he does not explore 
any specific actors and their responsibilities in detail. Instead, Caney lists a few potential 
actors who could bear responsibilities, for example ‘firms, trade unions, churches, states, 
and international institutions.9 The thesis contributes to global justice and climate change 
literature by specifying two types of actors which can be held morally responsible for 
climate change action, and explaining what exactly they are responsible for.  
 
The assessment of actors under the UNFCCC and within networked climate change 
governance in Chapters Seven and Eight constitutes the third original contribution of the 
thesis. These chapters illustrate what the climate justice position developed in this thesis 
can reveal about global response to climate change. An extensive review of the literature 
suggests that most climate justice theorists do not investigate how their theory relates to 
                                                          
9 Caney, S., ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’ in The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 22 (2014), p. 136 
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current institutional practice.10 Furthermore, if they do, cosmopolitan scholars only seem 
to assess multilateral climate change governance processes, and not networked climate 
change governance processes. 11  Although multilateral climate change governance 
processes are perhaps more public or familiar, climate governance scholars explain that the 
center of gravity in the global response to climate change is shifting from the multilateral 
treaties to diverse activities outside of this process, referred to in this thesis as networked 
climate change governance processes.12 Scholars of climate change governance go so far as 
to say that failing to explore networked governance processes would ignore the 
complexities of the climate change response.13 The thesis will therefore follow emerging 
convention and explore both types of climate change governance processes, adding a 
significant amount of original research to the climate justice debate. Importantly, although 
it is becoming conventional for climate change governance scholars to explore networked 
climate change governance, these scholars have not explored ethical issues or justice 
related concerns associated with networked climate change governance. 14  Matthew 
Hoffman claims that significant ethical analysis of networked climate change governance is 
therefore crucial.15 The fact that a justice based assessment of networked climate change 
governance has so far not been attempted by cosmopolitan justice theorists or climate 
governance scholars is important. The thesis will serve to fill a gap in both climate change 
justice and climate change governance literature, and make an original contribution to both 
the fields by normatively assessing networked climate change governance.  
 
The assessment of current practice in Chapters Seven and Eight furthers the aim of bridging 
the gap between climate justice theory and climate change governance research by 
illustrating what normative principles of climate justice can reveal about current practice. 
Bridging this gap constitutes the fourth and final original contribution of the thesis, because 
                                                          
10 See for example Page, E. A., Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 2006), Hayden, P., ‘The Environment, Global Justice and World Environmental Citizenship’, in 
Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (eds.), The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), or 
Hayward, T., ‘Human Rights Versus Emission Rights: Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of Ecological 
Space’ in Ethics and International Affairs, 21 (2007), pp. 431 – 450 
11 See for example, Harris, P., World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010), Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations: Climate Change and 
International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2014), Vanderheiden, S., Atmospheric Justice – A 
Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Harris, P., What’s Wrong With 
Climate Change and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 
12 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response After 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 5 
13 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 10 
14 Ibid., p. 68 
15 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response After Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 154 
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this has previously not been attempted. As was explained above, this is important because 
climate change justice theorists have the potential to provide normative insights into 
current practice, which could inform the field of climate change governance research and 
ultimately contribute to assessing how the response to climate change can become more 
just. Through this fourth and final contribution, the thesis hopes to provide a starting point 
for a discussion between two fields which are concerned with complementary, yet separate, 
agendas. As Steven Vanderheiden points out, this may narrow the gap between justice in 
theory and practice by illustrating that these fields have something to learn from one 
other.16 With this is mind, the concluding chapter of the thesis will concern how bridging 
the gap between these two fields can underwrite future thinking about a more just global 
response to climate change.  
Wider Aims of the Thesis 
Although the four contributions outlined above are important, they constitute 
contributions specific to climate justice and climate change governance literature. The 
thesis also has the wider aim of engaging with political debates on the global failure to 
address the climate change problem. The political debate surrounding climate change is 
often simplistic, misleading, and awash with confusion.17 By explaining what is normatively 
required to ensure a just response to climate change, and systematically pinpointing what 
is going wrong in climate change governance, the thesis hopes to provide clarity on the 
topic of climate change, which is ‘urgently necessary’ to inform current political debates.18 
By providing this clarity, the thesis hopes to contribute to political debates which concern 
improving the global response to climate change. An improvement in the global response 
to climate change is important not only because of the urgency of the climate change 
problem, but because, as David Held argues, a breakthrough in just one global problem, like 
climate change, might provide enthusiasm for new models of global politics, and create 
space for the development of a more egalitarian, representative, cosmopolitan politics at a 
global level in general.19 With this wider aim in mind, the thesis now turns to Part I: 
Defining the Problem. 
  
                                                          
16 Vanderheiden, S., ‘What Justice Theory and Climate Change Politics Can Learn From Each Other’ in Political 
Science and Politics, 46 (2013), p. 22 
17 Gardiner, S. M., ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’ in Ethics, 114 (2004), p. 595 
18 Ibid. 
19 Held, D., Cosmopolitanism – Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 246 
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Chapter One – Climate Change: A Global Problem 
Introduction 
This current chapter and the one following make up Part I of this thesis, ‘Defining the 
Climate Change Problem.’ These two chapters aim to provide an overview of the climate 
change problem and the climate ethics literature which has emerged as a response to it. 
The current chapter will outline the climate change problem by reviewing the latest 
scientific evidence. The chapter will make use of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), as this body provides the most comprehensive and up to date 
review of the scientific literature. The chapter will provide a detailed summary of the 
climate change problem, and will include an explanation of its causes and predicted effects. 
This ensures that the thesis is built on comprehensive empirical evidence, provided by 
leading scientific experts and reviewers. Each chapter following this first chapter will refer 
back to the evidence presented here as a basis for normative assessment. It is important to 
provide this empirical basis, because the thesis concerns the normative assessment of an 
existing problem, and this problem must be properly understood before it can be assessed.  
 
The chapter will be organized as follows. The first part of the chapter will provide an 
overview of the IPCC in order to illustrate why this particular body has been chosen as the 
basis for scientific evidence for the thesis.1 The second part of the chapter will define 
climate change and its main causes, before providing an overview of the key predicted 
consequences. This will involve a discussion of which human interests are at stake. The 
third part of the chapter will discuss why less developed countries and future generations 
should be considered the primary victims of climate change. Finally, the fourth part of the 
chapter will argue that collective action is required sooner rather than later to avoid 
irreversible damage. The overall aim of the chapter is to help clarify what an ethical 
discussion on climate change should include, which is important for the thesis, as it aims to 
provide an ethical discussion of the climate change problem.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United 
Nations Environment Program. It is considered to be the leading authority for the 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that the scientific evidence outlined here will be considered as best available evidence, not 
as fact. Even though the evidence has been thoroughly researched by thousands of scientists, the thesis accepts 
a certain level of epistemic uncertainty, which implies that it is possible that the evidence will change in the 
future. 
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assessment of the climate change problem.2 The IPCC is tasked with reviewing and 
assessing the most recent scientific, technical and socio-economic information on climate 
change produced worldwide. Through the review of scientific evidence, the ‘IPCC aims to 
provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate 
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts.’3 The IPCC does not 
conduct independent research, nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. 
Because of this, the IPCC claims to reflect a range of views and expertise, and provide 
objective assessment of the state of climate research.4 This is the first reason the IPCC 
reports have been chosen to form the basis of the scientific evidence in this thesis. The 
IPCC claims to be unbiased and explicitly states that it does not have an agenda besides 
providing evidence. It aims to be policy relevant but policy-neutral, and stays away from 
policy prescription: the reports the IPCC produces aim to reflect technical assessment of 
experts rather than government positions.5 This is important for the thesis, since bias in the 
scientific evidence may skew the climate justice position. The IPCC represents unbiased 
data which will not point the climate justice position towards any particular agenda. 
 
In addition, the IPCC provides a scale of scientific information that is unparalleled at the 
international level. It is open to all member countries of the United Nations and World 
Meteorological Association, and currently has 195 members. For the 2014 report, the IPCC 
hired 831 scientific reviewers from around the world, and analyzed over 9,000 peer 
reviewed scientific papers. 6  This amount of information would be impossible to 
disseminate by any one person, and the IPCC therefore provides a unique overview of the 
scientific literature. This is the second reason the IPCC has been chosen as the basis for 
scientific evidence in the thesis. IPCC reports represent a global scientific view which is 
based on the work of thousands of scientists and climate experts. This is important for the 
thesis as it attempts to capture the global state of scientific research, in order to ensure 
that relevant information is not overlooked. The IPCC provides the means to achieve this.   
 
                                                          
2 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 145 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Organization’ 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml [accessed 06.01.2015]   
4 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 145 
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ip
cc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 51 
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Activities’ 
http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.shtml#.UMzUkuB2MiA [accessed 06.01.2015]  
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Finally, the IPCC is regarded as a leading body within the climate science community. The 
IPCC has so far released five reports, in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2014. These successive 
reports have demonstrated a growing level of expertise and been met with enhanced 
credibility.7 The first report in 1990 represented little more than ‘an interesting hypothesis,’ 
and by the 2007 Fourth Report, the IPCC had garnered overwhelming scientific support.8 
This level of support for the evidence presented by the IPCC is the third and final reason 
why the thesis makes use of the IPCC reports as the basis of scientific evidence. For the 
reasons above, the chapter will make reference to the reports of the IPCC, or more 
specifically the summaries for policy makers from these reports, as they provide a succinct 
summary of the key evidence.  
Climate Change and Its Causes 
Under the definition provided by the IPCC, climate change refers to a change in the state of 
the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its 
properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.9 This 
definition is quite general, and in order to comprehend the empirical realities of the climate 
change problem, its main causes and key projected effects must be understood. In terms of 
causes, the 2014 IPCC report states that it is extremely likely (95% chance) that human 
influence has been the dominant cause of climate change since the mid-20th century.10 The 
significance of this high level of certainty is considerable as it reflects the views of over 
9,000 scientific peer reviewed papers. Therefore, it can be assumed that the latest scientific 
evidence, humans are the main cause for climate change. 
 
Humans cause climate change by increasing the naturally occurring greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), which warm the atmosphere and surface of the earth. More specifically, emissions 
from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons and nitrous oxide, referred to under the umbrella 
term of GHGs.11 The human induced atmospheric increase of these gases enhances the 
greenhouse gas effect, resulting in an additional warming of the earth’s surface.12 What is 
                                                          
7 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 145 
8 Ibid. 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 30 
10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 5 
11 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ip
cc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 37 
12 Ibid. 
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potentially dangerous about this warming is the long-lived nature of GHGs. Atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs adjust slowly to changes of emissions, which means present day 
emissions will continue to exist in the atmosphere for centuries to come.13 As the 
concentration of GHGs increases, their greenhouse effect increases. Eventually, the 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs lead to irreversible changes in the climate.14 Put more 
simply, over time, increased GHGs emitted by humans cause climate change. Human 
influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in 
the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in 
changes in some climate extremes.15 
 
The IPCC’s evidence of the relationship between humans, GHGs and climate change has 
been carefully assembled from a number of sources. Global-scale observations of 
temperature began in the mid-19th century, and more comprehensive and diverse sets of 
observations are available for the period from 1950 onwards.16 The IPCC makes use of 
remote sensing from satellites, paleoclimate reconstructions which date back to millions of 
years, and direct measurements of observable climate change effects. Together these 
observations provide a comprehensive view of the variability and long-term changes in the 
atmosphere, the ocean, the cryosphere, and the land surface.17 Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the IPCC is correct about the changes in climate and how they relate to 
human activity, as their findings are based in triangulated and thorough scientific research.  
Key Effects of Climate Change 
The outline of the key effects of climate change presented here will be based in the robust 
findings of the IPCC, defined as ‘findings which hold under a variety of approaches, 
methods, models and assumptions, and are expected to be relatively unaffected by 
uncertainties.’18 The IPCC has observed and predicted several key consequences of climate 
change. The first, and perhaps most well-known, is warming of the planet, which is an on-
going effect carefully observed by scientists over the last few decades. According to the 
                                                          
13 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ip
cc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 52 
14 Ibid., p. 53 
15Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 12 
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report, 
https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ip
cc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 53 
17 Ibid. 
18 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 72 
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latest IPCC report, warming of the climate system is now considered unequivocal.19 
Warming has been detected in changes in surface and atmospheric temperatures as well as 
in temperatures of the upper hundred meters of global oceans over the last decades.20 The 
most up to date findings suggest that these observed changes in temperature are 
unprecedented.21 Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the 
Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850.22 The latest research shows that 
there has been a warming of 0.85°C over the period of 1880-2012 in average land and 
ocean surface temperatures.23 The IPCC does not project that this warming will slow down 
in the coming decades and centuries. For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C 
per decade is projected for a range of emissions scenarios provided by the IPCC.24 
Afterwards, temperature projections increasingly depend on specific emissions scenarios, 
which in turn depend on what action is taken on cutting emissions.25  
 
The IPCC estimates that if current emissions trends continue, global temperatures will pass 
the threshold of 2°C warming above preindustrial levels sometime between 2050-2100.26 
This is illustrated in the graph below.27   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 3 
20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 39 
21 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Working Group I: Summary for 
Policy Makers, 2014 http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf [accessed 
30.09.2013], p. 3 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 45 
25 Ibid. 
26 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 8 
27 Ibid., p. 32 
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The 2°C threshold is important because the IPCC claims that in order to avoid dangerous 
climate change the global change in temperature must be kept at or below 2°C relative to 
preindustrial levels.28 Although this cut off point is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid 
due to current inaction, the IPCC maintains, at the time of writing, that there are multiple 
mitigation pathways that are likely to limit warming to below 2°C.29 These pathways would 
require substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades: emissions would have 
to be cut by 40% - 70% by 2050 compared to 2010, and would need to be near zero or 
below in 2100.30 This requirement will be further discussed in Chapters Four, Five, Seven 
and Eight. For now, the current chapter merely serves to illustrate that the IPCC stresses 
that in to avoid dangerous climate change, the global temperature change must be kept at 
or below 2°C. 
 
The warming which has taken place to date is already having effects on weather patterns. 
One effect that can be observed at present is the widespread melting of ice, which causes 
sea levels to rise. According to the IPCC, over the last two decades, the Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink almost 
worldwide, and Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued 
to decrease.31 The IPCC claims that it is very likely that the Arctic sea ice cover will continue 
to shrink and thin and that Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover will decrease during 
the 21st century as global mean surface temperature rises.32 In addition, it is predicted that 
global glacier volume will further decrease.33 This widespread melting of ice is having an 
observable effect on sea level rises. According to the IPCC, over the period 1901–2010, 
global mean sea levels rose by 0.19 meters.34 This rise is significant, as the rate of sea level 
rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two 
millennia.35 The IPCC projects that the atmosphere and oceans will continue to warm 
during the 21st century. Heat will penetrate from the surface to the deep ocean and affect 
                                                          
28 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 14 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p.. 5 
32 Ibid., p. 17 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 6 
35 Ibid. 
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ocean circulation.36 As a result, global mean sea levels will continue to rise during the 21st 
century, and could rise by a further 0.98 meters by 2100.37  
 
There are several consequences predicted if the temperatures continue to rise, ice 
continues to melt, and sea levels continue to rise. These include increased instances of 
heavy precipitation, floods, droughts and heat waves.38 It is predicted that by the 2080s, 
many millions more people than today are projected to experience floods every year.39 
These will be caused by sea-level rises as well as heavy precipitation events, and will result 
in a number of consequences including damage to crops, soil erosion, inability to cultivate 
land due to waterlogging of soils, adverse effects on quality of surface and groundwater, 
contamination of water supply, increased risk of death, injuries and infectious, respiratory 
and skin diseases.40 At the same time, increased occurrence of droughts and heat waves 
are predicted as a result of rising global temperatures. Increased droughts will have 
negative consequences, including land degradation, lower yields of crops due to crop 
damage and failure, increased livestock deaths, increased risks of wildfire, more 
widespread water stress, increased risk of food and water shortage, increased risk of 
malnutrition, and increased risk of water and food borne diseases.41 Heat waves will also 
have destructive consequences, such as reduced agriculture yields in warmer regions due 
to heat stress, increased danger of wildfires, increased water demand, water quality 
problems, increased risk of heat related morality, and poor quality of life for those without 
appropriate housing.42  
 
As can be seen from these predicted effects, a number of human interests are at stake 
according to climate change predictions. The first is the interest in food, as agriculture and 
livestock will be negatively affected, meaning that there will be less food available, 
particularly in regions dependent on local agriculture. A second is the interest in secure 
shelter, since wildfires, rising sea levels, and floods threaten homes, and will displace 
hundreds of thousands. These displaced people may end up in refugee camps, in living 
conditions that are not permanent or secure. A third is the interest in clean water, as the 
                                                          
36 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 17 
37 Ibid., p. 18 
38 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 53 
39 Ibid., p. 48 
40 Ibid., p. 53 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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changeable weather patterns will have negative effects on water supply. Not only will 
water supplies be threatened by contamination at surface and ground level due to flooding 
and precipitation, but there is projected to be an increased demand for water as 
temperatures rise. This means many will lack access to clean water, particularly in regions 
where there are no alternatives available. Finally, the interest in health is threatened. The 
health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for example, 
increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due to extreme weather 
events; increased burden of diarrheal diseases; increased frequency of cardio-respiratory 
diseases due to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone in urban areas related to 
climate change; and the altered spatial distribution of some infectious diseases.43 The 
human interests threatened by climate change will be further discussed in the rest of the 
thesis, particularly in Chapter Four, which will provide an exact definition of human 
interests. For now, the current chapter merely aims to point to the variety of human 
interests which are at risk, and turns to the question of who is predicted to have their 
interests threatened. 
Who will be Most Affected?  
It is important to discuss who the main victims of climate change are likely to be, as the 
thesis is concerned with questions of redistributing benefits and burdens, and it must be 
clear who will bear the burden of climate change according to the best available scientific 
evidence. According to the IPCC, climate change impacts will not be distributed evenly.44 
The scientific evidence points to two groups which will be most affected by climate change: 
future generations, and those living in less developed countries. The IPCC claims that in 
order to avoid dangerous climate change, the global change in temperature must be kept 
at or below 2°C.45 The graph provided above illustrates that this crucial 2°C temperature 
change will not occur until 2050 - 2100. Therefore, when discussing the human interests 
threatened by climate change, it is implicit that they are, in large part, interests of those 
who will exist in the future. This is why future generations must be very carefully 
considered in ethical and moral discussions on climate change. The issue of future 
generations and what is owed to them will be discussed throughout the thesis, especially in 
Chapter Five, which concerns outlining what exactly is owed to future generations under 
                                                          
43 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 48 
44 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Second Assessment Report, 1995 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf  [accessed 
12.02.2013], p.14 
45 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 14 
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the cosmopolitan approach defended in this thesis. The current chapter merely serves to 
illustrate why future generations are an important consideration when discussing the 
climate change problem.  
 
The second group which is predicted to be most affected by climate change consists of 
those living in less developed countries. According to the IPCC, the impacts of climate 
change will fall disproportionately upon developing countries.46 In addition, the World Bank 
estimates that less developed countries will bear 75-80% of the burdens of climate 
change.47 This is for two broad reasons. First, less developed countries are located in areas 
that will be hardest hit by climate change effects.48 Evidence increasingly points to the fact 
that less developed areas generally face greater risk, for example in dry areas and mega 
deltas.49 Agricultural production, including access to food, is projected to be severely 
compromised in many African countries, which will adversely affect food security and 
exacerbate malnutrition.50 Furthermore, substantial risks due to sea level rise are projected 
particularly for Asian mega deltas and for small island communities.51 In addition, by the 
2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East Asia, particularly in 
large river basins, is projected to decrease.52 Finally, endemic morbidity and mortality due 
to diarrheal disease primarily associated with floods and droughts are expected to rise in 
East, South and South-East Asia due to projected changes in the hydrological cycle.53 This is 
in contrast with richer parts of the world. For example, in New Zealand, initial benefits of 
climate change, such as longer growing seasons, are projected in some regions.54 Similarly, 
in North America, climate change is projected to increase aggregate yields of rain-fed 
agriculture by 5-20% in the first few decades.55 Of course, richer regions will also eventually 
be hit by negative climate change consequences, but not as severely as less developed 
countries, because less developed countries have low adaptive capacity. This is the second 
reason less developed countries will be harder hit by climate change. These countries often 
                                                          
46 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Third Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 12 
47 The World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2010 – Development and Climate Change’ (Washington DC: The 
World Bank, 2010) http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2010 [accessed 30.03.2011], p. xx 
48 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Third Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 12 
49 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 65 
50 Ibid., p. 50 
51 Ibid., p. 65 
52 Ibid., p. 50 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., p. 52 
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have other problems, such as poverty or weak infrastructure, which create conditions of 
low adaptive capacity to climate change. 56 Less developed countries therefore may not 
have the financial capacity or infrastructure necessary to combat the ill effects of climate 
change, and will as a consequence not be able to prepare or defend themselves against 
effects like flooding, droughts, or rising sea levels as effectively as richer states.  
 
The category of less developed country is quite complex, as this encompasses countries 
who differ greatly in development levels. For this reason, Chapter Five of the thesis will 
spend time explaining how less developed countries can be differentiated, and what this 
means in terms of what they are owed or what they may owe in the case of climate change. 
For example, richer or higher polluting less developed countries such as China or Brazil 
arguably have more of a responsibility to lower emissions than a country such as Ethiopia, 
which has limited financial resources and very low emissions. In fact, countries such as 
Ethiopia may be owed assistance to deal with climate change effects, rather than being 
responsible for climate change action. Chapter Five will elaborate on these differences 
between less developed countries. For now, the current chapter merely serves to highlight 
that less developed countries present one of the main groups of victims of climate change. 
Now that the key effects of climate change have been discussed and the most vulnerable 
groups have been identified, it is important to discuss what kind of action is needed to 
combat climate change. 
Collective Action and Irreversible Damages 
Combatting climate change will necessarily require action, as the problem will not 
disappear on its own. The IPCC asserts that if current action on climate change stays the 
same, global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next decades.57 The IPCC 
estimates that because economic growth is set to persist, and global population is set to 
increase, mean global surface temperatures could rise by as much as 4.8°C by 2100 without 
additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today.58 Therefore, it 
seems clear that further action must be taken if there is to be any hope of reducing the 
negative effects of climate change. What action to take against climate change is a complex 
matter, and will be discussed throughout the thesis. However, there are a few general 
                                                          
56 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Third Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2001 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/  [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 12 
57 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 72 
58 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 14 
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assumptions which can be made about what will be necessary for climate change action. 
The first assumption is that both adaptation and mitigation will be necessary to combat 
climate change. Mitigation refers to cutting back on emissions, and adaptation refers to 
tactics which can be taken to adjust to climate change effects, such as building sea walls. 
Many impacts of climate change can potentially be reduced, delayed or avoided by 
mitigation.59  Successful mitigation can be achieved by deployment of a portfolio of 
technologies that are currently available and some that are expected to be commercialized 
in coming decades, provided that appropriate and effective incentives are in place and 
barriers removed.60 Examples of mitigation include use of renewable energy, changes in 
consumption patterns, improving increased fuel efficiency or using biofuels, making new 
buildings more sustainable, and making use of waste as fuel.61 With these types of changes, 
it is possible to significantly reduce emissions, reducing the risks of climate change.62 
 
However, there is high confidence, according to the IPCC, that mitigation alone cannot 
avoid all climate change impacts.63 Adaptation will be necessary both in the short term and 
longer term to address impacts resulting from the warming that would occur even for the 
lowest emissions level scenarios assessed.64 In other words, even if all emissions were 
halted, the emissions that already exist in the atmosphere will still cause changes in the 
climate. Therefore, adaptation measures will be required to cope with the effects of 
climate change. Examples of adaptation include water reuse, rainwater harvesting, 
adjustment of planting dates and crop-variety, crop relocation, erosion control, building 
seawalls and storm surge barriers, creating heat-wave action plans, protecting water 
supplies, inoculating populations against certain diseases, and strengthening 
infrastructure.65 It should be noted that adaptation alone is not expected to cope with all 
the projected effects of climate change, especially not over the long term as impacts 
increase in magnitude.66 It is not possible to simply continue to emit at current levels, and 
rely on adaptation alone. Humans will not be able to adapt to certain conditions if they 
become irreversible, as will be explained below, and further discussed in Chapter Four. For 
                                                          
59 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
2007 https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [accessed 12.02.2013], p. 73 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., p. 60 
62 Ibid., p. 65 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p 57 
66 Ibid., p. 56 
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this reason, both adaptation and mitigation are necessary, and more importantly can work 
together to significantly reduce the risks of climate change.67 
 
The second general assumption which can be made about climate change action is that the 
response to climate change will necessarily have to be collective. The IPCC explains that 
climate change action will require a high degree of international cooperation.68 Climate 
change is a truly global problem. In order to combat it, every state will have to commit to a 
climate change deal. The highest emitting states will have to agree on targets, and those 
with lower emissions will have to ensure that their emissions do not exceed global limits as 
they continue to develop. Less developed countries may not be able to cut emissions 
immediately, and may require help to develop in a sustainable way. These factors must be 
taken into consideration in order to ensure a global climate deal is accepted. This need for 
collective action will be discussed throughout the thesis, especially in Chapter Five, which 
concerns defining who the ‘collective’ in collective action is. The purpose of this current 
chapter is to point out that action will have to be collective, as no one nation can stop 
climate change on its own.  
 
Collective action will not only be required in the short term. The latest IPCC report claims 
that aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions are stopped, 
which implies a substantial multi-century climate change commitment.69 Sustained global 
collective action will not be easy to achieve or maintain. However, it is important that 
action is taken sooner rather than later, in order to avoid irreversible damages. As the IPCC 
explains, delayed emissions reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve 
lower stabilization levels and increase the risk of more severe climate change impacts.70 
Unmitigated climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of 
natural, managed and human systems to adapt.71 This could lead to some impacts that are 
abrupt or irreversible, depending upon the rate and magnitude of climate change.72 These 
                                                          
67 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 
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irreversible changes include mass extinction of animals, changes in marine ecosystem 
productivity, damage to fisheries, changes in oceanic oxygen concentrations and decreased 
terrestrial vegetation.73 These changes would have severe and detrimental impacts on the 
human population.74 It is therefore paramount that action is taken sooner rather than later. 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the climate change problem by reviewing the latest scientific 
evidence, provided by the IPCC. The chapter began with a summary of the climate change 
problem, and included an explanation of its causes and predicted effects, as well as a 
discussion on which human interests are at stake. In addition, the chapter provided an 
overview of who will be most affected by climate change, namely less developed countries 
and future generations. Finally, the chapter discussed the importance of collective action to 
prevent irreversible damages. Now that the empirical background conditions of the climate 
change problem have been outlined, the thesis can move onto the ethical debates which 
have emerged as a response to climate change.  
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Chapter Two – Climate Ethics Literature: Assessing Four Approaches 
Introduction  
This chapter makes up second half of Part I of the thesis: ‘Defining the Climate Change 
Problem.’ The previous chapter, Chapter One, provided an overview of the key features of 
the climate change problem, using the latest scientific evidence on the subject. The current 
chapter serves as a review of the normative literature that has emerged as a result of this 
scientific evidence, namely climate change ethics literature. More specifically, the chapter 
will explore and critically assess four approaches found within climate change ethics 
literature: statist, pragmatic, utilitarian, and cosmopolitan. The first three approaches are 
arguably in opposition to the global justice approach, and it is therefore worthwhile to 
defend the use of cosmopolitanism against these potential critics. In doing so, the chapter 
will argue that the cosmopolitan approach presents the most useful approach for a 
normative assessment of the climate change problem because cosmopolitan theories of 
global justice can best address the complex issues which arise as a result of the empirical 
conditions of climate change. This chapter will lay the foundation for the remainder of the 
thesis, which normatively assesses the climate change problem from a global justice 
perspective. In order to conduct this normative assessment, the use of global justice theory 
must first be defended and compared to alternative approaches that will be rejected as the 
analytical framework for this thesis. In this way, the thesis clearly illustrates why a 
cosmopolitan approach is appropriate for the normative assessment of the climate change 
problem. 
The chapter maps the different normative approaches taken in relation to climate change. 
The term normative encompasses ideas which lie in the realm of what should or ought to 
be, as opposed to what is. These ideas are usually based, in political theory, on an 
understanding of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Exploring normative approaches to climate 
change therefore implies examining the presumptions and ideas which guide the process of 
determining what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ and how these values relate to what we ought to 
do, in this case about climate change. In other words, mapping the normative approaches 
involves unraveling the ontological and epistemological assumptions that different 
approaches rely on to make judgments about what ought to be done about climate change. 
Mapping the normative terrain is important, because this has so far not been attempted. 
Although Stephen Gardiner has written two overviews of the climate change ethics 
literature, his work involves mapping differing recommendations for action on climate 
change, without properly considering the underlying normative assumptions these 
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recommendations rely on.1 Although Gardiner’s reviews are important, it is arguably 
necessary to map the normative assumptions underlying climate ethics approaches in 
order to expose underlying ethical tensions that underwrite current normative thinking on 
climate change. In other words, this chapter will contribute to creating a more focused 
understanding of the ethical approaches to climate change. According to Gardiner, this 
focused understanding is necessary because philosophical clarity on the climate change 
problem is urgently needed.2  
The chapter will be organized as follows. Each approach, namely statist, pragmatic, 
utilitarian, and cosmopolitan, will be outlined and assessed in relation to how well each 
approach addresses the empirical background conditions of climate change. The previous 
chapter argued that climate change threatens several human interests, has two groups of 
primary victims, namely future generations and less developed countries, and requires 
collective action to be addressed. A normative assessment of climate change should 
therefore ideally address which human interests are threatened,3 what should be done to 
protect future generations and less developed countries, and finally discuss the need for 
collective action, because these four issues are part and parcel of the empirical conditions 
of climate change. The assessment of the four approaches serves to illustrate that the 
cosmopolitan global justice approach is most useful for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem. Cosmopolitanism involves thorough normative reasoning, takes 
morally equal human beings as a starting point, and is critical of the status quo, all of which 
make it especially suited for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. In 
addition, it will be argued that climate change is a problem of global justice by its very 
nature. The chapter will conclude with an overview of what has been argued in Part I of the 
thesis. 
The Statist Approach 
Scholars who take a statist approach maintain that the state has primary normative 
significance and that reason of state defines the parameters of our moral concern.4 Put 
simply, statist theorists believe that relationships within the state are more important than 
                                                          
1 See Gardiner, S. M., ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’ in Ethics, 114 (2004), pp. 555 – 600 and ‘Ethics and 
Climate Change: An Introduction’ in Ethics and Climate Change (2010), pp. 54 – 66 
2 Gardiner, S. M., ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’ in Ethics, 114 (2004), p. 595 
3 By human interests, the thesis refers to diversity of individual interests threatened by climate change. For 
example, the interest threatened by floods is not the same interest as that threatened by disease, or drought, 
or displacement. The multifaceted nature of threatened interests should be considered. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter Four, which defines human interests and explores the human interests threatened by 
climate change. 
4 Caney, S., ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State’ in Political Studies, 56 (2008), p. 488 
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relationships with ‘strangers’ abroad, and that this has consequences for what is owed to 
whom. In terms of duties of justice, this implies that although there may exist some weaker 
duties to those abroad, the main duties of justice are to fellow nationals. The statist 
approach is in direct opposition to the global justice approach. Statists, as will be illustrated 
below, are critical of the basic premise of the global justice position, namely that duties of 
justice exist independently of national borders. For this reason, it is important to assess the 
statist approach and defend the reasons against using this approach for the normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. It is important to illustrate that the main critics 
of global justice theory cannot provide a position which is useful for the normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. This is not to say that the statist position is 
never applicable or useful, but instead that the statist position cannot meaningfully address 
the climate change problem, which weakens the statist’s criticism of the global justice 
position, in the case of climate change. In order to make this argument, the chapter now 
turns to the overview and assessment of the statist approach. 
There are many examples of the statist approach, but as it is not specifically within the 
scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive overview of statist literature, the chapter 
will examine two of the most influential statist scholars, David Miller and Thomas Nagel, in 
order to illustrate that the statist approach is problematic for the normative assessment of 
the climate change problem. Miller and Nagel both advocate a statist approach, to 
different degrees. Miller supports a ‘moderate version,’ because he claims that there are 
some principles of distributive justice which apply outside of the state.5 Nagel, on the other 
hand, is a proponent of the ‘extreme version,’ of the statist position, which claims that all 
principles of distributive justice apply within states and that none apply at the global level, 
because there is a lack of institutions to enforce justice outside of the state.6 The section 
below will assess both Miller and Nagel’s positions in turn, and illustrate why the statist 
approach, whether moderate or extreme, is not suitable for the normative assessment of 
the climate change problem. 
David Miller is known as one of the most outspoken critics of the cosmopolitan position.7 
Miller is not convinced by moral cosmopolitanism, which demands a global conception of 
justice with no reference to special obligations between co-nationals. According to Miller, 
national and communal sentiments are important and necessary conditions in establishing 
                                                          
5 Caney, S., ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State’ in Political Studies, 56 (2008), p. 488 
6 Ibid. 
7 Brown, G.W. and Held, D., The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 373 
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the motivations for, and the reciprocal conditions of, social justice.8 This argument is based 
on, firstly, the idea that national identity creates ethical communities, and secondly that 
distributive justice can only function within these ethical communities. According to Miller, 
national identity is real and an essential part of self-identification.9 The fact that national 
identity exists implies that humans will naturally feel more attached to fellow nationals.10 
This attachment implies that humans within a state form an ethical community, where 
duties owed to fellow nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties 
owed to human being as such.11 Furthermore, Miller insists that duties of justice can only 
exist within these national ethical communities.12 This is because defining justice in any 
global sense seems infeasible to Miller, since each state has unique and separate views on 
justice.13 He believes that although justice regarding basic goods, such as food, shelter, and 
clothing will be simple to define, complex issues such as employment, money, or medical 
care will be more difficult, as nations will have diverging opinions on these matters.14 In 
addition, Miller argues that the question of who should be allocated which resources will 
be equally as contested, because different societies have different conceptions of what is 
needed to be ‘happy’, ‘rich’, and lead a ‘minimally decent life.’15 According to Miller, the 
‘right’ answer to ‘what is social justice’ must draw upon shared meanings and shared 
understanding, and this is possible only within the ethical community of a nation state.16 
For this reason, universal principles of justice, advocated by global justice theorists, are not 
‘practical or feasible.’17 Instead, Miller believes that some minimal, negative duties of 
justice should be respected outside of the state, but positive duties can only be defined and 
negotiated within states.18 Therefore, as an alternative to cosmopolitan global justice, 
Miller creates a ‘split level’ approach, where special duties to co-nationals generally take 
precedence over international obligations, but where some ‘weak cosmopolitan’ 
responsibilities to others can exist.19 
Miller’s denial of the possibility of defining universal principles and positive duties of justice 
at the global level feeds into his work on climate change, where he seems to skirt over 
                                                          
8 Brown, G.W. and Held, D., The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 373 
9 Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 10 
10 Ibid., p. 53 
11 Ibid., p. 11 
12 Ibid., p. 93 
13 Miller, D., Citizenship and National Identity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002), p. 168 
14 Ibid., p. 169 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 172 
17 Miller, D., On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 57 
18 Ibid., p. 74 
19 Brown, G.W. and Held, D., The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 374 
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questions of how collective global action on climate change will be organized and how 
targets will be agreed upon. As was discussed in Chapter One, climate change will 
necessarily require collective action, and Miller’s account of climate change seems to 
purposely avoid the subject of how this collective action will be negotiated. Miller’s first 
mention of the environment is in 1999, in a book chapter in Fairness and Futurity, an edited 
volume on sustainable development. In this piece, Miller explicitly ‘leaves aside the 
complex issues that arise when cross-national collaboration is needed in order to resolve 
environmental problems.’20 In other words, Miller explicitly avoids the subject of global 
cooperation and how this could be achieved.  
Miller directly addresses climate change in his 2008 Tanner Lecture on the subject. In this 
lecture, Miller goes into some detail about how to fairly distribute emissions globally. He 
criticizes previous approaches such as the historical approach or emissions rights approach, 
and creates his own, which he calls the equal sacrifice approach.21 Here, Miller is directly 
engaging in distributive questions on climate change. However, in his discussion about the 
distribution of benefits and burdens, Miller specifies that rather than imposing policy 
solutions from ‘above’ (presumably the global level), it is better for each nation to agree 
upon its targets, and then to allow policies for meeting those targets to be decided 
internally, ideally through a process of democratic debate.22 With this assertion, Miller 
again seems to be skirting over the idea of global cooperation, instead preferring that 
nations decide on their own targets for emissions. He seems to be sidestepping the idea 
that national targets would have to be based on a global target; otherwise it would be 
difficult to define national action. Each nation state cannot independently decide how 
much to lower emissions without knowing how much emissions must be lowered in total, 
at the global level. Miller does not address how such a global target could be negotiated or 
what principles would need to underwrite this negotiation.  
In the same lecture, Miller does not explain why it is necessary to act on climate change. 
Instead, Miller explains that ‘the underlying assumption [that we need to act] has been 
spelled out and defended more fully by others, and I am not going to say any more about it 
here, because the task I have set myself is narrower.’23 Here Miller footnotes Simon Caney, 
a global justice theorist whose work will be explored later in the chapter. The fact that 
                                                          
20 Miller, D., ‘Social Justice and Environmental Goods’ in Andrew Dobson (eds.) Fairness and Futurity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 152  
21 Miller, D., ‘Global Justice and Climate Change: How Should Responsibilities be Distributed?’ in The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Tsinghua University, Beijing (2008), p. 148 
22 Ibid., p. 122 
23 Ibid., p. 120 
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Miller footnotes Caney as a basis for his approach is interesting, because Caney 
fundamentally disagrees with Miller on the nature of global justice and what is owed to 
those outside of national borders. It seems as if Miller may be aware that his own approach 
is inadequate as a normative basis for action against climate change. Reasons for why 
Miller’s statist approach is inadequate will be further explored below, but at this time, it is 
important to note that Miller may be avoiding explicating a definite normative stance on 
why action on climate change is necessary because he is aware of the weaknesses of his 
approach in the case of climate change. Finally, in his latest book, Justice for Earthlings, 
Miller briefly states that fairness requires that when states establish rules to deal with 
climate change, the costs and benefits of cooperation should be shared equally, per head 
of population.24 However, Miller does not go into any detail about how states will be able 
to establish these rules, again skirting over details of collective action required for climate 
change. From this overview of Miller’s work on climate change, it seems that the statist 
position may not be able to adequately explain how and why collective action could be 
organized at the global level. This will be further discussed below, after a brief overview of 
Thomas Nagel’s statist position. 
Thomas Nagel believes that there may be some duties beyond borders, but due to current 
global structures, these are not duties of justice.25 To argue this point, Nagel claims that 
justice must be confined to the state, because states have special properties that render 
them the only appropriate institution to administer distributive justice. This argument rests 
on two assumptions. The first is that justice requires ‘a form of organization that claims the 
political legitimacy and right to impose decisions by force.’26 Nagel explains that justice 
depends on the coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be 
achieved without law, centralized authority to determine the rules, and a monopoly of 
force.27 Nagel’s second assumption is that justice depends on rights that can only arise 
when people are joined together in a political society.28 Nagel explains that defining rights 
is only possible within states, where the institutions which allow for citizens to be involved 
in the process of defining what is fair and unfair exist.29 Furthermore, it is only within states 
that citizens have the right to ask why they should accept inequalities.30 Because of this 
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(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 394 
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right, the state has obligations to its citizens, which Nagel claims are positive obligations of 
justice.31 Nagel puts forward that these institutional conditions do not seem to exist on a 
global level, as there is no global equivalent of a state.32 For this reason, Nagel concludes 
that duties of justice cannot be negotiated and decided upon outside of the state, and 
therefore universal duties of justice cannot exist.33  
Overall, Nagel’s approach is similar to Miller’s, although he goes one step further by 
insisting that there are no duties of justice outside of the state. For this reason, Nagel’s 
approach seems inappropriate for addressing important questions of how to collectively 
address global climate change and take human interests into account, as he clearly 
specifies that we do not owe people outside of our nation states more than the ‘moral 
minimum.’ Importantly, unlike Miller, Nagel makes no attempt to address climate change, 
which calls into question the usefulness of the ‘extreme’ statist position for the normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. In addition, although Miller touches upon 
climate change, he seems to skirt over questions of international cooperation, and does not 
make a normative case for acting on climate change, instead citing a global justice scholar 
who has made this argument. This seems to imply that the statist position, whether 
moderate or extreme, is not suitable for the normative assessment of the climate change 
problem. 
The case against the statist approach is strengthened when considering that statists have a 
favorable view of the status quo, which arguably renders the position unable to address 
global problems such as climate change. The statist approach is not open to fundamental 
structural change, because statists take it as a given that states exist as static entities, and 
in fact defend the existence of states because of their normative significance.34 Because of 
this apparent contentment with the status quo, the statist approach has been accused of 
being unable to cope with problems that are both ‘inherently global in their nature and 
which also raise questions about the distribution of burdens and benefits beyond 
borders.’35  
Climate change is one such a global problem, as impacts of global climate change will be 
felt across the globe and addressing it will necessarily require globally collective action, as 
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was explained in Chapter One. Furthermore, climate change raises questions of what ought 
to be done on a global level, including questions of who should get how much. For example, 
it raises questions about why it is important to protect present and future people from 
climate change, or how emissions reductions should be allocated globally. These are 
questions statist theories cannot seem to cope with.36 Simon Caney has gone so far as to 
say that the statist approach ‘lacks the conceptual resources to recognize the existence of 
supra-state distributive questions,’ and for this reason cannot engage with global issues 
such as climate change.37 Caney explains that even the moderate version, defended by 
Miller, fails to comprehend the need for global principles of distributive justice, and 
therefore cannot engage with distributive questions concerning climate change.38 This may 
be why Miller has not comprehensively addressed the global distributive questions raised 
by the climate change problem, instead claiming that states should, independently of one 
another, decide how to lower emissions. This not only sidesteps the fact that climate 
change will require a global agreement on action, as explained in Chapter One, but also 
overlooks the fact that there are international institutions working to address the 
distributive questions arising from the climate change problem, including the United 
Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
The above seems to illustrate that the statist approach is not able to cope with the 
empirical conditions of the climate change problem. The statist position cannot or will not 
address how global collective action on climate change will be negotiated, because the 
position denies the possibility of universal principles of justice, and statists are unable to 
discuss the global distribution questions raised by problems such as climate change.  All of 
the above indicates that the approach is not appropriate for the normative assessment of 
the climate change problem. The approach does not seem to be able to cope with the 
ethical questions and concerns raised by the empirical conditions of climate change: the 
approach cannot address what we owe to future generations and less developed countries 
beyond a bare minimum, and furthermore cannot fully address human interests and the 
reasons for needing to take collective action. It is as if the statist theorists deny that climate 
change needs to be addressed at the normative level at all. This indicates that the approach 
is not comprehensively appropriate for a normative assessment of the climate change 
problem. 
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In order to solidify this argument, the chapter turns to the question of what would happen 
if the statist approach were to attempt to address the empirical realities of the climate 
change problem. Chapter One outlined the idea that if climate change is to be addressed, it 
will have to be on global level, as it is a global issue, where unilateral action will have little 
to no effect. If there is to be global action, then there will inevitably have to be some 
discussion about cooperation, and defining the rules of cooperation will involve discussion 
about who owes what to whom, which by their nature are questions of distributive justice. 
Statists would have to address questions about how much is owed to less developed 
countries and future generations, and may have to concede or admit that there are positive 
obligations of justice beyond borders in the special circumstance of climate change. This 
would call into question the fundamental underlying premise that national boundaries are 
exclusively morally significant, because in the case of climate change, national borders may 
not be morally significant, since emissions cannot be kept within national borders. 
Defending the moral significance of borders in some cases, and not others, would be quite 
problematic for statist theorists, because the basic tenet of the statist position would no 
longer hold -  a point Miller has been critiqued on previously, as will be briefly explained 
below. 
Critics of Miller argue that Miller does not offer compelling enough reasons to make 
national boundaries morally relevant, full stop.39 This becomes especially obvious in his 
description of duties of justice, in what Miller describes as a ‘split level model,’ where 
special duties to co-nationals generally take precedence over international obligations, but 
where some ‘weak cosmopolitan’ responsibilities to ‘strangers’ can exist.40 In this regard, 
Miller believes that his alternative split level model makes room for both global 
responsibilities and for special responsibilities to compatriots.41 Megan Kime argues that 
this split level approach exposes an important contradiction in Miller’s account. Kime 
explains that in this model, Miller defines duties of justice which are conditional on national 
relationships, for example providing basic needs, and yet, when defining duties of justice 
abroad, Miller relies on a universal conception of human rights, as he argues we should 
uphold these internationally.42 There is a stark contradiction in Miller’s argument against 
contextual strategies when defining universal human rights, and his defense of 
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contextualism when defining national duties of justice.43 Kime believes that this renders 
Miller’s account inconsistent, because he seems to have two contradicting versions of 
justice, one which is international and based on human rights, and one which is national 
and based on special relationships. Kime explains that if Miller is convinced that there are 
some global duties of justice, this implies that national boundaries are not morally relevant 
in the way that he describes. As Kime suggests, it almost seems as if Miller recognizes a 
weakness in his approach and tries to strengthen it by adding a universal aspect, so that his 
theory can be more robustly universal. 44 However, Miller does not strengthen his case, but 
instead weakens his argument about the morally relevant nature of national boundaries, as 
boundaries only seem to be morally relevant in some, not all, cases. This implies an 
inherent weakness in Miller’s main premise for his argument. This criticism points to a 
serious flaw in Miller’s logic, which may be why Miller avoids questions of climate change, 
which highlights the idea that national borders may not be exclusively morally relevant, 
because emissions cannot be confined within state borders. 
It seems that statists will either have to continue to ignore the fact that empirical 
conditions of climate change call into question the moral relevance of borders or, 
alternatively, attempt to address climate change, which will arguably render their 
underlying assumptions untenable. Overall, the statist position does not seem to be able to 
address which human interests are at stake in climate change, what should be done to 
protect future generations and less developed countries, and how to coordinate the 
collective action necessary to combat climate change. Therefore, the thesis at this point 
rejects the statist position as a basis for normative assessment of the climate change 
problem. It seems what is needed is an approach which better addresses, and directly 
engages with, the issues and concerns raised by the empirical conditions of climate change. 
The chapter now moves onto the pragmatic approach, to assess whether it is more useful 
than the statist approach in providing a viable basis for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem. 
The Pragmatic Approach  
To be pragmatic is defined as ‘dealing with things sensibly and realistically in a way that is 
based on practical rather than theoretical considerations.’45Using the term ‘pragmatic’ is 
therefore appropriate in this chapter, because the scholars who fall under this approach 
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believe that climate change should be approached practically and logically, without over-
riding concern for ethical considerations. This is in direct opposition to the global justice 
approach, which argues that the ethical issues raised by climate change are important and 
must be considered in action on climate change. For this reason, it is worthwhile to assess 
the pragmatic position, because it can be said to be a critical response to the global justice 
approach. If it can be illustrated that the pragmatist approach cannot capture the empirical 
realities of the climate change problem, and provide a viable alternative to the global 
justice position, this will weaken pragmatist critiques of global justice theory in the case of 
climate change.  Paul Collier, one of the most outspoken pragmatists working on climate 
change, will be used as an example of this approach. For the scope of this chapter, Collier’s 
approach serves as an illustration of the main tenets of the pragmatic approach and the 
normative assumptions that underwrite the position. 
Collier explains that action on climate change is urgently necessary, especially because 
carbon accumulates over time, meaning the sooner action is taken, the better.46 In addition, 
Collier shows concern for less developed countries, in particular the bottom billion, which 
he explains will be hit hardest by climate change. As Collier puts it, ‘already too hot, most 
models predict that their climates will deteriorate more rapidly and more substantially than 
those in other regions.’47 He explains that Africa will be particularly hard hit, as its countries 
are doubly exposed: not only do they face the greatest climate degradation; their 
agriculture dominated economies are far more sensitive to climate change than the 
industrial service economies of the richer countries.48 Collier’s concern for less developed 
countries and the insistence on action sooner rather than later is more promising than the 
statist approach, which seems to deny the possibility for a collective response to climate 
change, and fails to provide a normative reason to act on climate change. 
Importantly, Collier does not believe that any approach taken to combat climate change 
should be based on normative or ethical considerations. In fact, he believes that moralizing 
has confused the subject of reducing carbon emissions.49 According to Collier, the modern 
discourse on climate change is too concerned with attribution of blame and guilt, or 
‘ethical baggage’ which he finds profoundly unhelpful.50 Collier asserts that the ethical 
baggage encumbering climate change is not intrinsic to the structure of the problem, but 
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imported from other agendas, like post-colonial guilt or poverty reduction.51 Collier’s 
solution to this is simple: there should be no ethical considerations – ‘nobody need feel 
guilty about past emissions, and nobody should feel victimized.’52 Instead of focusing on 
who is to blame, or who owes what to whom, Collier argues that the focus should be on 
how to reduce carbon, now that it has been discovered to be a problem.53 In this way, his 
approach is almost the very definition of pragmatic, as he focuses solely on the problems at 
hand, and not normative considerations about who is responsible or what a ‘just’ 
distribution of benefits and burdens would require. 
To Collier, ignoring ethical considerations means being as efficient as possible. As he puts it, 
‘climate change is bad news. Dealing with it is going to be expensive, and not dealing with it 
is going to be more expensive. We should therefore deal with it in the most efficient way 
possible.’54 His idea of an efficient response is to impose one common carbon tax globally.55 
In his work, he uses the example of $40 per ton of carbon, but suggests that it does not 
matter what the agreed amount is, as long as it is not too low for producers not to notice.56 
He believes this carbon tax will have a profound effect on heavy industry, energy producers, 
and other major carbon emitters, because unless these actors change their technologies, 
their costs would rise sharply, as would their prices, which would drive consumers away 
from their products.57 Therefore, these producers of carbon would automatically invest in 
cleaner technology, which could be new technologies like solar and wind, or existing 
technology, like nuclear power.58 Again, it is important to note that this is supposedly a 
pragmatic, practical approach, as it is not based on ethical considerations. And for Collier, 
this is good, because he thinks decisions over the management of carbon are too important 
to be guided by what he calls ‘romanticism.’59 
However, Collier asserts that alongside this carbon tax, reducing carbon emissions will need 
inter-governmental cooperation, because carbon is a problem that can only be addressed 
by common international responses.60 Although it is positive that Collier mentions the need 
for global cooperation on climate change, because this is in line with the empirical realities 
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of the climate change problem, Collier’s suggestion for global cooperation brings to light 
some problems inherent in his supposed non-ethical approach. Global cooperation on the 
climate change problem will necessarily involve common conceptions of what is ‘good,’ 
who owes what to whom, who will benefit, and who will bear costs, which are 
considerations of justice and must be guided by normative principles. Otherwise, it would 
not be possible to agree on any action, as there would be no underlying agreements and 
principles to guide collective action. By denying normative reasoning, and yet advocating 
global cooperation, Collier seems to be oversimplifying the climate change problem. This 
oversimplification becomes increasingly evident when considering Collier’s approach 
further.  
The empirical conditions of climate change outlined in Chapter One raise profound ethical 
questions, and especially ones of procedural and distributive justice.61For example, 
discussing future generations as a group who will benefit or suffer from current actions 
involves complicated epistemological considerations that demand theorization and 
hypothetical thought experiments. Considering how much future generations deserve, in 
particular, will require normative reasoning. It will be difficult to be pragmatic about this, as 
there is limited empirical precedent to base ideas on. In addition, less developed countries 
raise complex issues of distributive justice. For example, how much these countries are 
owed in terms of protection from the consequences of climate change, and whether these 
countries should have any responsibility to lower emissions. These kinds of distributive 
discussions must be had in order for collective action to be possible. A pragmatic approach 
may struggle to address these kinds of issues. It seems that the pragmatic approach Collier 
advocates may not be nuanced enough to address the complexities associated with the 
empirical conditions of climate change because these raise profound ethical questions he 
oversimplifies in his approach. 
This is best illustrated by outlining how Collier attempts to address what is owed to future 
generations and less developed countries. When addressing future generations, Collier 
claims that current generations should ‘keep emissions in check,’ and ‘only make decisions 
we think the future generations would be ok with.’62 However, determining what ‘we think 
future generations will be ok with’ will no doubt require a hypothetical experiment which 
requires notions of fairness and legitimate acceptance, questions which relate to who 
deserves what, which Collier is seemingly ignoring and oversimplifying. Similarly, when 
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discussing the less developed countries, Collier says ‘the lucky parts of the world should 
behave generously towards those that have been unlucky.’63 Making this kind of statement 
relies on a deeper moral assumption about who deserves what and why, and what is fair in 
terms of distribution – questions which Collier does not address. These statements seem to 
imply Collier is engaging in normative reasoning, as he is making normative assumptions 
about just distribution. He is prescribing what ought or should be instead of what is, which 
as explained above, are normative considerations.  Unfortunately, his normative reasoning 
is quite problematic. Although Collier’s broad statements are certainly positive, and speak 
directly to issues of justice, without any serious normative theorizing behind them, they 
remain weak. Collier insists on not using normative values and seemingly rejects these. As a 
consequence, when he speaks about his own normative considerations, they are not based 
in any critical reflection, but rather seem to be based in his own feelings. This renders his 
account both inconsistent and morally deceptive. It is inconsistent because he is making 
normative statements when he has strongly argued against ethical theorizing. Furthermore, 
his account is morally deceptive because Collier claims to be value neutral, but clearly 
subscribes to moral assumptions he is not spelling out explicitly.  
It seems that Collier, by taking a pragmatic approach, cannot adequately address complex 
issues associated with climate change – specifically questions about how much is owed to 
future generations and less developed countries, and how collective action should be 
coordinated. The pragmatic approach simply does not engage deeply enough with the 
normative and ethical issues at hand. Furthermore, Collier claims that moral considerations 
can be taken out of the equation, but at the same time he supports certain moral positions 
without explanation. This indicates that avoiding moral questions completely is not 
possible in the case of climate change. It is important to engage with these questions rather 
than to skirt over them and oversimplify them, as Collier does. For this reason, the thesis 
rejects the pragmatic position as a basis for the normative assessment of the climate 
change problem at this point.  
That said, the pragmatic approach should not be dismissed in its entirety, even if it cannot 
be used as a comprehensive model for the normative assessment of the climate change 
problem. It can, for example, help to inform normative thinking in terms of providing some 
empirical background conditions that must be ‘fed’ into formulating any just distribution. 
However, the pragmatic approach cannot provide clear moral reasoning required to 
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address the complex moral issues that arise as a result of the empirical realities of the 
climate change problem. The chapter now turns to the utilitarian approach, to critically 
assess whether it is more useful than the statist or pragmatic approaches in providing a 
viable basis for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. 
The Utilitarian Approach  
To take a utilitarian approach implies defining a value that must be maximized, a harm that 
must be minimized, or defining a rule that must be followed. When deciding a course of 
action in a given situation, the chosen value or rule will always trump all other 
considerations for utilitarians. Whichever value is chosen, it is normative, as it is based on 
what ought to be done, and grounded in assumptions of what is good. The utilitarian 
approach is arguably opposed to the cosmopolitan justice approach, because these two 
positions are grounded in different assumptions of what should be normatively prioritized. 
Utilitarianism is a complex field with a rich history. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint 
exact utilitarian objections to cosmopolitanism. Some utilitarians may directly oppose 
cosmopolitanism by denying the moral worth of individual human beings, instead 
concentrating on what is best for the greatest number of individuals. Other utilitarians may 
be opposed only to non-collective or individualistic forms of global justice, rather than 
being opposed to global justice as an approach. In fact, there exist cosmopolitan utilitarians, 
as will be discussed below. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to examine whether the 
utilitarian position can offer an alternative to the cosmopolitan position for the normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. If it can be illustrated that the utilitarian 
approach fails to capture the empirical realities of the climate change problem, then the 
utilitarian critique of cosmopolitanism will be weakened in the case of climate change.  
Utilitarianism is a broad church, containing many different approaches, such as act 
utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism, and rights based utilitarianism, 
among others. It is not explicitly within the scope of this chapter to review all existing 
utilitarian accounts. Instead, the chapter will focus on the most pervasive existing utilitarian 
climate ethics account: a cost-benefit calculative account put forward by Bjorn Lomborg.64 
According to an extensive review of the literature, this cost benefit analysis currently 
presents the most comprehensive utilitarian account of climate change ethics. As will be 
discussed below, utilitarians have a rich history in other ethical fields, including animal 
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rights, war and peace, and poverty. However, it seems that in the case of climate ethics, 
utilitarians have so far not offered a comprehensive account that goes beyond the cost-
benefit model outlined here. This will be further discussed after an assessment of 
Lomborg’s account. To reiterate, this chapter does not purport to provide a comprehensive 
overview of all possible utilitarian positions. Instead, the chapter aims to highlight potential 
problems with an existing utilitarian climate ethics account, and make the case these issues 
currently render the utilitarian account less suitable for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem than the cosmopolitan account.  In order to achieve this, 
Lomborg’s account will be outlined and assessed below. 
Bjorn Lomborg concerns himself with exploring what should be done about climate change 
at the global level.65 Applying a utilitarian approach, Lomborg chooses a normative value, 
cost, which he believes should be minimized. His main argument is that an economic 
analysis of the costs and benefits of climate change action clearly illustrates that the world, 
as a whole, would benefit more from investing in tackling problems in the developing world 
and in research and development of renewable energy, rather than following current 
policies on climate change. 66  Here Lomborg reveals his utilitarian assumption that 
minimizing cost will bring about a better world. To make his case, Lomborg analyzes the 
Kyoto Protocol, which is at the time of writing the only existing international climate 
change agreement. Lomborg explains that following the Kyoto Protocol in its current form 
would cost a significant amount of money for two reasons. Firstly, cutting emissions is an 
extremely expensive project if the technology to do so effectively is not in place.67 Cutting 
emissions with existing technology is not cost effective, because cheap green technology is 
not widely available. Secondly, high emitting less developed countries are currently not 
subject to emissions reductions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and are predicted to emit 
more as they develop.68 Therefore, Lomborg asserts that the only way to improve the 
Kyoto protocol would be to introduce global emissions trading, in order to ensure that all 
states do their part. However, Lomborg believes that it would be too difficult to define 
emission rights, divide emission rights up, and to ensure compliance.69 Lomborg therefore 
concludes that Kyoto Protocol is a waste of global resources.70 
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In light of his findings, Lomborg argues that we should be combatting climate change in the 
most cost efficient manner, which necessary implies rethinking global action on climate 
change.71 Lomborg uses his utilitarian cost-benefit calculus to make the case for a strategy 
which focuses on ensuring we can adapt to climate change, rather than attempting to 
lower emissions.72 Investing in adaptation measures now, according to Lomborg, would 
give less developed countries a better future because they would be better equipped to 
deal with the consequences of climate change.73 Furthermore, Lomborg also advocates 
easing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) over the long run, by investing in better 
technology research and development.74 He argues that this would be less costly than 
attempting to lower emissions with existing, inefficient technology. Lomborg concludes 
that there is no point in spending billions on ‘a pretty insignificant insurance policy, when 
we and our descendants could benefit far more from the same investment placed 
elsewhere.’75 
Lomborg presents an interesting point. It may be worthwhile considering what action must 
be taken outside of directly mitigating climate change, especially because this action may 
be more helpful in the long run, not only in terms of climate change, but for poverty 
reduction and better conditions for the future. Lomborg also makes an interesting case 
about the need for investment in new technologies. Furthermore, his account has merit 
because it illustrates an understanding of the need for collective action. Lomborg 
thoroughly explores what collective action should be taken at the global level. Finally, 
Lomborg’s work is useful because he goes a step further than Collier by beginning to 
grapple with some of the issues raised by climate change, by thinking more deeply about 
investing in future generations and helping less developed countries. However, his 
argument suffers from several flaws. 
First, cost-benefit analyses like Lomborg’s seem to skirt over significant epistemic 
uncertainties. Society is bound to change over time, which renders any real prediction of 
future scenarios near impossible.76 In particular, over the time scale relevant for climate 
change, society is bound to be radically transformed in ways that are utterly unpredictable 
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to use now.77 For this reason, Stephen Gardiner argues that fine-grained cost-benefit 
analyses are simply not possible for climate change.78 Second, it seems that cost-benefit 
analysis cannot adequately capture all of the relevant cost and benefits involved in climate 
change.79 More specifically, Lomborg’s analysis arguably cannot adequately take into 
account costs with special features, such as irreversible damages, which as explained in 
Chapter One, are very much associated with climate change.80 For this reason, there is 
cause to be skeptical about Lomborg’s cost argument in particular, and about the reliability 
of economic analyses of climate change more generally.81 Dale Jamieson argues that it is 
difficult enough to assess the economic benefits and costs of small-scale local activities, 
and it is therefore almost unimaginable that the diverse impacts of global climate change 
could be aggregated in enough detail to dictate policy responses.82 This indicates that the 
climate change problem may be too complex to be fully captured by simple utilitarian 
calculations of cost. It seems that cost-benefit analysis fails to take into account any factors 
outside of the narrowly defined values that are used to make calculations and predictions. 
Although cost is undoubtedly an important concern related to the climate change problem, 
cost is only one value, and may not be the most important one.83 Using cost as the single 
most important value arguably oversimplifies the climate change problem, because the 
problems posed by climate change are ethical as well as economic and scientific.84 It seems 
that a cost-benefit utilitarian approach, like the pragmatic approach above, may not be 
able to capture the complex issues implied by the empirical background conditions of 
climate change. This becomes clearer when considering specific examples from Lomborg’s 
analysis.  
 
For one, Lomborg seems to present a false dichotomy between helping the poor and 
lowering GHG emissions. This is a false dichotomy because lowering emissions and poverty 
relief are intrinsically linked, and should therefore not be presented as an ‘either/or’ choice. 
Digging new wells in Africa to reduce poverty would not make much difference if climate 
change induces severe drought in fifty years.85 In addition, the use of clean energy could be 
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used to enable development and aid poverty reduction, according to sustainable 
development theorists.86 However, since Lomborg is mainly concerned with cost benefit 
analysis, he cannot consider complexities such as these, and may make suggestions that 
are actually unhelpful both for reducing poverty as well as reducing emissions. A second 
example of oversimplification can be found in Lomborg’s treatment of future generations. 
Lomborg assumes that future generations will be compensated for the failure to reduce 
emissions because this will save money and ensure that future generations are better off 
financially. By assuming this, Lomborg overlooks the possibility that future people may be 
entitled to both a clean environment and wealth.87 Furthermore, when Lomborg assumes 
future generations will be better off, he ignores issues of responsibility, and especially 
intergenerational responsibility.88 If present generations cause the climate problem, it is far 
from clear that the future victims should pay to fix it, or pay disproportionately. This is so 
even if they happen to have more resources. It is not always assumed that those who have 
a greater ability to pay should pay. Sometimes it is assumed that those who caused the 
problem should pay instead.89 In addition, Lomborg does not acknowledge that future 
generations may not be richer, because they have been impoverished by the effects of 
climate change.90 It could be that costs to pay for environmental changes become excessive 
of any wealth which is guaranteed to future generations by saving money on emissions 
reductions in the present. Indeed, future generations may never exist at all if the burden of 
climate change results in irreversible damages, as will be explained in Chapter Four.  
 
In sum, Lomborg seems to be limited by his cost-benefit approach. Although cost-benefit 
analysis is arguably important because it can reveal what is at stake, the calculus can also 
oversimplify existing empirical conditions. In the case of climate change, the empirical 
conditions discussed in Chapter One pointed to a number of complexities. Lomborg creates 
a simplified version of the empirical conditions of climate change by framing the problem in 
economic terms, and concentrating solely on his normative value of cost. In doing so, 
Lomborg does not seem to be able to adequately engage with how much is owed to future 
generations and less developed countries or address which human interests are at stake 
and why this is important. For this reason, a cost-benefit approach does not seem 
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attractive as a basis for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. This is 
not to say that such an approach has no use at all for the assessment of the climate change 
problem. The normative value of cost is one which must be considered, because climate 
change action will require payment in some form, and how this payment is distributed will 
be need to be addressed. Lomborg’s cost-benefit analysis, and his words of caution about 
the costs of lowering GHG emissions, can be part of a comprehensive normative 
assessment of the climate change problem, but on its own, Lomborg’s approach is not 
sufficient to use as an all-encompassing normative approach. In other words, it seems that 
in its present form, the utilitarian approach does not represent a useful approach for the 
normative assessment of the climate change problem. 
As was explained above, Lomborg’s cost-benefit model is currently representative of the 
utilitarian approach to climate change ethics. However, there is more to utilitarianism than 
cost-benefit analysis. Utilitarianism has a rich history, and falls into several different 
approaches. The most well-known distinction between utilitarian approaches is act and 
rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism relies on the premise that each individual act must 
lead to the greatest utility (however utility has been defined), and that decisions on how to 
act should be made on a case by case basis. Rule utilitarians, on the other hand, stress the 
importance of moral rules which produce utility. Under this approach, individual actions 
are judged by how well they comply with these moral rules. Rule utilitarianism has gained 
popularity in recent decades, because it is considered by some as a more nuanced 
approach that can encompass deontological subfloors that prevent individual acts from 
overriding moral codes. There is heated debate about which position is superior, with some 
claiming that there is no difference between the accounts because rule utilitarianism 
collapses into act utilitarianism.91 There are also several utilitarian positions which come 
quite close to cosmopolitanism, with some utilitarians referring to themselves as 
cosmopolitan. 92  Raffaele Marchetti, for example, claims that only a multi-layered 
consequentialist cosmopolitan theory can properly deal with the complexity of global 
phenomena.93 Or, as another example, Peter Singer applies a cosmopolitan utilitarian 
approach to defend the rights of sentient beings throughout the world.94 This link between 
cosmopolitanism and utilitarianism is perhaps unsurprising, considering that some global 
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justice scholars, like Simon Caney, claim that one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism, 
Jeremy Bentham, can be considered a cosmopolitan because he defended the idea of 
international court to resolve conflicts.95  
The complexity of the utilitarian field and the link between cosmopolitanism and 
utilitarianism implies that there could possibly be a utilitarian approach which 
encompasses the complexities of the climate change problem and satisfies the 
cosmopolitan demands defined in Chapter Five of this thesis. There may be a maximizing 
principle which could underwrite climate justice as defined in this thesis. This would 
depend on which principle is maximized. However, there is currently no such utilitarian 
approach to climate change to refer to. The arguments made by utilitarians have thus far 
have been unconvincing: the uncertainties associated with the cost-benefit model outlined 
above currently imply that utilitarianism is unsuitable for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem. This lack of literature to refer to is perhaps surprising, because 
utilitarianism represents a comprehensive approach in other fields such as poverty, war 
and peace, security, and animal rights. This may be indicative of the fact that utilitarians 
have not engaged with the climate change problem for a reason.  Peter Singer, one of the 
most well-known utilitarian theorists, has reportedly admitted that his utilitarian account 
struggles to capture the vastness of the problem of climate change.96 Although Singer 
addresses climate change in his work on the ethics of globalization, he does not take a 
definitive utilitarian stance on what should be done about climate change, instead 
providing a brief overview of how benefits and burdens could be distributed.97 Relatedly, 
Dale Jamieson explains that although he believes utilitarianism is suited for addressing 
climate change, because of its focus on bringing about ‘the best possible world,’ ultimately 
utilitarianism faces problems when attempting to address climate change.98 Jamieson 
argues that the utilitarian focus on outcomes may be too limiting in the case of climate 
change.99 The lack of utilitarian engagement with climate change is problematic, because 
utilitarianism has the potential to present an interesting normative approach to climate 
change.100 So far, such an approach has not been developed, and the thesis therefore 
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rejects the utilitarian approach for the normative assessment of climate change at this 
point. This is not to say that a useful utilitarian account will not be developed in future, at 
which point it can be reassessed whether it represents a viable alternative to the 
cosmopolitan approach, to which the chapter now turns. 
The Cosmopolitan Approach 
Taking a cosmopolitan approach implies making the normative assumption that all humans 
have equal moral worth, and therefore have the right to equal moral consideration. These 
assumptions are based on the three main tenets of cosmopolitan theory: individualism, 
universality, and generality.101 Individualism implies that the ultimate units for concern are 
human beings, or persons, by virtue of their humanity. Universality indicates that this 
status attaches to every living human being equally and generality maintains that this 
special status applies globally.102 Although there are different strands of cosmopolitanism, 
the thesis will focus on a particular theme within cosmopolitanism, namely global justice. 
This will be referred to as the cosmopolitan approach, because ‘cosmopolitan’ is by now 
the preferred self-description of most political philosophers concerning themselves with 
global justice.103 As was explained above, statist, pragmatic, and utilitarian approaches are 
all critical of the cosmopolitan position for different reasons. The assessment below will 
illustrate that in the case of climate change, these criticisms are not convincing, because 
the cosmopolitan approach is more suited to the normative assessment of the climate 
change problem than the approaches assessed in this chapter.  
Any discussion of cosmopolitan global justice cannot exclude a brief summary of the work 
of John Rawls, who explicates his famous conception of justice in A Theory of Justice and 
Laws of Peoples. Many global justice theorists have been influenced by Rawls’ work, and it 
is therefore worthwhile to summarize his position below. Rawls’ conception of justice is 
based on his understanding that ‘the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.’104 His theory of justice holds that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged, 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
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opportunity.’105 However, Rawls specifies that this conception of justice does not apply 
outside of the state. This is because nation-states are presumed to be largely self-contained 
and his version of justice is ‘designed to apply to the special cooperative relations existing 
by virtue of the shared political, legal and economic institutions that constitute the basic 
structure of a democratic society.’106 Therefore, Rawls’ account of justice ‘is not designed 
to apply on a global level to the more fluid and inchoate collaborative relations among 
world inhabitants.’107 Instead, like the statist position, Rawls believes that ‘the duties of 
justice that governments and citizens owe to their own people are more extensive than the 
duties of justice they owe to other peoples.’108 Outside of the state, there exist minimal 
duties of mutual respect and humanitarianism, but not extensive duties of justice.109  
In contrast, global justice theorists are not convinced that justice should be limited to the 
state. There are numerous approaches to global justice; however, the approaches can be 
grouped into two broad categories. The first is referred to as relational, an approach which 
considers relationships with other humans as the grounds and motivation for global justice. 
For example, Charles Beitz argues that international economic interdependency has come 
to resemble the conditions of social cooperation that originally motivated Rawls’ domestic 
concern for distributive justice, which, under Rawls’ own logic, indicates that justice should 
be applied globally.110 According to Beitz, international economic interdependency creates 
special relationships, and these relationships are the basis for his conception of justice. 
Another example of a relational approach is Thomas Pogge’s, who argues that individuals 
enter into a relationship by participating in the global economic interactions, and, as 
benefiters, have responsibilities to rectify the inequalities these interactions perpetuate 
globally.111 In other words, Pogge suggests that participation in the global economy creates 
special relationships, and these relationships are the basis for his conception of justice. The 
second approach to global justice is referred to as non-relational, and asserts that special 
relationships with other humans are not required in order for duties of global justice to 
exist. Rather, as Simon Caney argues, persons should be included in the scope of 
distributive justice by virtue of their humanity, which implies that the scope of justice must 
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be global.112 For non-relational accounts of justice, special relationships do not have to exist 
for duties of distributive justice to be required. 
In order to expand on these categories, two accounts of climate justice will now be 
assessed in terms of how well they capture the empirical realities of climate change. The 
first approach is a relational account of global justice and climate change advocated by 
Patrick Hayden, and the second is the non-relational global justice and climate change 
approach defended by Simon Caney. The two accounts have been chosen because Hayden 
and Caney are two of the most prominent cosmopolitan scholars of climate justice, and 
their accounts represent examples of sophisticated and well developed work on the subject. 
The overview of these two accounts will be necessarily brief, as Part II of the thesis will 
involve unpacking and further exploring the global justice approach in relation to climate 
change. This current chapter merely serves to illustrate why the cosmopolitan approach is 
more attractive for the normative assessment of the climate change problem than statist, 
pragmatist, or utilitarian approaches.  
For Hayden, cosmopolitanism and climate change are linked, because human rights claims 
are contingent on the continued existence of a functioning and life-sustaining ecosystem.113 
Hayden explains that climate change will result in a number of problems, such as 
displacement, famine, or spread of disease, which directly threaten specific human rights, 
such as the right to life, health and home.114 This threat to human rights, according to 
Hayden, requires the development of an account of global justice and climate change. Like 
Pogge, Hayden argues that ‘given the massive inequalities in the present global distribution 
of resources recourse must be made to some redistributive claims as required by duties of 
justice.’115 Furthermore, similarly to Beitz, Hayden asserts that the shared fates and interest 
of persons extend beyond political boundaries as economic, environmental, social, cultural, 
and political life becomes increasingly global.116 Based on these modern relationships at the 
global level, Hayden believes Rawls’ conception of justice should be globalized. This is what 
makes Hayden’s account relational: the need for global distributive justice arises out of 
special global relationships between individuals. 
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Hayden creates an account of climate change justice, which he dubs ‘environmental justice.’ 
His conception of environmental justice focuses on human beings as the proper subjects of 
justice and concerns their claims to rights and fairness.117 Hayden believes that humans 
should have both substantive and procedural environmental rights.118 Substantive rights 
include the right to clean air and water, the right to be protected from environmental harm, 
and the right to natural resources being used and managed according to environmentally 
sound practices.119 Procedural rights include the right to enhance and protect our ability to 
claim substantive rights, as well as the right to be fully informed about the potential effects 
of environmental hazards, the right to participate in democratic procedures for policy 
making and decision making concerning such hazards, the right to consent to policies and 
decisions reached, and the right to complain about existing conditions, standards, and 
policies.120 
In terms of global cooperation, Hayden believes that the fundamental aim of 
environmental justice must be to ensure the existence of a just system of institutions.121 
Hayden explains that current institutions involved in climate change not only perpetuate 
inequality, but are also riddled by problems of non-compliance, national interest, and lack 
of enforcement.122 His argument is similar to Pogge’s, who defends the concept of 
reforming global institutional system in order to address inequalities in the distribution of 
justice. Hayden’s ideas on reform include a conception of ‘world environmental citizenship,’ 
where citizens are critical and informed, and are used as a vehicle to improve the 
effectiveness of global environmental governance.123 In other words, global civil society will 
drive institutional reform which will increase the just distribution of environmental rights, 
and therefore increase environmental justice. Hayden’s account will be discussed in detail 
in Part II of the thesis. The brief description of his account above merely serves to illustrate 
the usefulness of the cosmopolitan account. 
In summary, Hayden perceives climate change as a human rights issue, and applies 
principles of global justice to discuss how these rights should be distributed. His arguments 
are substantially different to those made in the statist, pragmatic, or utilitarian approaches 
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outlined above, and there are several important strengths to Hayden’s approach in terms 
of capturing the empirical realities of the climate change problem. For one, Hayden’s 
approach rests on the assumption that climate change threatens the rights of individuals. 
This cosmopolitan focus on the individual is useful for the assessment of which human 
interests are threatened by climate change, because a focus on individuals facilitates a 
discussion of the interests of these individuals. In addition, Hayden appears to be aware of 
the importance of the need for collective action, and he discusses what should be done, in 
a moral sense, to reform current global cooperative action on climate change in detail. 
Overall, Hayden seems to offer a more in depth approach to the normative assessment of 
the climate change problem than the other approaches in this chapter have been able to 
provide. From this, it seems that the cosmopolitan account is more suited to addressing the 
empirical conditions discussed in the previous chapter. This will be further illustrated below 
with the help of Simon Caney’s account of global justice and climate change.  
Caney argues that climate change threatens important human interests.124 He assumes that 
‘persons have fundamental interests in not suffering from: drought and crop failure, 
heatstroke, infectious diseases, flooding and the destruction of homes and infrastructure, 
enforced relocation, and rapid, unpredictable, and dramatic changes to their natural, social, 
and economic world, all of which will occur as a consequence of climate change.’125 From 
this, he infers that persons have the human right not to suffer from the disadvantages 
generated by climate change.126 Caney goes on to define specific human rights related to 
climate change, including the right to life, the right to health, the right to property, and the 
right to sustenance.127 In terms of these human rights, Caney does not support ‘rights-
discounting,’ a concept which implies that the rights of people alive today are more 
important than the rights of future generations. Caney asserts that the rights of people in 
the twenty-first century are as important as those in the twenty-third century, because 
human beings have rights no matter their time or place of birth.128 This is a complex non-
relational argument that will be expanded on in Chapter Three. For now, the chapter serves 
to briefly outline Caney’s approach to illustrate the usefulness of the cosmopolitan 
approach. 
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In order to ensure that the rights he defines are not violated, Caney develops a theory of 
climate justice, which fairly distributes the global benefits and burdens of climate 
change.129 Caney divides climate change burdens into burdens of adaptation and burdens 
of mitigation. He explains that mitigation burdens are the costs of actors not engaging in 
activities that contribute to global climate change, an opportunity cost of forgoing the 
emission of GHGs.130 Adaptation burdens are the costs to the persons of adopting 
measures which enable them and others to cope with the ill effects of climate change.131 
For example, spending money on inoculating people from infectious diseases, building 
protective walls around areas where sea levels will rise, or sending overseas aid to victims 
of malnutrition.132 He notes that it is widely recognized that, whatever happens, some 
adaptation is required. Even if emissions are cut dramatically, the carbon dioxide already 
present in the atmosphere will induce some climate changes.133 This is a similar point to 
Lomborg’s, who asserts that both adaption and mitigation will need to be paid for. 
However, unlike Lomborg, who claims that mitigation should be put off until better 
technology is developed, Caney argues that both adaptation and mitigation measures must 
be taken immediately. 
Caney develops a distributive principle based in his conception of global environmental 
justice to discuss how adaptation and mitigation burdens should be distributed. This 
principle prioritizes the interest of the global poor, and proposes that persons should bear 
the burden of climate change that they have caused so long as doing so does not push 
them beneath a decent standard of living.134 This implies that the wealthy have more of an 
obligation to pay for the burdens of climate change. Furthermore, he suggests that the 
least advantaged have a right to emit more GHGs in order to develop further until better 
technology is available. However, he stresses that the least advantaged have a duty of 
developing in ways that do not involve high levels of GHG emission, if they can do so 
without great cost to themselves.135 Caney believes that until these less developed 
countries become richer, the burden of dealing with climate change should rest 
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predominantly on the wealthy actors of the world.136 He asserts that all agents who are 
sufficiently affluent should help, whether it is firms, individuals, sub-state political 
authorities, or international financial institutions.137  Put simply, Caney’s approach is 
sensitive to who can bear the burdens of climate change and why.138 Caney’s conception of 
fair distribution will be further explored in Chapter Five. The brief explanation of the main 
tenets of Caney’s argument in this chapter merely serves to illustrate the usefulness of his 
normative approach in comparison to the statist, utilitarian and pragmatic approaches 
assessed above. 
In summary, Caney’s model provides a very strong normative framework with which to 
assess climate change and pegs thresholds for responsibility and action. Although his 
approach does not provide a specific institutional road map, it does provide key elements 
of justice from which to inform and restructure institutional frameworks. His approach 
captures the empirical realities of the climate change problem more completely than any 
approach discussed in this chapter, incorporating all four issues defined in Chapter One. 
Caney bases his approach on specific human interests threatened by climate change, 
carefully considers future generations by discussing rights discounting, his model of the fair 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of climate change involves a discussion of less 
developed countries, and he establishes his own model for a just distribution which is 
based on the need for collective action.   
In addition to capturing the empirical conditions of climate change more fully than the 
statist, pragmatic, and utilitarian accounts, Hayden and Caney’s accounts are illustrative of 
three important reasons why a cosmopolitan approach may be best suited for the 
normative assessment of the climate change problem. First, the cosmopolitan approach is 
useful because it focuses on the moral worth of the individual. Climate change brings up a 
number of ethical issues which concern individuals. GHG emissions are not confined to 
states, but can be caused by any individual regardless of their place of birth. Similarly, 
climate change can affect any individual in any state. This implies that individuals are both 
the victims and cause of climate change, raising distributive questions about which 
individuals should be protected and which individuals may have to refrain from emitting. 
The cosmopolitan position is suited to addressing these questions because of its focus on 
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the normative significance of the individual. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter One, the 
primary victims of climate change will be those living in less developed countries and future 
generations. An understanding of equal moral worth of humans allows global justice 
theorists to argue that it is unfair that individuals in less developed countries and future 
generations will be the primary victims of climate change, because the effects of climate 
change cause these groups of individuals to be treated as morally unequal. Because of this 
understanding global justice theorists are able to argue that we need greater collective 
action on climate change in order to rectify the unequal treatment of morally equal human 
beings. In this way, global justice theorists are able to effectively capture the empirical 
reality of climate change. 
Second, the cosmopolitan approach leaves room for exploring ethical considerations while 
still allowing for empirical and practical concerns to be addressed. Cosmopolitan global 
justice theorists do not shy away from addressing the normative concerns raised by climate 
change. Cosmopolitans directly engage in assessing which human interests are threatened, 
what is owed to future generations and less developed countries, and how to distribute 
benefits and burdens through collective action. This can be seen in Hayden’s account, 
which begins to grapple with considerations about why humans should be protected from 
climate change, and why institutions must be just. It can especially be seen in Caney’s 
account, where he not only develops a set of human rights directly related to climate 
change, but also engages with the idea of how much is owed to future generations, and 
thinks through how to define benefits and burdens, along with how these might be 
distributed fairly among developed countries and less developed countries.  
Third, the cosmopolitan approach has merit because it is critical of the status quo. 
Cosmopolitan theorists concern themselves with what is fair and just, and are interested in 
reforming institutions, laws, and procedures in order to meet a condition of justice.139 This 
inevitably involves changing structures and systems.140 Hayden’s approach, for example, is 
conducive to challenging the status quo. Hayden’s conception of institutional inequality, 
and the role of citizens to reform it, illustrates an understanding that current generations 
are not trapped in an existing system. This premise speaks to challenging the status quo, 
rather than accepting it, which is arguably what the statist approach does. In addition, the 
utilitarian and pragmatic approaches do not successfully engage in a normative discussion 
of why the current system must be changed. Pragmatists avoid normative discussion 
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altogether, and utilitarians currently focus on cost-benefit analysis, which limits normative 
discussion.  It was explained in Chapter One that climate change involves complex 
considerations which will require sustained collective action. It is inevitable that collective 
action will involve some structural change, and the fact that cosmopolitans are open to 
change is helpful for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. 
In addition to these three strengths of the cosmopolitan account, there is a final point to be 
made about the usefulness of the global justice approach: namely that climate change is 
arguably an issue of global justice by its very nature. If the climate change problem is an 
issue of global justice by its very nature, then a global justice approach will logically be 
particularly suited for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. Climate 
change can be considered a global justice problem for two main reasons.  
First, it is a truly global problem: it affects all people, and is caused by all people, as 
emissions cannot be confined within states. Steven Vanderheiden argues that these 
empirical conditions mean that for once, the global nature of the problem defies 
conventional assumptions about state sovereignty and geographically bounded justice.141 
In other words, climate change is a matter of global justice because it truly involves every 
individual on the globe, regardless of their location. Furthermore, the world’s nations and 
peoples, both present and future, depend on a global scheme of cooperation for their 
continued access to the vital conditions provided by climatic stability, and are therefore 
part of a global justice community142 or what is often referred to as an ‘overlapping 
community of fate,’ to use a term famously coined by David Held.143 While critics of global 
justice may be right to hold that such interdependence does not arise among nations in 
other ways, for example through a common global economy, they would surely be wrong 
to hold that nations are not interdependent in their common reliance on the services 
provided by the earth’s atmosphere.144 The argument here is that individuals around the 
world are truly in a globally interdependent community as a result of the empirical 
conditions of climate change.  
Second, climate change presents an unfair distribution of climate related benefits and 
burdens on a global level. Climate change will most negatively affect less developed 
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countries who have done the least to contribute to the causes of climate change, while 
developed countries, who have contributed the most emissions, will suffer the least.145 As 
discussed in Chapter One, this is because less developed countries are located in areas 
which will bear most of the problems associated with climate change, and furthermore 
because these nations do not have the ability to adapt to dangerous weather patterns. 
Developed countries, on the other hand, are located in areas which are not predicted to 
suffer extreme weather conditions to the same extent or as quickly. Furthermore, 
developed countries have the capability of coping with weather changes because of their 
existing institutional and financial power. In this sense climate change presents a case of 
global injustice.146 As Paul Harris argues, the empirical conditions of climate change ‘cry out 
for justice’, as climate change is imposed on people who are already poor, cannot 
adequately protect themselves, and have no real say in the matter.147 In other words, 
climate change is an issue of global justice because those worst off are forced to deal with 
an issue which they did not cause and cannot defend themselves from, and which they 
have no power to change because of their weak position in global decision making.  
For all of the reasons outlined above, a cosmopolitan global justice approach is arguably 
the most attractive for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. The 
approach seems to best capture nuanced and complex global issues that arise as a 
consequence of the empirical conditions of climate change. The cosmopolitan approach is 
able to address which human interests are at stake, what is owed to future generations and 
less developed countries, and thoroughly discuss what collective action must be taken. 
These four issues are part and parcel of the climate change problem, as discussed in 
Chapter One. It was illustrated above that the statist, pragmatist, and utilitarian accounts 
are each too limited to fully address the empirical realities of the climate change problem, 
and therefore cannot, on their own, provide a basis for the normative assessment of the 
climate change problem. In addition, climate change seems to represent a problem of 
global justice by its very nature. For these reasons, the thesis will use the cosmopolitan 
global justice approach for the assessment of the climate change problem. This is not to say 
that there are no other approaches that might be useful for this assessment, but that the 
use of the cosmopolitan approach is warranted. The thesis does not aim to represent the 
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‘best’ approach for the assessment of the climate change problem, but rather an approach 
that has been proven to be useful for this assessment.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a review of climate ethics literature and involved the critical 
assessment of four approaches found within this literature: statist, pragmatic, utilitarian, 
and cosmopolitan. Each approach was outlined and assessed on how well it addresses the 
empirical background conditions of climate change. It was argued that the statist approach 
is unable to capture the empirical realities of the climate change problem because of its 
refusal to acknowledge universal principles of distributive justice. The pragmatic approach, 
although more engaged with the problem of climate change, was argued to be too limited 
in scope to capture the complex issues that arise in the case of climate change. Similarly, 
the utilitarian approach, although engaged with issues surrounding climate change, proved 
problematic because of its limited focus on cost-benefit analysis.  In the final section, the 
chapter put forward that the cosmopolitan approach is the most useful for a normative 
assessment of the climate change problem because cosmopolitan theories of global justice 
can best address the complex issues which arise as a result of the empirical conditions of 
climate change, and because climate change is arguably a problem of global justice by its 
very nature. 
This chapter concludes Part I of the thesis: ‘Defining the Problem.’ Part I laid the 
foundations for the assessment of the climate change problem from a global justice 
perspective, firstly by providing an understanding of the climate change problem which the 
assessment can be based on, and secondly by situating global justice theory in the wider 
climate ethics literature while making the case for its usefulness for the normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. The thesis now turns to this assessment. Part II 
of the thesis will normatively assess the empirical conditions of climate change discussed in 
Chapter One, and in doing so, develop a cosmopolitan climate justice position. 
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Chapter Three – The Scope of Climate Justice 
Introduction 
Part I of the thesis: ‘Defining the Climate Change Problem,’ outlined the problem of climate 
change and illustrated why a cosmopolitan approach is appropriate and useful for the 
normative assessment of the climate change problem. The thesis now turns to this 
normative assessment, in Part II ‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position.’ 
Part II consists of three chapters, which assess the climate change problem from a global 
justice perspective with the aim of developing an original climate justice approach. The 
current chapter, and the two which follow, will address the four main issues associated 
with climate change identified in Chapter One, namely which human interests are at stake, 
how much is owed to future generations, how to include less developed countries in 
climate change action, and who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in collective action. In 
this way, Part II addresses the empirical background conditions outlined in Chapter One, 
and, in doing so, develops a climate justice position. The development of this position is 
split into three chapters, as there are three broad discussions required: defining the scope 
of justice, defining the grounds of justice, and defining what justice demands. These three 
discussions will consider past work on global justice and climate change, and build on this 
in order to advance and solidify a cosmopolitan approach to climate change. Overall, Part II 
of the thesis will lay the foundations for the third and final Part of the thesis, which 
concerns the assessment of current climate change governance practice from a global 
justice perspective.  
The current chapter, Chapter Three, concerns defining the scope of justice, and will be 
organized as follows. It will begin with a brief note on scientific uncertainty and how this 
relates to the cosmopolitan position taken in this thesis. Following this, the remainder of 
the chapter will advance the first tenet of the climate justice position defended in this 
thesis: the scope of climate justice. The chapter will discuss the merits of a non-relational 
vs. relational approach to climate justice, and argue that both relational and non-relational 
elements of global justice are necessary to fully capture and understand the normative 
demands which stem out of the special relationships created by climate change. Following 
this, the chapter will outline and defend a mixed approach, which will comprise the scope 
of climate justice. The chapter will conclude with a summary of what has been argued. 
A Note on Scientific Uncertainty 
Scientific uncertainty is an unavoidable subject, because climate change science is, at the 
time of writing, not considered to be undisputable. Each of the five reports produced by 
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the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) discusses some degree of 
uncertainty. The IPCC does not claim that its findings are one hundred percent certain, and 
it is made clear in the reports that models used to predict the effects of climate change are 
not without their problems. Predicting the future response of the atmosphere and climate 
systems is by no means a straightforward or simple task, which is why a degree of 
uncertainty of the future remains. This degree of scientific uncertainty has been, in the past, 
used as a reason for inaction. Governments, most notably in the United States of America, 
have refused to take part in global climate change deals, citing scientific uncertainty.1 This 
phenomenon extends beyond governments, as there are individuals who simply do not 
believe that there is enough evidence to be certain about the effects of climate change, 
and therefore consider action to be unnecessary. A response to these critics of climate 
science would be to reassert that the thesis is based on best available evidence, as was 
explained in Chapter One. Nevertheless, it is important to meet potential critics head on 
and explain why scientific uncertainty does not weaken the cosmopolitan position taken in 
this thesis. 
The first response to these critics is that the level of scientific uncertainty is not as 
widespread and significant as it is often claimed to be by climate change skeptics. For 
example, the IPCC explains that it is extremely likely (95% chance) that human influence 
has been the dominant cause of climate change since the mid-20th century, as was 
explained in Chapter One.2 This is a significant amount of certainty, especially when 
considering that this reflects the opinion of over 9,000 scientists who specialize in the study 
of climate change. If it is virtually certain that humans are the main cause of climate change, 
this brings with it the certainty that humans will have to act in order to prevent climate 
change or at least weaken its effects. Climate change will not disappear on its own: humans 
must make changes in order to influence the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). Thus it seems that the problem of uncertainty no longer lies with the 
question of whether humans cause climate change, but rather how much should be done 
about climate change.  
Deciding how much action to take on climate change relates to uncertainties about the 
effects of climate change. However, even though there are undoubtedly uncertainties 
involved in the modelling of future scenarios, it is important to stress that these 
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uncertainties are not as widespread or significant as skeptics make them out to be.  For one, 
there is a level of certainty that arises from the fact that climate change effects are already 
occurring. Chapter One explained that the warming of the climate system is now 
considered unequivocal by the IPCC.3 This IPCC is virtually certain (99-100%) that surface 
and atmospheric temperatures as well as in temperatures of the upper hundred meters of 
global oceans have warmed over the last decades.4 Furthermore, the IPCC has high 
confidence that this warming has resulted in a diminishment in ice and snow, and a rise in 
sea levels.5 According to the IPCC, over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic 
ice sheets have been losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide, and 
Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued to decrease.6 
This widespread melting of ice is having an effect on sea level rises. According to the IPCC, 
over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea levels rose by 0.19 meters.7 This rise is 
significant, as the rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the 
mean rate during the previous two millennia.8 The fact that these changes are already 
observable gives weight to the level of certainty that GHG emissions have, and will 
continue to have, an effect on the global climate. 
 
In addition, although there remain some uncertainties, the IPCC reports contain a high level 
of certainty about a majority of predicted effects.9 For example, the 2014 report claims that 
it is very likely (90-100%) that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that 
extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions.10 
The IPCC is also virtually certain (99-100%) that near-surface permafrost extent at high 
northern latitudes will be reduced as global mean surface temperature increases. 11 In 
addition, the IPCC predicts that global mean sea-level rise will continue during the 21st 
century, very likely (90-100%) at a faster rate than observed from 1971 to 2010.12 Finally, 
the IPCC claims that it is likely (66-100%) that global surface temperature changes for the 
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9 Caney, S., ‘Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk’ in Journal of Social 
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end of the 21st century (2081-2100) will exceed 1.5°C.13 Heat waves, extreme precipitation, 
melting ice, sea level rises, and rising temperatures are the key effects of climate change, 
as discussed in Chapter One. The level of certainty around these effects is very high, or 
quite high in the case of temperature change. This level of certainty is significant when 
considering how many thousands of scientists have been involved in finding a consensus on 
the likelihood of these effects. In sum, although it is undeniable that there is uncertainty of 
the exact effects, there is a high level of certainty of key predicted effects, which is based 
on the research of a significant number of experts in the field.14   
 
From the above, it can be argued that although some uncertainty remains, this is not 
enough to undermine the cosmopolitan position taken in this thesis. The key effects of 
climate change are already occurring, and scientists are very certain that they will continue 
to worsen, and threaten human interests, as was explained in Chapter One, and as will be 
further discussed in Chapter Four. The potential cost to human life is therefore too high to 
gamble on the level of uncertainty that currently exists.15 Even though there is some 
uncertainty about how serious the effects will be, it is undisputed that climate change will 
have detrimental effects. For this reason it is no longer undisputed that humans will suffer, 
and uncertainty merely lies in the question of how many will suffer. This thesis takes the 
cosmopolitan view that human suffering is morally important, and for this reason it is 
important to act on climate change. This view will be expanded on throughout the thesis. 
On this cosmopolitan view, waiting for absolute certainty on the amount of human 
suffering is not required for action, because certainty that humans will suffer already exists. 
This idea is not unusual among cosmopolitan climate change scholars. Stephen Gardiner for 
example argues that the predicted magnitude of loss to human life and threats to basic 
human rights is so serious that only a very high level of uncertainty could warrant inaction 
on climate change.16 Simon Caney agrees, and believes there should be no hesitance to act, 
and instead the world should act as if it were beyond a doubt that the harmful effects will 
materialize.17Finally, Dale Jamieson argues that ‘there are many uncertainties concerning 
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climate change, yet we cannot wait until all the facts are in before we respond - all the facts 
may never be in.’ 18 For all of the reason above, this thesis will develop a climate justice 
position based on the idea that action on climate change is required even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty. What exact action is required is still to be determined in the 
remainder of the thesis. The first step to determining this is to define who should be 
included in the scope of justice, a question to which the chapter now turns.  
The Scope of Justice 
Defining the scope of justice is an essential part of any global justice position, because 
doing so clarifies who must be included in considerations of justice, or in other words how 
wide the net of justice should be cast. This thesis makes the case for a particular 
conception of the scope of climate justice: namely one that is both relational and non-
relational. The discussion below will illustrate why these two approaches should be 
combined in the case of climate change, and will demonstrate how this can be achieved. 
Chapter Five will return to this mixed approach to climate justice and explain how the 
mixed account can be put into practice in order to develop demands of climate justice. The 
scope of justice defended here presents a unique approach to climate justice, because 
existing climate justice scholars implicitly or explicitly rely on either a non-relational or 
relational scope of justice. The development of a mixed position aims to bridge the divide 
between the two positions by illustrating that the two positions are not only compatible in 
the special case of climate change, but furthermore that both relational and non-relational 
elements are necessary to fully understand and address the relationships created by 
climate change.19 
 
In order to make the case for a mixed position, existing accounts of non-relational and 
relational climate justice will now be outlined below. Each account will be briefly assessed 
on how well it is able to engage with the realities of the climate change problem, and 
specifically the relationships which stem out of the empirical conditions of climate change. 
This discussion will point to strengths and weakness of each account, which will be 
elaborated on when making the case for a mixed approach. Making the case for a mixed 
approach will involve a detailed discussion of the relationships created by the climate 
change problem, and expand on the strengths and weaknesses of both accounts in 
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capturing these relationships. Finally, the mixed position will be outlined in order to 
provide clarity on what exactly a mixed climate justice approach entails.   
The Relational Account 
The relational account, as briefly explained in the previous chapter, emphasizes the 
importance of relationships as a basis for justice. Relational accounts are usually grounded 
in the idea that social relationships and/or political institutions fundamentally alter the 
relations in which individuals stand, and hence the principles of distributive justice that are 
appropriate to them.20 Importantly, relational theorists insist that principles of distributive 
justice cannot be formulated or justified independently of the practices they are intended 
to regulate.21 Relational accounts have two functions. The first is to provide context: a 
relational account defines the scope of justice as limited to certain relationships or 
institutions. For example, David Miller defines the scope of justice as limited to national 
borders, as discussed in the previous chapter. The second function of the relational account 
is to provide content: to illustrate what the demands of justice require within the defined 
scope, or context, of justice. The relationships and/or institutions defined by a relational 
account are typically existing relationships and institutions which involve actual 
interactions between peoples, and the relational account uses these interactions to 
highlight what exactly justice demands, basing the content of justice on the context, or 
scope, of justice. For example, for David Miller, the scope of justice is the nation state, and 
the content of justice is determined by what the needs are within a particular nation state, 
whether it be basic health care, education, or a fair tax system.22 In order to further explain 
this relationship between content and context, and what this implies in the case of climate 
change, two existing relational accounts of climate justice, put forward by Patrick Hayden 
and Steven Vanderheiden, will be examined below.   
Hayden asserts that there is room for effective global institutions given the systematic 
interconnectedness and interdependency of the globalized political system, and especially 
the extensive global impact of environmental destruction and pollution.23 He explains that 
the shared fates and interest of persons extend beyond political boundaries as 
environmental life becomes increasingly global, stretching the boundaries of justice.24 
Hayden argues that these relationships create true global interdependency, and therefore 
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makes the case for ‘globalized’ version of John Rawls’ conception of justice in order to 
tackle climate change. Rawls’ argument was outlined in previous chapter, and calls for an 
equal distribution of benefits and burdens through just social institutions within nation 
states. By calling for a globalized version of Rawls’ account, Hayden is defining a global 
context, or scope of justice. As Hayden bases his ideas in Rawls’ theory, Hayden’s main 
concern is the existence of a just system of institutions.25 He argues that in terms of climate 
change, international society has unjust institutions that perpetuate inequality, and 
therefore adapts Rawls’ line of argument in order to reform these institutions.26 This is the 
content of Hayden’s relational position: the requirement that global institutions are 
reformed. In other words, according to Hayden, climate change creates relationships which 
establish the context, or scope of justice. The content, or demands, of justice are based on 
these existing relationships, and require the reform of global institutions that govern 
climate change action.  
 
A second example of a relational climate justice account is explicated by Steven 
Vanderheiden, who also applies a Rawlsian approach. Like Hayden, Vanderheiden 
concentrates on reforming institutions, because he believes climate change will require 
both an international cooperative scheme and significantly expanded domestic 
institutions.27 Vanderheiden defends a scope of justice that is grounded in the idea that the 
predicted effects of climate change result in substantial global relationships.28 He uses this 
context of global relationships caused by climate change to argue that Rawls’ theory of 
justice can be applied globally in order to reform global institutions so that they can fairly 
redistribute a basic good, defined by Vanderheiden as the global atmosphere. For 
Vanderheiden, this means using principles of distributive justice to allocate the capacity to 
absorb carbon.29 Vanderheiden provides similar content, or demands of justice, as Hayden: 
justice demands that international institutions are reformed. Furthermore, like Hayden, 
Vanderheiden’s demands of justice, or content, is based in the context of global 
relationships caused by climate change, as it requires reforming global institutions in order 
to make these global relationships fairer.   
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These two examples of relational justice highlight an important strength of the relational 
approach, namely capturing the complexities of the relationships created by the climate 
change problem. The relational approach emphasizes that climate change creates a unique 
set of relationships which are truly global. Every person on the planet can contribute to the 
problem, and will potentially be affected by its consequences, either directly by the 
predicted effects of climate change outlined in Chapter One, or indirectly by the changes 
these will cause, such as changes in global markets or increases in immigration. This results 
in unique relationships which in turn raises new ethical or distributive questions which may 
not have previously been addressed. A relational account is arguably necessary to answer 
these distributive questions, because the account focuses on these unique relationships as 
context, and forms content, or demands of justice that are directly linked to this context. 
This is especially important in the case of climate change, which involves relationships that 
raise questions of distributive justice, such as the relationship between developed and less 
developed countries. Distributive questions raised by this relationship include questions of 
which country is owed how much help in dealing with climate change, and which countries 
have the moral responsibility to act on climate change. This relationship will be further 
discussed when making the case for a mixed approach, for now the thesis is briefly pointing 
to the idea that climate change involves relationships that raise distributive questions the 
relational account is arguably suited to answering. 
 
A scholar who has recognized the aforementioned strength of the relational account is 
David Miller, who defends the importance of basing content, or demands of justice, on 
context under the term ‘contextualism’ or the idea that a just distribution will depend on 
the social context in which the distribution is going to occur.30 Miller explains that the 
relationship in which parties stand to one another must be properly understood before one 
can say what justice requires these parties to do.31 What Miller is stressing here is that it is 
important to ground demands of justice in existing relationships so that it is clear what is 
required to meet a condition of justice. Relationships raise distributive questions which can 
only be answered when considering the context of these relationships. Miller explains that 
if the parties in a relationship are defined, and it is clear in what relations parties stand, 
then the demands of justice will be not only more ‘realistic,’ but more easily 
implementable.32 This strength of the relational account will be further discussed when 
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making the case for a mixed approach below. For now, it has been only briefly introduced 
in order to make the case that the relational account presents a valuable approach to 
climate justice. However, although the relational account has a significant strength, the 
account also has an important weakness that is especially important in the case of climate 
change. Relational accounts arguably limit justice by restricting the context of justice to 
specific global relationships. This is problematic in the case of climate change because this 
could potentially exclude future generations from the scope of justice, which may mute 
present action on climate change. This will be further discussed below, when making the 
case for a mixed approach. Before the case for a mixed approach can be made, the non-
relational account must be examined.  
The Non-Relational Account 
As briefly explained in the previous chapter, non-relational accounts of justice reject the 
idea that the scope of justice depends on the relations in which individuals stand.33 Instead, 
non-relational accounts argue that no one should be unfairly worse off than anyone else, 
whether or not they share any institutions or special relationships.34  Non-relational 
accounts can be broken down into the same two basic functions as relational accounts, 
namely to provide context and content. Non-relational accounts set out a global scope, or 
context, which includes all humans, by virtue of their humanity. Although all non-relational 
accounts share this context, or scope of justice, non-relational accounts can differ in terms 
of their content. Most commonly, non-relational contents are either sufficientarian or 
egalitarian.35 Sufficientarian non-relational theorists defend a minimal content, which 
consists of a moral threshold every human is entitled to, for example basic human rights, or 
a certain standard of living. Egalitarian non-relational theorists defend the idea that 
egalitarian principles of distributive justice obtain at the global level, even in the absence of 
global associations, and therefore define a content that demands the egalitarian 
distribution of benefits and burdens.36 The chapter will discuss both types of approaches 
below, after a brief overview of two strengths of the non-relational account in the case of 
climate change. 
 
The first strength of the non-relational account is its focus on humans, which casts a wide 
net on who to include in moral considerations and sets a broad scope, or context of justice. 
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This is very useful in the case of the climate change problem, because climate change 
involves every individual on the planet, as well as future peoples. It is therefore important 
that these individuals are included in moral discussions, and the non-relational account is 
especially suited for this, because it makes the case that all humans have equal moral 
worth, no matter their time or place of birth. In this way, non-relational accounts of justice 
consider future generations as having equal moral worth to present generations, a view 
that places urgency on action on climate change. This will be further discussed when 
making the case for a mixed approach below.  
 
The second strength of non-relational accounts is that this account is arguably more 
comprehensive as a cosmopolitan position than relational accounts. Cosmopolitans take 
the equal moral worth of humans as their starting point. Defining justice as a condition of a 
special relationship, as relational justice scholars do, seems to contradict this cosmopolitan 
premise. Relational accounts focus on relationships and why they create the need for 
justice. This seems to imply that human worth is not enough to require distributive justice, 
and instead it is only when humans enter into relationships that distributive justice is 
required. This arguably appears incompatible with the cosmopolitan position, as equal 
moral worth is not defined as conditional by cosmopolitans. Tan Kok-Chor argues that 
‘constraining the applicability of justice to whatever social arrangements we currently 
happen to have would arbitrarily favor the status quo, which is plainly contrary to the aims 
of justice.’37 In other words, the non-relational account seems to support cosmopolitan 
aims of justice more fully than the relational account. This is an important advantage of 
non-relational accounts in terms of cosmopolitan consistency. The two strengths outlined 
above will here be accepted as an indication that a non-relational account can be 
considered a valid approach for climate justice. 
 
However, the non-relational account suffers from an important weakness when it comes to 
addressing the realities of the climate change problem. Although non-relational accounts, 
whether sufficientarian or egalitarian, define content, or demands of justice, these 
demands are arguably limited in the sense that they skirt over the realities of the 
relationships created by climate change. For this reason, it can be argued that the demands 
of a non-relational account are less in tune with what is morally required to achieve a 
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condition of justice in the case of climate change. In order to explain this further, the 
chapter now turns to existing non-relational accounts.  
 
Simon Caney defends a sufficientarian non-relational account of climate justice that is 
based on the idea that persons should be included in the scope of justice by virtue of their 
humanity.38 More specifically, Caney grounds his conception of climate justice in human 
rights, implying that the scope or context of justice should be global, as every individual 
possesses these rights as humans. Caney defines three distinct rights, which are predicted 
to be threatened by climate change: the right to life, the right to food, and the right to 
health.39 Therefore Caney’s context, or scope, is every individual who possesses these 
rights, no matter their time or place of birth. Caney’s approach, at least in the case of 
climate change, appears to be sufficientarian, as he concludes that any program of 
combating climate change should not violate the rights he defines and therefore sets a 
minimum moral threshold which cannot be crossed.40 This minimum moral threshold, 
although useful in the case of climate change,41 limits the demands of climate justice. 
Climate justice, on this sufficientarian approach, concerns the demand that rights are not 
violated, but does not require anything beyond this. This is arguably problematic because 
this does not allow for a discussion on what justice might demand beyond not violating 
these rights in the case of climate change.  
 
Mathias Risse has alluded to this problem facing sufficientarian non-relational accounts. 
Risse argues that recognizing the significance of basic rights does not readily deliver 
conclusions about precisely what is demanded of people under duties of justice.42 
According to Risse, simply listing rights makes it difficult to assess not only how imposing 
duties are but also precisely what the content of duties is.43 Risse claims that to protect the 
rights established by sufficientarian non-relational scholars requires references to 
associations (or relationships) for specific assignments of duties.44 Only through reference 
to existing associations can we define specific obligations or prescriptions for action.45 In 
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other words, Risse claims that a sufficientarian non-relational account, by identifying basic 
rights, only offers a very limited content of justice with unspecified demands. This is 
problematic in the case of climate change, which involves relationships which raise 
distributive questions which may give rise to demands of justice which go beyond the 
sufficientarian minimum of not violating human rights, for example the relationship 
between developed and less developed countries. This will be further discussed when the 
case for a mixed approach is made below, after an assessment of egalitarian non-relational 
justice. 
 
Interestingly, outside of the climate change context, Caney defends what he refers to as 
‘humanity-centered cosmopolitan egalitarianism,’ which is an egalitarian account of non-
relational justice.46 According to Caney, egalitarian accounts of non-relational justice can 
attribute ethical significance to relationships.47 It is therefore worthwhile to assess whether 
an egalitarian non-relational account avoids the weakness sufficientarian accounts face, 
even though Caney does not explicitly defend an egalitarian non-relational account of 
climate justice. Egalitarian non-relational accounts define a global scope or context of 
justice and define a content of justice that is based on a fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens. This content is arguably more prescriptive than the minimal content of not 
violating certain human rights, according to Caney.48 In addition, Caney puts forward that 
this egalitarian position is able to accommodate the thought that increased ties have 
normative implications for people’s entitlements, or in other words, can take into account 
the normative significance of the context of existing relationships.49  
 
Caney explains this in the following way: ‘although humanity-centered cosmopolitan 
egalitarians hold that some distributive principles apply independently of persons’ 
membership of a common association, the substantive implications of those principles will 
be affected by the extent to which persons belong to a common association and the extent 
to which that association is coercive and characterized by high levels of interdependence.’50 
What Caney is implying here is that the distribution of benefits and burdens will depend on 
the context of existing relationships. Caney uses the example of the right to health to 
illustrate his point. He explains that although every human is entitled to the highest 
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attainable standard of healthcare, the standard which persons receive will depend on 
where they live.51 If a community is for example isolated and has no roads by which 
medicines can be delivered, then the highest standard of healthcare this community can 
receive is lower than the standard which can be received in other, more connected, 
communities.52 As the isolated community becomes more connected, the standard of 
healthcare they receive will improve. The point Caney is making is that ‘what justice means 
in practice will vary as interdependence increases.’53 According to Caney accepting this 
implies that egalitarian accounts of non-relational justice are able to capture the ways in 
which existing relationships have moral relevance for distributive justice.54 In other words, 
Caney is claiming that egalitarian non-relational accounts can factor in existing 
relationships, which arguably implies that existing relationships of climate change could be 
factored into a non-relational account of climate justice. 
 
Caney’s assertions serve to answer the critiques of the sufficientarian non-relational 
account raised above. Caney claims that existing relationships can be taken into account, 
which is what both Miller and Risse believe to be necessary in order to explicate demands 
of justice. However, the question is whether it is enough, in the case of climate change, 
that it is acknowledged that existing relationships are morally relevant in the sense that 
they can affect distribution, or whether existing relationships should instead determine the 
content of justice, as they do in relational accounts. It will be argued below that in the case 
of climate change it is not enough to accept that existing relationships are morally relevant. 
In order to explicate demands of justice which are in tune with the realities of the climate 
change problem, morally relevant relationships must be used to explicate demands of 
justice, or in other words, be more substantially factored into the climate justice position 
than sufficientarian and egalitarian non-relational accounts allow them to be. This will be 
further explained below, as the chapter turns to defending the mixed approach. 
The Case for a Mixed Approach 
Cosmopolitan climate justice literature seems to posit a strict dichotomy between non-
relational and relational accounts of cosmopolitan justice, as if a clear either/or choice 
must exist between the positions. This is reflected in the fact that cosmopolitan justice 
scholars explicitly or implicitly pick one position or the other for their account of climate 
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justice.55 However, as briefly outlined above, in the case of climate change, both positions 
have their advantages, and importantly, disadvantages. These advantages and 
disadvantages will now be further discussed in order to make the case for a mixed 
approach to climate justice. What follows are two examples of relationships unique to the 
climate change problem, which aim to illustrate the need for a mixed approach. The first is 
the relationship between developed and less developed countries, and the second is the 
relationship between future and present generations. Each example will be taken in turn. 
 
It was explained in Chapter One that climate change will most negatively affect less 
developed countries due to their lack of resources and/or their geographical location.56 This 
creates a relationship between developed and less developed countries, because 
developed countries are engaging in behavior which endangers the people living in less 
developed countries. To complicate matters, some less developed countries are now 
developing to the point where their emissions are higher than developed countries (for 
example China or India, as will be discussed in Chapter Five). This raises questions about 
how much developed countries owe to less developed countries, and whether some less 
developed countries may need to contribute to the global climate change reduction efforts 
due to their level of emissions and/or wealth. These questions are by their nature 
questions of distributive justice, because they concern what is owed and what is deserved, 
and more specifically how benefits and burdens should be distributed. A climate justice 
account must be able to answer these distributive questions, because less developed 
countries are part and parcel of the climate change problem, as was explained in Chapter 
One. 
 
The distributive questions outlined above are not merely theoretical. Global negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
have revealed that less developed countries are very concerned with making it clear that 
the developed countries are historically at fault. These concerns are reflected in the 
Convention on Climate Change, which states that ‘the largest share of historical and current 
global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries.’57 As a result 
of this historical responsibility, the UNFCCC calls exclusively on developed countries to ‘take 
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immediate action.’58 The fact the UNFCCC, which has 195 member states, agreed to put 
into writing the historical responsibility of developed nations and uses this responsibility as 
grounds for action, reflects the fact that the relationship between less developed and 
developed countries raises distributive questions which must be answered such as, what 
does historical fault imply for responsibility? The thesis will provide a thorough discussion 
of this question and the distributive questions outlined above in Chapter Five. For now, the 
thesis aims to illustrate that answering such distributive justice questions is a matter of 
relational justice, and that a non-relational account is arguably less suited for capturing the 
realities of this relationship, and answering the distributive questions outlined above. 
 
A sufficientarian non-relational account, for example, could assert that there is a duty to 
stop violating certain human rights, which could be used to make the case for lowered 
emissions by developed countries in order to protect the rights of people living in less 
developed countries.  However, a non-relational account is arguably not able incorporate 
the nuances of the relationship between less developed and developed countries beyond 
these minimal demands. This is an important weakness, because the relationship between 
less developed and developed countries involves more than the problem of human rights 
violations, as was explained above. The relationships raises questions about historical 
responsibility, what is owed to less developed countries, and how much high emitting less 
developed countries must engage in mitigating climate change. A sufficientarian account 
could not base demands of distributive justice on these types of questions, because it sets 
a moral minimum of human rights or a decent standard of living as the sole demand of 
justice and does not go beyond this.  
 
To illustrate, consider the following scenario. Imagine that five people want to share a cake. 
A non-relational sufficientarian account would require that all five individuals get a certain 
amount of cake which is in line with the sufficientarian moral minimum defined. For 
example, sufficientarians who defend a right to life may say that each person is entitled to 
a number of calories which will keep them alive. However, if the cake has more calories 
than are required to keep five individuals alive, then it is unclear what each person is 
entitled to under the demands of justice specified under the sufficientarian account. Under 
this account, individual A, who is greedy and arrogant, and believes that she deserves more, 
could reasonably take the biggest piece by force, leaving four pieces which each have 
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enough calories for the remaining individuals. This would not be unjust under a non-
relational sufficientarian account, because the basic rights of the other four individuals 
would not be violated. Applied to the climate change case, this implies developed countries 
could take more of the emissions share than less developed countries, as long as the right 
to life of individuals in less developed countries is protected. However, this ignores 
complexities like historical fault, level of development, or level of wealth, all of which raise 
questions about distribution. A sufficientarian account presents demands that are too 
simple to capture the complexities of this relationship, because it cannot provide demands 
of justice which are specific to the relationship between developed and less developed 
countries.  
 
Simon Caney offers a response to this type of criticism. He claims that egalitarian accounts 
of non-relational justice can accommodate the thought that increased ties (relationships) 
have normative implications to people’s entitlements of distributive justice, as was 
explained above.59 Egalitarian non-relational accounts are, according to Caney’s defense, 
able to capture the moral relevance of the relationship between developed and less 
developed countries, and could explain that the human beings must be treated in an 
egalitarian manner within this relationship. However, although Caney explains that 
relationships have ‘morally significant’ implications on demands of justice, he denies that 
relationships need to be factored in, in order to explicate demands of justice. For this 
reason, it is arguably questionable whether an egalitarian non-relational account could 
truly capture the complexities of the relationship between developed and less developed 
countries, because this relationship raises distributive questions that cannot be fully 
addressed by demanding that there should be an egalitarian distribution. Answering these 
distributive questions will arguably require a thorough exploration of the complexities of 
the relationship between developed and less developed countries, and outlining demands 
of justice that are specific to this relationship, which requires a relational account of justice. 
Taking relationships as a starting point for grounding demands of justice means that the 
complexities of those relationships can be addressed, and answers to the distributive 
questions raised by a relationship can form a constitutive part of the climate justice 
position, rather than something which is considered after the demands have already been 
defined.  
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To illustrate this more simply, consider the cake scenario again. Under an egalitarian 
account, the five individuals would not merely be entitled to enough calories to stay alive, 
but to an egalitarian distribution of the pieces of cake.  However, without discussing the 
relationships between the five individuals eating cake, it would be difficult to define what is 
required for egalitarian distribution. Caney claims that the moral relevance of relationships 
is taken into account in the egalitarian position, in the sense that the account can 
acknowledge that relationships will affect distribution. Caney could on this logic 
acknowledge that the greedy and arrogant individual A will take more cake, and that will 
affect distribution, just as the access to health care affects the distribution of the right to 
health. However, without considering the relationship between individual A and the other 
four individuals, this simple acknowledgment can potentially skirt over the realities of the 
relationship, which may raise distributive questions. For example, individual A may be a 
serial cake-stealer, and never allow the other four individuals a bigger piece, even though 
these four individuals bought the ingredients for the cake and baked it. This may seem 
insignificant, but in the case of climate change, developed countries have historically taken 
the biggest share of emissions, which is now causing climate change, which will harm 
persons in less developed countries who have not contributed to global emissions.  In 
addition, some less developed countries are now developing at a rate which has placed 
them into the top ten of highest emitting countries. This raises distributive questions about 
how much developed countries owe less developed countries, and whether less developed 
countries have any moral responsibility to address climate change when they have so far 
not contributed to the problem on the same scale as developed countries. An egalitarian 
non-relational model which simply calls for an egalitarian distribution shirks over these 
questions by putting a blanket ‘egalitarian’ principle in place.  
 
A relational approach, by contrast, would take the distributive questions raised by the 
relationship between developed and less developed accounts into account when 
formulating demands of justice. This is because relational accounts are based on the idea 
that principles of distributive justice cannot be formulated or justified independently of the 
practices they are intended to regulate.60 In the cake scenario, a relational account would 
take the relationship between the five individuals as a starting point, and explore what is 
owed to whom in the basis of this relationship. The relational account could discuss 
whether the four individuals who bought the ingredients for the cake may deserve more 
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than individual A, or whether Individual A, due to her past behavior, may deserve less than 
the others. In the case of climate change, a relational account could take the relationship 
between less developed and developed countries as a starting point, and answer whether 
historical fault has implications on responsibility, or whether level of emissions, rather than 
level of development, has a bearing on how much countries must contribute to global 
mitigation efforts. The relational account could then formulate demands of justice which 
serve to answer these questions directly, instead of skirting over them, and merely 
acknowledging their moral significance, as in Caney’s egalitarian account.  
 
In sum, what is being put forward here is that a thorough discussion of the distributive 
questions raised by the relationship between developed and less developed countries 
arguably requires a relational account, because this account formulates demands of justice 
which are based on the specifics of relationships. On this logic, a relational account is 
required for the development of a climate justice position that concerns itself, in part, with 
the question of how less developed countries factor into the climate change problem. The 
thesis argued in Chapter One and Two that this question stems from the empirical realities 
of the climate problem, and must therefore be answered. For this reason, the climate 
justice position will, in part, be based on a relational conception of justice. The chapter has 
made its case for the relational side of the mixed account, and will now turn to making the 
case for the non-relational side, by discussing the usefulness of this account for the 
relationship between current and future generations. Following this, the chapter will 
explain how the positions can be mixed. 
 
The non-relational account arguably has an advantage in the case of the relationships 
between future and present generations, because for non-relational accounts, future 
generations are morally as important as those living today, by virtue of their humanity.61 
Non-relational accounts, as explained above, do not take global relationships as a starting 
point, but instead focus on a feature of humanity, such as human rights, which all humans, 
including future humans, have in common. In this sense, both egalitarian and 
sufficientarian non-relational accounts would include future persons in the scope of 
distributive justice, by virtue of their humanity. This implies that a non-relational account 
must seriously consider what exactly present generations owe to future generations and 
why. A non-relational account would have to address which rights are threatened, and 
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what this implies in terms of how much action should be taken. The thesis will discuss both 
of these questions in Chapters Four and Five, for now the chapter merely serves to point 
out that a non-relational account must address how much is owed to future generations. 
 
 A relational account may be less able to address the question of how much is owed to 
future generations. Relational scholars focus on existing global relationships to set the 
scope of justice and discuss what is required for distributive justice. It is therefore arguably 
difficult for relational scholars to claim that present generations have duties of justice 
towards future generations, since future generations are not part of existing global 
relationships, as they are not alive and participating in these relationships. A relational 
account depends on the context of existing global relationships in order to set the scope of 
justice and define demands of justice. For this reason, relational scholars may not only 
exclude future generations from the scope of justice, but also may be unable to define 
demands of justice which apply to future generations. This is because it is unclear what the 
conditions of a relationship with future generations are, as their concerns cannot be 
ascertained, because they do not yet exist. A relational account will therefore arguably 
have trouble defining content, or demands of justice in the case of future generations, 
because the context is unspecified.  
 
This is problematic, because not fully factoring in the importance of future generations 
would fail to capture the realities of the climate change problem, since future generations 
represent the primary victims of climate change, as was explained in Chapter One. More 
detrimentally, if future generations are not included in the scope of justice, and no 
demands of distributive justice apply to them, this could potentially mute climate change 
action, because the urgency for action would be reduced. If future generations are not 
considered morally equal to present generations, then there is little reason to act on 
climate change until present generations are affected, which could be as long as fifty to a 
hundred years from today, as explained in Chapter One. This would intensify and worsen 
the effects on future generations as GHG emission continue to collect in the atmosphere, 
eventually causing irreversible damages, as was explained in Chapter One. Therefore, in the 
case of future generations, a non-relational context is critical in order to adequately 
address the realities of the climate change problem, specifically the reality that future 
generations will be the main victims of climate change. As can be seen above, the relational 
and non-relational accounts are able to address certain distributive questions raised by 
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relationships which stem out of climate change, and unable to answer others. For this 
reason, there is arguably an incentive to combine the approaches in the case of climate 
change. The chapter now turns to defining such a mixed approach. 
Defining the Mixed Approach  
The mixed approach will be defined as follows. The mixed approach is based, in the first 
instance, on a non-relational scope, and therefore entails certain basic immutable demands, 
such as not violating minimum human rights or ensuring an egalitarian distribution of 
benefits and burdens. However, the mixed approach goes beyond this, and applies, on top 
of the basic immutable demands, a relational scope in order to explore existing 
relationships and provide guidance for demands of justice based on these relationships. In 
other words, the non-relational side of the account defines a global scope and demands 
that a minimum threshold is met within this scope, and the relational side of the account 
helps to explicate a more detailed content, or further specific demands, of justice, based on 
the special relationships created by climate change. The relationships caused by climate 
change are in this way a constitutive part of the climate change justice position, which help 
to explicate demands of justice relevant to these relationships. This is relational in the 
sense that relationships give rise to demands of justice. It is important at this point to 
explain how this mixed account is different from both Simon Caney’s egalitarian account, 
and David Miller’s split level approach, because these accounts have some similarities with 
the mixed account defended here. Furthermore, explaining how the mixed approach differs 
from these two positions should further clarify the approach. 
 
Under Caney’s egalitarian non-relational approach, demands of justice arise from a non-
relational conception justice, and how these demands are met is acknowledged to be 
affected by existing relationships. In the position defended here, the relationships which 
are unique to climate change are part and parcel of the climate justice position: these 
relationships give rise to demands rather than accommodating demands which have 
previously been defined by a non-relational position. This is the difference between a 
strictly non-relational and mixed account – in the mixed account demands of justice stem 
out of relationships as well as the non-relational scope, whereas in a strictly non-relational 
account demands of justice exclusively stem from the non-relational scope. Returning to 
the cake scenario, an egalitarian account would demand an egalitarian distribution of cake 
without further considering the relationship between the five individuals sharing the cake, 
and what distributive questions this relationship raises. Instead, the egalitarian account, as 
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defended by Caney, would state that the relationship of the individuals may have an effect 
on the distribution, but not that the relationship between the individuals gives rise to any 
demands specific to these relationships. The mixed approach, on the other hand, defends 
in the first instance, a non-relational minimum, such as the right to life, which would 
ensure that each individual sharing the cake is allocated enough calories to live. On top of 
this requirement, the mixed approach would then investigate the relationship between the 
five individuals, explore what distributive questions this relationship raises, and then 
explicate demands of justice in order to answer these distributive questions. In this way, 
the relationship between the individuals is part and parcel of the development of the 
demands of justice.  
 
Leaving the cake scenario and returning to climate change, an egalitarian account, as 
defended by Caney, would demand that benefits and burdens must be shared in an 
egalitarian manner, but would not explore specific relationships, such as the relationship 
between developed and less developed countries in order to specify further specific 
demands. The mixed position, on the contrary, would set a moral minimum such as the 
right to life. On top of this, the mixed position could then explore special relationships, such 
as the relationship between developed and less developed countries, discuss the 
distributive justice questions raised by this relationship, and answer these by explicating 
demands of justice. In this way, the relationship between developed and less developed 
countries is explicitly explored as part of the justice position, and is relevant in terms of 
explicating demands of justice. The difference between Caney’s approach and the mixed 
approach is important because, as argued above, relationships involved in climate change 
raise distributive justice questions which need to be addressed. If demands of justice are 
formed through a thorough examination of these relationships, then these distributive 
questions can be answered as part and parcel of the climate justice position. If, in contrast, 
demands of justice are set out in a non-relational manner, and specific relationships are not 
considered, then the distributive justice questions raised by these relationships will not be 
addressed adequately.  
 
Now that the mixed approach has been distinguished from Caney’s non-relational 
approach, the approach must be distinguished from a relational account defended by David 
Miller, which arguably shares some similarities with the approach defended here. 
Explaining the distinction between Miller’s approach and the mixed approach defended 
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here also serves to answer some potential criticisms which are directed at relational 
accounts of cosmopolitan justice. As was explained in Chapter Two, Miller explicates a split 
level approach, where basic rights must be respected at the global level, which is a non-
relational demand, but where more complex demands of justice are defined within states, 
which is relational position because states represent a specific relationship within which 
demands of justice are defined. Miller’s approach is arguably a mixed approach which 
combines non-relational and relational elements. However, the mixed account presented 
here differs from Miller’s account, because Miller is not consistent in his non-relational 
defense of basic rights at the global level. For example, Miller argues that according to his 
split level approach, a nation could offer international aid if it meant minimally reducing 
national education funding, but not if it meant that fellow nationals would starve.62 Here 
Miller is attempting to explain that relationships to fellow nationals can override non-
relational human rights of those outside national borders. In his example, starving nationals 
would be prioritized over international aid which would help starving strangers abroad. In 
other words, the human rights of non-nationals can be overridden by the human rights of 
fellow nationals. In this way, Miller limits the non-relational demand of protecting basic 
rights in favor of the relational demands that exist within the state.  
 
This is in stark contrast to what is being posited here. The non-relational element of the 
mixed approach defended here would ensure that non-relational demands of justice 
related to climate change can under no circumstances be violated. In the mixed account, 
the scope of justice is immutably non-relational, and the relational element of the mixed 
position merely helps to explicate more exact demands of justice, rather than limiting the 
non-relational scope of justice. The rationale behind not overriding the non-relational 
scope of justice can be found in the basis of cosmopolitan theory outlined in Chapter Two: 
the equal moral status of humans, regardless of their place or time of birth. This equal 
moral status of individuals implies that the non-relational scope of the mixed account 
defended here cannot be overridden. All humans, by virtue of their humanity, are included 
in the scope of justice, and cannot be taken out of the scope of justice because of a special 
relationship. The non-relational scope sets a moral minimum which must never be crossed. 
This ensures that the mixed approach is consistent as a cosmopolitan position. Miller’s 
position, on the other hand, cannot be said to be consistent in this manner, his approach 
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seemingly allows the non-relational scope of justice to be overridden on a case by case 
basis.    
 
In order to explain this further, the chapter will now briefly outline how the mixed position 
will be applied in Chapter Five. This is merely for the purpose of clarification, Chapter Five 
will go into much further detail. Chapter Five will make the case that the non-relational 
scope of justice in the mixed position gives rise to the demand that future generations 
must be treated as morally equal to present generations. As was explained above, a 
relational account could, on its own, make a case for discounting the rights of future 
generations because there is no existing relationship between future and present 
generations. However, since the non-relational account forms the basis of the mixed 
approach, and must respected in all instances, the relational account is in this case not 
applied, because doing so would limit the demands of justice which apply to future 
generations. Relational demands can never override non-relational demands in the mixed 
approach defended here. To illustrate further, Chapter Five will use the relational element 
of the mixed position to explicate a demand of justice relevant to the relationship between 
developed and less developed countries and the distributive questions this relationship 
raises. This does not limit the non-relational demand that present and future generations 
must be treated equally. Instead, the relational side of the account is merely applied to 
answer distributive justice questions. In a case where the relational side of the account 
would limit the non-relational demands of justice, for example by muting the obligations to 
future generations, this is prevented because the non-relational side of the account must 
be respected as a priority.  
 
Prioritization of the non-relational account is important not only for cosmopolitan 
consistency, but also in order to answer some common concerns associated with relational 
cosmopolitan accounts. The first concern is that the idea that morally arbitrary factors 
should not affect what people deserve under a cosmopolitan account. Simon Caney for 
example claims that ‘it is difficult to see how and why the fact that one group of people is 
linked by interaction should impact on their entitlements.’63 He goes on to say that one’s 
life prospects or one’s access to opportunities should not depend on ‘morally arbitrary 
considerations’ such as which associational scheme one is born into.64 This is a valid 
criticism of the relational account, because if the scope of distributive justice is limited to 
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certain social schemes, then this will affect what people are entitled to. However, in the 
mixed position defended here, every human being, including future generations, is 
included in the scope of justice. Every human, present and future, is entitled to the same 
basics rights, as will be explained in Chapter Four. Furthermore, these rights can never be 
overridden, as was explained above. This is in line with the cosmopolitan perception of 
equal moral worth of individuals. In addition, the relational side of the account is not used 
in order to discuss morally arbitrary circumstances, but rather to discuss specific 
distributive justice questions which arise from the relationship between developed and less 
developed countries. Historical emissions levels and levels of current emissions and wealth 
are not morally arbitrary, because these factors impact on what is considered fair and just 
to the parties within an existing relationship, and these are moral considerations.   
A second concern with the relational account is that individuals could fall outside the scope 
of justice if they if they are not part of the relationships chosen by relational scholars, or if 
they happen to leave these relationships at a later time. This is problematic because 
individuals who fall outside of the scope of justice would not be considered full moral 
equals of those within the relationship which is chosen by relational scholars. In this way, 
these individuals would not share the status of being a primary unit of moral concern and 
would not be considered to possess equal moral worth. This is not acceptable from a 
cosmopolitan perspective, which emphasizes the equal moral status of all individuals. The 
mixed approach defended here can arguably overcome this criticism. In the mixed 
approach, there is a non-relational minimum which can never be crossed, and which 
ensures that no individual is excluded from the scope of distributive justice. Moreover, this 
non-relational minimum implies that individuals are the primary unit of moral concern and 
possess equal moral worth, which is reflected in their equal rights, as will be explained in 
Chapter Four. Those individuals who participate in the relationship of developed and less 
developed countries are entitled to the same basic rights as every individual, and are not 
entitled to additional rights. Instead, those participating in the relationship may be 
responsible for lowering emissions or they may be owed help with fighting climate change, 
depending on the circumstance. This does not afford these individuals any additional 
privileges, but rather responds to the questions of distributive justice which exist in the 
case of climate change, and which must be answered.  
Now that the mixed account has been defined, it should be noted that an argument made 
by Arash Abizadeh may help to clarify why mixing the accounts is indeed a possibility. 
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Abizadeh suggests that the scope of justice and the site (content) of justice should not be 
conflated, and the content of justice can be used as a constitutive condition to realizing 
justice.65 His argument is quite complex, and concerns illustrating that the context of justice 
does not necessarily limit the scope of justice. Importantly for the argument here, his logic 
implies that justice does not need to be based in existing relationships in the first instance 
in order to use existing relationships to clarify demands of justice, because the context and 
content of justice are not necessarily fixed to one another. Therefore, proposing a scope of 
justice which is in the first instance non-relational and results in a content which prescribes 
certain immutable demands, and in the second instance uses a relational scope of justice to 
explore the realities global relationships and to define demands based on these 
relationships seems feasible. It is worthwhile to note that Abizadeh does not take a 
position on relational vs. non-relational justice. He ‘is not trying to settle an argument, but 
explain the field’.66 Therefore, although this chapter refers to his work, it goes a step 
further in order to explain how the ‘argument’ between relational and non-relational 
justice scholars might be settled in the specific case of climate change. Finally, it is worth 
stressing that there has so far been no explicit attempt to mix non-relational and relational 
justice in the climate change justice literature. As a result, there may be some skepticism as 
to whether this mixed approach is defensible. Chapter Five of this thesis will apply the 
mixed approach in order to define three demands of justice. There, the case for a mixed 
approach will be strengthened by illustrating how it can be used to develop these demands 
and this will hopefully convince sceptics of the plausibility and usefulness of the mixed 
approach.  
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a brief note on scientific uncertainty and how it relates to the 
cosmopolitan position. Following this, the chapter advanced the first tenet of the climate 
justice position defended in this thesis: the scope of justice. This involved a discussion of 
the merits of a non-relational vs. relational approach to global justice, and a defense of a 
mixed approach in the special case of climate change. This mixed approach includes a non-
relational scope which sets a minimum threshold of justice which must be met under all 
circumstances, and a relational scope which can be used to explicate demands of justice in 
order to answer the distributive questions raised by relationships which exist as a result of 
the climate change problem.  The chapter has argued that the mixed approach provides a 
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comprehensive approach to climate change, which fully captures the realities of the 
climate change problem. The subsequent chapter, Chapter Four, will advance the second 
tenet of the climate justice position by explaining what climate justice will be grounded in. 
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Chapter Four – The Grounds of Climate Justice 
Introduction 
This chapter is the second of chapter of Part II of the thesis ‘Developing a Global Justice and 
Climate Change Position,’ which concerns defining the scope of climate justice, the grounds 
of climate justice, and what climate justice demands. The previous chapter made the case 
for a scope of justice that is both relational and non-relational. This current chapter aims to 
explicate what exactly grounds the conditions of justice in the case of climate change. The 
importance of defining the grounds of justice lies in the mixed approach defended in the 
previous chapter. As was explained in Chapter Three, the thesis is based, in the first 
instance, on a non-relational account of justice. The non-relational side of the account 
serves to set a minimum moral threshold which applies to all individuals no matter the time 
or place of birth, and which cannot be crossed. For this reason, the thesis must now define 
a minimal moral threshold, which will constitute the grounds of climate justice. The current 
chapter and previous chapter serve to lay the foundation for Chapter Five, which will make 
use of the scope and grounds of climate justice developed in these two chapters to define 
what climate justice demands. 
The current chapter will make the case for a non-relational moral minimum, namely the 
human right to health, which will serve as the grounds of climate justice. The chapter will 
be organized as follows. First, the chapter will defend the use of a human rights approach. 
Next, the chapter will explain that human rights will be defined as protecting human 
interests. Following this, key existing cosmopolitan human rights positions in the case of 
climate change will be examined in order to assess whether any right, or set of rights, are 
best suited for the grounds of climate justice. It will be argued that negative rights, 
substantive rights, and existing rights are particularly useful for the climate justice position 
defended in this thesis. It will then be put forward that the right to health arguably 
encompasses the basic human interests threatened by climate change, and is therefore 
sufficient to ground the climate justice position. Finally, the chapter will provide a 
definition of the right to health, which is particular to the climate change problem, and 
begin to explain what action is necessary in order to protect this right. The chapter will 
conclude with a summary of the points defended. 
Human Rights as a Grounds for Climate Justice  
This thesis makes use of a human rights approach to define the minimum moral threshold 
that cannot be crossed, referred to here as the grounds of justice, for three reasons. First, 
and most importantly, a human rights based approach has been chosen because this 
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enables the thesis to engage with one of the empirical realities of the climate change 
problem outlined in Chapter One, namely the fact that climate change threatens several 
human interests. As will be explained below, human rights can be used to represent basic 
human interests, including those threatened by climate change. Defending a specific 
human right as the moral threshold which grounds climate justice therefore requires an 
analysis of which human interests are threatened by climate change. This is important, 
because Chapter Two argued that a normative assessment of climate change should 
address which human interests are threatened by climate change, because this issue is part 
and parcel of the climate change problem. Second, the thesis is in this chapter defining a 
minimal non-relational moral threshold that cannot be crossed. Human rights, in political 
philosophy, commonly represent moral thresholds below which people should not fall. 
They designate the most basic moral standards to which persons are entitled, and specify 
the line beneath no one is allowed to sink.1 Thirdly and relatedly, a human rights based 
approach is becoming more common within climate justice literature, as will be illustrated 
below. Since human rights are commonly used to represent a moral threshold that cannot 
be crossed, especially within cosmopolitan climate change literature, using such an 
approach ensures that the climate justice position taken in this thesis speaks to existing 
literature.  The thesis aims to contribute to existing climate justice literature, which is why 
it is important to draw on and refer to an approach which exists within the literature. Now 
that the reasons behind using a human rights approach have been explained, the chapter 
turns to explaining how human rights will be defined. In order to explain this, the notion of 
basic interests must first be clarified. 
Basic Interests 
Basic interests are not subjective, but rather objective interests, which are not subject to 
bias from the individual. This is important because individuals can be wrong about what 
their interests are and why having them fulfilled will make them better off. For example, 
individuals may believe that being rich will make them happy, and therefore assume that 
they have an interest in earning money. However, basic interests, as defined in this thesis, 
are different. This is because the thesis assumes that basic interests are not linked to a 
conception of ‘good.’ A conception of ‘good’ which is universal is impossible to define, as 
every individual will have their own ideas of ‘good,’ derived from their history, education, 
ethnicity, gender, and other factors which determine our sense of what is ‘best’ for us. 
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Instead of being linked to a conception of ‘good,’ interests are here limited to a small 
number of basic interests which are so minimal, yet fundamental to the human experience, 
that they can be argued to apply to all individuals. To put it simply, these are interests 
which are considered necessary to lead a minimally decent life. This implies that it would 
be impossible to imagine how any individual could lead a minimally decent life without 
having these basic interests met. A minimally decent life is here defined as one which is not 
consumed with the struggle to stay alive. A thriving human life does not seem possible if all 
energy is expended on trying to survive, with no room for any other human pursuits. This 
definition of minimally decent is in line with Martha Nussbaum’s well known definition of a 
minimally decent life, which she defines a living a life that is fully human rather than 
subhuman, a life worthy of the dignity of the human being.2 Nussbaum argues that a fully 
human life requires adequate nutrition, education of the faculties, protection of bodily 
integrity, liberty for speech and religious self-expression, among other pursuits.3 This 
reflects the idea that a minimally decent life requires human pursuits, such as education or 
religious expression, which lie outside of the struggle to survive. In order to clarify this 
conception of basic interests, a basic interest that is related to the climate change problem 
will be discussed below. 
Climate Change and the Basic Interest in Health 
The basic interest in health will be used as an example here because this interest is 
threatened by the effects of climate change. Furthermore, as will be argued later in the 
chapter, the basic interest in health is particularly important to the climate change problem, 
because other basic interests threatened by climate change are arguably encompassed 
within the basic interest in health. For now, the chapter merely aims to illustrate why the 
basic interest in health can be said to be threatened by climate change, in order to clarify 
the conception of basic interests outlined above. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) outlines six key future risks related to climate change in its latest report: 
food security, health, extinction of species, water shortages, economic costs, and 
displacement.4 Prioritizing health as one of the six key risks is indicative of the fact that the 
interest in health will be threatened by climate change. The IPCC explains that climate 
change will, until 2050, impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that 
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already exist.5 Furthermore, throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to 
lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with 
low income.6 In urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, 
economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme 
precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, 
sea-level rise, and storm surges.7 In addition to this, climate change is predicted to lead to 
an increase in diseases such as malaria, diarrheal diseases, infectious disease such as HIV 
and AIDS as well as an increase in serious cardio-respiratory problems, all of which are life 
threatening diseases.8 Two of these conditions, malaria and diarrheal disease, will be 
examined in detail below, in order to explain how climate change exacerbates these 
diseases and furthermore how these diseases threaten the basic interest in health. 
 
Malaria is predicted to worsen due to climate change because malaria epidemics are 
associated with changes in environmental or social conditions, such as heavy rains 
following drought bringing more mosquitos, or migration of immigrants and refugees who 
are infected.9 Chapter One explained that climate change will cause flooding and increased 
precipitation. In addition, according to the IPCC, the adverse weather associated with 
climate change is projected to increase displacement of peoples across the world as areas 
become increasingly uninhabitable, leading to increases in migration and refugees.10 It is 
therefore likely that climate change will result in higher rates of malarial infection, since 
climate change brings about the environmental and social conditions associated with 
malaria epidemics. Furthermore, diarrheal diseases are expected to worsen as a result of 
climate change because these diseases are exacerbated by poor housing, crowding, dirt 
floors, lack of access to sufficient clean water or to sanitary disposal of fecal waste, and a 
lack of refrigerated storage for food.11 Lack of clean water is expected to be intensified by 
climate change due to flooding and droughts, as discussed in Chapter One. In addition, 
forced migration and relocation as a result of flooding or other adverse weather associated 
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with climate change is predicted to increase the number of migrants and refugees living in 
the inadequate conditions described above, which have the potential to exacerbate 
diarrheal disease. On top of this, climate change will damage crops, and lead to water 
shortages, restricting the ability to provide nutritionally balanced diets to mitigate and 
repair liquid and nutrient losses when diarrhea develops, potentially increasing the 
morbidity rate of diarrhea.12  
Basic interests have here been defined as being integral to an individual leading a minimally 
decent life which is not consumed with the struggle to stay alive. An individual who is ill 
with malaria and diarrheal disease will struggle to survive, and therefore not have a chance 
at a decent life, as all of their energy will be spent on survival, dealing with painful and 
persistent effects of their illness, and leaving them unable to pursue other activities outside 
of this.  To illustrate this point, what follows are medical descriptions of the symptoms of 
diarrheal disease and malaria. Malaria has several different strands, and the symptoms 
associated with malaria range widely. One symptom is hypoglycemia, which causes 
weakness, sweating, dizziness, blurred vision, confusion and can result in comas.13 Malaria 
also causes severe anemia, which includes symptoms such as weakness, shortness of 
breath, heart palpitations, bone deformities, leg ulcers, and eventually heart failure.14 In 
addition, cerebral forms of malaria can cause acute respiratory arrest, seizures, and loss of 
consciousness.15 Even when malaria is overcome, it can leave lasting impacts in the form of 
residual neurological deficit, for example weakness on one side of the body, muscle spasms, 
stiffening of muscles, or residual pain in limbs.16 The World Health Organization ranks 
malaria as the eighth-highest contributor to the global disease burden and the second 
highest in Africa, illustrating its severity as a health issue.17  
 
Diarrheal disease is caused by infectious organisms, including viruses, bacteria, protozoa, 
and helminthes, which are transmitted from the stool of one individual to the mouth of 
another, for example through dirty water as a result of inadequate sanitation, or through 
objects such as cups or plates due to a lack of hygienic practices.18 Three major diarrhea 
syndromes exist: acute watery diarrhea, persistent diarrhea, which lasts fourteen days or 
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longer, and bloody diarrhea, which is a sign of the intestinal damage caused by 
inflammation.19 Acute watery diarrhea can be rapidly dehydrating, with stool losses of 250 
milliliters per kilogram per day or more, a quantity that quickly exceeds total plasma and 
interstitial fluid volumes and is incompatible with life unless fluid therapy can keep up with 
losses.20 Persistent diarrhea is typically associated with malnutrition, which leads to 
weakness, lack of energy, chronic pain, loss of consciousness, and is associated with a 
disproportionately increased risk of death.21 Bloody diarrhea, defined as diarrhea with 
visible or microscopic blood in the stool, is associated with intestinal damage and 
nutritional deterioration, and often with secondary sepsis which causes high fever, rapid 
breathing, confusion, organ failure, and death.22 The symptoms associated with any of 
these types of diarrhea rapidly become life threatening if they are not reversed through 
nutrition or water replacement, and therefore diarrheal diseases remain a leading cause of 
preventable death, especially among children under five.23  
 
The symptoms of malaria and diarrhea outlined above arguably make it difficult to imagine 
an individual with malaria or diarrhea leading a minimally decent life. The symptoms of 
both diseases are likely to disrupt normal day to day activities, and energy will be expended 
on trying to survive, with no room for other human pursuits which would be expected 
under any reasonable understanding of a minimally decent life – for example the pursuit of 
education, or enjoying family life. This implies that by the definition of this thesis, an 
interest in health, in cases where diseases significantly impair life and reduce it to a 
struggle for survival, can be defined as a basic interest. Now that the concept of basic 
interests has been illustrated through an example, it will be explained below how basic 
interests, such as the basic interest in health, can be used to define human rights. 
Basic Interests and Human Rights 
A common line of argument in political philosophy is that if individuals have basic interests, 
then these can be used to articulate human rights.24 Human rights, according to this line of 
thinking, are not self-evident truths, fundamental to morality, but instead require 
justification from a more basic moral assessment of interests, an assessment to see if these 
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interests are sufficient to ground duties on the part of others.25 According to this argument, 
if basic interests are fundamentally important, or sufficient enough to protect, then they 
can reasonably be thought to impose duties on others to respect and promote those 
interests.26 Furthermore, if there is a duty to protect an interest, then this logically means 
there is a corresponding right to that interest, which is usually referred to as a human 
right.27 According to this conception of rights as interests, human rights are not considered 
‘natural,’ but rather serve the purpose of highlighting the importance of the basic interests 
that they serve to protect. In summary, according to this common argument, human rights 
are defined as human interests. As this is a common argument to make, the thesis will 
apply the logic of the rights as interests argument and define human rights as 
representative of human basic interests.28 
Now that the connection between basic interests as human rights has been explained the 
chapter will explore some existing accounts of global justice and climate change to 
ascertain which human rights have previously been defended by climate justice scholars, 
and whether any specific right or set of rights is especially suited for grounding the climate 
justice position defended in this thesis. This exploration of human rights should be viewed 
as an exploration of which basic interests are threatened by climate change, because 
human rights have been defined to be representative of basic human interests in this thesis.  
Existing Climate Justice Accounts 
The chapter will now outline and assess some existing cosmopolitan positions which 
explicate specific human rights related to climate change, put forward by Patrick Hayden, 
Tim Hayward, and Simon Caney. The chapter will then will explore whether any particular 
right or group of rights defended above are more or less useful for a grounds of climate 
justice. The first example of a climate justice account which outlines human rights is put 
forward by Patrick Hayden, who defines specific environmental human rights.29 Hayden’s 
conception of rights encompasses both substantive and procedural rights. His substantive 
rights include the right to be protected from environmental harm, which encompasses the 
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right to clean air and water.30 Hayden’s procedural rights serve to enhance and protect the 
ability to claim substantive rights and include the right to be fully informed about the 
potential effects of environmental hazards, the right to participate in democratic 
procedures for policy making and decision making concerning such hazards, the right to 
consent to policies and decisions reached, and the right to complain about existing 
conditions, standards, and policies.31 Similarly, Tim Hayward defines a right specific to the 
climate change problem, namely the human right to ecological space. This is defined as a 
human right to live in an environment free of harmful pollution.32 Hayward qualifies this 
right by grounding it in the right to secure access to the means of a decent life. 33 He 
explains that an equitable distribution of rights to ecological space would in principle 
ensure an equitable distribution of welfare goods without sanctioning any excess use of 
natural or environmental services, including the planet’s capacity for absorbing carbon.34 
According to Hayward, this should ensure the right of each individual to an environment 
adequate for their health and well- being.35  
Finally, Simon Caney bases his conception of justice in three key human rights, defined as 
human interests which are threatened by climate change: the human right to life, the 
human right to health, and the human right to subsistence.36 His conception of human 
rights is negative, which means that there is no positive duty to protect the right to life, but 
a negative duty to refrain from activities which threaten the right to life, sustenance, and 
health of others.37 According to Caney, climate change is predicted to threaten the right to 
life, health and sustenance in a number of ways: climate change will lead to drought and 
thereby undermine food and water security; second, sea level rises will involve loss of land 
to the sea and thus negatively affect agriculture; third, flooding will lead to crop failure; 
and fourth, unusual weather events will destroy agriculture and increase global diseases.38   
Hayden’s use of both substantive and procedural rights is no doubt interesting and 
insightful. However, the thesis will not make use of procedural rights. The justification 
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behind this decision is that, although it could be argued that individuals have an interest in 
being included in decisions that affect their lives, and that they have an interest in 
complaining about or consenting to new policies,39 this interest cannot be considered to be 
a basic interest under the definition defended above. Voting, deliberation, participation 
and complaints procedures are arguably in the interest of individuals affected by climate 
change because these procedures ensure that individuals can be involved in decisions that 
affect their lives. However, procedural rights are arguably not representative of basic 
interests, for several reasons. For one, it is theoretically possible to have basic interests met 
without any democratic participation, for example if there were a benevolent leader who 
ensures all basic interests are met. This indicates that procedural rights are not 
representative of basic interests, because being involved in decision making is not essential 
to ensuring basic interests are met in all instances.  Secondly, basic interests seem to 
logically precede procedural rights. Democratic participation will not be possible if an 
individual is living a life concerned solely with survival, and unable to pursue other interests. 
Instead, procedural rights are acted on by individuals who are capable of political 
participation because their basic rights have already been met. Finally, basic rights, which 
serve to protect basic interests, are traditionally defined as basic only if enjoyment of them 
is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.40 Procedural rights do not seem basic 
enough to be essential to the enjoyment of all other rights. In contrast, procedural rights 
seem to depend on basic rights being met, so that an individual’s life is not consumed 
solely by the struggle to survive, and they are capable of pursuing procedural rights. For the 
reasons above, procedural rights are arguably not representative of basic interests. This 
thesis bases its human rights account on basic interests, and therefore cannot make use of 
a notion of procedural rights. Therefore, the thesis will only make use of substantive rights. 
Which substantive rights will be used will be explained below, by discussing the advantages 
of existing rights over rights unique to the climate change problems. 
It is arguable that existing human rights, which have previously been accepted as human 
rights at the international level, may be more useful than rights unique to the climate 
change problem. For example, the right to life, defended by Caney, can be found in Article 
Three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that ‘everyone has the 
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right to life, liberty and security of person.’41 Similarly, the right to health and sustenance, 
also defended by Caney, can be found in Article Twenty Five, which states that ‘everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself … 
including food.’42 Although the Declaration of Human Rights is not a legal document, it is a 
well-known and well-referenced list of human rights. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
today there is no question that human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration have 
attained the status of a lingua franca of global moral discourse.43 Hayden and Hayward, 
unlike Caney, create original rights tailored specifically to climate change, which could 
arguably be more difficult to integrate into global moral discourse. Furthermore, it may be 
difficult to convince policy makers to change their practices based on the creation of new 
and unfamiliar rights. It might therefore be more useful to ground justice in rights which 
exist in an internationally recognized document and form part of moral discourse. If the 
grounding for justice is already a part of existing understandings of human rights, the 
approach defended here would be more consistent with existing normative discourse. 
Therefore, it seems that the right to life, health, and sustenance may be more useful than a 
right to an environment free from harmful pollution as defined by Hayward, or a right to be 
protected from environmental harm, as defined by Hayden.  
It should be noted that there have been attempts to define a comprehensive list of climate 
change related rights, for example in the 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human 
Rights and Environment, which was written by a panel of experts and presented to the 
United Nations.44 This suggests that rights unique to the climate change problem may 
become part of the normative discourse over time. However, it is important to point out 
that the above declaration focuses on the environmental dimension of established human 
rights, such as the rights to life and health.45 This raises questions about the value of unique 
climate change related rights. Although climate change rights can be argued to reflect basic 
interests, because the right to a clean environment protects the conditions which are 
necessary for the enjoyment of basic interests,46 it is questionable whether separate 
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environmental rights add meaningfully to the rights discourse when these mainly serve to 
protect previously agreed upon rights.  
Defining a right specific to the climate change problem seems to be an unnecessary in-
between step, when it may be more useful to directly address the existing human rights 
threatened by climate change. For example, Hayward’s conception of human right to 
ecological space seeks to ensure the right of each individual to an environment adequate 
for their health and well- being.47 Interestingly, the United Nations defines the right to 
health as ‘a right to standard of living adequate for health and well-being.’48 This seems to 
indicate that Hayden’s right to ecological space directly encompasses the right to health as 
defined by the United Nations. Furthermore, Hayden’s account of the right to be protected 
from environmental harm encompasses the existing right to clean air and water; he lists 
these as specific substantive rights that should be protected under the right to be 
protected from environmental harm.49 This indicates that rights unique to the climate 
change problem merely serve to encompass existing rights, which may overcomplicate the 
rights discourse. Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin argue that if a large number of rights 
purport to reflect the same basic interests, there will be confusion as to which right trumps 
another.50 It may therefore be beneficial to have a small number of key basic rights, rather 
than a high number of competing rights that overlap and encompass one another. For all of 
these reasons, it seems that it may be more useful to argue for the protection of previously 
internationally recognized basic rights, rather than defining new rights which incorporate 
these existing rights under a different name. 
Following a similar logic, it may also be more useful to conceptualize the human rights used 
to ground climate justice as negative rights rather than positive rights. Caney claims that in 
this way, the rights are less contentious, as the duties they prescribe are less stringent than 
if the rights were positive.51 The positive duty to protect a right to water, for example, 
would mean ensuring that an individual receives water, whereas a negative duty would 
mean that one should refrain from preventing water being restricted. Similar to using rights 
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which already exist in the Declaration of Human Rights, using negative rights may be more 
easily integrated into climate change policy, as they are not as stringent as positive rights. 
That said, although they are not as stringent, negative rights are still stringent enough to 
require action in the case of climate change. For example, because climate change is 
predicted to create droughts, in order to fulfill the negative right to water, emissions would 
have to be reduced to prevent these droughts from occurring. However, although reducing 
emissions requires action from policy makers, these actions can be tied into existing 
policies on reducing emissions, which are put in place for a number of reasons, including 
self-interested reasons. For example, heads of state may want to appear progressive, they 
may want to ensure their own future survival, and they may even want to spur on 
technological advances which can later be sold off to other countries for profit. Fulfilling a 
negative right to water by reducing emissions fits more easily and seamlessly into existing 
policy than the positive duty to supply everyone in a certain country with a minimum 
amount of water a day, which would involve exporting funds, materials, or even people. 
Therefore, Caney’s approach has something valuable to add.  
Nevertheless, it must be noted that even though negative rights may be more easily 
integrated into existing climate change policy, in reality a cosmopolitan account of climate 
justice will require very stringent positive action. Caney makes it seem as if fulfilling 
negative duties will not be too difficult, but those who defend the cosmopolitan position, 
which includes this thesis, must be aware that it will not be a simple or easy process. This 
will be further discussed in Chapter Five, which will outline three demands of justice that 
must be met to reach a condition of justice in the case of climate change. Branding rights as 
negative may make them sound more palatable to policy makers, but cosmopolitans must 
remain aware of, and more importantly not deny, the fact that creating a condition of 
justice in the case of climate change will require difficult and stringent positive action.  
A Right to Health as Grounds for Justice 
Now that it has been discussed that existing substantive human rights which are negative 
are most useful for grounding justice, the chapter will turn to explaining that one specific 
right, namely the right to health, is sufficient to serve as a grounds to climate justice. It will 
be argued that Caney’s three human rights related to climate change, the right to health, 
sustenance, and life, can be encompassed under the right to health. Caney’s three rights 
will be used here because they represent an accurate depiction of the key basic interests 
which are threatened by climate change, according to the best available scientific evidence. 
As was explained above, the IPCC identifies six key future risks to related to climate change 
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impacts: food security, health, extinction of species, water shortages, economic costs, and 
displacement.52 These future risks threaten the right to health, life, and sustenance. 
Lack of food security and water shortages threaten the human interest in sustenance (food 
and water) and the human interest in life, because lack of sustenance results in death if the 
lack is sufficient enough. Furthermore, the risk of health and displacement are indicative of 
the threat to the human interest in health, particularly because displacement results in 
conditions which threaten the interest in health, as was explained earlier in the chapter. In 
addition, economic costs are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty 
reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and prolong existing and create new 
poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger.53 
These effects will threaten the human interest in sustenance and health by reducing 
individuals to poverty or keeping them there, and by eroding food security, which may also 
threaten the human interest in life. Finally, extinction of species is not directly related to 
basic human interests because extinction of species does not result in human lives being 
consumed with the struggle to survive, unless extinction becomes so widespread that it 
begins to threaten ecosystems, or results in food and water shortages, and threaten the 
interest in sustenance.   
In sum, the three human rights defended by Caney arguably encompass the six main risks 
identified by the IPCC, and can therefore be seen as representative of the key human 
interests currently projected to be threatened according to climate change scientists. 
Caney himself refers to the rights he defends as ‘key.’54 For these reasons, the thesis will 
consider Caney’s three basic rights to life, sustenance, and health as representative of the 
key basic human interests threatened by climate change. This is not to say that there are 
no other human interests which are threatened by climate change. Caney himself admits 
that there could be other rights threatened by climate change, such as the human right to 
development, or the human right not to be forcibly evicted, but he does not consider such 
rights as ‘fundamental’ in the same sense as the three rights he defends.55 In the same vein, 
the thesis does not claim that the right to health, sustenance, and life are all encompassing 
of every human interest threatened by climate change, but rather that these three rights 
represented key basic interests threatened by climate change. 
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Although Caney’s three rights are useful in the sense that they represent key basic interests 
threatened by climate change, these three rights could arguably be encompassed by one 
right: the human right to health. The right to sustenance, for example, is a broader way of 
expressing the right to food and water, which is arguably implicit in the right to health. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has a right ‘to a standard of 
living adequate for health and well-being for himself and his family, including food.’56 This 
seems to imply that food, or sustenance as Caney refers to it, is a necessary condition to 
the right to health. It is also well known that inadequate nutrition or hydration leads to ill 
health, and therefore, it seems that the right to food and water can be considered as 
implicit in the right to health. Furthermore, the right to life also seems implicit to the right 
to health, as inadequate health results in a loss of life. Defending the right to life therefore 
seems unnecessary, because staying alive requires adequate health. In addition, most 
predicted causes of death of climate change could arguably be related to health. Not 
having enough food and water aside, overheating or succumbing to diseases due to 
changing weather patterns or inadequate housing conditions cause health problems which 
eventually lead to death if not treated. It seems that the right to health encompasses the 
basic interests threatened by climate change - the basic interest in food, water, and life, all 
of which are required to live a life which is not consumed with the struggle to survive. 
Furthermore, the right to health is not only one of the key risks identified by the IPCC, but 
also seen as key by scholars who study climate change. For example, James Hansen et al. 
argue that impacts of climate change will cause widespread harm to human health. These 
scholars explain that food shortage, polluted air, contaminated or scarce supplies of water, 
an expanding area of vectors causing infectious diseases, and more intensely allergenic 
plants are among the harmful impacts which will threaten health.57 For this reason, Hansen 
et al. prioritize the risk to health in their discussion of what should be done to protect 
young people from climate change. Interestingly, Hansen et al. incorporate the threat to 
food and water under the threat to health, by explaining that climate change will cause 
food shortage and contaminated or scarce supplies of water, which will threaten health. 
This is in line with what is being argued here: that the right to health can encompass the 
right to sustenance. In sum, the prioritization of the right to health in this thesis is based on 
the idea that the right to sustenance and life can be encompassed by the right to health, 
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and also on the premise that the right to health is one of the key rights threatened by 
climate change and represents the key basic interests which are threatened. For these 
reasons, the right to health will be used as a ground for climate justice in this thesis. This is 
not to say that there are no other human rights threatened by climate change, or that the 
right to health definitively represents the most important right, but rather than the right to 
health is appropriate as a grounds of justice in the case of climate change.  
Now that the reasons behind using the right to health have been outlined, the chapter 
turns to providing an overview of previous conceptions of the right to health, in order to 
develop a definition of the right to health which can be used to ground climate justice in 
this thesis. As was argued above, rights that are part of existing global normative discourse 
are particularly useful for a conception of climate justice. It is therefore important to assert 
that the right to health has been explicated in internationally recognized documents. As 
can be seen above, the right to health has been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. It has also been defined by the World Health Organization as a fundamental 
right, and has been unanimously endorsed by its member states.58 Furthermore, the right 
to health is affirmed in several regional conventions, including the 1948 American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the 1981 African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.59 
Recently, scholars have gone so far as to claim that the human right to health has surged 
onto the international stage as one of the most pressing human rights of the twenty-first 
century.60 Therefore, it can be said that a right to health is well established in global 
normative discourses. 
 
The most basic conception of a right to health in current normative discourse is provided in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and defines the right to health as ‘the right to 
standard of living adequate for health and well-being.’61 The right to health is not always 
conceptualized in this minimal way. An example of a more stringent conception of a right 
to health is the one defended by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, which defines the right to health as the ‘right of everyone to the enjoyment 
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of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’62 In this way, the right to 
health is not understood as a right to be ‘healthy’. Rather, it is defined as a right to the 
enjoyment of a variety of diagnostic, curative, and preventive ‘facilities, goods, services and 
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health’.63 
Although this conception of the right to health is no doubt important, it may be valuable to 
examine to what extent the most basic conception of a right to health is protected through 
climate change action, because this will perhaps be more revealing about the inadequacies 
of the climate change response than the failure to meet a stringent conception of the right 
to health, which requires substantial action beyond lowering emissions or paying for 
adaptation costs. If even a very basic conception of a right to health cannot be said to be 
protected under current climate change action, then this will present a strong case for 
claiming that the climate change response is unjust, and unable to meet even the most 
minimal demands of justice.  
 
Therefore, a right to health will here be defined as more minimal, and in line with the right 
to health defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘a right to standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being.’64 However, the human right to health, as defined in 
this thesis, serves to incorporate the right to sustenance and the right to life, as discussed 
above. The human right to health will therefore be defined as the right to a standard of 
health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes adequate sustenance to 
maintain this standard of health. Minimally decent here refers to the definition provided 
above, which states that a minimally decent life is one not spent on the sole pursuit of 
survival. For this reason a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level 
and includes adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health refers to a standard 
of health which is adequate for an individual to live a minimally decent life without being 
burdened by disease, hunger, or thirst. In this way, the right to health incorporates the 
right to life, because it requires a level of health to maintain life at a minimally decent level, 
which implies that a person must be alive, and their right to life must be protected. 
Similarly, the right to health, as defined here, explicitly encompasses the right to 
sustenance, by calling for adequate sustenance to maintain a standard of health which 
sustains life at a minimally decent level. The thesis therefore encompasses Caney’s three 
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rights under one right to health, which was argued to be possible and useful for the case of 
climate change above. To reiterate, the right to health, as defined here, is not considered 
the sole human right threatened by climate change, but rather seen as a useful 
representation of the key interests threatened by climate change. 
 
The above defined right to health should be considered, in the case of climate change, as a 
negative right, because it was argued above that negative rights are more useful for the 
grounds of climate justice than positive rights. This implies that in order to respect the 
human right to health, actors must refrain from any action which reduces the standard of 
health to a level below minimally decent. Partaking in activities that reduce the standard of 
health below this threshold should be considered a violation to the human right to health. 
Importantly, this negative right is strong enough to require significant global action on 
climate change. Chapter One explained that in order to avoid dangerous climate change, 
global temperature change must be kept at or below 2°C compared to pre-industrial 
levels.65 Importantly for this thesis, there is a relationship between the threat to the human 
right to health and the 2°C threshold. For one, the definition of a right to health, in this 
chapter, encompasses the right to sustenance, which is threatened by a 2°C rise. According 
to the IPCC, a 2°C rise would negatively impact production of wheat, rice, and maize in 
tropical and temperate regions.66 In addition, a 2°C is projected to threaten renewable 
surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions, intensifying 
competition for water among sectors.67 This clearly illustrates that a rise in temperature of 
2°C is projected to threaten the adequate level of sustenance necessary to standard of 
health which sustains life at a minimally decent level. In addition to this, a 2°C rise is 
projected to cause ‘dangerous’ climate change, which includes a major ice melting, 
wildfires, ocean acidification, and heat waves.68 These effects of climate change will result 
in loss of life, forced migration, place stress on water and food resources, and result in 
spreading of diseases, as was explained in Chapter One and in the current chapter. Forced 
migration will threaten the right to health by exposing individuals to conditions which are 
likely to spread deadly diseases, as was explained above. Furthermore, stress on food and 
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water resources will threaten the right to health because these conditions are not 
conducive to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level. World 
health experts have concluded with ‘very high confidence’ that climate change will 
contribute to the global burden of disease and premature death, and that a rise of 2°C will 
lead to deleterious consequences.69 All of the above seems to suggest that protecting the 
negative right to health, as defended in this thesis, will require that global temperatures 
are kept below at or below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels.  
 
Keeping global temperatures at this level will require substantial emissions reductions over 
the next few decades. The IPCC claims, at the time of writing, that emissions would have to 
be cut by 40% - 70% by 2050 compared to 2010, and would need to be near zero or below 
in 2100.70 This will require substantial global action, because at the time of writing, 
emissions have not yet slowed. The latest IPCC report claims that greenhouse gas emissions 
have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 2000 
and 2010, despite a growing number of climate change mitigation policies.71 The growth 
rate of emissions increased from 1.5% a year in 1980 – 2000 to 3% a year in 2000 – 2012.72 
This indicates that even a negative, minimal right to health, requires urgent change in 
behavior at the global level to keep global temperature change at or below 2°C.73 In order 
to prevent the violation of the right to health, actors around the world will have to lower 
emissions substantially. Emission must be lowered because adaptation to climate change 
effects alone will not be enough ensure that the right to health is not violated. The IPCC 
explains that without mitigation efforts (lowering emissions), warming is more likely than 
not to exceed 4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.74  The risks associated with 
temperatures at or above 4°C include substantial species extinction, global and regional 
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food insecurity, consequential constraints on common human activities, and limited 
potential for adaptation.75 In other words, if emissions are not lowered, it will not be 
possible for humans to ‘adapt themselves out’ of climate change. After a certain point, 
there will be irreversible damages which not only threaten the right to health,76 but also 
cannot be addressed by adaptation. These irreversible damages have the potential to exist 
for multiple centuries, or even millennia, threatening the right to health of humans far into 
the future.77  
 
To take one example of an irreversible effect of climate change, consider Antarctic ice 
sheets. These ice sheets required millennia to grow to their present sizes. Once ice sheet 
disintegration reaches a certain point, the momentum of the process of melting will mean 
further melting is unpreventable, which will cause sea level rise of many meters and 
worldwide loss of coastal cities, a consequence that is irreversible.78 A loss of coastal cities 
will threaten the human right to health, as people are forced to migrate, potentially 
spreading diseases, and forced to live in inadequate conditions. As another example, take 
the extinction of species, which will have irreversible consequences on ecosystems which 
humans depend on to remain alive.79 If ecosystems are damaged irreversibly, then this will 
threaten the right to health because it will result in loss of sustenance sources for humans 
who depend on these ecosystems. Finally, along with irreversible damage, a lack of 
mitigation (lowering emissions) can also lead to sudden, unpredictable, large scale impacts 
descending at random on particular individuals, communities, industries and visiting them 
with pure, unrecoverable cots.80 The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the 
magnitude of global warming increases.81 An accumulation of GHG gases in the atmosphere 
may quite suddenly drive the climate system into some unanticipated, radically different 
state to which it is virtually impossible to adapt.82 In sum, according to the best available 
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scientific evidence, it seems that it is not possible to refrain from violating the right to 
health without lowering emissions.  This will be further discussed in Chapter Five, which 
will outline what justice demands in the case of climate change. 
 
It should be noted that even though the right to health has been defined as minimal, when 
it comes to a right to health and climate change in the long run, more must be done. The 
right to health is linked to other, more complex matters. A useful way to illustrate this point 
is to outline the social determinants of health, which encompass the ways in which health 
is shaped by various social factors and living conditions.83 Some examples of social 
determinants of health are income and employment, education, health systems, social 
protection, the built environment, and social patterns of exclusion.84 Most of these social 
determinants of health overlap and affect one another.85 For example, two of the most 
impactful social determinants of health are income and education, and these factors seem 
to be intertwined in a number of ways. Studies show that the most disadvantaged 
members of society, especially those with below poverty-level incomes or without a high-
school diploma, generally experience the worst health, and even those with intermediate 
income appear less healthy than the most affluent and educated members of society.86 The 
direct impact of income is related to having more economic resources, and thus having 
access to healthier nutrition, housing, or neighborhood conditions, or less stress due to the 
availability of more resources to cope with daily challenges.87 Income is linked to education, 
because poor families may not be able to send their children to school or university, and 
without degrees, these children will not be able to get high paying jobs in their adult life, 
and not send their own children to school, meaning the cycle of lack of education and 
poverty continue, which negatively impacts health.  
 
Some of the above social determinants are linked to climate change, since climate change 
affects the built environment and health systems, but many are also linked to overarching 
global inequality issues, such as unequal income, education, and unemployment, which are 
important to highlight as a cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan justice is concerned with the equal 
treatment of morally equal human beings, and the social determinants of health are clearly 
not distributed in an equal manner across the globe, or even within nations. If they were, 
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then every individual on the planet would be in good health. The high rates of childhood 
mortality and low life expectancy in poorer countries and the high levels of health 
inequality even within the richest countries suggest that this is not the case. For this reason, 
protecting the right to health adequately will include taking aspects of the social 
determinants of health seriously. Rectifying the unequal distribution of these social 
determinants will necessarily require substantial resources for redistributive purposes.88  
However, for the purposes of this thesis, which seeks to assess current action on climate 
change from a global justice perspective, a minimally defined negative right to health will 
be enough to illustrate that current climate action does not represent a just response to 
climate change. The above serves only to acknowledge that health is a complex issue, 
which is being simplified for the sake of this thesis in order to demonstrate that climate 
change action cannot be said to represent even the most minimal protection of the right to 
health. For this reason, the climate justice position will be grounded in the negative right to 
health, defined as the human right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally 
decent level, and includes adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health.89   
Conclusion 
This chapter concerned defining what grounds the conditions of justice. The chapter 
defended the use of a human rights based approach and explained that human rights will 
be defined as protecting human interests. Following this, the chapter examined existing 
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cosmopolitan arguments for human rights in the case of climate change in order to assess 
whether any right, or set of rights, are best suited for the grounds of justice. It was put 
forward that negative rights, substantive rights, and existing rights are particularly useful 
for the climate justice position defended in this thesis. Finally, it was argued that the right 
to health encompasses the key basic human interests threatened by climate change, and is 
therefore sufficient to ground the climate justice position. The chapter defined the right to 
health as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, 
and includes adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health, and began to explain 
what action is necessary according to this right. Chapters Three and Four have now laid the 
foundation for Chapter Five, which will use the scope and grounds of climate justice 
developed in these two chapters in order to define what climate justice demands. 
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Chapter Five – The Demands of Climate Justice 
Introduction 
This chapter is the third of three chapters that make up Part II of the thesis ‘Developing a 
Global Justice and Climate Change Position.’ Chapter Three concerned defining the scope of 
climate justice, Chapter Four was concerned with setting out the grounds of climate justice, 
and this current chapter will identify what climate justice demands. The chapter will build 
on Chapters Three and Four and complete the climate justice position defended in the 
thesis by defining three demands of justice required to meet a condition of justice in the 
case of climate change. These three demands are considered normative principles, which 
must underwrite a more just global response to climate change. To achieve this, the 
chapter will explore three main issues associated with the empirical conditions of climate 
change, namely what is owed to future generations, how to include less developed 
countries in climate change action, and who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in 
collective action. Chapter Two argued that these issues must be addressed in a normative 
assessment of the climate change problem, because they are part and parcel of the 
problem.   
 
The chapter will be organized into three main parts. The first section will address how 
much is owed to future generations. It will be argued that the non-relational scope of the 
mixed position defined in Chapter Three, and the grounds of justice defined in Chapter 
Four imply that the right to health1 of future generations must be considered to be equally 
as valuable as the right to health of current generations. This will be considered as the non-
relational minimum, which cannot be crossed under any circumstances. The section that 
follows will use the relational side of the mixed position to explore the relationship 
between developed countries and less developed countries, and make the case that states 
should be held to account according to both their emissions levels and wealth levels. This 
will be considered a relational demand which stems from the special relationships created 
by climate change. Finally, the third section of the chapter will make the case that empirical 
conditions of the climate change problem imply that responsible actors making up the 
‘collective’ in collective action extend beyond states, and should include all capable actors, 
including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international institutions, and states, 
irrespective of the country they live or exist in. This conception of collective responsibility 
will be developed from a relational discussion of the relationships between actors causing 
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climate change and those suffering from its consequences, and make up the third demand 
of justice.  The chapter will conclude with a summary of the arguments made in Part II of 
the thesis, and outline what is to come in Part III. 
Future Generations  
The issue of future generations, and particularly how much is owed to them, is a 
contentious topic within climate ethics literature. This section of the chapter will explain 
what exactly is owed to future generations according to the climate justice position 
defended in this thesis. In order to determine this, it must first be argued that future 
generations are an important part of the climate change problem, and must therefore be 
considered within the climate justice position defended in this thesis.  
Future Generations and Climate Change 
As was explained in Chapter One, future generations are part and parcel of the climate 
change problem, because future generations will be the primary victims of climate change. 
Although climate change effects are already occurring and will increasingly affect present 
generations, a temperature change of 2°C, which will result in ‘dangerous climate change’ 
according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will not occur until 
2050-2100.2 This implies that the primary group of victims will be those who are not yet 
alive today. To complicate matters, the main benefit of emissions, namely energy 
production, is largely consumed by the present generation.3 This provides a significant 
incentive for the current generation to take no action, because members of the current 
generation may never see the environmental benefits of cutting back on their energy. In 
addition, there is no chance for a reciprocal relationship between present and future 
generations. Future generations cannot offer present generations any reward for their 
actions. Furthermore, future generations may have interests, but cannot express these, as 
they do not yet exist, and therefore have no bargaining power.4 Deciding what action to 
take on climate change, a decision that will significantly affect future generations, 
therefore rests completely with the current generation. For this reason, it is important to 
define what is owed to future generations. More specifically, the rights of future 
generations must be defined, because rights imply duties. If rights are not defined, it may 
be difficult to argue that present generations have any duties to change their current 
behavior. For the reasons above, a discussion of the rights of future generations must be 
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included in the climate justice position explicated in this thesis. The chapter now turns to 
this discussion, by assessing arguments for and against the rights of future generations. It 
will be put forward that the scope and grounds of justice defended in the previous chapters 
imply that arguments for the rights of future generations outweigh arguments against 
these rights. Through this discussion, the chapter will take a stance on how much is owed 
to future generations according to the climate justice position defended in this thesis. 
The Case Against the Rights of Future Generations 
The most well-known argument against protecting the rights of future generations is a 
problem presented by Derek Parfit. Parfit sets up a puzzle he refers to as the ‘non-identity 
problem,’ which asserts that the harm committed against future generations is not morally 
problematic as long as these individuals have a life worth living. It is worth noting that 
Parfit himself does not seek to support a specific stance here, but is rather setting up a 
problem which must be solved. The non-identity problem rests on the idea that the exact 
moment an individual is conceived is highly important: if an individual had been conceived 
‘even an hour after their actual conception,’ they would not be the same individual, but 
someone else, because the genetic makeup of the individual would be based on a different 
sperm.5 This is relevant to the climate change problem for the following reason. When 
current generations choose to pollute, this means that there will be a higher standard of 
living for the next few centuries, resulting from the profits of energy consumption. 
According to the logic underpinning the non-identity problem, this will directly affect 
conception times, because being richer implies that people will marry different people over 
time, and even in the same marriages, the children will be conceived at different times.6 
This implies that current generations can directly affect which individuals are conceived by 
choosing not to lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which will affect wealth levels, and 
ultimately conception times.  
 
According to non-identity problem, the power of current generations to affect conception 
implies that future generations cannot be harmed, because they are benefitted overall by 
being born in the first place.7 In this sense, even if high GHG emissions levels negatively 
affect the environment, existing and suffering from the effects of climate change is better 
than never having existed at all. Therefore, the decision of present generations to emit 
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GHGs, which leads to the birth of a specific future generation, does not harm that specific 
generation. If GHG emissions levels had been lowered, then specific future generations 
would never have been born. Since it is better to be alive and existing in the conditions 
caused by climate change than never being born, there is no moral wrong in emitting GHGs, 
because this leads to future generations benefitting by being born in the first place.8 
However, there is a caveat to the non-identity problem, which is that individuals must be 
able to lead a ‘life worth living.’9  According to the non-identity problem, if polluting results 
in lives which are worth living, then ‘we know that our choice [to pollute] will not be worse 
for [future generations].’10 This is an important caveat, which will be further discussed 
below, when it will be questioned whether future generations will be able to lead such a 
life if their right to health is violated. 
 
This ‘non-identity’ problem is the most common argument used to reject the idea of 
obligations to future generations. There are not many arguments against obligations to 
future generations which are as convincing as Parfit’s non-identity thought experiment. 
Other, less sophisticated counterarguments do exist, and are often presented by the 
utilitarian or pragmatist theorists discussed in Chapter Two. These theorists commonly 
claim, for example, that future generations will be better off than present generations, and 
will therefore have the capacity to address climate change.11 These types of arguments will 
be addressed alongside Parfit’s argument below, when making the case for the rights of 
future generations.  
The Case for the Rights of Future Generations 
There are several justice based arguments in defense of the rights of future generations. 
One argument commonly put forward by justice theorists is that time of birth is a matter of 
luck, similarly to place of birth, rendering time morally arbitrary.12  An individual cannot 
choose when to be born, so this should not affect what they deserve. This assertion is 
usually based on a non-relational conception of justice, which, as explained in Chapter 
Three, requires all humans to be included in the scope of justice, on the basis of their 
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eds. Gardiner, S. M., Caney, S., Jamieson, D., and Shue, H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 116 
9 Ibid., p. 113 
10 Ibid., p. 116 
11 See for example, Collier, P., The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature (London: Allen 
Lane, 2010), p. 201, or Lomborg, B., The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 322 
12 See for example Caney, S., ‘Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk’ in Journal 
of Social Philosophy, 40 (2009), p. 168 or Vanderheiden, S., Atmospheric Justice – A Political Theory of Climate 
Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 114 
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humanity. In this way, all humans are morally equal, no matter the time or place of their 
birth. Chapter Three explained that the scope of justice defended in this thesis is based, in 
the first instance, in a non-relational conception of justice. This non-relational scope implies 
that present and future generations must be considered as morally equal, because both 
generations are made up of morally equal individuals. As was explained in Chapter Four, 
the non-relational scope of this thesis is grounded in the right to health, which implies that 
all humans, unconditionally, have the right to health, defined as the right to a standard of 
health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes adequate sustenance to 
maintain this standard of health. In terms of future generations, this implies that right to 
health of future generations is morally as important as the rights of current generations, 
because future generations and present generations are part of the non-relational scope of 
this thesis, which is grounded in the right to health. This implies that the basic right to 
health of future persons must not be sacrificed in order to promote the basic right to 
health of the present generations.   
However, before ascribing the right to health to future generations, it must be illustrated 
that it is indeed possible for future generations to possess rights. This is a contentious issue, 
because future generations do not yet exist, and there may be doubt over whether non-
existent individuals can be said to possess human rights. Since rights are intended to 
protect or advance a person’s basic interests, as was argued in Chapter Four of this thesis, 
the question to ask is whether it is possible to attribute basic interests to future 
generations without knowledge of who these individuals will be. If this is the case, a right to 
health, which is based on the basic interest in health, can be attributed to individuals who 
make up future generations. Steven Vanderheiden claims that this is indeed possible, 
because even if the exact genetic makeup of future generations is unknown, it can be 
assumed that future generations will have interests, because they will be humans.13 
Importantly for this thesis, it can be assumed that future humans will have the same basic 
needs of clean water, sufficient nutrition, adequate housing, and lack of diseases to 
maintain basic health. Therefore it can be assumed that future generations will have a basic 
interest in health. And as Vanderheiden explains, ‘although we do not violate the interests 
of future generations now, because future people do not yet exist, our actions are almost 
assured to do so in the future.’14 This has important moral implications. 
 
                                                          
13 Vanderheiden, S., Atmospheric Justice – A Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 129 
14 Ibid. 
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The time-lag between actions today and the violation of interests in the future is arguably 
morally irrelevant according to a non-relational conception of justice. According to the non-
relational scope of this thesis, all individuals, irrespective of their time or place of birth, 
have the right to health, because they have a basic interest in health, and there is a duty of 
justice to respect this right. For this reason, it is morally wrong to act in ways that cause an 
individual’s right to health to be violated, whether the right is violated immediately or at 
some point in the future.15 As Vanderheiden explains, ‘if we adopt a polluting policy today 
and some future technology prevents it adversely affecting persons a century from now, 
that policy is nonetheless wrong at the time we adopt it insofar as we can anticipate its 
harmful effects.’16 Therefore, if a right will in the future be threatened by policy decisions 
made today, then the ability to connect those policy decisions with future rights violations 
must inform current decisions.17 Vanderheiden refers to this as the rational capacity for 
foresight: ‘the fact that we can foresee having obligations has moral consequences for 
us.’18 This argument complements the position taken in this thesis which aims to respond 
to the best available scientific evidence on the empirical conditions of climate change. If 
this evidence is accepted as credible, there arguably exists ‘rational foresight’ which can 
predict that basic interests in health of future generations will be threatened by climate 
change. Since the right to health19 serves to protect the basic interest in health, this implies 
that the right to health must be respected, and current action on climate change must take 
the right to health into account.  
 
The argument above presents a powerful response to the non-identity problem, because it 
illustrates that present generations can harm future generations, by violating their basic 
interests, and therefore their human rights. This seems to suggest that the violation of 
human rights is an important moral wrong which is not fully acknowledged in the non-
identity problem. Instead, the non-identity problem purports that future generations are 
overall benefitted from being born, and can therefore not be harmed by current pollution. 
James Woodward is critical of this notion and puts forward that even if an action which 
violates a person’s human rights benefits this person in some way, this does not cancel out 
or detract from the moral wrong of the rights violation. For example, even if an individual 
                                                          
15 Vanderheiden, S., Atmospheric Justice – A Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 130 
16 Ibid., p. 132 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 136 
19 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
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who was held in a Nazi concentration camp feels that this experience bestowed him with a 
deeper appreciation of life than if he had not been a prisoner, this does not negate the fact 
that his human rights were violated.20 In this sense, even if high emitting present 
generations benefit future generations by ensuring that they are born, which means they 
are better off than if they had never been born at all, this does not detract from the moral 
wrong which is committed against future individuals whose basic right to health is violated. 
The non-identity problem does not address this moral harm, and is for this reason does not 
provide an adequate defense against the rights of future generations. 
Furthermore, the non-identity problem asserts that polluting is acceptable if future 
individuals lead a worthwhile life. However, it was explained in Chapter Four that humans 
will not be able to lead a minimally decent life if their basic interests are violated. A 
minimally decent life has been defined as one which is not consumed with the struggle to 
survive. If present generations continue to emit, then future generations’ basic interest in 
health will be violated, which will result in these individuals living lives that are not 
minimally decent, as was explained in Chapter Four. This seems to imply that the non-
identity problem falsely assumes that future generations will be able to lead a worthwhile 
life even if pollution occurs.  In other words, the non-identity problem is arguably mistaken 
in its assertion that future generations will be able to lead a life worth living. Moreover, the 
non-identity problem is not able to account for the moral importance of violating the rights 
of future generations. For these reasons, the non-identity problem will at this point be 
dismissed as an argument against the protection of the right to health of future 
generations. 
Another potential criticism against protecting the rights of future generations is put 
forward by some pragmatists and utilitarians, who claim that future generations will be 
better off than present generations, and will therefore have the capacity to address climate 
change.21 For these theorists, this assumption is enough to discount the rights of future 
generations, and allow present generations to emit GHGs until a less costly solution to 
curbing emissions is found. The problem with this type of argument, according to Simon 
Caney, is that it is not certain future generations will be wealthier, because the level of cost 
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21 See for example, Collier, P., The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature (London: Allen 
Lane, 2010), p. 201, or Lomborg, B., The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World 
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to tackle climate change may increase at a greater speed than the level of wealth.22 
Secondly, the argument overlooks that it may be cheaper to tackle the problem earlier 
rather than later, or even that there may be a ‘tipping point’ of irreversible damage.23 In 
other words, Caney claims that assuming that future generations will be richer necessarily 
means oversimplifying the climate change problem by making assumptions which are not 
in line with the climate science outlined in Chapter One and Chapter Four. Both of these 
chapters explained that continued GHG emissions will lead to increasingly dangerous 
climate change effects, and that eventually, inaction will lead to irreversible damages, 
which are incompatible with human life. These irreversible changes include mass extinction 
of animals, changes in marine ecosystem productivity, damage to fisheries, changes in 
oceanic oxygen concentrations and decreased terrestrial vegetation.24 For this reason, 
claiming that future generations will be better off, and therefore better equipped to deal 
with the consequences of climate change, is an epistemic presupposition of the scientific 
evidence on climate change. The argument that future generations will be better off will 
here be dismissed, and not considered reason enough to discount the rights of future 
generations. Now that the arguments for and against the rights of future generations have 
been explored, the chapter turns to what climate justice demands in the case of future 
generations. 
 
In line with the non-relational conception of climate justice defended in Chapter Three, 
which is grounded in the right to health defended in Chapter Four,  it seems clear that the 
defense of the right to health of future generations must be included in the conception of 
climate justice defended in this thesis. The thesis is based, in the first instance, on a non-
relational conception of justice and defines a moral minimum of every person having the 
human right to health by virtue of their humanity. This implies that the right to health of 
future generations is morally as important as the right to health of current generations. 
More specifically, since it can be reasonably assumed that future generations will have a 
basic interest in health, as explained above, rights-discounting is considered to be 
incompatible with the global justice position defended in this thesis. This implies that the 
right to health does not diminish over time, and future generations have a right to health in 
the same sense that present generations do, and this right must be protected. Taking these 
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23 Ibid., p. 174 
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considerations into account, the stance on future generations is as follows: the right to 
health25 of future generations is considered to be equally as valuable as the right to health 
of current generations, and must therefore be protected. This is the first explicit demand of 
justice that must be met in order to achieve a condition of climate justice according to the 
position defended in this thesis.  
 
Substantial action on climate change will be required in order to meet this demand. 
Chapter Four explained that in order to protect the right to health of future generations, 
the global temperature rise must be kept at or below 2°C. Surpassing this threshold will 
lead to wide scale floods, droughts, heat-waves, sea-level rises, and forced migration, all of 
which threaten the right to health, as was explained in the previous chapter.26 Although the 
2°C goal is becoming increasingly difficult due to current inaction, the IPCC maintains, at 
the time of writing, that there are multiple mitigation pathways that are likely to limit 
warming to below 2°C.27 As was explained in the previous chapter, these pathways would 
require extensive emissions reductions over the next few decades.28 The IPCC stresses that 
emissions would have to be cut by 40% - 70% by 2050 compared to 2010, and would need 
to be near zero or below in 2100.29 This will be further discussed in Part III of the thesis, 
particularly in Chapters Seven and Eight, which concern assessing current practice. For now, 
the chapter merely serves to highlight that the non-relational scope of the thesis, which is 
grounded in the right to health, calls for extensive lowering of global emissions.  
Less Developed Countries 
The question of how to include less developed counties in climate change action is subject 
to ongoing debate within the climate justice field. In order to explore this question, it must 
first be explained that less developed countries are important to the climate change 
problem. After this has been clarified, the chapter will discuss how to include less 
developed countries in climate change action, or, more specifically, discuss how global 
benefits and burdens should be distributed between developed countries and less 
developed countries. This is a relational discussion. The thesis has defined a moral 
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minimum using a non-relational scope and grounds of justice above: the right to health30 of 
future generations is considered to be equally as valuable as the right to health of current 
generations, and must therefore be protected. This sets a moral minimum that cannot be 
crossed, and implies that action on climate change is morally necessary. The discussion 
below will now assess what kind of action is necessary, by exploring the relationship 
between developed countries and less developed countries. In other words, the thesis has 
now set a non-relational minimum, and moves onto the relational discussion, which seeks 
to explore what demands of justice stem from the relationships arising as a result of 
climate change. This was defended as important and necessary in Chapter Three, which 
advocated a scope of justice that is both relational and non-relational, so as to fully capture 
the empirical realities of the climate change problem.  
 
Before the importance of less developed countries is discussed, the benefits and burdens 
of climate change must be briefly defined, in order to clarify what exactly is at stake. 
Benefits in the case of climate change include profits made by large industries (e.g. oil and 
automobile), as well as smaller scale companies who profit from pollution.31 There are also 
individual level benefits such as driving, air travel, heating and cooling of homes, and 
buying foreign products. Climate change burdens, on the other hand, are usually split into 
two broad categories: mitigation and adaptation.  
Mitigation burdens are defined as the costs of actors not engaging in activities that 
contribute to climate change. This is an opportunity cost, because these actors forego 
benefits they could have had if they had been allowed to emit freely, for example profits 
from production of goods.32 Mitigation burdens can also involve additional costs associated 
with lowering emissions, for example investing in new technology. In contrast, adaptation 
burdens are defined as the costs of adopting measures which enable others to cope with 
the ill effects of climate change.33 Examples include building seawalls to protect those who 
live near the coast, subsidizing people to move away from threatened areas, inoculating 
people from infectious diseases, supporting irrigation systems in drought prone areas, and 
sending overseas aid to victims of malnutrition.34 These and other burdens of adaptation 
                                                          
30 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
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31 Gardiner, S. M., ‘Ethics and Global Climate Change’ in Ethics, 114 (2004), p. 595 
32 Caney, S., ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’ in Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 18 (2005), p. 751 
33 Ibid., p. 752 
34 Caney, S., ‘Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged’ in Critical Review of International Social and 
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are largely financial burdens. As was explained in Chapter One, it is widely recognized that 
whatever happens, some adaptation measures will be required alongside mitigation 
measures. This is because even if emissions are cut dramatically, the greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) expelled so far are predicted to cause environmental changes.35 For this reason, 
mitigation and adaption will both need to be pursued. The chapter now turns to how these 
burdens should be distributed between developed and less developed countries according 
to the climate justice position defended in this thesis. 
The Importance of Less Developed Countries 
There are two main reasons why less developed countries must be considered in the 
conception of climate justice defended in this thesis. The first is because these countries 
will be hardest hit by the detrimental effects of climate change. As was explained in 
Chapter One, this is in part because of their geographical location and in part because these 
countries depend on local resources which will be affected by climate change more than 
developed countries. In addition, less developed countries may not have the financial 
assets to respond to climate change, and will as a consequence not be able to prepare or 
defend themselves against effects like flooding, droughts, or rising sea levels.36 As this 
thesis is based in a non-relational conception of justice, which implies that every human, by 
virtue of their humanity, has the basic right to health, it seems clear that less developed 
countries must be included in a conception of climate change justice because the basic 
right to health of individuals living in these countries is threatened by climate change. They 
are the primary victims of climate change, alongside with future generations, as explained 
in Chapter One.  
 
However, there is an important difference between future generations and less developed 
countries, because unlike future generations, which do not yet exist, some less developed 
countries currently have an effect on global GHG levels. This is the second reason they 
must be included in a climate justice conception. It is now becoming increasingly clear that 
if less developed countries pursue their own economic development with the same 
disregard for the natural environment that developed countries displayed, it will 
dramatically worsen the predicted effects of climate change.37 In fact, less developed 
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countries are projected to contribute 45% of global emissions by 2050.38 It is therefore 
necessary to consider how to include less developed countries in global climate change 
action, so that these countries can contribute to lowering global emissions to avoid global 
temperatures rising by more than 2°C. However, this inclusion is no simple matter, because 
the relationship between developed countries and less developed countries is quite 
complex, as will be explored below. 
 
Before the relationship between developed and less developed countries can be discussed, 
it is important to stress that the term ‘less developed country’ is not a straightforward or 
unproblematic categorization. Interestingly, the category of less developed country is often 
skirted over or left undefined within climate justice literature. For example, Steven 
Vanderheiden39 and Simon Caney40  do not provide a definition of less developed countries, 
and simply state that countries such as China, India, and Brazil are less developed. Similarly, 
Paul Harris does not define less developed countries and includes China under his 
conception.41 Finally, Henry Shue42 and Edward Page43  discuss less developed countries at 
length, without providing a definition of this category. Leaving less developed countries 
undefined is problematic, because this categorization is not uncontested.  
 
To illustrate the contested nature of the category, consider that the World Bank defines 
countries as less developed according to a simple economic calculation: countries with a 
gross national income of 11,905 US Dollars or less are currently (until December 2015) 
defined as developing countries.44 In contrast to the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) takes a more complex approach, dubbed the ‘Human 
Development Index’, which includes more than economic considerations. According to the 
UNDP, the Human Development Index was created to emphasize that people and their 
capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not 
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44 International Statistics Institute ‘Developing Countries’ http://www.isi-
web.org/component/content/article/5-root/root/81-developing [accessed 03.04.2015] 
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economic growth alone.45 The Human Development Index takes into account three factors: 
life expectancy, level of education, and standard of living. The scores of these factors are 
then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.46 The difference in the 
approaches of the UNDP and the World Bank is illustrative of the fact that categorizing 
countries is not a straightforward process, and that the category of less developed country 
should not be seen as uncontested. There is disagreement over which factors to take into 
account, and there is no one standard definition of ‘less developed.’ To add to the 
complexity, there is a category which captures ‘five major emerging national economies’ 
referred to as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Although all of these 
countries, except Russia, are considered less developed according to the World Bank,47 the 
BRICS countries are distinguished from other less developed countries by their large, fast-
growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs (all five are G20 
members, for example). Furthermore, the BRICS countries represent 26% of the planet's 
land mass, are home to 46% of the world's population, and account for 18% of the world's 
GDP.48 The economic and political power of these nations is indicative of the reality that 
the category of ‘less developed countries’ captures countries, which are incredibly diverse 
– China and Somalia for example are both considered less developed according to the 
World Bank. 
 
The distinction between less developed and developed countries is especially important in 
the case of climate change, because under current climate change governance laws, only 
certain ‘developed’ countries are held to direct account for financial contributions and 
lowering of emissions. This will be further discussed in Chapter Seven, but it is worth briefly 
explaining the categories employed by the United Nations Framework for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) here. The UNFCCC currently has four categories of countries: Annex I, Annex II, 
non-Annex I, and Least Developed Countries. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the 
Annex I countries are ‘industrialized’ and held to account for emissions reductions, and the 
Annex II countries, which represent the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development members of Annex I, are held to account for financial contributions.49 Non-
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Annex I countries, a category which includes 148 countries including Brazil, China, India and 
South Africa, are considered ‘mostly developing countries’ and are currently not held to 
account for emissions reductions or financial contributions.50 Finally, out of the 148 Non-
Annex I countries, there are 49 ‘Least Developed Countries’ which are considered especially 
vulnerable to climate change because of their limited capacity to respond and adapt to its 
adverse effects.51 In sum, under the UNFCCC, all 148 countries outside of Annex I and II are 
considered developing countries, and there are 49 countries, including Angola, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Somalia, which are especially vulnerable to climate change. The category of 
less developed countries under the UNFCCC is indicative of the complexity of defining ‘less 
developed.’ The discussion below, and remainder of the thesis, will aim to take the above 
complexities into account when discussing the relationship between less developed and 
developed countries. Because this thesis concerns itself with climate change, the categories 
of the UNFCCC will be used to define which countries are less developed (non-Annex I) and 
which countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change (Least Developed Countries). 
However, it should be noted that this is not the only way to categorize these countries, and 
that the thesis is merely following one categorization which is well established, and more 
importantly, relevant to the climate change problem. 
The Distribution of Benefits and Burdens in Climate Change  
As can be seen above, less developed countries must be included in a conception of climate 
justice because they present one group of primary victims of climate change, and because 
they at the same time contribute to the climate change problem. However, deciding on 
how to include less developed countries in climate change action is by no means a 
straightforward matter, especially because the category of less developed country is not 
only contested, but often very broad, encompassing countries which differ from one 
another significantly. Interestingly, although the category of less developed country is very 
broad, there is one issue in particular which is often discussed in climate ethics literature 
when considering how to include less developed countries in climate change action. This is 
the issue of fairness, which arises from the relationship between developed countries and 
less developed countries in the case of climate change. Historically, developed countries 
are the main cause of climate change, and less developed countries are said to find it unfair 
that they must curb emissions when developed countries had the chance to emit freely. In 
addition, less developed countries are said to find it unfair that they must suffer from 
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consequences of climate change, when they have not caused this problem, and therefore 
deserve compensation.52 At the same time, developed countries have been known to be 
hesitant to act without the commitment of less developed countries, which is one of the 
main reasons the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.53 In sum, it seems that the 
relationship between developed and less developed countries reveals questions of fairness 
in terms of the distribution of benefits and burdens in climate change. Fairness is extremely 
important in the case of climate change because proposed action which is seen as unfair is 
likely to be rejected, and efforts to reduce the effects of climate change will be drastically 
undermined due to lack of participation. Considering the urgency of the climate change 
problem, and the non-relational right to health which is at stake, action on climate change 
is morally required. If the issue of fairness is important in terms of taking climate change 
action, then finding a fair solution is, by this logic, morally important. For this reason, it is 
arguably morally important to consider what less developed countries consider to be a fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens in the case of climate change.  
 
The notion of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens will here be defined in line with 
Brian Barry’s definition of fair distribution. Barry defines fair distribution as a distribution 
‘people can accept not merely in the sense that they cannot reasonably expect to get more, 
but in the stronger sense that they can reasonably claim more, morally speaking, as they 
can reasonably accept the distribution and have no moral claim for a different 
distribution.’54 Under this conception, if distribution is reflective of what all parties can 
reasonably agree to, then it is morally fair, because no one party could morally expect more 
than this. Barry’s argument resides on the idea that if a party can reasonably agree to a 
distribution, this implies that the party accepts this distribution as fair. This definition of 
fairness has been well established in political philosophy. Although there exist other 
conceptions of fairness, Barry’s conception is useful in the sense that it provides a moral 
argument for exploring the relationship between parties in order to understand what these 
parties could reasonably agree to. Barry provides a manner in which to explore the realities 
of existing relationships and define what is morally fair in these relationships. Finding a fair 
solution to the distribution of benefits and burdens is morally important in the case of 
climate change, and Barry provides a blueprint for finding this fair solution. For this reason, 
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 128 
 
the thesis will adapt Barry’s conception of moral fairness, in order to discuss how to fairly 
distribute benefits and burdens between developed and less developed countries.  
 
Although the thesis makes use of Barry’s position, his position will necessarily have to be 
adapted in order to ensure that it is compatible with the global justice approach taken here. 
While the demand of justice developed below is a normative one, and reflects what 
countries ought to do according to the climate justice position defended here, the thesis 
will base this demand on a discussion of what less developed countries actually find fair, 
and would therefore agree to. In other words, the chapter explores the realities of the 
relationship between developed and less developed countries in order to consider what 
justice demands in the case of this relationship. This differs from Barry’s conception, which 
is moral rather than empirical in the sense that he is not concerned with what parties 
actually want, but rather solely concerned with what parties ought to do.  
 
The thesis adds an empirical element to the discussion in order to apply the mixed scope of 
justice defended in Chapter Three. The scope of justice employed in this thesis is in part 
relational, and aims to explore the realities of global relationships caused by climate 
change in order to explicate demands of justice. In this sense, the thesis must explore the 
realities of what less developed countries find fair in order to explicate demands of justice 
which are specific to the relationship between developed and less developed countries. If 
the thesis merely assigned moral duties to less developed countries without considering 
the realities of what less developed countries find fair, then the thesis would not be 
conducting a relational discussion. For this reason, although the thesis makes use of Brian 
Barry’s position, the position is adapted in the sense that the realities of what less 
developed countries find fair is included. In this sense, Barry’s notion of fairness is used to 
provide a blueprint for a normative relational discussion, which results in the formulation 
of a moral demand of climate justice. This demand is not based on a purely moral 
discussion, but on an empirical discussion of the reality of the relationship between 
developed and less developed countries that informs a moral discussion. 
 
 In order to ascertain what less developed countries would reasonably agree to, previous 
work on less developed countries’ perceptions of fairness in the case of climate change will 
be briefly outlined below. According to Steven Vanderheiden, less developed countries 
have three main concerns related to the issue of fairness. It is important to reiterate that 
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Vanderheiden includes China, India, and Brazil in his conception of less developed countries, 
which implies that the three concerns he outlines speak to the broad category of less 
developed countries, and not merely the Least Developed Countries which are most 
vulnerable to climate change. According to Vanderheiden, the first concern less developed 
countries have relates to the idea that developed countries have contributed most to the 
climate change problem, and should therefore pay more towards the cost of combatting its 
effects.55 This implies that less developed countries will perceive a distribution of benefits 
and burdens as unfair if these are not in line with historical contribution. Second, less 
developed countries believe that they face greater immediate problems that must be 
addressed before they can agree to help with climate change action.56 According to Henry 
Shue, it is difficult to see why less developed countries should divert their attention from 
their own worst problems in order to help with problems that for them are far less 
immediate and deadly.57 This implies that a distribution of benefits and burdens that 
includes less developed countries should consider the need to address urgent basic needs, 
because otherwise less developed countries cannot reasonably agree to it. Third, 
Vanderheiden explains that less developed countries believe that they should have a right 
to develop, and should therefore not have to cut their emissions as drastically as developed 
countries until such development is achieved.58 This is a complex concern, because less 
developed countries should not have to accept a climate change deal where they are 
essentially blocked from developing, but they cannot be left out of the climate deal entirely, 
because universal participation is necessary.59 To make matters more complicated, the 
developed countries will see little point in acting if the less developed countries are holding 
back.60 It appears there needs to be a balance between the concern for development and 
the need for cutting emissions. In sum, the three main concerns of the less developed 
countries in terms of fairness are acceptance of responsibility by the rich, ensuring basic 
needs are met, and guaranteeing that there is an opportunity to develop. If these are the 
main concerns in terms of fairness, it seems that all three concerns must be addressed to 
make the distribution of benefits and burdens reasonably acceptable to less developed 
countries. 
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It should be noted that some countries, particularly those classed as Least Developed 
Countries by the UNFCCC, would be more concerned about addressing urgent needs than 
having a right to develop, because they undoubtedly have greater urgent needs to address 
than BRICS countries, for example. Richer and advanced less developed countries, like 
China and Brazil, on the other hand, may be more concerned with having a right to develop, 
because these countries are well on their way to becoming developed countries, according 
to the BRICS categorization, and will feel strongly about not having this development 
impinged. Keeping these complexities in mind, the chapter now turns to discussing how 
these perceptions of fairness, which stem out of the relationship between developed 
countries and less developed countries, can be integrated into a conception of a 
distribution of benefits and burdens in the case of climate change. There are three existing 
positions on distributing benefits and burdens between states in climate ethics literature: 
Polluter Pays, Ability to Pay, or a mixture of both. Each of these positions will be assessed in 
turn. The assessment will concern to what extent each position is able to include the 
concerns of less developed countries outlined above. It will be argued that a mixed position 
is best able to accommodate less developed countries concerns, and therefore is best able 
to represent a distribution of benefits and burdens which is fair, in the sense that it can be 
reasonably accepted by all parties. 
The Polluter Pays Principle 
The Polluter Pays Principle, commonly referred to as the PPP, is based on examining who 
caused the problem, and using this information to determine who should pay (and how 
much) for climate change action. As Henry Shue explains, the PPP is based on a well-known 
conception of fairness, whereby we ‘clean up our own mess.’ 61 The ‘mess’ created in 
climate change is high GHG levels, which must be lowered to protect the right to health of 
future generations, as explained above. According to the PPP, the countries that have 
emitted the most, and/or continue to emit the most, are responsible for paying for most of 
the damages caused by these emissions. Proponents of the PPP usually conclude that 
developed countries should bear most of the burdens of climate change due to their high 
GHG emissions.62 In this way, the PPP is based entirely on taking responsibility for high GHG 
emissions by paying to fix the problems associated with these emissions. The PPP has an 
important advantage: it has been strongly defended by China, Brazil, and other less 
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developed countries in climate change negotiations.63 This implies that the less developed 
countries perceive it to be fair. This is unsurprising, because the PPP seems to fit in with the 
three concerns of less developed countries outlined above. The PPP explicitly places 
responsibility on developed countries, which allows less developed countries to address 
urgent needs because they are not required to act on climate change, and also allows these 
countries to develop without being burdened by costs, because they are not expected to 
pay for emissions reductions, unless their emissions reach a certain level. 
 
However, the PPP could considered to be unfair by some high emitting less developed 
countries because there is not a perfect correlation between high emissions and wealth, 
and requiring countries to pay in proportion to their emissions may perpetuate the poverty 
of some and reduce others to poverty. For example, China or India, countries which have 
high emissions (both countries were top three emitters in 2014),64 may not have the 
resources to pay for damages caused by these emissions because their level of wealth is 
not high enough to pay for damages.65 Simon Caney therefore believes it would be a 
mistake to determine who should bear the burden of climate change in isolation from an 
analysis of economic resources.66 This argument suggests that the PPP may be too 
simplistic, and result in a distribution of benefits and burdens which cannot be reasonably 
agreed to by all parties. If high emitting less developed countries are called on to pay for 
lowering emissions, and this results in them not being able to address urgent needs of their 
population, or to continue their development, because the cost of lowering emissions is 
too high, then it would be difficult for these countries to reasonably accept the distribution 
of benefits and burdens implied by the PPP. For this reason, the PPP arguably does not 
represent a useful model for the fair distribution of benefits and burdens between 
developed countries and less developed countries, because basing distribution of pollution 
may not be reasonably accepted by all. The chapter will now examine another position, the 
Ability to Pay Principle, in order to assess whether it is better suited to addressing the three 
less developed countries concerns outlined above. 
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The Ability to Pay Principle 
The Ability to Pay Principle, commonly referred to as the ATP, asserts that the responsibility 
for addressing climate change should be borne by the wealthy, and, moreover, that this 
responsibility should increase in line with the agent’s wealth.67 The key difference between 
the PPP and the ATP is that the ATP is indifferent to who caused harm and focuses instead 
on who can rectify harm.68 The ATP has several important advantages relating directly to 
the concerns of less developed countries outlined above. For this reason, it seems plausible 
that less developed countries would find the ATP fair. First, the responsibility to pay for 
climate change will fall mostly on the developed countries because they are the wealthiest 
countries, which is the first concern of the less developed countries, namely that developed 
countries are held to account for climate change. Secondly, if the responsibility to pay falls 
on a less developed country, this will only be when this country has the ability to pay. If a 
country is wealthy enough to pay for climate change action, or to reduce emissions, this 
seems to imply that other concerns, such as meeting the basic needs, may have already 
been met. Under the ATP, less developed countries will not be asked to pay until they are 
at a certain level of wealth, which is particularly important in the case of Least Developed 
Countries, which are vulnerable to climate change and do not have the resources to 
address the problem. This addresses the second concern of the less developed countries, 
namely that urgent needs must be addressed before climate change can be acted on. 
Finally, the fact that countries only have to pay when they are wealthy enough seems to 
imply that less developed countries would have time to develop to a certain point, at which 
they could begin to pay for climate change action. This addresses the third concern of the 
less developed countries which is that less developed countries have a right to develop. 
This is particularly important for richer less developed countries, who may feel that they 
have a right to develop to a certain level before being held accountable for climate change 
action. From the above, the ATP seems to be in line with what less developed countries 
consider fair, and what these countries could reasonably agree to. 
However, the ATP suffers from a key disadvantage. Not taking levels of emissions into 
consideration implies that wealthy countries with low GHG emissions will be required to 
pay as much as wealthy countries with high GHG emissions. This could be perceived as 
unfair because wealthy countries which contribute to combatting the climate change 
problem by limiting emissions are not rewarded for this behavior, and are in fact treated in 
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the same manner as high emitting countries. This is an important weakness of the ATP 
because the thesis is concerned with a solution which can be reasonably accepted by all. It 
seems unreasonable for wealthy low emitting nations, such as Iceland (average of 6.2 
metric tons of carbon per capita per year), to accept that they have to pay as much as rich 
polluting nations, such as the United States (average of 17.6 metric tons of carbon per 
capita per year),69 with no consideration for the differences in their emissions levels. In 
addition, the ATP arguably does not provide an incentive for countries to lower emissions, 
because there is no reward for lowering emissions under this model. Instead, countries can 
simply ‘pay their way’ and not consider emissions at all, which seems counterproductive to 
the goals of lowering emissions worldwide. It was explained in Chapter One and Chapter 
Four that it is not possible to pay for climate change without lowering emissions, in the 
sense that not lowering emissions will eventually lead to irreversible damages which 
humans will not be able to adapt to. These criticisms of the ATP, along with the criticisms of 
the PPP, will be taken into account below, when arguing that a mixed approach is best able 
to represent a distribution of benefits and burdens which can be reasonably accepted by 
less developed countries and developed countries. 
A Mixed Approach 
There is no one name for a mixed approach, as each proponent has their own version of 
ATP-PPP combinations and offer various names for their approaches. The discussion below 
will refer to two of the most well-known mixed approaches advocated by Thomas Risse and 
Simon Caney. Risse suggests a mixed approach that is based on an index that measures per-
capita wealth and per-capita emission rates, and then groups countries into categories 
depending on their combined index which weighs both criteria equally.70 The amount of 
emissions reduction or payments towards climate action for which a country is responsible 
would be a function of this index.71 Under this approach, a number of countries would not 
incur any responsibility, because they are ranked too low according to either one or both of 
these criteria.72 To illustrate, countries which have high levels of pollution and high levels of 
wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for global adaptation costs, and 
countries of low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best 
possible, and only when they rise in wealth will they have to pay more towards climate 
change adaptation costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low 
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emissions and low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and 
high wealth may be asked to contribute financially but not lower their emissions. 
 
This approach avoids the PPP’s problem of requiring high polluting countries to lower 
emissions, even if these countries are not wealthy enough to be able to do so. Although 
some less developed countries have high emissions levels, they may not be able to afford 
to reduce emissions or pay for mitigation as easily as other countries. This may interfere 
with their ability to address basic needs of their populations, or to pursue development, 
which are two of the less developed countries concerns outlined above. At the same time, 
Risse’s mixed approach strengthens the ATP because it acknowledges that some nations 
may be rich but have low emissions. As was discussed above, it is important to provide an 
incentive for countries with low emissions, and to treat them differently than countries 
with high emissions. Risse’s mixed approach seems to have an advantage over the ATP in 
this regard, because his approach highlights the fact that countries with low emissions and 
high emissions should be differentiated in terms of responsibilities, and may therefore be 
perceived as fairer than an approach based solely on wealth.  In this sense, the mixed 
approach Risse creates has the advantage of being fairer than either the ATP or PPP on its 
own, which is important because it may be more easily accepted by both developed 
countries and less developed countries.  
 
However, there is a second mixed approach which has an important contribution to make 
in terms of addressing less developed countries’ concerns. Simon Caney argues for an 
approach which recognizes a difference between (i) those whose wealth came about in 
ways which endangered the climate and (ii) those whose wealth came about in ways which 
did not endanger the climate.73 He believes that countries that fall into category (i) should 
be contributing more to climate change costs.74 This is in line with Risse’s argument, 
because Risse argues that high polluting countries that are rich are responsible for both 
financial contribution and lowering emissions, whereas ‘green’ rich countries are only 
responsible for contributing financially. Interestingly, Caney qualifies his approach with the 
notion that a country should only bear the burden of climate change so long as doing so 
does not push that country beneath a decent standard of living.75 This argument is useful 
because it seems to be particularly sensitive to the second and third concern of less 
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developed countries, which are that less developed countries have urgent needs which 
have to be addressed before contributions to climate change are made, and that less 
developed countries should have the right to develop. If countries must only contribute so 
long as this does not push them beneath a decent standard of living, this seems to imply 
that basic needs must be met and that countries must be developed enough to be able to 
contribute so that their contributions do not result in substandard living conditions for their 
population. This seems to be especially fair to countries which face urgent needs, 
particularly those in the category of Least Developed under the UNFCCC, who would under 
Caney’s model not be held to account for climate change action. 
 
Overall, it seems that all the mixed approaches defended by Risse and Caney have 
advantages over the ATP and PPP, especially in terms of taking the concerns of less 
developed countries into account. As was argued above, a distribution of benefits and 
burdens is considered fair when all parties cannot reasonably reject a distribution. In order 
to meet this condition, there must be consideration of what less developed countries 
believe to be fair: the burden falling on developed states who are seen to have caused the 
problem, basic needs being met before any climate action is taken, and the right to develop 
being taken into account. However, as it is important that all states participate in climate 
action, the developed nations, especially those that are ‘green,’ should also find any 
climate action fair. After reviewing the PPP, ATP, and mixed approaches, it seems that a 
mixed approach is fairest for all countries. It was illustrated above that the ATP puts too 
much burden on wealthy ‘green’ countries, and the PPP has the potential to push high 
emitters with low wealth into poverty. The mixed approach arguably recognizes the 
concerns of both less developed countries and countries which have low emissions and 
high levels of wealth. Therefore, the global justice position on less developed countries will 
be based on a mixed approach. This approach will now be outlined below. 
 
The two mixed approaches assessed above both have strong elements, which will be 
incorporated into the mixed approach defended in this thesis. This ensures that the thesis 
speaks to existing literature. Risse suggests measuring emissions output as well as per 
capita wealth in order to ascertain how much a country should contribute to climate 
change efforts, which has the benefit of being more likely to be perceived as fair the PPP 
and ATP approach, as was explained above. However, it is arguably useful to qualify such 
an index with Caney’s assertion that countries should not be pushed under a decent 
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threshold of living by their climate change reduction efforts, which was illustrated to be a 
useful argument in terms of incorporating concerns of less developed countries, and in 
particular Least Developed Countries. These elements – the basic notion of using both 
wealth and emissions levels, Risse’s index model, and Caney’s caveat – will be used as the 
building blocks of the mixed approach defended in this thesis.  
 
This mixed approach will be referred to, for the rest of the thesis, as the Polluter’s Ability to 
Pay approach, or PATP model. Under the PATP model, countries which have high levels of 
emissions and high levels of wealth are responsible for reducing their pollution and pay for 
climate change action, and countries of low wealth and high pollution are responsible for 
reducing their emissions as best possible, as long as it does not push them under a 
threshold of a decent standard of living. Countries should have to pay for climate change 
costs and reduce emissions only when they are well off enough to do so. Furthermore, 
countries which have low emissions and low wealth should be excluded from responsibility, 
and those with low emissions and high wealth should be asked to contribute financially but 
not lower their emissions. This is a theoretical model of the distribution of benefits and 
burdens of climate change which attempts to incorporate notions of fairness as explicated 
by less developed countries in order to represent a fair distribution of benefits and burdens.  
 
The PATP model also attempts to capture the complexity of the category ‘less developed 
country.’ Although this category is very broad, the PATP model points out two important 
factors which can help to clarify which less developed countries may be more responsible 
for sharing the burdens of climate change than others, by virtue of their level of wealth and 
their level of emissions. If the thesis simply argued that less developed countries should be 
included in climate change action, this would not be very exact, since less developed 
countries account for almost 150 countries of the world according to the UNFCCC. Defining 
the PATP model enables a discussion which can account for the differences between these 
countries. The model can accommodate the idea that some richer less developed countries 
must be held to account for their emissions, while at the same time stressing that Least 
Developed Countries should bear no responsibility until their level of wealth and emissions 
meets a level which implies responsibility.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the PATP model cannot guarantee that the concerns of less 
developed countries are taken into account. It is merely a model of distribution which 
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attempts to capture these concerns.  As will be illustrated in Chapter Seven and Eight, less 
developed countries, and in particular Least Developed Countries, are often not included in 
climate change decision making processes, which can often mean that their concerns are 
not taken to consideration. This is problematic from the perspective of fairness, because 
the distribution of benefits and burdens must be one all can reasonably agree to. If Least 
Developed Countries are unable to express their concerns, then it is questionable whether 
these countries can be said to reasonably accept the distribution that is decided on their 
behalf. For this reason, the requirement that less developed countries’ concerns must be 
taken into account will be left explicit so that the evaluation of current practice can include 
a thorough discussion on the extent to which these concerns are being addressed.  
 
The stance on less developed countries is therefore as follows: in line with the definition of 
fairness outlined above, the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action in order to ensure that they can reasonably accept the 
distribution of benefits and burdens associated with climate change. Furthermore, the 
distribution of benefits and burdens in global climate change action should be based in the 
PATP model. This is the second explicit demand of climate justice that must be met under 
the position defended in this thesis. The chapter now turns to the final issue to be included 
in the justice position defended in this thesis, namely who makes up the ‘collective’ in 
collective action.  
 
Collective Action 
The chapter has now defined a non-relational minimum which cannot be crossed by 
developing a demand which concerns what future generations are entitled to, and used the 
relational side of the climate justice approach to develop a demand that is relevant to the 
relationship between developed countries and less developed countries. The chapter now 
moves onto defining a third and final demand, which concerns who makes up the 
‘collective’ in collective action. Both scientific reviews from the IPCC and cosmopolitan 
climate change literature heavily emphasize collective action. But who is this ‘collective’ in 
collective action? Or more precisely, who is morally responsible for what actions in the case 
of climate change? The discussion above concerned the distribution of benefits and 
burdens between developed countries and less developed countries, which has clarified 
the responsibility of states, who make up an important part of the ‘collective’ in collective 
action. However, this final section of the chapter will make the case that the empirical 
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realities of the climate change problem imply that responsible actors making up the 
‘collective’ in collective action extend beyond states. It will be put forward that the 
responsible ‘collective’ should include all capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-
state entities, international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or 
exist in.   
 
This conception of collective responsibility will stem out of a relational discussion of the 
relationships between actors causing climate change and suffering from the consequences 
of climate change. It was explained in Chapter Two that climate change is an issue of global 
justice because it places ‘everyone, everywhere’ in a situation of mutual dependency: there 
is only one atmosphere, and multiple actors, within and outside of states, contribute to 
changes in global climate, albeit with varying effects in different places, regardless of where 
they are located.76 This seems to imply that climate change is as a cross-level distributive 
justice issue among all actors causing and suffering from climate change impacts.77 It is 
therefore important to discuss who these actors are, and how they relate to one another. 
This relational discussion will take place below, when making the case for a conception of a 
responsible ‘collective’ which encompasses all actors capable of affecting the climate 
change problem. It is important to stress that the stance on collective action defended here 
faces potential criticisms which stem from both practical and moral perspectives. Four of 
these criticisms will be outlined below. The stance on collective action will be defended as 
each challenge is addressed. The first criticism that will be addressed is that individuals 
cannot affect climate change, the second is that individuals may be able to affect climate 
change, but are not able to cause harm, and the third is that individual responsibility 
distracts from state responsibility. Finally, the criticism of individual responsibility from the 
Foucauldian school of governmentality will be addressed. 
Criticism One: Individuals Cannot Affect Climate Change 
The position on collective action that is defended here is that all capable actors, including 
individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international institutions, and states, irrespective of 
the country they live or exist in, should be held responsible for climate change action. A 
potential criticism against this position is the practical criticism that individuals cannot 
affect climate change, advocated by Gil Seyfang. Seyfang argues that individuals do not 
have the opportunity to make a significant impact on emissions levels. She explains that 
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this is because individual consumers are only able to choose between options which are 
available to them. Some options are simply not available, for example clean, efficient, 
affordable and safe public transport.78 In other words, Seyfang argues that consumers are 
effectively locked into particular consumption patterns.79 In addition, decisions which make 
a major impact on emissions are made on a societal, not individual level.80 For example, 
decisions on building and maintaining roads, hospitals, schools, and equipping the military 
account for half of all consumption in Western Europe.81 Seyfang therefore concludes that 
individuals are not only locked into consumption patterns, but that these consumption 
patterns have a negligible effect on emissions.  
 
Seyfang makes a valuable argument which requires a response. If individuals cannot make 
a meaningful impact on emissions levels because they are locked into consumption 
patterns, does this mean they should not be held responsible for mitigation? And what 
does this imply for the responsibility of other actors whose behavior has a substantial 
effect on emissions? In an answer the first question, it will be argued below that if certain 
individuals are able to change their level of emissions within available consumption 
patterns, they must be held morally responsible for doing so. The answer to the second 
question will link to this argument. It will be argued that other actors, such as corporations, 
international institutions, and sub-state authorities, and states should also be held 
responsible if they have an effect on emissions and are capable of changing their level of 
emissions. To begin answering the above questions, it is important to note that Seyfang 
undoubtedly highlights an important fact: individual consumption is by no means the most 
significant cause of climate change, and individuals are locked into certain consumer 
patterns. However, it would be difficult to argue that no individual has an impact on 
climate change, and that no individual is capable of changing their behavior in order to 
reduce this impact within existing consumption options. In fact, there have been studies 
which reveal exactly the opposite – there are individuals who have a significant impact on 
emissions, and at the same time have the capability of changing their consumption 
patterns.82  
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For example, Paul Harris has conducted research into the detrimental effects affluent 
individuals have on climate change. According to Harris, there are hundreds of millions of 
well-off individuals living within, and more importantly, outside of developed states who 
are capable of affecting GHG emissions levels.83 He concentrates mainly on individuals in 
less developed countries, as most climate change action is geared towards responsibilities 
of developed countries, meaning that the individuals in less developed countries are largely 
under no obligation to lower emissions. Harris argues that this is problematic because 
pollution of the atmosphere is increasingly caused by the growing number of rich people 
living in less developed countries.84 Harris makes use of a number of previously conducted 
studies to illustrate that these individuals are producing GHGs through excessive 
consumption at a pace and scale never experienced in human history.85 For example, 
individuals living within BRICs countries like China and India together account for over one 
fifth of the ‘global consumer class,’ a number that is approaching 400 million and that 
exceeds the number of people living in Western Europe.86 In India in particular, new 
consumers make up one eighth of the population, possess two fifths of purchasing power 
and account for fifteen times the energy consumption of the remaining country’s 
population.87 Harris explains that this is in part why  some studies estimate that developing 
countries now produce half of the world’s emissions. 88  Harris argues that these 
‘unregulated’ individuals must be held responsible for their emissions levels in order to 
keep global emissions levels in check. 
 
Harris’s research reveals two important points. The first is that individuals, and in particular 
rich individuals, have a significant effect on climate change. Harris illustrates, with the help 
of numerous studies, that ‘voluntary’ individual consumption patterns are having a 
detrimental effect on emissions levels. As he puts it, ‘affluence is the primary and 
disproportionate cause of global environmental degradation.’89 Importantly, Harris makes 
the argument that the consumption patterns of the wealthy, in particular flying, eating 
meat, or buying new products such as cars every year, are all behaviors that can be cut 
back on, which implies that individuals are capable of mitigating climate change through 
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behavioral change.90 This is a direct response to Gil Seyfang, who argues that individual 
consumption is locked into specific patterns, and that individuals therefore only have a 
marginal effect on climate change. Although this may be partly true, as will be explained 
below, it would surely be difficult to argue that individual consumers have no effect on 
climate change, and that there is no possibility for changing behavior, especially in the face 
of evidence Harris provides.  
 
The second point Harris’s research reveals is that there is a differentiation to be made 
between individuals, because some individuals have a more significant impact on emissions 
than others, and some individuals are more capable of change than others. According to 
Harris, this should have an effect on which individuals are held responsible, which is why he 
concentrates on wealthy individuals. This could be referred to as an argument from 
capability – those individuals who are more capable of mitigating climate change have the 
moral responsibility to do so. This type of moral argument has famously been made by 
Peter Singer, who argues that if it is ‘within our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we 
ought, morally, to do it.’91 Singer illustrates his argument by explaining that if someone is 
walking past a shallow pond and sees a child drowning in it, they ought to wade in and pull 
the child out, even if this will mean getting their clothes muddy.92 The muddy clothes are 
not of comparable moral importance to the death of a child in this example. In the case of 
climate change, a wealthy individual buying a new car every year, or flying every month, or 
eating meat for every meal, is by no stretch of the imagination equally morally important to 
preserving the right to health of potential climate change victims, which is a consequence 
of excessive consumption. Being healthy enough to lead a fulfilling life is not morally 
comparable to the happiness that may result in owning a new car every year, or eating 
meat for every meal. Health is a basic human need, whereas owning a number of luxury 
cars may bring satisfaction or happiness, but is not essential to living a life which is not 
consumed with the struggle to survive.  
 
In addition, it is surely within the power of a rich individual to reduce their meat 
consumption, change their luxurious shopping habits, or reduce their travel for pleasure 
without sacrificing something as morally important as the violation of the human right to 
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health of millions. Not eating meat a few times a week may marginally reduce a consumer’s 
choice, but this is morally incomparable to suffering from a debilitating illness. Although 
Seyfang makes an excellent point about consumers only being able to choose from 
available alternatives, and this is undoubtedly problematic, it is important to note that 
even within these locked choices, consumers can make a difference to global emissions 
levels through their behavior, for example by eating less meat or flying less. According to 
Singer’s logic, this would imply that wealthy individuals, who are capable of mitigating 
climate change and therefore protecting the right to health of potential climate change 
victims, should be held responsible for doing so. This is the response to the first question 
posed above: if individuals are locked into certain consumption patterns, and can only have 
a marginal effect on emissions, does this mean they should not be held responsible? The 
answer is no. It may be true that individuals are not the main cause of climate change, and 
that their choices are somewhat restricted, but this does not negate the fact that some 
individuals, especially the wealthy, have a detrimental effect on emissions, are capable of 
mitigating climate change, and are therefore morally responsible for doing so. 
 
However, the second question remains unanswered. What does the above argument imply 
for responsibility for other actors whose behavior has an effect on emissions? Individual 
consumption only results in a part of the emissions which cause climate change. There are 
other actors which emit more than individuals, for example corporations or cities. A 
Greenpeace study found that Shell emits more than Saudi Arabia, Amoco more than 
Canada, Mobil more than Australia, and BP, Exxon and Texaco more than France, Spain, 
and the Netherlands.93 Furthermore, cities are home to half of the world’s population, and 
consume over two thirds of the world’s energy and account for more than 70% of carbon 
emissions.94 The argument from capability made above can be used to hold these types of 
actors to account for their high emissions. Simon Caney has made an argument along these 
lines – as he believes that not only wealthy individuals, but all agents who contribute to 
emissions and have the means of lowering these should be held accountable for going so,95 
including firms, sub-state political authorities, and international financial institutions.96 This 
is in line with the argument from capability made above; it is simply being extended to all 
capable actors. Extending the argument from capability is especially useful because it 
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allows actors which are capable of having a greater impact on emissions levels than 
individuals, for example corporations or cities, to be held morally accountable. For this 
reason, not only individuals, but corporations, sub-state political authorities, and 
international financial institutions, and states are included in the conception of actors who 
are responsible under ‘collective action.’ 
 
Importantly, Caney suggests that if these actors are not only high emitters, but affluent, 
they have the capability of financially contributing to climate change efforts, such as 
scientific research into climate science, or adaptation measures, and should therefore be 
accountable for doing so.97 This argument for financial contribution is in line with capability 
logic – spending money on preventing future human rights abuses (specifically violations of 
the right to health in the case of climate change) is morally required of agents capable of 
doing so, as long as spending funds does not result in a moral harm equal to the violation of 
the human right to health. For this reason, the argument that agents who are capable of 
contributing financially to climate change mitigation/adaptation should be held responsible 
for doing so is incorporated into the conception of responsible agents under ‘collective 
action.’ The stance on collective action (or more precisely who is responsible for collective 
action) in this thesis is therefore that agents, including individuals, corporations, sub-state 
entities, international institutions and states who are capable of financially contributing 
and/or capable of lowering emissions should be held morally responsible for doing so, 
according to their capability, and as long as this does not result in a moral harm equal to 
the violation of the right to health of future generations.   
 
It is important to note about the stance on ‘collective action’ outlined above emphasizes 
differentiation between agents. Each agent should be held accountable according to 
capability – not every individual, corporation, sub-state entity, international institution or 
state is capable of the same amount of emissions reduction or financial contribution. It is 
also important to note that the conception of actors being responsible for lowering 
emissions and/or contributing financially is in line with the logic of the PATP model outlined 
in the previous section. However, the PATP model applies specifically to states, because it is 
based on previous conceptions of state responsibility, the PPP and the ATP. The conception 
on collective action here is in line with the logic of the PATP, but must be defended 
separately, because it is not commonly assumed that actors outside of states have 
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responsibility to act on climate change. This is why the stance on collective action is 
enclosed in a separate demand of justice. The chapter now turns to the second criticism of 
the position on collective responsibility defended here: namely the moral criticism that 
individuals are not capable of causing harm in the case of climate change. 
Criticism Two: Individuals Cannot Cause Harm 
The second potential criticism of assigning responsibility to agents outside of states which 
will be addressed in this section is put forward by Sinnott-Armstrong, who claims that 
although it is indisputable that some individuals can affect emissions levels, it is not 
possible to assign these individuals moral responsibility to refrain from emitting under any 
existing moral principles. In order to make his case, Sinnott-Armstrong goes through a 
series of existing moral principles to illustrate how they do not apply in the case of climate 
change. He orders existing moral principles into three categories: actual act, internal, and 
collective. The first ‘actual act’ principle he examines is the harm principle, which states 
that we have a moral obligation not to perform an act that causes harm to others.98 
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that although one act, such as driving for pleasure on a Sunday, 
may contribute to climate change, the act itself does not directly harm anyone, because 
climate change only happens when emissions accumulate over time. In this way, it is not 
clear which action does what harm, and there is no direct link between action and harm.99 
In an effort to explore the harm principle further, Sinnott-Armstrong outlines the indirect 
harm principle, which states we have a moral obligation not to perform an act that causes 
harm to others indirectly.100 However, he argues that the indirect harm principle suffers 
from similar problems to the harm principle, because individual action is not enough to 
cause harm, even indirectly: emissions must accumulate over time to cause harm, and it is 
not clear that one action can cause indirect harm.101 Finally, Sinnott-Armstrong explores 
the contribution principle, which states that we have a moral obligation not to make 
problems worse.102 However, he explains that this is also problematic because the small act 
of driving does not make climate change worse, as no individual person or animal will be 
worse off because of it.103 Sinnott-Armstrong concludes that the problem with ‘actual act’ 
principles is that climate change occurs on such a massive scale that an individual driving 
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makes no difference to the welfare of anyone.104 He concludes that actual act principles 
cannot be applied to ground moral responsibility in the case of climate change. 
 
After dismissing the applicability of actual act principles, Sinnott-Armstrong moves onto 
internal principles. He examines Kant’s universalizability principle, which states that we 
have a moral obligation not to act on any maxim that we cannot will to be a universal 
law.105 However, Sinnott- Armstrong believes that the maxim, or intention, of a Sunday 
driver would not be to expel carbon, because the motivation is to have fun, and that can be 
achieved without carbon emissions, if it were possible.106 Therefore Kant’s principle cannot 
be applied to climate change, and Sinnott-Armstrong rejects its applicability to climate 
change. Next, Sinnott-Armstrong outlines the doctrine of double effect, which states that 
individuals have the moral obligation not to harm anyone intentionally.107 He believes that 
this principle cannot ground moral responsibility of individuals, because individuals who 
emit GHGs, for example through driving, do not intend to harm, and do not cause actual 
harm to anyone.108 He therefore also rejects this internal principle. He concludes that 
internal moral principles cannot be applied to ground moral responsibility of individuals in 
the case of climate change. 
 
Finally, Sinnott-Armstrong turns to collective principles. He examines the group principle, 
which states that we have a moral obligation not to perform an action if this action makes 
us a member of a group whose actions together cause harm.109 However, Sinnott-
Armstrong finds that this principle is difficult to apply in the case of climate change because 
it does not seem immoral to do what others do if this will not change the action of others, 
because the harm will occur with or without individual action.110 He explains that because 
an individual cannot change what the group does, it may be morally good or ideal to 
protest what the group does, but it does not seem morally obligatory.111 He then examines 
the Ideal Law principle, which states that we have a moral obligation not to perform an 
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action if it ought to be illegal.112 Sinnott-Armstrong argues that this principle does not apply 
to the climate change problem because it is not clear that GHG emissions should be illegal, 
since this would be impossible, because even the act of breathing results in emissions.113 
He therefore concludes that collective principles cannot be applied to ground moral 
responsibility of individuals in the case of climate change. After rejecting the applicability of 
actual act, internal, and collective principles, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes that there are 
no moral obligations on individuals to refrain from emitting GHGs according to well-known 
moral principles. Sinnott-Armstrong provides a thorough case against holding individuals 
morally responsible for climate change action which must be taken seriously and 
responded to. There are two possible responses to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument, both of 
which will be outlined below. The first response is to question whether it is morally 
important that actual act and internal principles do not apply to the case of climate change. 
The second response is to question Sinnott-Armstrong’s conception of collective principles.  
 
As was illustrated above, Sinnott-Armstrong outlines actual act and harm principles and 
explains that these are not applicable in the case of climate change because individuals do 
not cause a moral harm with their individual actions and do not intend to do harm. The 
question to ask is whether it matters, morally, that these existing moral principles are not 
applicable in the unique case of climate change.  It has been argued above that some 
individuals are capable of affecting climate change and should therefore be held morally 
responsible. Does the fact that they do not cause direct harm, or do not intend to do harm, 
make a moral difference? Steven Vanderheiden is not convinced that it does.  
Vanderheiden argues that if we were to apply common moral principles of harm and fault 
(what Sinnott-Armstrong describes as actual act and internal principles) to climate change, 
this would ban nearly all human activity, including exhaling, which would be absurd.114 
However, Vanderheiden explains that although conventional moral principles cannot be 
applied to assign individual moral responsibility, this does not mean it is morally right to 
assign no moral blame to individuals, 115  as Sinnott-Armstrong does. According to 
Vanderheiden, ignoring the moral nature of individual acts which cause climate change is 
wrong for both practical and moral reasons.  
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His practical concern is that this may lead to individuals to stop recycling or to increase 
driving because they will believe that they have no moral responsibility to alter their 
behavior.116 Vanderheiden argues that we cannot afford to think this way because it is too 
dangerous, because of the urgency of abating climate change.117 His moral concern is that 
ignoring individual responsibility as Sinnott-Armstrong does may cause an unfair 
distribution of blame. Some individuals may be more to blame for climate change than 
others because they cause higher GHG emissions, but these individuals may live in states 
where they are not required to curb GHG emissions under current climate change 
regulation.118 Similarly, some individuals in rich countries may be less to blame as they emit 
a small amount, but these individuals may still be asked to contribute towards preventing 
climate change, as they live in a rich country which is under regulation. Vanderheiden 
explains that if individual moral responsibility is not defined, this will impose a burden on 
those who may not have done anything wrong, and let those who are responsible go 
unpunished, which seems to violate a basic precept of redistributive justice.119 Furthermore, 
individuals in states which are not regulated will continue to not be held to account, which 
is morally objectionable because, as was argued above, all individuals who are capable of 
lowering emissions and/or contributing financially are morally required to do so. 
 
Vanderheiden, in other words, argues that the fact that existing moral principles of blame 
and fault do not apply to the case of climate change does not imply that there should be no 
moral individual responsibility. Instead, Vanderheiden seems to imply that climate change 
is a morally unique situation which challenges both conventional ethical theory and 
entrenched moral norms. This illustrates that while Sinnott-Armstrong makes an interesting 
case, his conclusions are too hastily drawn. Sinnott-Armstrong establishes that existing 
moral principles of fault and harm do not apply, and concludes that this implies no 
individual moral responsibility. In contrast, Vanderheiden explores whether there could be 
another moral reason for individual responsibility which is unique to the situation of 
climate change. In other words, Vanderheiden treats climate change as morally and 
empirically unique, and illustrates why individual moral responsibility is important beyond 
general moral principles. Vanderheiden’s argument that a basic precept of redistributive 
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justice would be violated without a conception of individual moral responsibility is 
especially important. Vanderheiden illustrates that a conception of individual responsibility 
is important for a climate justice account. It is therefore tempting to side with 
Vanderheiden and dismiss Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument outright. However, there is a 
second possible response to Sinnott-Armstrong, which involves questioning his conception 
of existing collective principles.  
 
Even if it were accepted that there is no moral responsibility for individuals in the case of 
climate change because individuals cannot cause direct harm and do not intend to do harm, 
it is undeniable that individuals are causing harm to the climate collectively. Sinnott-
Armstrong rejects collective principles, but his dismissal of these may be premature, as is 
pointed out by Anders Sandberg. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that collective principles do not 
apply to the case of climate change, because it is not immoral to do what others do as long 
as others’ behavior cannot be changed, because the harm will occur with or without a 
particular individual action.120 Sandberg argues that Sinnott-Armstrong is mistaken, and 
that in the case of climate change ‘we have a collective obligation to change our ways.’121 
Sandberg believes that ‘all drivers and flyers ought to reduce this behavior, because their 
collective behavior is currently causing a threat of climate change.’122 In other words, 
although individual acts do not cause direct harm, collectively these acts do cause harm, 
and this raises an obligation to change individual behavior.  
 
This argument is very similar to one made by Thomas Pogge. Pogge argues that if 
individuals are part of an institutional system or structure that causes moral wrongs to 
occur, they have a moral obligation to rectify these wrongs.123 He claims that in the case of 
global poverty, affluent and powerful individuals have a significant impact upon living 
conditions elsewhere in their everyday actions, and should be held to account for these 
actions because they are part of a wider system of harm.124 In the case of climate change 
this would imply that although it may not be possible to argue that an individual causes 
direct harm to another individual through an act such as driving, or in fact intends to do 
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harm, the individual is nonetheless part of, and indeed contributing to, a wider system of 
harm, and therefore has a moral responsibility for the harm caused. Pogge’s argument 
implies that Sinnott-Armstrong’s dismissal of collective principles is arguably too hasty, as 
an existing collective moral principle, defended by Pogge, clearly points to a moral 
obligation of individuals in the case of climate change. Pogge’s moral principle offers a firm 
reply to the Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that ‘it may be morally good or ideal to protest 
what the group does, but it does not seem morally obligatory.’125 What this implies is that 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument about lack of moral responsibility of individuals in the case 
of climate change rests on a false assumption, namely that there are no existing moral 
principles which can be applied to ground individual responsibility. For this reason, and 
furthermore as a result of the fact that climate change is a morally unique situation as 
argued above, Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against the moral responsibility of individuals 
will be dismissed at this point in the thesis. The chapter maintains that capable agents, 
including individuals, corporations, sub-state entities, international institutions and states 
should be held morally responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to 
mitigation and adaptation efforts according to their capability. In order to strengthen this 
position further, the chapter now turns to the third possible criticism against this 
conception of responsibility, namely that individual responsibility distracts from state 
responsibility. 
Criticism Three: Individual Responsibility Distracts from State Responsibility 
A third potential criticism of the position on collective responsibility taken in this thesis is 
the argument that placing responsibility on actors outside of the state amounts to a 
distraction from state responsibility and discourages political action. This type of argument 
can be found in the work of Jennifer Kent, Michael Maniates, and Gil Seyfang, and will be 
outlined below. Maniates, Kent, and Seyfang all highlight the potential dangers of 
individualized responsibility for climate change action. Maniates, for example, argues that 
the individualization of responsibility focuses on the person as consumer rather than citizen, 
and positions the individual within the comfort zone of consumerism, diverting people 
from more important environmental and citizen-led political action.126 Jennifer Kent agrees 
with this assessment, and explains that placing responsibility on individuals means that 
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opportunities for citizen-led action are lost.127 Her evidence for this comes in the form of 
studies which illustrate that the growing sense of urgency surrounding the effects of 
climate change is failing to translate into an international groundswell of socially and 
politically engaged public citizens.128 For example, in one study conducted in the United 
States and United Kingdom, 75% of individuals stated that they were concerned about 
global warming, but only 9% indicated both concern and willingness to take action.129 Kent 
believes that this may be down to individual actors feel their actions are futile in the face of 
climate change.130 In other words, individual responsibility makes individuals feel as if they 
should act, but at the same time makes them feel their actions are futile, which renders 
them unwilling to take action. What Kent is arguing is that individual responsibility is not 
only a distraction from state responsibility, but demotivates citizens from action. Finally, Gil 
Seyfang makes a very similar case. She explains that placing responsibility in the hands of 
individuals may imply that there is little room to ponder the role of the state.131 In other 
words, individual responsibility serves as a distraction from the responsibility of agents 
which are capable of affecting change. 
 
The criticism that individual responsibility may demotivate individuals, and cause a 
distraction from political action and state responsibilities, is an important argument worth 
considering. If citizens feel their actions are futile and therefore do not engage in political 
action, and at the same time states are not held to account, and therefore fail to act, this 
will result in a lack of action on climate change on the state and individual level. It may 
therefore seem that the argument made by Maniates, Kent, and Seyfang is quite 
detrimental to the conception of collective responsibility defended in this chapter. 
However, there are two possible responses to the criticism that individual responsibility is a 
distraction from state responsibly. The first is to question whether individual responsibility 
exclusively leads to lack of political action and distraction from state responsibility. The 
second response is to explain that state responsibility and other actor’s responsibility are 
not mutually exclusive. These two responses will be outlined below. 
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Kent, Maniates, and Seyfang all argue that individual responsibility discourages individuals 
from taking political action, and therefore distracts from state responsibility. However, it is 
questionable whether this is always the case. As Kent herself points out, there has been an 
increase in the number of social and political movements focusing on climate change 
organized by individuals. Kent explains that there has been a burgeoning of over a hundred 
local community climate action groups in Australia over recent years.132 Interestingly, Kent 
does not argue that this is despite feelings of individual futility, but that these feelings of 
futility cause dissatisfaction with continuing international government inaction.133 These 
feelings of dissatisfaction, in turn, cause individuals to take political action: individuals 
recognizing their inability to effect global change through their individual agency leads to 
individuals increasingly to call on their governments to act.134 In other words, the very 
feelings of futility that supposedly mute political action are having the opposite effect, and 
are resulting in increased political action by individuals. Individuals seem to be increasingly 
aware of the fact that states could be doing more about climate change. In reaction, 
individuals are taking action on climate change within their community and calling on their 
government to act. It should be noted that this does not apply to all individuals, and Kent 
points out that individuals who take political action are still in the minority. Nevertheless, it 
is worthwhile to stress that individual responsibility does not exclusively lead to lack of 
political action. 
 
In terms of distracting from state responsibility, Peter Singer has made the case that 
individuals taking responsibility for issues does not distract from state responsibility, but 
rather encourages states to take responsibility. His argument concerns global poverty and 
is not specific to climate change, but is nevertheless highly relevant here. Singer explains 
that there is an argument which claims that overseas aid should be a government’s 
responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities. Giving 
privately, it is said, allows the government to escape their responsibilities.135 Singer has 
little time for this type of argument. He explains that this argument seems to assume that 
the more people there are who give to privately organized famine relief funds, the less 
likely it is that the government will take full responsibility for such aid.136 However, he 
believes that this assumption is unsupported, and furthermore not plausible. Singer 
                                                          
132 Kent, J., ‘Individualized Responsibility and Climate Change: If Climate Protection Becomes Everyone’s 
Responsibility, Does It End Up Being No-One’s?’ in Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, 1 (2009) p. 146 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid., p. 143 
135 Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), p. 239 
136 Ibid. 
 152 
 
believes the opposite view is true, namely that if no one gives voluntarily a government will 
assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would therefore refrain from 
giving more aid.137 In other words, citizens expressing interest by taking individual action 
sends a signal to governments that citizens care about a particular problem, and 
encourages governments to take more action in order to garner support from citizens. A 
lack of individual action would result in the opposite effect.  
This is an interesting point. In the case of climate change, this would seem to imply that 
individual action on climate change will encourage states to act, instead of providing a 
distraction from state responsibility. This is a direct counterargument to Kent, Maniates, 
and Seyfang. If notions of individual responsibility cause individuals to act on climate 
change, governments will see that citizens care about the cause of climate change, and 
therefore be motivated to act on these concerns. Furthermore, as Kent illustrates, 
individuals who are frustrated with their lack of impact are increasingly taking political 
action, which adds to the pressure on states to act. For this reason, it is tempting to dismiss 
the argument that individual responsibility discourages political action and distracts from 
state responsibility at this point. However, there is more to be said on the matter. Kent, 
Maniates and Seyfang make an excellent point that states have a responsibility which must 
not be distracted from. This concern will be addressed below. 
 
The conception of collective responsibility defended in this chapter applies to individuals, 
corporations, sub-state entities, international institutions and states that are capable of 
lowering emissions and/or making a financial contribution. Kent, Maniates and Seyfang are 
concerned that assigning actors outside of the state responsibility will distract from states’ 
responsibilities. However, morally, states cannot escape their responsibilities in the case of 
climate change. Many states are very much capable of lowering emissions by implementing 
policies within their borders, and on top of this have the financial capability to contribute 
to the climate change effort, which implies moral responsibility in line with the argument 
from capability made above.  The response to Kent, Maniates, and Seyfang is therefore that 
individual moral responsibility and state moral responsibility are not mutually exclusive. 
Even if individual responsibility distracted from state responsibility, which was argued not 
to always be the case above, states cannot escape their moral responsibilities in the case of 
climate change, due to their capabilities to affect the climate change problem. For this 
reason, states are explicitly incorporated into the stance on ‘collective action,’ or more 
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specifically, collective responsibility. In addition, the thesis has explicated a specific demand 
which is exclusively concerned with the moral responsibility of states – the demand that 
the distribution of benefits and burdens should be based on the PATP model. This model 
holds states with high emissions and/or high levels of wealth to account. In this way moral 
responsibility of states is not ‘distracted from’ in this thesis. The moral responsibility of 
states is considered morally as important as the responsibility of other capable agents.  
Now that the second potential criticism against individual responsibility has been 
responded to, the chapter turns to the fourth and final criticism: the criticism from 
governmentality.  
Criticism Four: Governmentality 
The theory of governmentality seeks to highlight the underlying power dimensions of the 
concept of individual responsibility. The term governmentality was coined by Michel 
Foucault in the 1970s. Governmentality, he explains, is ‘an activity that undertakes to 
conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide 
responsible for what they do and for what happens to them.’138 In other words, it is an 
activity which results in individuals conducting their behavior based on the understanding 
that they are responsible for their own actions, without understanding that they are under 
a guiding influence of subversive power. The theory of governmentality stems out of 
Foucault’s study of the emergence of neo-liberalism. Foucault explains that neo-liberalism 
aspires to construct responsible subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they 
rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative 
acts.139 This results in the ‘responsibilisation’ of subjects, which essentially implies that 
individuals see themselves as responsible for problems which may have previously been 
under the domain of social structures, for example unemployment, alcoholism, or 
criminality.140 What is being put forward here is that the neo-liberal system has created a 
false illusion, or rationality, of individual responsibility. Not only is the rationality of 
individual responsibility an illusion, it also creates conditions through which certain forms 
of conduct, or behavior, are created.141 This is referred to as governmentality.  Importantly, 
as Thomas Lenke explains, governmentality is not about coercion in a traditional sense, but 
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rather about shifting rationality, which is a form of power.142 Processes of governmentality 
do not necessarily make an individual feel governed, but instead cause them to conduct 
their behavior in a certain way.143 These individuals do not question their responsibilities 
and, importantly, do not turn to social structures for help with these responsibilities.  
 
Processes of governmentality are relevant to the idea of individual responsibility for 
climate change. Matthew Paterson and Johannes Stripple explain that there is an emergent 
governmentality within the context of climate change which results in individuals viewing 
themselves as concerned carbon emitters and governing their emissions in various ways - 
as counters, displacers, dieters, communitarians, or citizens.144 Paterson and Stripple find 
this problematic because governmentality, in the case of climate change, is not only 
shaping individual behavior, but internal rationalities, identities, and what individuals 
fundamentally regard as ‘normal’ behavior.145 They explain that this is a good example of 
how power operates, guiding the ways that individuals behave.146  The fundamental 
problem with this is that individuals are unaware of the power which lies behind their 
conviction to ‘do their part’ against climate change.   
 
The critique from governmentality is interesting and important. The fact that individuals 
are unaware that their behavior is being pre-determined is problematic and raises concerns 
about the structures which make up society. It seems to reveal a fundamental inequality 
between these structures and the individuals who live within them. Nevertheless, there are 
two possible responses to the criticism from a governmentality perspective. The first is that 
the theory of governmentality may highlight an important problem, but it does not provide 
scope for positive action or change. One of the most famous proponents of this response is 
Jürgen Habermas, who accuses Foucault of presenting governmentality as something so 
ubiquitous and overwhelming that all resistance becomes pointless.147 Habermas goes so 
far as to say that Foucault’s philosophy enocurages political non-committment and 
conservatism, and leaves no room for positive action.148 Habermas seems to be suggesting 
that governmentality cannot be escaped. This is a powerful argument. If governmentality 
                                                          
142 Lenke, T., ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’ presented at the Rethinking Marxism Conference, 
University of Amherst (MA), September 21 – 24, 2000, p. 3 
143 Ibid., p. 5 
144 Paterson, M. and Stripple, J., ‘My Space: Governing Individual’s Carbon Emissions’ in Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 28 (2010), p. 342 
145 Ibid., p. 359 
146 Ibid. 
147 Pickett, B. L., ‘Foucault and the Politics of Resistance’ in Polity 28 (1996), p. 461 
148 Isenberg, B., ‘Habermas on Foucault – Critical Remarks’ in Acta Sociologica 24 (1991), p. 301 
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has indeed developed through neo-liberal rationality, and controls individual behavior in a 
way which cannot be detected by individuals, this leaves very little space for resistance. It 
seems to be a fabric of every day life individuals cannot escape. In addition, and perhaps 
more detrimentally, Foucault does not provide an answer to how societal structures can be 
reformed, he merely provides a critique of these structures. In relation to climate change,  
Paterson and Stripple explain that imagining a response to climate change which does not 
include individual action is manifestly problematic, because it is difficult to envisage how 
limiting global emissions might be achieved without individual effort.149 It seems that the 
problem with the theory of governmentality is that it does not provide an answer of how to 
take positive action and what to aim for.  This provides grounds for rejecting the criticism, 
because a lack of positive action is unacceptable in the case of climate change. If 
governmentality indeed encourages nihilism, as Habermas claims, then it is dangerous 
because climate change requires urgent action, including individual action, to prevent the 
violation of the human right to health. 
 
However, the first response to governmentality reveals a second response to the critique 
which is worth articulating. Proponents of governmentality explain why Foucault does not 
need to leave room for positive action, or indeed lay out alternative social arrangements. 
As Brent Pickett explains, Foucault cannot lay down how or why one should struggle, 
because this would amount to a globalistic theory which would act as an agent of power, 
because it would predetermine the conduct of individuals.150 In other words, if Foucault 
provided a scope for positive action, or a blueprint of an alternative social arrangement, 
this would amount to governmentality in itself. Pickett explains that for this reason, 
Foucault directly distances himself from the kinds of universal 'what is to be done?' 
formulas. Foucault believes that 'solutions' of this type are themselves part of the 
problem.151 This points to an incompatibility between Habermas and Foucault. Foucault is a 
declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to 'what ought I to do?' or 
‘what is to be done?'152 These questions are precisely the questions Habermas tries to 
answer – he works in a 'top-down' moralist fashion, and sketches procedures to be 
followed.153 This suggests that Habermas and Foucault have fundamentally different 
                                                          
149 Paterson, M. and Stripple, J., ‘My Space: Governing Individual’s Carbon Emissions’ in Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 28 (2010), p. 359 
150 Pickett, B. L., ‘Foucault and the Politics of Resistance’ in Polity 28 (1996), p. 461 
151 Flyvbjerg, B., ‘Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?’ in The British Journal of Sociology 49 (1998), 
p. 224 
152 Ibid., p. 220 
153 Ibid., p. 224 
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approaches to political theory. Interestingly, Bent Flyvbjerg believes this may be down to 
the traditions and literatures Habermas and Foucault stem out of: Foucault works within a 
particularistic and contextualist tradition, and Habermas is an exponent of a universalistic 
and theorizing tradition.154 Bo Isenberg agrees with Flyvbjerg’s assessment, and explains 
that Habermas and Foucault simply speak different languages: they operate within 
different ensembles of perspectives, theories, concepts, and logics.155 
 
What the above illustrates is that Habermas and Foucault stem from different backgrounds 
and therefore fundamentally disagree about how political theory should be conducted. This 
thesis is based in the normative, universalist theory of global justice, which is similar to the 
Habermasian approach to conducting political theory in the sense that global justice theory 
attempts to provide moral solutions to problems. What this implies is that there may be a 
fundamental incompatibility between the critique from governmentality and the 
cosmopolitan position on individual responsibility. This is not to say that the critique from 
governmentality is not interesting or important, but that the critique from governmentality 
does not offer a constructive critique to the cosmopolitan position. To accept the critique 
from governmentality would be to reject the basic premise of cosmopolitanism, which aims 
to provide a prescriptive moral theory. To accept this as problematic, as Foucault does, 
would be counterproductive and potentially nihilistic. Previous chapters have 
comprehensively illustrated that the global justice position is useful in the case of the 
climate change problem, and argued that it is a worthwhile endeavor to assess the climate 
change problem from this perspective. For this reason, the critique from governmentality 
will be considered unconstructive, and be rejected at this point in the thesis.   
 
Now that all four criticisms have been addressed, the chapter will summarize the position 
on collective action below. It has been argued above that agents, including individuals, 
corporations, sub-state entities, international institutions, and states can have an effect on 
climate change, and should therefore be held morally responsible for lowering emissions 
and/or contributing financially to mitigation and adaptation efforts, according to their 
respective capabilities, and as long as this does not imply sacrificing something as morally 
important as the human right to health. This position has been defended against four 
potential criticisms. The stance on collective action represents the third and final explicit 
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demand of justice which must be met under the climate justice position defended in this 
thesis.  
Conclusion  
This chapter constituted the third of three chapters which make up Part II of the thesis 
‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position, and concerned defining what 
climate justice, as defended in this thesis, demands. To achieve this, the chapter examined 
three main issues associated with the empirical conditions of climate change, namely what 
is owed to future generations, how to include less developed countries in climate change 
action, and who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in collective action. The chapter 
aimed to illustrate how the mixed approach defended in Chapter Three can be applied to 
take a stance on each of these issues. The first section of the chapter addressed how much 
is owed to future generations and argued that the non-relational scope of the mixed 
position defined in Chapter Three demands that the right to health of future generations 
must be considered to be equally as valuable as the right to health of current generations, 
and must therefore be protected. This is the non-relational minimum which cannot be 
crossed under any circumstances. The section which followed used the relational side of 
the mixed position to explore the relationship between developed countries and less 
developed countries, and made the case that states should be held to account according to 
both their emissions levels and wealth levels, because this best incorporates a solution 
which can reasonably be accepted by all. This is a relational demand which stems out of the 
special relationships created by climate change. Finally, the third section of the chapter 
argued that the empirical realities of the climate change problem imply that the 
responsible actors making up the ‘collective’ in collective action extend beyond states, and 
should include all capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in. This 
conception of collective responsibility stemmed out of a relational discussion of the 
relationships between actors causing climate change and suffering from its effects, and 
makes up the third demand of justice.   
Part II of the thesis, ‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position’ is now 
complete.  This second part of the thesis has laid the foundation for the assessment of 
current practice, by defining the scope and grounds of justice, and explaining what climate 
justice demands. The three demands of justice defined in this chapter are considered 
normative principles which must underwrite a more just global response to climate change. 
 158 
 
With these normative principles in hand, the thesis can turn to the assessment of the global 
response to climate change. 
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Part III: Assessing Current Institutional Practice 
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Chapter Six – Current Institutional Practice: A Conceptual Introduction 
Introduction 
The thesis has now completed Part One: ‘Defining the Problem’, as well as Part Two: 
‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position,’ and now moves on to Part Three: 
‘Assessing Current Institutional Practice.’ Part One reviewed empirical evidence for climate 
change and argued that the cosmopolitan justice position is appropriate for a normative 
assessment of the climate change problem. Part Two developed a unique climate justice 
position by defining a scope and grounds of justice, and explaining what justice demands. 
This current chapter, Chapter Six, and the two which follow, Chapters Seven and Eight, will 
make up the final part of the thesis, which concerns demonstrating how current 
institutional practice can be evaluated using the climate justice position developed in Part II 
of this thesis. This speaks to the broader aim of bridging the gap between climate justice 
theory and climate change governance research. By illustrating that climate justice theory 
can be relevant and useful for the assessment of climate governance, the thesis aims to 
create a bridge between theory and practice, as was explained in the Introduction of this 
thesis. 
 
This current chapter serves to provide a conceptual introduction for the two chapters that 
follow. Chapter Seven and Eight will concern the exploratory assessment of multilateral 
climate change governance processes (in Chapter Seven) and networked climate change 
governance processes (in Chapter Eight). This current chapter, Chapter Six, is necessary to 
clarify what is meant by current institutional practice, why actors who operate under 
current institutional practice have a responsibility to act on climate change, and how 
current institutional practice will be assessed. The chapter will be split into four sections; 
beginning with a section that will briefly summarize the climate change justice position 
developed in Part II of this thesis. Section two of the chapter will then define current 
institutional practice, by outlining the processes involved in global climate change 
governance: multilateral (United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change, 
or UNFCCC) and networked climate change governance. Following this, Section three will 
outline why exactly actors in the UNFCCC and actors involved in networked governance 
processes can be held responsible for bringing about a just response to climate change. 
Finally, Section four will outline a methodological framework to clarify how current practice 
will be assessed. The chapter will then conclude with a brief overview of what has been put 
forward. 
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The Climate Justice Position - Three Demands of Justice 
This section will provide a brief summary of the climate justice position defended in Part II 
of this thesis, and outline three demands of justice that must be met in order to achieve a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change. These three demands stem from Part II of 
the thesis. Chapter Three defined the scope of justice as both relational and non-relational, 
and argued that the non-relational conception of justice will be used to define moral 
thresholds, while the relational conception of justice will be used to explicate demands of 
justice specific to special relationships climate change creates. Chapter Four grounded the 
non-relational scope of justice in the right to health, which represents the moral minimum 
all humans are entitled to, no matter the time or place of their birth. Chapter Five used the 
scope and grounds of justice developed in Chapters Three and Four to discuss what is owed 
to future generations, how to include less develop countries in climate change action, and 
who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in collective action. In doing so, Chapter Five 
aimed to clarify and defend normative principles that must underwrite a more just global 
response to climate change. Chapter Five defined three demands, which will be presented 
as a list below.  
 
1. The right to health1 of future generations must be considered to be equally as 
valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must therefore be 
protected.  
 
2. The concerns of less developed countries must be properly considered in 
climate change action. The distribution of benefits and burdens in global 
climate change action should be based in the PATP2 model. 
 
3. Capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international 
institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in, must be 
held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the 
climate change cause, in line with their respective capabilities. 
 
These three demands of justice represent what is required to meet a condition of justice in 
the case of climate change according to the position defended in this thesis. This current 
                                                          
1 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
2 Polluter’s Ability to Pay model: the responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions is based on both 
per capita emissions levels and per capita wealth. To illustrate, countries which have high levels of pollution and 
high levels of wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for climate change action, and countries of 
low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best possible, as long as it does not push 
them under a threshold of a decent standard of living, and only when they rise in wealth will they have to pay 
more towards climate change costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low emissions and 
low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and high wealth may be asked to 
contribute financially but not lower their emissions.  
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chapter serves to explain how these demands can be used in the assessment of current 
practice. For now, the chapter moves onto defining current institutional practice. 
Defining Current Institutional Practice 
The current global response to climate change consists of a wide array of institutions. This 
is because ‘if climate change is to be slowed, let alone reversed, huge sacrifices will have to 
be shared by all,’ 3  – or more specifically, by individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, as was argued in Chapter Five. Coordinating these 
sacrifices is a complicated matter. The number of institutions involved in addressing 
climate change is almost immeasurable, as institutions are in place at the global, regional, 
national, and local level. In order to narrow the vast field of current institutional practice, 
the thesis will concentrate on global climate change governance. The decision to focus on 
this area of current institutional practice has been made for two reasons. Firstly, the 
coordination for climate change action takes place, in the first instance, at the global level. 
It has been widely accepted that environmental concerns, including climate change, are 
transnational collective action problems that are unlikely to be resolved by action at the 
level of the nation state.4 For this reason, climate change action is coordinated largely at 
the global level, and the decisions made at this level have an effect on all levels below it. 
Consequently, it is a worthwhile endeavor to assess this level of current institutional 
practice as a priority. Relatedly, recommending changes at the regional, national, or local 
institutional level may be difficult without an understanding of global institutional practice, 
because problems at the lower levels of institutional practice may have been caused by 
global level decisions. Secondly, although assessing regional, national or local institutional 
practice is no doubt important and interesting, the thesis cannot possibly assess all types of 
institutions involved in action against climate change. For these two reasons, the thesis will 
prioritize global climate change governance in its assessment of current practice. 
 
Global climate change governance can be defined as ‘all purposeful mechanisms and 
measures aimed at steering the social systems towards preventing, mitigating, or adapting 
to the risks posed by climate change.’5 This broad definition captures the fact that global 
climate change governance is a complex array of many different types of institutions, 
organizations, regimes, regulatory bodies, decision making procedures and actors. 
                                                          
3 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 166 
4 Bevir, M., Key Concepts in Governance (London: Sage, 2009), p. 78 
5 Stripple, J., and Pattberg, P., ‘Agency in Global Climate change governance: Setting the Stage’ in Biermann, F., 
Pattberg, P., and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Change Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency, and 
Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 142 
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Although a broad definition is easily found, it is difficult to pin down exactly what global 
climate change governance involves. For example, it is difficult to define exactly what 
processes are occurring, who has authority over what issues, and who is responsible for 
what action. This is linked to the fact that the concept of global governance is difficult to 
define, as will be briefly illustrated below. Nevertheless, this chapter will attempt to 
provide some clarity on what processes are involved in global climate change governance, 
how these processes compare, and in the section which follows, why actors within these 
processes can be held morally responsible.  
 
Governance is a broad term used in the study of national politics to capture norms or 
patterns of rule that arise either when the state is dependent upon others or when the 
state plays little or no role, or in other words in absence of an enforcing agent.6 In this 
sense, governance is quite a general term, and can be used to explore abstract analyses of 
the construction of social orders, social coordination, or social practices irrespective of 
their specific context.7 This is where the difficulty in answering questions about processes, 
authority, and responsibility begin to become apparent, because governance seems to 
cover a wide spectrum of activity.8 Global governance is an equally broad term. Global 
governance refers to the ways in which a variety of actors come together to address global 
problems.9 These actors produce a global pattern of rule even in the absence of an 
overarching world state.10 This is in line with the definition of governance above, as it refers 
to patterns of rule in the absence of an enforcing agent. Global governance is also 
sometimes defined as efforts which attempt to respond to or address social and political 
issues that go beyond the capacities of individual states to solve.11 Overall, the conception 
of global governance appears to be quite broad, in the sense that scholars studying these 
processes do not specify specific actors or institutions, but rather outline a process which 
can encompass a variety of actors. The broad nature of the concept of global governance 
above reveals the difficulties in providing a clear overview of processes which occur under 
global governance, and how these processes may relate in terms of their authority and 
responsibilities. It seems that it is necessary to zero in on one area of global governance, 
such as climate change, in order to gain more insight.  
                                                          
6 Bevir, M., Key Concepts in Governance (London: Sage, 2009), p. 3 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A., Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 1 
9 Bevir, M., Key Concepts in Governance (London: Sage, 2009), p. 85 
10 Ibid. 
11 Whitman, J., The Fundamentals of Global Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 8 
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Global Climate Change Governance 
Although climate change governance is a vast arena of actors and institutions, these 
processes can be broken down into two broad categories common to global governance as 
a whole: multilateral and networked climate change governance. Multilateral governance 
involves states working together to solve a problem. Networked climate change 
governance, on the other hand, is made up of a variety of actors, including multinational 
corporations, international organizations, and individuals who coordinate their action 
globally. These actors promote policies, set standards, and call for action both with and 
without the cooperation of states.12 These types of actors are often grouped together 
under a common umbrella term, such as experimental governance, 13  networked 
governance,14 or transnational governance.15 The thesis will use only one term, namely 
‘networked governance’ to describe governance processes outside of multilateral global 
governance processes in order to avoid confusion. Nevertheless, this term should be taken 
to imply ‘experimental’ governance or ‘transnational’ governance by those who refer to it 
as such.  
  
It is important to outline, in this chapter, and assess, in the chapters which follow, both 
multilateral and networked governance, because both processes play an important part in 
acting against climate change. 16  Although multilateral climate change governance 
processes are perhaps more public or familiar, ‘we no longer observe a singular global 
response to climate change, and are instead observing multiple global responses,’ including 
networked climate change governance responses.17 Furthermore, some scholars, such as 
Matthew Hoffman, go so far as to claim that networked climate change governance 
processes do not merely exist alongside multilateral governance processes, but that the 
center of gravity in the global response to climate change is shifting from the multilateral 
treaties to diverse activities outside of this process. 18  If networked climate change 
governance processes are indeed becoming increasingly important, it is crucial to research 
these processes in order to fully understand global climate change governance.  
 
                                                          
12 Bevir, M., Key Concepts in Governance (London: Sage, 2009), p. 87 
13 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
14 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) 
15 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 55 
16 Ibid. p. 10 
17 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 17 
18 Ibid. p. 5 
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In addition, while it may be difficult to research networked climate change governance 
processes due to their diversity and complexity, Hoffman claims that networked climate 
change governance processes may represent the best hope for effectively responding to 
climate change.19 If this is the case, it is important to assess whether these processes may 
also represent the best hope for a just response to climate change. Furthermore, because 
of the apparent growing importance of networked climate change governance processes, it 
is increasingly common for climate change governance literature to concern both 
multilateral and networked climate change governance processes. Scholars of climate 
change governance go so far as to say that failing to explore networked governance 
processes would ignore the complexities of the climate change governance process.20 In 
other words, solely assessing multilateral climate change governance processes would 
seemingly ignore a thriving and influential part of climate change governance, and lead to 
an incomplete assessment of current institutional practice. The thesis will therefore follow 
emerging convention and outline both types of climate change governance processes 
below.  
Multilateral Climate Change Governance Processes 
Multilateral climate change governance refers to the state led processes of climate change 
governance coordinated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC is the only global multilateral institution tasked, by treaty, 
with coordinating global climate change action. It will therefore be the only institution 
assessed under the heading of multilateral climate change governance processes. The 
emergence of the UNFCCC can be traced back to the 1980s, which saw the first attempts at 
coordinating international action against climate change during a series of workshops and 
conferences that produced political declarations and aspirational targets for reducing 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as the so-called ‘Toronto Target.’21 In 1992 
climate change was firmly established on the global agenda at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, which adopted the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC.22 The Convention, an 
international treaty ratified by 195 states, entered into force on 21 March 1994. The 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas 
                                                          
19 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 5 
20 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 10 
21 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 2 
22 Ibid. 
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concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.23  
 
The UNFCCC provides a framework to assess progress and to negotiate policy and 
international treaties, referred to as Protocols. The main actors operating under the 
UNFCCC are states, referred to as Parties to the Convention, who meet annually at the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to review progress on commitments and to update them in 
the light of the latest scientific advice.24 The Parties are the ultimate decision making body 
in climate negotiations, which implies that states are the ultimate decision makers in 
multilateral climate change governance.25  At the annual COP, states often organize 
themselves into blocs and negotiating coalitions to enhance their influence and to advance 
common agendas.26 The most notable blocs are the European Union (EU), the developing 
countries (G77+China), the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Umbrella Group 
(composed of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Ukraine, Japan, 
and Norway), and the Environmental Integrity Group (Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Monaco, 
South Korea, and Mexico).27 These blocs negotiate at the COPs, assess current measures 
taken, and work towards developing protocols and implementation measures. The most 
significant outcome of the COPs remains the first and only protocol: the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, which committed a number of developed countries to GHG reduction and 
limitation targets.28  
 
It is important to note that the main actors of the UNFCCC are states. Although states come 
together under the UNFCCC to negotiate treaties, the UNFCCC is itself not an actor with its 
own powers. States have the final say on all decisions. States collectively set targets and 
goals, and individual states then follow these targets and goals within their borders. For 
example, states can use carbon taxes, emissions trading, building codes, or encourage 
individuals to reduce emissions. It is states who must ensure that these efforts collectively 
add up to the agreed emissions reduction targets. Therefore, although the UNFCCC has 
authority to make decisions about how to act on climate change, this authority is ultimately 
                                                          
23 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 9 
24 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 18 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 63 
28 Ibid. , p. 62 
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derived from states.29 What this type of authority implies for responsibility in climate 
change governance will be further discussed below. Before this, an overview of networked 
climate change governance processes will be provided. 
Networked Climate Change Governance Processes  
Alongside the UNFCCC, there exists an array of activities that are attempting to respond to 
climate change, referred to here under the umbrella term of networked climate change 
governance. These processes of climate change governance are not focused on a single 
outcome, such as a global treaty. Instead, networked climate change governance initiatives 
push the global response to climate change in a number of directions - energy efficiency, 
carbon markets, local adaptation, and transformation of the built environment or 
transportation systems, among others.30  Most commonly, networked climate change 
initiatives are involved in information sharing or voluntary goal setting. With such an array 
of actors and activities, it is difficult to define networked climate change governance 
processes succinctly. Nevertheless, these processes can be categorized in order to provide 
clarity.  
 
One of the most common ways to categorize the processes occurring involved in 
networked governance processes is to group the activities into public, private, and hybrid.31 
Public networked climate change governance processes include transnational municipal 
networks, networks of regional governments or bilateral agreements between subnational 
governments.32 These public groups usually focus on meeting common goals.33 Examples 
include the C40, which is a network of the world’s largest cities. These cities aim to share 
best practices and develop collaborative initiatives on city specific issues. 34  Hybrid 
networked climate change governance processes include both public and private actors in 
various forms of collaborations.35 This type of networked climate change governance can 
                                                          
29 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 87 
30 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 5 
31 See: Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 87, Bäckstrand, K., ‘Accountability of Networked Climate change 
governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate Partnerships’ in Global Environmental Politics 8 (2008), p. 74 and 
Stripple, J., and Pattberg, P., ‘Agency in Global Climate Change Governance: Setting the Stage’ in Biermann, F., 
Pattberg, P., and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Change Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency, and 
Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 142, and Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing 
Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 61 
32 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 59 
33 Ibid.,  p. 61 
34 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 19 
35 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 62 
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involve a range of actors, including host governments, private investors, carbon brokers, 
and non-governmental organizations.36 An example of a hybrid project is the Climate Group, 
which involves both public actors (e.g. Germany, California, and London) and private actors 
(e.g. M&S, BP, HSBC, Shell), and aims to spread best practices and solutions.37 Private 
networked climate change governance processes involve a variety of private actors, 
including corporate and civil-society sectors, who work together to define issues, set up 
rules to follow, and ensure compliance to these rules is monitored.38 Examples include the 
Verified Carbon Standard, a private institution which facilitates the exchange of carbon 
credits by ‘eliminating the need for the purchaser to evaluate the merits of many different 
projects,’ and therefore plays a crucial role in enabling carbon markets to run.39  
 
Grouping the processes of networked climate governance into public, private, and hybrid 
governance is relatively common in climate change governance literature. However, 
processes of networked climate governance can also be grouped according to function. For 
example, Hoffman defines four groups according to function: networkers, infrastructure 
builders, voluntary actors, and accountable actors. 40  Another way climate change 
governance scholars group networked governance processes is according to both function 
and type of actor. Kenneth Abbott, for example, focuses on both functions and types of 
actors in his analysis of the different types of networked governance projects.41 These 
three common ways to group networked governance processes (actor type, function, or 
both) reveal that networked climate change governance is a complex field. Chapter Eight 
will provide further insight into networked climate change governance processes. For now, 
the current chapter merely serves to emphasize how complex these processes of 
governance are.  
 
It is important to note that while the UNFCCC obtains its authority through legal ratification 
by its sovereign state members, authority in networked climate change governance 
processes is often obtained more informally, for example through filling gaps in 
                                                          
36 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 61 
37 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 82 
38 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 65 
39 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 111 
40 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Change Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after 
Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 41 
41 Abbott, K. W., ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Environment & Planning C: 
Government & Policy 30(4) (2012) pp. 578 
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regulation.42 Whether this difference in authority has an effect on the responsibility of 
actors under the UNFCCC and within networked governance processes will be explored 
below.  
Responsibility and Authority in Climate Change Governance 
This chapter has, so far, provided an overview of institutional practice, and explained why 
the UNFCCC and networked climate change governance processes have been chosen to 
represent this practice. This penultimate section of the chapter will defend the idea that 
actors in the UNFCCC and those actors who operate involved in networked climate change 
governance processes can be held responsible for a just response to climate change. This 
argument will be made in two parts. First, the chapter will ground the responsibility of 
these actors in a conception of their capability to ‘enable’ the three demands of justice 
explicated in this thesis, a conception of responsibility which will be explained in detail 
below. This will be referred to as ‘institutional responsibility.’ Second, the chapter will 
explore differences in authority of actors in the UNFCCC and networked climate change 
governance processes, and will explain what this difference in authority means for 
institutional responsibility. 
Institutional Responsibility: Moral Responsibility from Capability 
The argument which will be put forward here is similar to the argument made in the 
previous chapter, which established the moral responsibility of capable actors to lower 
emissions and contribute financially to the climate change cause. However, it will be 
argued here that the responsibility of actors within climate governance institutions is not 
simply to lower emissions or contribute financially, but to ‘enable’ the three demands of 
justice set out in this thesis. The discussion below will explain what is meant by ‘enabling,’ 
and why this responsibility can be attributed to actors under the UNFCCC and actors 
involved in networked climate change governance processes. The chapter will make use of 
Peter Singer’s capability argument and draw on the work of Simon Caney, who has very 
recently made a case for institutional responsibility in the case of climate change. However, 
as will be illustrated below, Caney’s argument remains theoretical, in the sense that it does 
not aim to investigate whether the responsibilities he defines are met. There is more work 
to be done in this area, and this thesis will contribute to moving the global justice and 
climate change debate forward by investigating actors in specific institutions and assessing 
to what extent they are meeting their responsibilities. This speaks to the aim of bridging 
                                                          
42 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate change governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 87 
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the gap between climate justice theory and climate change governance practice, because it 
involves applying the most recent theory in order to assess current practice. The chapter 
will now make the case for institutional responsibility by drawing on Singer’s and Caney’s 
work, before explaining how a conception of institutional responsibility will be applied in 
this thesis. 
 
Singer’s argument for moral responsibility from capability was used in the previous chapter, 
Chapter Five, to establish the moral responsibility of capable actors to lower emissions and 
contribute financially to the climate change cause. To recap, Singer argues that if it is 
‘within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it.’43 He illustrates 
his argument by explaining that if someone is walking past a shallow pond and sees a child 
drowning in it, they ought to wade in and pull the child out, even if this will mean getting 
their clothes muddy.’44 In other words, an agent is morally responsible if they are capable 
of acting to prevent a moral harm without sacrificing something of equal moral importance. 
It is arguable that Singer’s account of responsibility from capability can be applied in order 
to defend institutional responsibility. Singer himself hints at this in his work on climate 
change, where he outlines the need for global institutions to regulate climate change. 
Singer argues that it difficult to envisage ‘any solution to climate change that does not 
require effective global institutions.’45 He also claims that although it will not be easy for 
global institutions to regulate climate change, the challenge nonetheless ‘needs to be 
met.’46 Singer seems to be implying two points here. The first is that institutions have the 
capability to meet the challenge of regulating climate change efforts, and the second is that 
it is morally necessary that they meet this challenge.  
 
According to Singer’s own responsibility from capability argument, which states that actors 
capable of preventing moral harm must act as long as they do not sacrifice something of 
equal moral importance, this seems to imply moral responsibility for capable institutions in 
the case of climate change. If global institutions are capable of ‘meeting the challenge of 
regulating climate change efforts’ and this challenge ‘needs to be met’ then this implies 
that capable global institutions must act. This is consistent with Singer’s optimism for the 
                                                          
43 Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), p. 231 
44 Ibid. 
45 Singer, P., ‘Ethics and Climate Change: A Commentary on MacCracken, Toman and Gardiner’ in Environmental 
Values 15 (2006), p. 421 
46 Ibid. 
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future, which he bases in the fact that ‘the developed countries have signed the Kyoto 
Protocol, and are now discussing further steps that need to be taken.’47 Singer is seemingly 
putting faith into global institutions and their potential capability to deal with the climate 
change problem, which implies, according to his own logic, that these institutions have a 
responsibility to act on their capabilities. While Singer does not make the case for 
institutional responsibility explicitly, it is arguably in line with his original argument and 
implicit in his work on the climate change problem. This suggests that an argument for the 
moral responsibility of institutions could potentially rest on the same argument from 
capability on which the responsibility of capable actors to lower emissions and make 
financial contributions rests. 
 
Simon Caney openly advocates such a capability as responsibility approach to climate 
change.  Caney explains that we need to take ‘institutional and political reality’ of climate 
change into account. The ‘political reality’ of climate change is that actors will not 
automatically comply with their moral responsibilities. Caney explains that thinking 
otherwise would be ‘be naïve in the extreme’ based on 'our experience of human nature 
and the inconclusive nature of the negotiations on climate change for the last two 
decades.’48 In other words, although the moral responsibilities of actors have been laid out, 
this has not resulted in serious action on climate change. For this reason, Caney believes 
something must be done to ensure that moral responsibilities are met. He argues that the 
‘institutional reality’ of climate change is that there are some actors who are capable of 
ensuring compliance with moral responsibilities or at least enabling action in the first 
place.49 When applied to the climate justice position defended in this thesis, Caney’s 
argument seems to suggest the ‘political reality’ is that the three demands of justice will 
not automatically be realized merely because they have been defined. However, Caney’s 
conception of ‘institutional reality’ implies that there may be actors who have the 
capability of ensuring these demands of justice are met, which seems to imply that these 
actors may have a moral responsibility to act on these capabilities, based on the argument 
from capability advocated by Singer. Caney seems to agree with Singer’s argument, and 
makes the case for what he refers to as a two tier approach to climate justice, split into first 
and second order responsibilities. 
                                                          
47 Singer, P., ‘Ethics and Climate Change: A Commentary on MacCracken, Toman and Gardiner’ in Environmental 
Values 15 (2006), p. 421 
48 Caney, S., ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’ in The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 22 (2014), p. 134 
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Caney’s first order responsibilities include ‘responsibilities to mitigate climate change, to 
enable adaption, and to compensate people for harm done.’50 Second-order responsibilities, 
by contrast, refer to responsibilities that some have to ensure that agents comply with 
their first-order responsibilities.51 What this seems to imply is that Caney is attempting to 
differentiate between the moral responsibility to act on climate change, and the moral 
responsibility to ensure that climate change is acted upon. What is interesting to note is 
that second order responsibilities are based on capability. Caney lists six kinds of 
capabilities that would imply second order responsibility. One of these is enforcement, or 
the political power to set up enforcement mechanisms.52 Caney also outlines enablement, 
incentivization, norm creation, undermining resistance, and civil disobedience.53 What 
Caney stresses in his outline of these capabilities is that the possession of these capabilities 
implies the second order moral responsibility to act on them. Caney explains that he wants 
to attribute second order responsibilities to ‘those who can make a valuable difference.’54 
He posits that those with the power to compel or induce or enable others to act have a 
responsibility to do so.55 Although Caney refers to ‘power,’ not ‘capability,’ his argument is 
clearly an argument from capability. This is implicit in the fact that Caney refers to those 
responsible as ‘those who can,’ and in the fact that power is a synonym for capability.56 It is 
also interesting to note that Caney’s argument implies a differentiation between agents in 
terms of capability. The previous chapter argued that there is differentiation between 
actors in terms of their capabilities to reduce emissions and/or contribute financially, and 
that responsibilities should be allocated accordingly.  It is implicit in Caney’s list of six 
possible capabilities of second order agents that these agents have differing capabilities. As 
Caney explains: ‘though their capacities vary, second-order agents can make a marked 
difference to whether people comply with their first-order responsibilities.’57 Therefore, 
the moral responsibility of agents will vary according to their capabilities. This 
differentiation between actors will be further discussed in the section on the differences in 
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 174 
 
authority between the UNFCCC and networked climate change governance processes, 
because as will be explained, a difference in authority implies a difference in responsibility.  
 
To summarize, Caney’s argument is that those agents with the power to discharge second-
order responsibilities have a duty to do so. 58  Caney’s conception of second order 
responsibilities will be adopted in this thesis. How exactly the approach will be adopted will 
be outlined below. Yet, before doing so, it is important to explain the usefulness of Caney’s 
approach to the thesis. Caney, as was noted above, creates his position in order to take 
into account the political and institutional realities of climate change. He argues that his 
approach ‘provides an account of the explicitly political responsibilities that are needed if 
we are to avoid severe climatic changes.’59 In other words, his approach defines who 
exactly is responsible for meeting demands of justice in the current political context. 
Defining who is responsible in the current political context is useful because it allows an 
exploration of the extent to which agents defined as responsible are meeting their 
responsibilities. Without an idea of who the responsible agents are, it is not possible to 
explore to what extent responsibilities are being met. One of the main aims of the thesis is 
to normatively assess the current response to climate change in order to try and bridge the 
gap between climate justice theory and climate change governance practice. In order to 
achieve this, demands of justice must be defined, and agents responsible for ‘enabling’ 
these demands must be identified so that it is clear whom to hold accountable and for 
what we can reasonably hold them morally responsible for. For this reason, Caney’s 
argument will be adapted in order to create a conception of institutional responsibility.  
Institutional Responsibility of Actors in Multilateral and Networked Climate Change 
Governance 
The chapter will now define the concept of institutional responsibility, by drawing on and 
expanding Caney’s argument for second order responsibilities. The chapter will also define 
what is meant by ‘enable,’ and include an overview of the capabilities of the actors under 
the UNFCCC and within networked climate change governance, in order to illustrate why 
these actors can be assigned institutional responsibility. As was explained above, Caney’s 
argument, which is arguably based on a responsibility from capability approach, is 
extremely useful for the thesis. However, Caney’s position must be built upon and 
expanded in order to fit within the remits of the thesis and address some of the limitations 
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of his approach. In terms of building on the approach, the first step is to expand the 
conception of first order responsibilities. Caney defines first order responsibilities as 
‘responsibilities to mitigate climate change, to enable adaption, and to compensate people 
for harm done.’60 This is in line with Demand Three set out in this thesis, which calls for all 
capable actors, including individuals, corporations, international institutions and states to 
lower emissions and/or contribute financially to the climate change problem depending on 
their capabilities. However, the thesis goes beyond this one demand, and outlines two 
more which must be met in order to achieve a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change. Demand One states that the right to health61 of future generations must be 
considered to be equally as valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must 
therefore be protected. Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries 
must be properly considered in climate change action, and that the distribution of benefits 
and burdens in global climate change action should be based in the PATP62 model. In other 
words, the thesis defines three distinct first order responsibilities.  
Building on Caney’s logic would imply that second order responsibilities would consist of 
not only ensuring that actors lower emissions and contribute financially, but to ensure the 
protection of the right to health of future generations, and to ensure that the concerns of 
less developed countries to be taken into account, and finally ensure that a PATP 
distribution of benefits and burdens between states. In other words, the second order 
responsibilities of actors would be to ensure the fulfilment of the three demands of justice 
set out in the thesis. If this cannot be ensured, then second order responsibility implies ‘at 
least enabling action’ on these three demands, according to Caney’s position.63  
 
At this point it is important to clarify what Caney means by ‘ensuring’ or ‘at least enabling 
action,’ in order to explain what second order responsibility entails. When Caney discusses 
ensuring/enabling action on second order responsibilities, he explains that agents operate 
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in social, economic, and political contexts, and it is possible to structure these contexts in 
ways which induce agents to comply with their first-order responsibilities.64 For this reason, 
Caney argues that these contexts should be restructured to enable greater compliance with 
first order responsibilities.65 This seems to imply that Caney’s conception of ‘ensuring’ that 
first order responsibilities are met means restructuring the context in which agents operate, 
in order to ‘enable’ agents to meet their first order responsibilities. Put more simply, actors 
with second order responsibilities must ‘enable’ actors to comply with their first order 
responsibilities, by restructuring the context these actors operate in. Applied to this thesis, 
this means that actors who have institutional responsibility must ‘enable’ the three 
demands of justice by restructuring the context so that these demands can be met. This, 
then, is what the chapter means by ‘enabling,’ and what this term should be taken to imply 
from this point forward. ‘Restructuring the context’ is a notion which is left quite broad in 
Caney’s work, and can include enforcing compliance through policy measures, 66 
incentivizing actors by offering rewards for their action, creating norms which encourage 
compliance by making non-compliance seem unacceptable,67 undermining resistance to 
compliance, for example through accurate media representation of climate change, and 
using civil disobedience to encourage governments to act. 68  This broad notion of 
restructuring the context will be adapted here, and the chapter will clarify how specific 
actors can enable the three demands of justice by restructuring the context below. 
 
The second step to building on and addressing the limitations of Caney’s approach is to 
define actors which are capable of meeting the above defined second order responsibility 
of enabling the three demands of justice, or in other words, enabling a condition of justice 
in the case of climate change. Although Caney lists a few potential actors who could bear 
second order responsibilities, for example ‘firms, trade unions, churches, states, and 
international institutions,’69 or ‘government departments, journalists, scientists, writers, 
research councils, officials responsible for demographic policy, and charismatic 
individuals’70 and mentions the ‘WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’71 as potential enforcers, 
he does not explore any specific actors and their responsibilities in detail. More importantly, 
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Caney does not attempt to assess to what extent the actors he lists are meeting their 
second order responsibilities. For this reason, the thesis will build on Caney’s argument and 
contribute to global justice and climate change debates by doing what Caney does not: 
choose specific actors, explain why they have second order responsibilities, and explore to 
what extent these responsibilities are being met.  
 
This will add a significant amount of original research to the debate. Importantly, the thesis 
will also contribute to Caney’s goal of creating a realistic approach which takes into account 
political and institutional realities. The thesis will contribute to this goal by conducting an 
investigation of institutional ‘reality,’ or what is here referred to as current institutional 
practice, with the aim of pinpointing responsible actors. This is a useful endeavor in terms 
of enhancing the ‘realistic’ element of Caney’s two tier approach, but perhaps more 
importantly, this assessment of the institutional context conducted in Chapters Seven and 
Eight will reveal tentative positive trajectories and existing hindrances at the institutional 
level which need to be encouraged or overcome in order to ensure second order 
responsibilities are met in the future. The concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter Nine, 
will draw on the findings made in Chapters Seven and Eight and provide a discussion on 
what future research on climate justice should focus on. This will meaningfully contribute 
to global justice and climate change debates, because it will facilitate future discussions on 
achieving a more just response to climate change.  
 
Before the assessment of institutional context can commence, responsible actors must be 
identified. This means identifying actors that have the capability of enabling the three 
demands of justice defended in this thesis, by restructuring the context so that the 
demands can be met. The capability to enable the three demands of justice implies a moral 
responsibility to act, as was explained above. This moral responsibility to act will be 
referred to as institutional responsibility, a term unique to this thesis, which denotes the 
second tier responsibility to enable the three demands of justice explicated in this thesis. In 
this way, any confusion with Caney’s position will be avoided, as he refers to his notion of 
institutional responsibility as second order responsibility. Although the thesis builds on his 
work, the first order responsibilities defined here are more expansive than Caney’s, and the 
notion of second order responsibilities will be explored in significantly greater detail. For 
this reason, a new term is appropriate. The term institutional responsibility has been 
chosen because it will be used to explore responsibilities of actors in the current 
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institutional context of climate change governance. The thesis will now identify two types 
actors as having the institutional responsibility of enabling a condition of justice: the actors 
operating under the UNFCCC and the actors operating within networked climate change 
governance processes. In order to assign institutional responsibility to these actors, it must 
be illustrated that they have the capability of enabling the three demands of justice set out 
in this thesis. This capability will be briefly explained below, and elaborated on in Chapters 
Seven and Eight, which concern the exploratory assessment of the extent to which actors 
within the UNFCCC and networked climate change governance processes are meeting their 
institutional responsibility. 
 
As was explained earlier in the chapter, the UNFCCC provides a framework to assess 
progress and to negotiate policy and international treaties concerning climate change, 
referred to as Protocols. The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve stabilization of 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.72 It is quite clear that actors under the 
UNFCCC have the potential to affect climate change policy because these actors are 
charged with designing such policy. Actors in the UNFCCC are therefore arguably capable of 
enabling the three demands of justice, because these actors have the capability of 
restructuring the context so that the demands can be met, as will be explained below. 
Before this can be explained, it must be restated that states are the ultimate decision 
makers in the UNFCCC. For this reason, assigning institutional responsibility to actors under 
the UNFCCC implies assigning responsibility to states who are signatories to the UNFCCC.  
 
In order to illustrate the capability of actors under the UNFCCC to enable the three 
demands of justice, each demand will be taken in turn. Demand One states that ‘the right 
to health73 of future generations must be considered to be equally as valuable as the right 
to health of current generations, and must therefore be protected.’ Chapters Four and Five 
explained that this requires that global temperature rise is kept at or below 2°C, because 
warming above this level will cause ‘dangerous effects’ which harm the human right to 
health.74 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) claims, at the time of 
writing, that to achieve this goal, emissions would have to be cut by 40% - 70% by 2050 
                                                          
72 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,  UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 9 
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74 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
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compared to 2010, and would need to be near zero or below in 2100.75 Actors under the 
UNFCCC have the capability to enable Demand One because these actors can restructure 
the context to ensure that appropriate mitigation takes place. Actors in the UNFCCC are 
explicitly tasked with creating global treaties and agreements in order to ‘to achieve 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’76 In other words, 
the UNFCCC has been set up exactly for the purpose of developing policies in order to 
mitigate emissions. For this reason, the actors under the UNFCCC have the capability to 
make decisions which can enable Demand One, because they can restructure the context 
to ensure that emissions are kept to the required limit, which will ensure that effects of 
climate change are kept to a minimum, thereby protecting the right to health of future 
generations.  
 
Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action, and that the distribution of benefits and burdens in 
global climate change action should be based in the PATP77 model. Actors under the 
UNFCCC have the capability to enable the first part of this demand because the UNFCCC 
creates a context within which this is possible. The UNFCCC includes 195 member states, 
and therefore encompasses almost every state in the world. This implies that actors under 
the UNFCCC have the capability of ensuring that the concerns of less developed countries 
are properly considered, because less developed countries are members of the UNFCCC 
and are included in climate change policy negotiations, and furthermore have the same 
voting rights as all other states. In this way, actors under the UNFCCC can include less 
developed countries in the decision making process, ensuring that their concerns can be 
taken into account. The second part of Demand Two calls for the distribution of benefits 
and burdens between states to be based on a PATP model. Actors under the UNFCCC have 
the capability to enable this because the UNFCCC has been charged with drawing up global 
treaties to, among other things, regulate the distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
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climate change. For this reason, the actors operating under the UNFCCC have the capability 
to change the context by designing global treaties to be based on the PATP model, 
therefore enabling the realization of this model.  
 
Finally, Demand Three states that ‘capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state 
entities, international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist 
in, must be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the 
climate change cause in line with their respective capabilities.’ Actors under the UNFCCC 
have the capability to enable this demand of justice because the UNFCCC is tasked with 
creating regulations around climate change, and can therefore create a context within 
which actors can meet their responsibilities. The UNFCCC creates regulations that assign a 
certain emissions target per state, and this in turn allows states to regulate the emissions of 
individuals, corporations, and stub state entities within their borders. The UNFCCC also has 
the capability to set up fundraising targets which states could raise money for through 
taxes or fines on individuals, sub-state entities, and corporations. In this way, actors under 
the UNFCCC have the capability to enable the realization of Demand Three of justice, 
because these actors can design global treaties and create a context which allows actors to 
meet their responsibilities to lower emissions and make financial contributions. 
Furthermore, as was illustrated above, actors under the UNFCCC are also arguably capable 
of enabling the realization of Demands One and Two of justice. The conception of 
institutional responsibility defended above implies that actors under the UNFCCC therefore 
have the moral responsibility to enable Demands One, Two and Three, by creating a 
context in which these demands can be met. Chapter Seven will provide a detailed 
overview of this responsibility and an assessment of the extent to which the actors under 
the UNFCCC are meeting their institutional responsibility. 
 
Now that the capability of actors under the UNFCCC has been briefly demonstrated, the 
capability of actors involved in networked climate change governance processes will be 
briefly outlined, with each demand being taken in turn. As was explained earlier in the 
chapter, actors working within networked governance practices can vary from individuals 
to corporations to sub-state entities, so when reference is made to ‘actors,’ these varied 
types of actors should be taken as implicit to the term. Actors involved in networked 
climate change governance processes do not operate under a global treaty or strive 
towards a unified goal, as was explained earlier in this chapter. In addition, as will be 
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further discussed below, networked climate change governance processes do not operate 
under international legal authority like the UNFCCC. However, it is still arguable that the 
actors involved in networked governance processes have the capability of enabling the 
three demands of justice set out in this thesis by creating a context in which these demands 
can be met.  
 
Demand One states that ‘the right to health78 of future generations must be considered to 
be equally as valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must therefore be 
protected.’ As was explained above, this demand requires emissions to be kept at a certain 
level to prevent dangerous warming of the planet. Actors involved in networked climate 
change governance processes are capable of enabling this demand of justice because these 
processes include projects which have significant potential to substantially lower global 
emissions. In other words, these projects create a context in which Demand One can be 
enabled through the lowering of emissions. The capability of networked governance actors 
to lower emissions will be fully explored in Chapter Eight; two examples will be outlined 
below in order to briefly illustrate this capability. One networked governance project, the 
C40, is a group of cities which aim to reduce carbon emissions and increase energy 
efficiency in large cities across the world.79 The members of the C40 account for one in 
twelve people worldwide, formally representing approximately 302 million people.80 The 
potential emissions reductions from these cities is therefore significant, as will be explained 
in Chapter Eight. As another brief example, the Climate Group is a networked governance 
project which has members from both the public sector (e.g. Germany, California, and 
London) and corporate sector (e.g. M&S, BP, HSBC, Shell) worlds.81 This group funds 
projects such a global pilot program to bring light-emitting diode (LED) street lighting, 
which has 50-70% lower emissions than traditional lighting, to major global cities including 
London, New York, Hong Kong, Mumbai, and Calcutta.82 Initial results from the Climate 
Group’s pilot project in New York are pointing to emissions reductions of up to 80%.83 The 
possible gains of this project are significant because street lighting accounts for 6% of 
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global emissions levels, which is the equivalent of emissions from 70% of the world’s 
passenger vehicles.84 The Climate Group, through projects such as these, has the capability 
of significantly affecting global emissions rates, and therefore protecting future generations’ 
rights to health. These examples will be elaborated on in Chapter Eight in order to illustrate 
the capability of actors involved in networked climate change governance to enable the 
realization of Demand One of justice by creating a context where this is possible. For now, 
these examples serve to very briefly illustrate this capability.  
 
Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action, and that the distribution of benefits and burdens in 
global climate change action should be based in the PATP85 model. Actors involved in 
networked governance processes are arguably capable of enabling the first part of this 
demand, because networked governance processes allow for a context in which this 
demand can be met. Projects of networked governance can include actors from less 
developed countries, can focus on financing projects which meet less developed countries’ 
concerns, and can ensure that less developed countries’ voices are heard. Projects involved 
in networked governance processes are flexible enough to accommodate these types of 
aims. As will be illustrated in Chapter Eight, there are projects which include developing 
country founders, such as the Global Methane Initiative, which prides itself in being the 
only international effort to specifically target methane abatement, recovery, and use.86 In 
addition, there are projects which take less developed country concerns into account, such 
as the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network, which focuses on adaptation.87 
These examples will be elaborated on in Chapter Eight. 
 
The second part of Demand Two can arguably be enabled by actors involved in networked 
governance processes if these actors create a context where Demand Two can be met. This 
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context could be created for example through information sharing or campaigning on the 
subject, which could build support for a PATP distribution of benefits and burdens between 
states. Networked governance projects often involve campaigning and advocacy, and 
actors within these processes frequently attend the annual UNFCCC COPs in the hopes of 
influencing decision making. In addition, networked governance projects can include states 
which are high emitting/and or wealthy and not held to account under the UNFCCC, 
therefore creating a context for these states to meet their responsibilities. For example, the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), which has now come to 
an end, consisted of Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United 
States of America.88 With the exception of Australia, none of these states was held to 
account for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially under the UNFCCC at the 
time of the APP. For this reason, it is arguably possible for actors involved in networked 
governance processes to enable the second part of Demand Two of justice, by creating a 
context where wealthy and high emitting states are held to account for their 
responsibilities, which is required under the PATP model. This will be further discussed in 
Chapter Eight.  
 
Finally, Demand Three states that capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state 
entities, international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist 
in, must be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the 
climate change cause in line with their respective capabilities.’ Actors involved in 
networked governance processes are arguably capable of enabling this demand, because 
networked governance projects create a context which allows firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and individuals to act on climate change. Involved in networked 
governance projects, these actors are, albeit mostly voluntarily, being held responsible for 
climate change action, and engaging in activities which involve both lowering emissions and 
making financial contributions to projects which fight against climate change.  Chapter 
Eight will explore several networked governance projects which include specific actors, for 
example the Verified Carbon Standard, which involves corporations, and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which involves federal states in the United States of America. 
Through these types of projects, actors involved in networked climate change governance 
processes are creating a context which incorporates new actors who were previously under 
no obligation to lower emissions under the UNFCCC. For this reason, it seems the actors 
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involved in networked governance processes are capable of enabling Demand Three, 
because the networked governance projects they run and take part in create a context in 
which previously unregulated actors can commit themselves to lowering their emissions 
and making financial contributions, in line with Demand Three of justice. Furthermore, as 
was illustrated above, networked governance actors are capable of enabling Demands One 
and Two of justice. Under the logic of institutional responsibility, this implies that actors 
involved in networked governance processes can be held morally responsible for enabling 
Demands One, Two, and Three of justice. Chapter Eight will provide an exploratory 
assessment of the extent to which the actors involved in networked governance processes 
are meeting their institutional responsibility. 
 
The above illustration of capabilities implies that under the logic of institutional 
responsibility, both actors in the UNFCCC and involved in networked climate change 
governance processes have the moral responsibility to enable the three demands of justice 
explicated in this thesis by restructuring the context so that these demands can be met. For 
this reason, it is worthwhile to explore to what extent these actors are living up to their 
responsibilities in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis. This is not to say that these are 
only two types of actors which have a moral responsibility to act. Other actors may well 
have similar institutional responsibilities. However, the two types of actors have been 
chosen because the thesis focuses on global climate change governance, and the UNFCCC 
and networked governance processes represent global climate change governance, as was 
explained earlier in this chapter.  
 
It is also important to stress that it is the capability of the actors under the UNFCCC and 
within networked climate change governance to enable demands of justice which implies 
their institutional responsibility, and this responsibility is not affected by whether or not 
these actors are likely to enable the demands of justice defined in this thesis. As David 
Estlund has recently argued, the fact that an agent’s action is unlikely, even extremely 
unlikely, does not entail that it is beyond the agent’s ability.89 To make his case, Estlund 
explains that there is a difference between impossible and improbable. Impossible implies 
that an agent cannot perform an action. Improbable, on the other hand, implies that an 
agent is capable of an action, but there is no chance that she will do it, that the (objective) 
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 185 
 
probability of her doing it is zero.90 He suggests that even a zero probability that an action 
will be performed does not entail inability.91 What Estlund is implying is that probability of 
an action does not affect the capability to perform an action. Since institutional 
responsibility has here been defended on the grounds of capability, and probability of 
action does not affect capability, then under this logic, probability of action does not affect 
institutional responsibility. Or, as Estlund puts it, ‘the likelihood that a person will not 
behave in a certain (entirely possible) way simply does not bear on whether they morally 
should: it is not a fact that has that kind of moral significance.’92 Therefore, even if the 
actors under the UNFCCC or networked climate change governance are unlikely to live up 
the their institutional responsibility, say for example because of a lack of political will, this 
does not take away from the duty these actors have to act on their institutional 
responsibility. It is capability that matters, morally, and not probability. Probability of an 
action does not affect the moral requirement of that action.  
 
Now that the institutional responsibility of actors in the UNFCCC and networked 
governance processes has been established, the chapter turns to establishing whether 
either actors under the UNFCCC or actors involved in networked governance processes are 
more responsible for enabling the three demands of justice explicated in this thesis. This is 
important to explore because responsibilities must be clearly defined and laid out before 
the extent to which they are being met can be assessed.  
Differences in Authority and Responsibility in Climate Change Governance  
It has been established that both actors in the UNFCCC and involved in networked climate 
change governance processes have a responsibility to enable the realization of Demands 
One, Two, and Three, based in their respective capabilities do to so. However, there is an 
important difference between these actors which affects their responsibilities: the 
difference in their source of authority. Actors under the UNFCCC derive authority in a 
formal manner, while actors involved in networked governance derive authority more 
informally. These differences in authority will be explained below, and will be followed an 
explanation of what these differences imply for institutional responsibility in the case of 
climate change. 
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The differences in authority between actors in the UNFCCC and networked governance 
processes stems from the extensive disaggregation of authority in global governance, 
which is a result of the absence of clear authority, such as a world state.93 Not only is there 
disaggregation of authority, there is also differentiation between types of authority in 
global governance. The concept of authority in global governance has been explored by a 
number of different authors in recent decades, resulting in multiple definitions and 
conceptions of what authority is and how authority is derived. For example, having 
authority can be defined as getting an actor to do what they would not do otherwise, or 
creating new preferences in actors who were previously indifferent or at odds, or even 
mobilizing new or different constituencies for political action.94 For others, authority simply 
implies power: power to take the lead, power to make decisions, and power to implement 
policies. In fact, some global governance scholars use power and authority 
interchangeably.95 There are also numerous conceptions of how authority can be derived. 
For example, one of the most formal means of obtaining authority in global governance is 
through legal authority.96 Actors in the UNFCCC arguably possess this type of formal 
authority, because the Convention is based on an international treaty, which is considered 
the most robust form of international law.97 Furthermore, the treaties, or protocols, that 
the actors in the UNFCCC decide upon are considered international law.98 This provides 
actors under the UNFCCC with legal status, which arguably makes them authoritative 
agents in climate change governance. Another formal manner of obtaining authority is 
through delegated authority from another authoritative agent.99 Actors under the UNFCCC 
arguably also possess this type of formal authority. The UNFCCC is made up of authoritative 
states, and these states delegate their authority onto the UNFCCC. The state is 
unquestionably an authoritative agent in global governance, largely because its leaders 
hold a democratic mandate from the people.100 The UNFCCC has formally been delegated 
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authority by the legal ratification of states who are party to the Convention.101 Actors under 
the UNFCCC therefore arguably possess a form of delegated authority. Finally, a third 
formal source of authority is the mandate to act. Actors in the UNFCCC arguably possess 
this type of formal authority. The Convention has been ratified by 195 states, 
encompassing and representing a large proportion of the global population. This implies 
that the UNFCCC has a global mandate to act on climate change. This provides actors in 
UNFCCC with authority, because they have global backing to take action on climate change. 
These three sources of formal authority combined illustrate the formal authority of the 
actors in the UNFCCC. 
 
Actors operating within processes of networked climate change governance, on the other 
hand, do not derive authority in a formal manner.  Networked climate change governance 
processes do not operate under a legally ratified international treaty, and are therefore not 
acknowledged under international law as having the legal status to act on climate change. 
This implies that the actors involved in networked climate change governance processes do 
not possess legal authority. Actors in networked climate change governance processes also 
do not derive authority from the delegation of state authority, as the actors in these 
processes are almost exclusively non-state actors. Networked governance processes also 
cannot be said to have a global mandate to act, because the projects taking place within 
these processes are not operating under a single global treaty or are backed by a global 
decision making procedure. For this reason, it is arguable that actors involved in networked 
governance processes have no formal authority in climate change.102 However, many global 
governance scholars make the case that agents in global governance can derive authority in 
less formal ways. For example, authority can be based on the service to a commonly 
accepted set of principles, morals, or values.103 Actors involved in networked climate 
change governance arguably possess this source of authority because networked 
governance projects are based around the value of making an impact on climate change 
efforts. This is arguably a commonly accepted value, as there exists an institution with the 
global mandate to act on this value. Another source of informal authority is filling a 
recognized gap in regulation.104 Networked governance projects bring together actors 
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which are currently under no obligation to lower emissions under regulation, as was 
explained above. This directly fills gaps in regulation, which indicates that actors involved in 
networked governance processes arguably derive informal authority from this source. 
Finally, another informal source of authority is capacity based. It is argued that if a 
community agrees that a task must be accomplished, then satisfying the community’s 
preferences imparts authority to an actor.105 The international community has established 
climate change as an urgent concern, by setting up a multilateral institution tasked with 
addressing it and charging an international body of scientists to research the problem and 
provide guidelines for action. This indicates that the international community has agreed 
that there is a task to be accomplished, namely to address climate change. Actors involved 
in networked climate change governance processes act to ‘satisfy’ the international 
community’s ‘preferences’ by acting as if climate change is a problem, and attempting to 
provide solutions to the problem. Actors involved in networked governance processes 
therefore arguably derive informal authority from their capacity to address climate change. 
The three types of informal authority described above seem to imply that although actors 
involved in networked governance processes do not derive authority in a formal manner, 
these actors arguably possess informal authority in climate change governance.  
 
It should be noted that there may be other sources of informal authority. The above merely 
serves to illustrate that actors involved in networked governance can be argued to possess 
informal authority. It is also worth noting that actors in the UNFCCC may derive authority 
from the informal sources described above, on top of the formal sources of authority 
outlined above. This would be unsurprising, as most actors in global governance are 
authorized by some mix of authority types.106 However, this does not affect the argument 
that the actors in the UNFCCC and networked governance processes differ in the types of 
authority they possess. Actors under the UNFCCC possess formal authority, and actors 
involved in networked governance processes do not. This has implications for institutional 
responsibility, as will be explained below. 
The Relationship Between Responsibility and Authority in Climate Change Governance 
This chapter has argued that both actors under the UNFCCC and involved in networked 
governance processes have the institutional responsibility to enable a condition of justice 
in the case of climate change, because of their capability to do so. However, as was 
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illustrated above, the actors under the UNFCCC arguably possess formal authority, while 
actors in networked governance processes arguably only possess informal authority. The 
discussion below will illustrate why this may imply that actors under the UNFCCC possess 
greater institutional responsibility. However, it will be argued that if actors under the 
UNFCCC should fail to meet their institutional responsibility, then responsibility will fall on 
actors involved in networked climate change governance. In other words, the responsibility 
to meet a condition of justice falls on both types of actors until such a condition is achieved. 
 
In order to illustrate this point, consider the following thought experiment. Imagine there 
exists a pool, which has a lifeguard specifically assigned to save individuals from drowning. 
By some terrible coincidence, three people suddenly begin to drown simultaneously in this 
pool. The lifeguard cannot possibly save all three people, because they are on opposite 
ends of the pool. The lifeguard has the formal authority to act, because the lifeguard has 
been hired to save individuals from drowning. She has also signed a legally binding contract 
of employment in which she has agreed to save drowning persons. She has been trained to 
save lives, and she possesses a buoy to help keep an individual afloat. She is arguably the 
most authoritative agent at the pool to intervene in a drowning, and is therefore the most 
responsible agent in case of a drowning, because formal authority has been vested in her 
to do so. However, the lifeguard cannot save all three individuals. Imagine now that the 
pool has bystanders, who are aware of the drowning people. Some of these bystanders 
know how to swim, and have been trained in basic first aid, including CPR. In other words, 
these bystanders have the capability to save drowning persons, but no formal authority to 
do so. According to the capability argument made by Singer, the capable bystanders would 
have the moral responsibility to save the drowning individuals the lifeguard is unable to 
save. This is because they have the capability to prevent a moral harm without sacrificing 
something equally morally important: they can prevent a death of an individual without 
putting their own lives in danger due to their capability to swim. In other words, even in the 
absence of authority, these capable actors are morally responsible, and should act 
accordingly. There seems to be no moral difference between the responsibility of the 
lifeguard and the capable bystanders in a scenario where the lifeguard cannot meet her 
responsibilities.  
 
Further to this, now imagine a second scenario where only one person is drowning. In this 
scenario, the lifeguard had the capability to save the individual, and the authority to do so, 
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but is unwilling to act, because she is feeling tired, or lazy, or maybe does not care for the 
person who is drowning. According to the capability argument, this unwillingness to act 
would not take away from her moral responsibility to act. As was explained above, it is not 
the probability, but the capability of an actor which implies moral responsibility. Probability 
is not morally relevant, and so the fact that the probability of the lifeguard leaving her chair 
is low because of her lack of will to act does not affect her moral responsibility. Importantly, 
if the lifeguard does not, due to her lack of will, act on her responsibility to save the 
drowning individual, then the capable bystanders would have a moral responsibility to 
intervene, because the person charged with the authority to act would be failing to save 
the drowning person, as in the case of the three drowning persons above. In this scenario, 
as in the one above, the bystanders must jump in to save the drowning person, because of 
their capability to do so. It is not morally relevant to the bystanders whether the lifeguard 
will not or cannot save a drowning person, in both cases, the bystanders must intervene. 
The only case where the bystanders would not have to intervene is if the lifeguard saves 
the individual from drowning. In this case, the bystanders have no moral responsibility to 
help, because they are not capable of saving the individual, because the individual has 
already been saved. To reiterate the point made above, there is no moral difference 
between the responsibility of the lifeguard and the capable bystanders in a scenario where 
the lifeguard cannot, or will not, meet her responsibilities. 
 
This type of argument has been made in relation to humanitarian intervention. James 
Pattinson argues that legal authority to act does not make a moral difference in a 
humanitarian emergency such as genocide. In this type of scenario, the most effective actor 
must act, even in the absence of formal authority. Pattinson’s argument is based on the 
idea that a humanitarian emergency involves a violation of basic human rights on a massive 
scale.107 Accordingly, it is of the utmost moral importance that the humanitarian crisis is 
effectively tackled.108 It follows that it is paramount that the most effective agent be 
assigned the duty to intervene, so that the mass suffering which occurs in a humanitarian 
crisis can be stopped as soon as possible.109 Importantly, effectiveness of an intervener is 
determined by whether it is successful at tackling the mass violation of basic human 
rights.110 Pattinson believes that the formal authority to intervene, or more specifically the 
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legal authority to intervene, does not make a moral difference in this case. He believes that 
an intervener’s legal status according to current international law plays little or no role in 
its moral responsibility.111 According to current international law, legal interveners are 
those with expressed United Nation Security Council (UNSC) authorization and illegal 
interveners are those without it.112 Pattinson argues that in the case of a humanitarian 
emergency, if faced with a choice between an ineffective but legal UNSC action, and an 
illegal humanitarian intervention by an effective agent, we should prefer the latter, other 
things being equal.113 Interestingly, Pattinson argues that if there were an international 
institution with legal authority and experience which could rapidly intervene in any 
humanitarian emergency, this would be desirable and indeed preferable to the most 
effective actor approach he defends.114 However, he explains that currently, this scenario 
does not exist because current international institutions are far from this ideal.115 His 
argument then is that until such institutions are developed, the most effective agents 
should intervene.116 
 
Pattinson’s argument directly relates to the lifeguard argument. In his scenario, the most 
effective (most capable of tackling the massive violation of human rights) actor has moral 
responsibility to act, even in the absence of authority. The most capable agent is like the 
bystander at the pool, who has no formal authority to act, but is capable of acting. The 
lifeguard in this case would be an actor with the UNSC mandate to act, which as Pattinson 
explains may not be the most effective actor in a humanitarian emergency, just as the lone 
lifeguard cannot effectively save three drowning persons in the pool, or will not act to save 
one drowning person. It seems that the lifeguard scenario and Pattinson’s argument both 
point to the fact that although there may be an agent with formal authority who has the 
responsibility to act, if that agent is unable or unwilling to fulfil their moral responsibility, 
capable agents are morally required to act. This has implications for what the difference in 
authority between actors in the UNFCCC and involved in networked governance processes 
imply for institutional responsibility in the case of climate change.  
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Actors in the UNFCCC are arguably comparable to the lifeguard in the pool scenario. They 
have the formal authority to act on climate change, and the capability of enabling the 
fulfilment of the three demands of justice, as was explained above. These actors therefore 
have primary responsibility to act before actors who do not have the authority to act, much 
like the lifeguard has the primary responsibility to act before bystanders do. However, if 
the actors in the UNFCCC were unable, or unwilling, to fulfil this responsibility, just as the 
lifeguard is unable to save three drowning people in the above scenario, or unwilling to 
save one individual, then the bystanders with capability but no formal authority are morally 
required to step in. In the case of climate change, the role of the capable bystander is 
played by the actors involved in networked governance processes, who although capable of 
enabling a condition of justice do not possess the formal authority to do so. This argument 
implies that if the actors in the UNFCCC are unable, or unwilling to meet their institutional 
responsibilities, then other actors capable of this, specifically actors involved in networked 
governance processes are morally required to act. Pattinson’s argument has similar 
implications. He stresses that although it would be preferable for there to be an 
authoritative actor that can effectively intervene in cases of humanitarian emergencies, 
such an actor does not currently exist, and therefore the most effective actor has the moral 
responsibility to intervene. Pattinson’s reasoning for this is that humanitarian interventions 
entail mass human rights violations, which must be brought to an end sooner rather than 
later. This makes his argument relatable to the climate change problem, because climate 
change, as explained in this thesis, will result in the mass violation of the human right to 
health. In the case of climate change, applying Pattinson’s argument would entail making 
the case that the extreme rights violations related to climate change require effective 
actors to act, even in the absence of authority.  
 
Importantly, Pattinson seems to be making his argument in the face of the institutional 
reality that humanitarian intervention currently operates in the absence of a capable, 
authoritative actor. The thesis will, in the chapters which follow this one, explore the 
institutional reality of climate change governance. Chapter Seven will explore to what 
extent the actors under the UNFCCC are meeting their moral responsibility to enable a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change. Actors under the UNFCCC have the 
formal authority to act on climate change, which gives these actors greater institutional 
responsibility, much like the lifeguard has a greater responsibility to save drowning 
individuals than a bystander. For this reason, the responsibilities of actors under the 
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UNFCCC will be examined as a priority. Chapter Seven will illustrate that a preliminary 
assessment reveals that actors under the UNFCCC fail to meet their responsibilities to 
enable a condition of justice. This implies that actors operating involved in networked 
climate change governance practices, much like the capable bystanders in the pool 
scenario, have the moral responsibility to act. Therefore, Chapter Eight will explore to what 
extent these actors are meeting their moral responsibility.   
 
It should be noted that the presence of other capable actors at the pool, or in the case of 
this thesis in climate change governance, does not diminish the responsibility of the 
lifeguard, or indeed of actors in the UNFCCC. The presence of capable actors does not let 
the lifeguard or actors in the UNFCCC ‘off the hook’ in terms of moral responsibility. Actors 
under the UNFFCCC are under a moral obligation to act, based in their capability to act, as 
was argued above. The presence of other capable actors does not diminish this moral 
responsibility. Actors in the UNFCCC must act on their responsibility until it is fulfilled and 
they can no longer contribute to enabling a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change. The only other possible manner in which actors under the UNFCCC could escape 
institutional responsibility is if actors under the UNFCCC were no longer capable of enabling 
a condition of justice, for example if the UNFCCC were to dissolve. Similarly, actors involved 
in networked climate change governance processes have the institutional responsibility to 
enable a condition of justice as long as they are capable of doing so.  The only possibility of 
escaping moral responsibility for networked climate change governance actors is if actors 
under the UNFCCC were to fully enable all three demands of justice, and a condition of 
climate justice was therefore achieved. In this case, networked climate change governance 
actors would no longer be under a moral obligation to help, because they would no longer 
be capable of enabling a condition of justice, as this would already have been achieved by 
actors in the UNFCCC. This is comparable to the argument that the bystanders at the pool 
would have no moral responsibility to save a drowning individual if the lifeguard saved the 
individual, since the individual would already have been saved. The logic which underpins 
this argument stems from the moral argument that actors cannot be morally obligated to 
do what they cannot do.117 This is the logical inverse of the capability argument, which 
holds capable actors morally accountable. Only in the absence of capability, in the case of 
this thesis the capability to enable a condition of justice, is there absence of moral 
obligation. For this reason, although actors under the UNFCCC have the formal authority to 
                                                          
117 Lawford-Smith, H., ‘The Feasibility of Collectives’ Actions’ in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90 (2011), p. 
456 
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act and are therefore most responsible for enabling a condition of justice, as long as actors 
under the UNFCCC are failing to meet their responsibilities, actors involved in networked 
governance processes must step in, much like the bystanders at the pool. The chapter now 
turns to its final section, to explain how the thesis will assess whether actors in the UNFCCC 
and networked governance processes are meeting their respective institutional 
responsibilities.  
Assessing Current Practice  
The chapter has so far defined three demands of justice, outlined current institutional 
practice, and made the case for the moral responsibility of actors under the UNFCCC and 
within networked climate change governance to enable a condition of justice in the case of 
climate change. The two chapters which follow, Chapters Seven and Eight, will assess 
whether current institutional practice enables a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change.  An overview of the methodology that will be employed to achieve this will be 
outlined below. As was explained above, in order to achieve a condition of justice in the 
case of climate change, the three basic demands of justice must be met. Furthermore, as 
was explained in the previous section, if these demands are to be met, they must be 
enabled, through a restructuring of the context. In order to assess whether actors under 
the UNFCCC and within networked governance processes enable a condition of justice, 
Chapters Seven and Eight will make use of a four point hierarchy, outlined below.  
 
This four point hierarchy is based on the idea that in order to enable a demand of justice, 
the context must be restructured. One way of examining whether the context is structured 
in a way which makes it possible for demands of justice to be met is to examine whether 
policies for action are in place. ‘Policies’ is here used in a broad sense: the term captures 
enforcement mechanisms, incentives, creating norms, undermining resistance to effective 
climate policies, as Caney suggests,118 and other policies such as regulation for emissions or 
adaption finance, policies on inclusiveness, or policies on ensuring compliance. These types 
of policies have the potential to ensure that the institutional context is structured to enable 
the three demands of justice, as will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. Of course, 
there are some issues with examining policies, because climate change policies can often 
contain ambiguities, which could be interpreted as creating a context which is conducive to 
climate justice, but do not imply that a condition of justice is guaranteed. This will be 
                                                          
118 Caney, S., ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’ in The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 22 (2014), p. 136 
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further discussed during the assessment of current institutional practice in Chapters Seven 
and Eight. For now, the current chapter will outline the hierarchy which will be used to 
explore to what extent actors under the UNFCCC and involved in networked climate change 
governance enable a condition of justice by restructuring the context to allow for this. 
 
1. Actors in the institution enable the demand of justice – the demand of justice is 
unequivocally fulfilled in its entirety.  
 
2. Actors in the institution are consistently working towards enabling the demand of 
justice – the demand of justice is not yet fulfilled, but there are policies in place 
which are consistently leading towards this goal.  
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the demand 
of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the potential for 
the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards enabling the demand 
of justice. 
 
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the demand of justice – there has been no 
promise or attempt to enable the demand of justice and there are no policies in 
place. 
 
Chapters Seven and Eight will make use of this four point hierarchy to evaluate to what 
extent actors within current institutional practice enable the three demands of justice 
explicated in this thesis. Enabling a demand of justice is at the top of the hierarchy, because 
the demands of justice must be fulfilled in order to meet a condition of justice in the case 
of climate change. The fulfilment of a demand of justice is therefore the goal to aim for, 
which is why it sits at the top of the hierarchy. The hierarchy is important because it allows 
for the assessment of the extent to which actors in current institutional practice are able to 
meet the moral parameters set by this thesis. If current institutional practice fails to meet 
the moral parameters, the thesis can point to this, and discuss the hindrances which are in 
place at the institutional level. The objective of using the above hierarchy, then, is to make 
normative judgments about current institutional practice in order to investigate what 
moral conditions must be fulfilled to meet a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change. In this way, the thesis can provide normative criteria which can be used in future 
research on a just response to climate change. 
 
It should be noted that the assessment of institutional practice may reveal that the 
demands set out in this thesis cannot be enabled by current institutional practice. If this is 
the case, the justice position will not be revised. Instead, the thesis will point out the 
 196 
 
discrepancies between current practice and the normative demands made in this thesis. 
Therefore, assessing current practice does not imply compromising the demands of justice 
to fit with the reality of institutional practice. The demands of justice are the goal towards 
which current institutional practice should strive, and the assessment of practice will reflect 
this. As David Estlund argues, ‘the truth about justice is not constrained by considerations 
of the likelihood of success in realizing it.’119 The institutional reality of climate change 
governance does not affect the climate justice position defended in this thesis. For this 
reason, even if none of the demands of justice are met, it is still important to explain how 
and why current institutional practice could move towards meeting these.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in terms of making an original contribution, an 
extensive review of the literature suggests that most cosmopolitan climate justice theorists 
do not investigate how their theory relates to current institutional practice.120 Furthermore, 
if they do, cosmopolitan scholars only seem to assess multilateral climate change 
governance processes, and not networked climate change governance processes.121 The 
thesis will assess both types of climate change governance processes. This sets the thesis 
apart from other work on the subject of climate justice, and furthermore implies that the 
thesis makes a useful and important contribution to the climate justice literature. However, 
the assessment conducted in Chapters Seven and Eight should be considered exploratory 
and preliminary and does not purport to make definitive claim about the practice of the 
actors under the UNFCCC and within networked climate change governance. The 
assessment in these chapters is exploratory because a comprehensive assessment of 
climate change governance is not possible within the scope of this thesis, which places an 
emphasis on both the development of a climate justice position and the application of this 
position. This leaves somewhat limited space available for assessment, especially of the 
complex processes involved in current climate change governance practice. Nevertheless, 
Chapters Seven and Eight aim to illustrate how a climate justice position can be used in 
conjunction with climate change governance research, in order to create a bridge between 
                                                          
119 Estlund, D., ‘Utopophobia’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42 (2014) p. 115  
120 See for example Page, E. A., Climate Change, Justice and Future Generations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 2006), Hayden, P., ‘The Environment, Global Justice and World Environmental Citizenship’, in 
Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (eds.), The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), or 
Hayward, T., ‘Human Rights Versus Emission Rights: Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of Ecological 
Space’ in Ethics and International Affairs, 21 (2007), pp. 431 – 450 
121 See for example, Harris, P., World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010),  Lawrence, P., Climate Change and International Law (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2014), Vanderheiden, S., Atmospheric Justice – A Political Theory of Climate Change 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), or Harris, P., What’s Wrong With Climate Change and How to Fix It 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 
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these two fields. As was explained in the Introduction, bridging these two fields is 
important because these scholars are concerned with complementary, yet separate, 
agendas. 
Conclusion 
This current chapter, Chapter Six, and the two which follow, Chapters Seven and Eight, 
make up Part III of the thesis, which concerns demonstrating how current institutional 
practice can be evaluated using the global justice position developed in Part II of this thesis. 
This current chapter served to provide conceptual clarification for the chapters which 
follow. The chapter began by restating the three demands of justice developed in Chapter 
Five. The chapter then turned to defining current institutional practice, and provided an 
overview of both multilateral and networked climate change governance processes. The 
chapter subsequently moved onto defining which actors can be held responsible for 
enabling the demands of justice defined in this thesis. It was argued that both actors under 
the UNFCCC as well as those involved in networked climate change governance processes 
have a moral responsibility to enable a condition of justice, due to their capability of 
creating a context in which the three demands of justice explicated in this thesis can be 
met. It was also argued that the actors under the UNFCCC have formal authority to act and 
are therefore more responsible for enabling a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change. However, it was explained that this does not diminish the moral responsibility of 
other actors, specifically those involved in networked governance processes, if the actors 
under the UNFCCC should fail to enable the three demands of justice explicated in this 
thesis. It was illustrated that actors under the UNFCCC and within networked governance 
processes will remain morally responsible for enabling a condition of justice until this is 
achieved. Finally, the chapter explained how the thesis will conduct its exploratory 
assessment of the extent to which actors in the UNFCCC and networked climate change 
governance processes meet their institutional responsibility. The thesis now turns to this 
assessment, beginning with Chapter Seven, which concerns multilateral climate change 
governance actors.  
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Chapter Seven – Assessing Multilateral Climate Change Governance 
Introduction 
This chapter makes up the second of three chapters which constitute Part III of this thesis: 
‘Assessing Current Institutional Practice.’ The previous chapter, Chapter Six, defined which 
actors can be held responsible for enabling a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change, and set out a methodological framework to assess to what extent these actors 
meet their responsibilities. It was argued that both actors under the United Nations 
Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and actors involved in 
networked climate change governance processes have a moral responsibility to enable a 
condition of justice, due to their capability of ‘restructuring the context’ so that the three 
demands defended in this thesis can be met. It was also argued that the actors under the 
UNFCCC have formal authority to act and are therefore most responsible for enabling a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change. The purpose of the current chapter, 
Chapter Seven, is therefore to assess to what extent actors under the UNFCCC enable the 
three demands of justice developed in this thesis.  
The assessment in this chapter is considered exploratory, and does not purport to make 
definitive claims about the practice of the actors under the UNFCCC. Rather, the chapter 
aims to illustrate how the climate justice framework developed in Part II of this thesis can 
be used to assess current practice. This has the wider purpose of bridging the gap between 
climate justice literature and climate change governance research by illustrating that 
climate justice theorists have the potential to provide normative insights into current 
practice, as was explained in the Introduction of the thesis. The assessment in this chapter 
is exploratory because a comprehensive assessment of the UNFCCC would not be possible 
within the scope of this thesis, which places an emphasis on both the development of a 
climate justice position and the application of this position. This allows somewhat limited 
space for the assessment of a complex process of governance that has been running for 
two decades. Nevertheless, the assessment conducted in this chapter aims to tentatively 
illustrate what the application of the climate justice position developed in this thesis can 
reveal about current global climate change governance practice. 
The chapter will focus on both positive trajectories and current hindrances to meeting a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change. The aim of the chapter is to illustrate that 
while the actors under the UNFCCC have made promising normative commitments, which 
are arguably in line with the demands of justice explicated in this thesis, the practice of 
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these actors does not match up to their commitments. In other words, political reality is 
not living up to normative rhetoric. The chapter will make use of UNFCCC documents, 
including the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as academic literature concerning 
the UNFCCC, and will be organized as follows. The first part of the chapter will assess the 
normative commitments made by actors under the UNFCCC in the Convention and 
compare these directly to the practice of the actors under UNFCCC by assessing the Kyoto 
Protocol. The second part of the chapter will assess whether actors under the UNFCCC have 
the capacity to enable a condition of climate justice in the future by briefly commenting on 
the hindrances and positive trajectories associated with the current practice of the UNFCCC, 
and discussing the present state of negotiations in the lead up to the Conference of the 
Parties in Paris in late 2015, which is expected to produce a new legally binding treaty. The 
chapter will conclude with an overview of the findings made, as well as with an outline of 
what these findings imply for actors involved in networked climate change governance, 
which will be the subject of Chapter Eight. 
It is important to note that the assessment of climate change governance conducted in this 
current chapter and Chapter Eight has heuristic value. Although the findings made may be 
intuitive in the sense that it is well known that actors under climate change governance are 
not adequately addressing the climate change problem, it is nevertheless valuable to 
systematically examine the positive trajectories and current hindrances facing global 
climate change governance. This type of exploration allows for research to go beyond 
intuition and assumption and provide specialized and detailed knowledge on the current 
situation. The importance of this cannot be understated, because intuitive thinking may not 
be adequate for explicating normative suggestions for reform toward a better condition of 
justice. A thorough examination of current practices provides a denominator from which to 
begin suggesting what is needed to ensure a just response to climate change. In other 
words, the current and subsequent chapters aim to systematically pinpoint what is going 
right, what is going wrong, and provide clarity on arguably intuitive notions of the failure of 
global climate change governance. In this way, these chapters illustrate that the normative 
assessment conducted in Part III can be used to underwrite future thinking about a more 
just global response to climate change. 
Multilateral Climate Change Governance: A Justice Based Evaluation  
Before the assessment of multilateral climate change governance can commence, the 
chapter will briefly explain how this assessment will be conducted. As was explained in 
Chapter Six, multilateral governance refers to the top down governance conducted under 
 201 
 
the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC provides a framework for negotiating international treaties, 
referred to as Protocols, as well as to assess global progress in dealing with climate change. 
At the annual Conference of the Parties (COPs) the actors under the UNFCCC assess current 
measures taken, and work towards developing protocols and implementation measures. 
The most significant outcome of the COPs remains the first and only protocol: the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, which committed the developed countries to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reduction and limitation targets.1 Assessing multilateral governance is not a 
straightforward process, as the UNFCCC has achieved successes, but is also plagued by 
significant setbacks. In order to illustrate the achievements of the UNFCCC alongside the 
setbacks, the chapter will assess the UNFCCC both in theory and practice. What this implies 
will be explained below. 
The theory part of the assessment will focus on the Convention on which the UNFCCC is 
based. The Convention is an international treaty, which aims to guide multilateral action on 
climate change. All decisions made at the COPs and all Protocols developed, including the 
Kyoto Protocol, are based on the ideas defended in this original treaty, which has been 
ratified by 195 countries. The Convention can be considered to represent the UNFCCC in 
theory because it outlines proposed action on climate change and clarifies normative 
reasons for this action. In other words, the Convention provides an overview of the 
ambitions of the actors under the UNFCCC.  The Convention predates any concrete action 
on climate change, and so wholly represents what ought to be done according to the 
UNFCCC. In this way, it provides a list of normative principles to guide climate change 
action. The practice part of the assessment will focus on the Kyoto Protocol, because the 
Kyoto Protocol is the current ‘plan for action’ of the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol was 
signed by more than 150 countries in 1997. It has recently been extended to cover the 
period 2013 - 2020, during which time additional complementary agreements will be 
negotiated, most crucially at the next COP in Paris, as will be explained below. Although the 
Kyoto Protocol will eventually be replaced, at the time of writing, it is the only Protocol of 
the UNFCCC, and encompasses the scope of climate change action under the UNFCCC to 
date. The Kyoto Protocol represents the UNFCCC in practice because it represents the 
current action being taken by the UNFCCC. 
It is important to evaluate both the theory and practice of the UNFCCC in order to gain a 
fair assessment of multilateral governance. Assessing theory and practice can capture both 
                                                          
1 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 62 
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the ambitions of actors under multilateral governance as well as how these actors meet 
these ambitions in practice. This allows an understanding of both what actors under the 
UNFCCC aim to achieve and what has been achieved so far. Assessing only aims would be 
problematic because it would not reveal whether these aims have been fulfilled. Assessing 
only achievements, on the other hand, would be problematic because it would be difficult 
to assess to what extent action matches ambition. As will be discussed throughout the 
chapter, actors in the UNFCCC often set out normative commitments within the 
Convention which are arguably in line with the demands of justice defined in this thesis. 
And yet, the achievements of the UNFCCC do not suggest the demands of justice are fully 
enabled by the UNFCCC. It is important to investigate why this is, and this would not be 
possible without an understanding of the UNFCCC’s ambitions.  
 
One possible explanation for the disconnect between the UNFCCC’s ambitions and its 
achievements is the ambiguous nature of the commitments made in the Convention. The 
vague nature of these commitments is sometimes referred to as ‘constructive ambiguity’ 
because this ambiguity is not accidental.2 During negotiations, the Parties of the UNFCCC 
often seek flexible language to accommodate the diverging positions of parties.3 Common 
ambiguities include the use of  ‘shall’ instead of ‘will’ or ‘must,’ and the frequent use of 
‘should’ instead of these more peremptory words.4 This can be problematic, because these 
ambiguities imply that commitments can be interpreted in different ways, which calls into 
question what the actors under the UNFCCC have committed to, and what this 
commitment will mean in practice. Hayley Stevenson and John Dryzek have critiqued this 
use of ambiguity, claiming that ‘instead of constructive politics, we get constructive 
ambiguity.’5 For this reason, although it may appear that the commitment or ambitions of 
the actors in the UNFCCC are in line with the demands of justice, this does not guarantee 
that the demands will be enabled. This will be further discussed throughout the chapter.  
 
The assessment of the UNFCCC will take each demand of justice in turn, and assess to what 
extent actors under the UNFCCC enable this demand in theory and in practice. The 
assessment will make use of the four point hierarchy developed in Chapter Six, which is 
outlined below for the purpose of clarity.  
                                                          
2 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 70  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 84  
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The Four Point Hierarchy 
1. Actors in the institution enable the demand of justice – the demand of justice is 
unequivocally fulfilled in its entirety.  
 
2. Actors in the institution are consistently working towards enabling the demand of 
justice – the demand of justice is not yet fulfilled, but there are policies in place 
which are consistently leading towards this goal.  
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the demand 
of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the potential for 
the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards enabling the demand 
of justice. 
 
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the demand of justice – there has been no 
promise or attempt to enable the demand of justice and there are no policies in 
place. 
 
Demand One – The Right to Health of Future Generations 
Demand One states that the right to health6 of future generations must be considered to 
be equally as valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must therefore be 
protected. As was explained in Chapter Four, Five, and Six, in order for this demand to be 
met global temperature changes must be kept at or below 2°C. This is because changes in 
temperature above this will result in ‘dangerous climate change,’ including wide scale 
floods, droughts, heat-waves, sea-level rises, and forced migration, all of which threaten 
the right to health, as explained in Chapter Four.7 Although keeping global temperatures at 
or below 2°C is looking increasingly unlikely due to current inaction, the IPCC maintains, at 
the time of writing, that there are multiple mitigation pathways that are likely to limit 
warming to below 2°C.8 According to the IPCC, emissions will have to be cut by 40% - 70% 
by 2050 compared to 2010, and will need to be near zero or below in 2100.9 Therefore, 
when assessing to what extent actors under the UNFCCC are enabling Demand One of 
justice, the section will refer to the 2°C goal and investigate to what extent actors under 
the UNFCCC are working towards this.  
The chapter now turns to assessing the UNFCCC in theory by assessing the ambitions set 
out in the Convention. This will illustrate whether the actors of the UNFCCC ‘have promised 
                                                          
6 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  www.ipcc.ch/  [accessed 
04.11.2014], p. 14 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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to begin working on enabling the demand of justice in the future’ which would place actors 
under rung three of the four point hierarchy above. The Convention does not contain any 
action plans or emission level restrictions, but is rather a list of intentions or ambitions, so 
it cannot represent more than a commitment to enable Demand One of justice. The 
Convention is a thirty three page document of agreements made by the Parties to the 
Convention, consisting of twenty-six articles. Relevant articles from the treaty will be used 
below in order to illustrate to what extent the commitments made in the convention match 
up to Demand One of justice. The assessment will first concern the preamble of the 
Convention, before examining relevant articles in the body of the Convention. The 
preamble, although not legally binding, sets the tone of the Convention and is therefore 
important to consider alongside the main body of the treaty.  
The preamble of the Convention claims that ‘the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are 
a common concern of humankind.’10 The use of ‘common concern of humankind’ implies 
that all humans are included in the scope of climate change concern. This indicates that all 
humans must be considered equal, without any qualifications such as when or where they 
are born. This is arguably in line with Demand One, which asserts that the rights of present 
and future generations must be considered morally equal. Furthermore, the preamble 
states that actors under the UNFCCC are ‘determined to protect the climate system for 
present and future generations.’11 Again, this is arguably in line with Demand One, because 
the UNFCCC aims to protect the climate system for present and future generations without 
any qualifications highlighting a moral difference between these generations. However, 
under international law, the preamble of a treaty is not considered legally binding. For this 
reason, it is important to investigate whether the legally binding articles of the Convention 
reflect the sentiment of the preamble.  
One of the most significant articles in terms of future generations is Article 3.1 of the 
Convention, which states that ‘the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity.’12 The wording of 
this article indicates that present and future are considered equally important reasons to 
protect the climate. The use of the word ‘equity’ is particularly interesting. Although equity 
does not imply equality, but rather fair treatment, this speaks to the idea that future 
generations should be treated equally. If fair treatment of future generations is considered, 
                                                          
10 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 2 
11 Ibid, p. 6 
12 Ibid, p. 9 
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as it is in this thesis, as equal treatment, then the Article 3.1 can be interpreted as in line 
with Demand One. However, the fact that Article 3.1 can be interpreted in different ways is 
indicative of the ambiguity of its wording, which will be further discussed below. First, it is 
important to note that the wording of Article 3.1 implies that future and present 
generations are considered equally important, as they are mentioned as reasons to act 
against climate change without any conditions explaining that one group is morally more 
important than the other. Peter Lawrence agrees with this assessment. His work 
investigates to what extent current international climate change law protects the rights of 
future generations. Lawrence argues that the principle of intergenerational justice is 
reflected in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC.13  
However, Lawrence also points out that Article 3.1 is vague, or ambiguous, because there is 
no guidance on how to balance the needs of present and future generations.14 He explains 
that the vague nature of Article 3.1 stems from the political disagreement which occurred 
over its wording.15 The political disagreement revolved around the fact that the United 
States of America (US) did not want the Article to have legal consequences outside of the 
UNFCCC.16 The US successfully lobbied for the wording in Article 3.1 to be changed from 
‘states’ to ‘parties’ so that the Article would only apply in the context of the UNFCCC, and 
not as international law on climate change more generally, which would allow to the US to 
opt out of commitments in future (which they did, by not ratifying Kyoto Protocol, as will 
be discussed below.)17 This is a good example of a ‘constructive ambiguity,’ or the 
ambiguity that is inserted into a commitment in order to accommodate the diverging 
positions of parties.18 As was explained above, these constructive ambiguities can cause 
problems, because although they may ensure consensus, they leave the question of what is 
actually being committed to very much open to interpretation. This may allow states to 
avoid action on climate change in future, because they can argue that their interpretation 
of obligations did not imply stringent action. 
Although the ambiguous nature of Article 3.1 is indisputable, the wording of the article 
nevertheless seems to fall in line with Demand One of justice explicated in this thesis. It is 
                                                          
13 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  13 
14 Ibid., p. 100 
15 Ibid. 
16 Bodansky, D., ‘The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ in Yale Journal of 
International Law 18 (1993), p. 501  
17 Ibid., p. 502 
18 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 70  
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possible to argue that Article 3.1 can be seen as a commitment to treat future and present 
generations as morally equal, which is in line with Demand One. This is important, because 
enabling a demand of justice has been defined as creating a context under which this is 
possible. The commitments made in the Convention set the context for climate change 
action, in the sense that they set out the ambitions of the UNFCCC, which allows for the 
UNFCCC to take action in line with these ambitions. Therefore, although the ambitions are, 
in the case of Article 3.1, ambiguous, they can be interpreted as in line with Demand One, 
which creates a context where Demand One can be met. Of course, this does not imply that 
Demand One will definitely be met, or even that it is likely that it will be met, but it does 
mean that it is not impossible for the UNFCCC to consider future generations as morally 
equal to present generations. This provides room for enablement, which will do doubt take 
political will. What is important is that there is room, or scope, for enablement. Whether 
actors under the UNFCCC treat future generations as equal to present generations in 
practice is another matter that will be explored below. Arguably the action of the actors 
under the UNFCCC will reveal more about the commitment to protecting future 
generations than the statements made Article 3.1. It is important to see how well the 
commitments match up to institutional practice in order to gauge whether the UNFCCC 
creates a context where Demand One can be met. 
In addition to requiring the equal moral status of present and future generations, Demand 
One also states that climate justice should be grounded in the human right to health, 
defined in Chapter Four as ‘the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a 
minimally decent level, and includes adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of 
health.’ It is not possible for the UNFCCC to make use of this definition of the right to 
health, as it is unique to this thesis. However, the Convention mentions health as a factor 
which must be considered in Article 4.1f, where the Convention aims to ‘take climate 
change considerations into account… and employ appropriate methods… with a view to 
minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health19 and on the quality of the 
environment.’20 In addition, ‘adverse effects to humankind’ caused by climate change are 
defined in the Convention as effects on ‘the operation of socio-economic systems or on 
human health and welfare,’21 indicating that the UNFCCC considers adverse effects to 
health as one of the reasons to act on climate change. In other words, the Convention 
bases its concerns about the effects of climate change, at least partially, on human health. 
                                                          
19 Emphasis added. 
20 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 11 
21 Ibid., p. 2 
 207 
 
For this reason, it is possible to claim that actors under the UNFCCC see the protection of 
human health as a reason to act on climate change. It is therefore plausible to argue that 
the actors under the UNFCCC have committed themselves to protecting the right to health, 
because acting on climate change explicitly indicates addressing the risk to human health 
according to the Convention. Of course, this is a matter of interpretation. However, as was 
explained above, the fact that the UNFCCC’s ambitions can be interpreted as in line with 
Demand One, means that the actors under the UNFCCC create a context where Demand 
One can be met. Again, this this does not imply that Demand One will definitely be met, or 
even that it is likely that it will be met, but it does mean that it is not impossible for the 
UNFCCC to consider the right to health as a reason to act on climate change.  
Furthermore, as was explained above, Article 3.1 indicates that future generations and 
present generations could be considered morally equal. Therefore, when the UNFCCC 
considers the risk to health, it is plausible to assume this risk to health refers to the risk for 
both present and future generations. For this reason, the Convention indicates that the 
actors under the UNFCCC are on the third rung on the hierarchy in terms of Demand One: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
The potential to create policy lies in the ambitions of the Convention and the fact that a 
framework for the creation of policy has been established under the UNFCCC. Articles in 
the Convention which can be interpreted as ambitions to treat future generations equally 
to present generations and which take human health as a factor for acting on climate 
change indicates a potential for policy to make good on these ambitions. In addition, it 
indicates that the parties of the UNFCCC view these issues as important. However, since 
the Convention does not set any mandatory mitigation targets and timetables, the 
ambitions in the Convention alone are not enough to fully protect the rights of future 
generations, and therefore the Convention cannot be said to be consistently working 
towards enabling the demand, which would place it on the second rung of the hierarchy. 
For this reason, it is important to investigate the current action of the actors under the 
UNFCCC, enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol, to assess whether the actors under the UNFCCC 
can live up to their ambitions and implement policies which enable Demand One of justice. 
The Kyoto Protocol is a treaty that further institutionalizes the Convention. In international 
law, a Protocol can usually amend a treaty or add additional provisions. In the case of 
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climate change, the Convention establishes a normative framework for developing 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, and the Kyoto Protocol contains specific provisions 
and regulations to achieve this. Therefore, ideally, the Kyoto Protocol should make good on 
the ambitions made by the Convention in the form of policy. However, as will be illustrated 
below, this is arguably not the case, and the Kyoto Protocol cannot be said to represent a 
policy which enables Demand One of justice for a number of reasons. 
To begin with, the Kyoto Protocol does not mention future generations or the right to 
health. However, as the Protocol is a plan of action to implement the Convention, this may 
not be important, as the Convention sets ambitions that are in line with Demand One. The 
Kyoto Protocol attempts to implement the UNFCCC’s ambitions, and therefore does not 
have to explicitly restate these ambitions to enable Demand One of justice. It is perhaps 
more important to explore whether the Kyoto Protocol is able to protect the right to health 
of future generations. As was explained above, this involves limiting the global temperature 
increase to 2°C. Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol cannot be said to be seriously 
contributing to this goal for several reasons. The first reason is that the Kyoto Protocol did 
not originally include the 2°C target. This target was only affirmed at the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord, and only applies to the second, and current, commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol.22 However, even though the UNFCCC has affirmed the 2°C goal, the current 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol only aims to lower emissions by ‘at least 18% 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2013 to 2020.’23 This is in comparison to the 
original commitment period, which aimed to reduce overall emissions to at least 5% below 
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-2012.24 As was explained above, the current 
IPCC report calls for emissions to be lowered by 40 – 70% of 2010 levels by 2050 in order to 
keep warming to 2°C. Lowering emissions to 18% of 1990 levels by 2020 does not seem in 
line with this requirement, because 1990 levels were substantially lower than 2010 levels. 
The growth rate of emissions increased from 1.5% a year in 1980 – 2000 to 3% a year in 
2000 – 2012.25 It therefore seems that the Kyoto Protocol cannot be said to represent 
policy which prevents dangerous climate change, and therefore protects the right to health 
of future generations.  
In fact, Stephen Gardiner argues that the targets set by the Kyoto Protocol are much too 
                                                          
22 Hansen, J., et al. ‘Assessing Dangerous Climate Change: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect 
Young People, Future Generations and Nature’ in Plos One, 8 (2013), p. 2 
23 UNFCCC, Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations, Doha (2012), p. 4 
24 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  104 
25 Hansen, J., et al. ‘Assessing Dangerous Climate Change: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect 
Young People, Future Generations and Nature’ in Plos One, 8 (2013), p. 1 
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weak, which indicates that the Protocol does little to protect future generations.26 Gardiner 
accuses the Kyoto Protocol of being ‘at best, a prudent wait-and-see policy for the present 
generation, narrowly defined.’27 Therefore, Gardiner concludes that the Kyoto Protocol 
does not seem like a sincere global initiative to protect the interests of future generations. 
28 This appears to be a fair assessment, considering that even if the initial period of the 
Kyoto Protocol had met its targets, this would have only reduced global emissions by 5%.29 
This is due to the weak targets, but also due to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol only sets 
targets for a handful of industrialized countries, excluding some of the currently highest 
emitters: Brazil, China, and the US, significantly weakening the number of emissions which 
must be reduced under the Kyoto Protocol.30 This will be further discussed when the 
chapter turns to Demand Two and the enablement of Demand Two below.  
 
Furthermore, although the Kyoto Protocol sets specific targets, the Protocol does not set 
up any compliance mechanisms for failure to meet these targets. Instead, any emissions 
reductions which are not met can be, ‘on request… be added to the assigned amount for 
subsequent commitment periods.’31 This is indicative of a very loose and voluntary 
compliance system, where states are not obligated to meet targets in the current 
commitment period, and if they do not, it is up to them to make up for this in later 
commitment periods. This lack of compliance measures has several different consequences. 
The first is that the Kyoto Protocol is failing to meet the targets it set out: few countries will 
meet their targets and face no real penalty for failing to do so.32 The second consequence 
of weak compliance mechanisms is that countries do not face penalties for leaving the 
Kyoto Protocol, or for not joining in the first place. This allowed the US not to join the 
Protocol.  As the US is currently one of the top global emitters, and one of the richest 
countries in the world, this seriously undermines the potential of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
weak compliance mechanisms have also led to states refusing to participate in the second 
round of the Protocol when it became clear that they could not fulfil their commitments: 
Canada, Japan, Russia, and New Zealand have refused to participate in the second 
                                                          
26 Gardiner, S., ‘The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol’ in Ethics and 
International Affairs 18 (2004), p. 24 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 36 
29 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  21 
30 Climate Action Network Europe, The Climate Change Performance Index 
https://germanwatch.org/en/download/10407.pdf [accessed 26.01.2015], p. 12 
31 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, United Nations, 
Kyoto (1998), p. 5 
32 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 2 
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commitment period.33 These are major emitters, and their lack of participation raises grave 
concerns over whether actors under multilateral governance enable Demand One of justice, 
because these actors are not creating a context where Demand One can be met, because 
emissions are not being controlled in a way which protects the human right to health. 
 
As a result of the weak targets and weak compliance measures outlined above, emissions 
levels have continued to rise in the past decades, rendering the 2°C target increasingly 
unattainable. The latest IPCC report claims that GHG emissions have continued to increase 
over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010, despite a 
growing number of climate change mitigation policies.34 The IPCC estimates that because 
economic growth is set to persist, and global population is set to increase, mean global 
surface temperatures could rise by as much as 4.8°C by 2100 without additional efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today.35 The IPCC expresses ‘high confidence’ 
that this would result in high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible 
impacts globally.36 In addition, Hansen et al. explain that it will become exceedingly difficult 
to keep warming below a target of 2°C, if high emissions continue much longer.37 For this 
reason, it is possible to make the case that actors under the UNFCCC are currently not living 
up to the ambition to enable Demand One, because the context for meeting this demand 
has not been created under the UNFCCC. The right to health of future generations is not 
being protected because, at the time of writing, the UNFCCC’s impact on the global level of 
emissions has not been in line with what is necessary to achieve the goal of no more than 
2°C warming. For this reason, actors under the UNFCCC fall on the third rung of the four 
point hierarchy, because actors under the UNFCCC have not put into place policies which 
are consistently leading towards enabling Demand One of justice. Instead: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
The potential to create policy lies in the ambitions of the Convention and the fact that a 
framework for the creation of policy has been established under the UNFCCC. In addition, 
                                                          
33 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 2 
34 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2014 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf  [accessed 04.11.2014], p. 5 
35 Ibid., p. 14 
36 Ibid., p. 12 
37 Hansen, J., et al. ‘Assessing Dangerous Climate Change: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect 
Young People, Future Generations and Nature’ in Plos One, 8 (2013), p. 6 
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the Kyoto Protocol has created policies which although not in line with the targets 
suggested by the IPCC, nevertheless indicate that there is an existing policy framework 
which can be built upon. This indicates that creating a context where Demand One of 
justice is met is not impossible, but perhaps currently improbable. In sum, actors under the 
UNFCCC may have arguably aimed to enable Demand One of justice, but are failing to put 
adequate policy into place in practice in order to enable Demand One. The targets which 
have been set are too weak and on top of this are not being complied with. These two 
issues present key hindrances that must be overcome in future in order to bring about a 
just response to climate change. More must be done to protect the right to health of future 
generations by keeping temperature changes to 2°C. This will be further discussed in the 
second part of the chapter, which concerns the practices of the UNFCC and the future of 
multilateral climate change governance. 
Demand Two – Less Developed Countries 
Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action (this will be referred to as part one of Demand Two 
below, for the sake of clarity). In addition, the distribution of benefits and burdens in global 
climate change action should be based in the PATP38 model (this will be referred to as part 
two of Demand Two below). Mirroring the assessment above, the chapter will first discuss 
to what extent actors under the UNFCCC enable Demand Two in theory by examining the 
preamble and main body of the Convention before exploring to what extent these actors 
enable the demand in practice by examining the Kyoto Protocol. The chapter will examine 
the two parts of Demand Two in turn, beginning with the first part of Demand Two, which 
states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly considered in climate 
change action. Chapter Five outlined three main less developed country concerns, which 
must be properly considered under Demand Two. These are: 1) the acknowledgment that 
developed countries have contributed most to the climate change problem, 2) that less 
developed countries face greater immediate problems which must be addressed before 
they can act on climate change, and 3) that less developed countries have a right to 
develop before they must make contributions to climate change efforts. These three 
                                                          
38 Polluter’s Ability to Pay model: the responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions is based on both 
per capita emissions levels and per capita wealth. To illustrate, countries which have high levels of pollution and 
high levels of wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for climate change action, and countries of 
low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best possible, as long as it does not push 
them under a threshold of a decent standard of living, and only when they rise in wealth will they have to pay 
more towards climate change costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low emissions and 
low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and high wealth may be asked to 
contribute financially but not lower their emissions.  
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concerns must be taken into account by actors under the UNFCCC in order to meet the first 
part of Demand Two. Chapter Five explained that the category of less developed country is 
contested, and will be defined in this thesis in line with the categories of the UNFCCC, 
which refers to less developed countries under the categories of non-Annex I and Least 
Developed Countries. This is a broad category, and for this reason the differences between 
richer, larger less developed countries like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) countries, and those countries which are very poor and vulnerable to climate 
change will be kept in mind and referred to in the assessment which follows. 
The preamble of the Convention arguably takes each of the three less developed countries’ 
concerns into account. In terms of acknowledging that developed countries have 
contributed most to the problem, the preamble puts the burden of responsibility on 
developed countries, because ‘the largest share of historical and current global emissions 
of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries,’39  and urges developed 
countries to take ‘immediate action.’40 Furthermore, the preamble notes that ‘the largest 
share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in 
developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively 
low.’41 The wording here indicates that the preamble is placing primary responsibility on 
developed countries, which is in line with the first less developed countries’ concern. In 
terms of having more immediate concerns and a right to develop, which are the second 
and third less developed countries’ concerns, the preamble of the Convention 
acknowledges that ‘the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will 
grow to meet their social and development needs.’42 This is not viewed as problematic in 
the Convention, as long as ‘responses to climate change [are] coordinated with social and 
economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts 
on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries 
for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty.’43 This 
indicates that the preamble of the Convention is taking into account that less developed 
countries will need time to develop before they contribute to climate change efforts, partly 
because they face more immediate concerns such as the eradication of poverty. The 
preamble indicates that actors under the UNFCCC are stating their ambition to take less 
developed countries’ concerns into account. However, as explained above, the preamble of 
                                                          
39 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,  UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 2 
40 Ibid., p. 4 
41 Ibid., p. 2 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 9 
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the Convention is not legally binding, and so it is important to explore the legally binding 
articles of the Convention to ascertain whether these live up to scale of ambition of the 
preamble. 
The Convention arguably makes commitments that indicate that actors under the UNFCCCC 
are properly considering concerns of less developed countries. For example, Article 3.2 of 
the Convention notes that ‘the specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties… should be given full consideration.’44 This is very much in line with the first 
part of Demand Two. However, the language here is quite vague and ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Convention states that less developed countries should be 
given full consideration indicates that there is room for the enablement of the first Part of 
Demand Two, because the UNFCCC is setting up a context where this is possible. Of course, 
this does not imply that the first part of Demand Two will definitely be met, or even that it 
is likely that it will be met, but it does indicate that it is not impossible for the actors of the 
UNFCCC to fully consider the concerns of less developed countries. Even so, the ambiguous 
wording of Article 3.2 suggests that it is important to explore whether there are more 
specific commitments made in the Convention.  
The most significant manner in which less developed countries’ concerns are taken into 
account lies in the fact that the Convention calls on developed countries to assist less 
developed countries with developing in a climate conscious manner. This potentially meets 
all three less developed countries’ concerns because it places responsibility on developed 
nations, acknowledges that less developed countries have urgent concerns which must be 
addressed and with which they require assistance, and that less developed countries have 
the right to develop. To illustrate, Article 3.5 states that ‘the Parties should cooperate to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to 
sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing 
country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change.’ 45 
Enabling a demand has been defined as creating a context within which the demand can be 
met, and Article 3.5 seems to speak to this by referring to an open and economic system 
within which less developed countries can develop and address climate change. 
Importantly, the concept of promoting a supportive system is broken down into smaller 
examples, three of which will be outlined below: adaptation, financial transfer, and 
technology transfer. There are additional examples of how developed countries should 
                                                          
44 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,  UNFCCC Secretariat, Bonn (1992), p. 9 
45 Ibid., p. 10 
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help less developed countries according to the Convention, the three examples below 
merely serve as an illustration of some of the main responsibilities of the developed 
countries as stipulated by the Convention.  
In terms of adaptation, Article 4.1e calls on all parties to ‘cooperate in preparing for 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and 
integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, and for 
the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods.’46 In addition, Article 4.4 states that ‘the developed 
country Parties… shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects.’ 47  From this responsibility to support adaptation stem two further 
responsibilities: financial and technological transfer. Article 4.3 of the Convention states 
that ‘the developed country Parties… shall provide new and additional financial resources 
to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties.’ Article 4.5 states that 
‘the developed country Parties… shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and 
finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies 
and know how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the Convention.’ 48 These Articles illustrate that the Convention 
aims to help less developed countries with adaptation specifically through financial transfer, 
and transfer of technologies, which should assist these countries to develop cleanly. These 
specific tasks seem to indicate that the Convention is enabling the first part of Demand Two 
by creating a context where less developed countries concerns can be taken into account 
though specific actions, which place the primary role on developed countries and place no 
obligations on less developed countries, which allows these countries to address more 
immediate concerns, and acknowledges less developed countries’ right to develop with the 
help of technological and financial transfers. For this reason, the actors under the UNFCCC 
fall on the third rung of the four point hierarchy in the case of the first part of Demand Two: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
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47 Ibid., p. 14 
48 Ibid. 
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The potential to create policy lies in the ambitions of the Convention and the fact that a 
framework for the creation of policy has been established under the UNFCCC. The ambition 
to include less developed country concerns indicates a potential for policy to make good on 
this commitment, and the existing framework put in place under the UNFCCC indicates 
potential for policy to be created.  This provides room for enablement, because the 
creation of such policies would create a context within which less developed countries’ 
concerns could be taken into consideration. This room for enablement does not guarantee 
that the first part of Demand Two will be met, but nevertheless indicates that this is 
possible. Whether actors under the UNFCCC take the concerns of less developed countries 
into account in practice is another matter which will be explored below. It is important to 
see how well the ambitions of the convention match up to institutional practice in order to 
gauge whether the UNFCCC creates a context where the first part of Demand Two can be 
met. 
 
The assessment below will illustrate that the Kyoto Protocol can be viewed as an attempt 
of the actors under the UNFCCC to make good the ambitions of the Convention to properly 
consider less developed countries’ concerns in climate change action. However, in practice, 
the UNFCCC has not provided a framework where less developed countries are properly 
included in negotiations. This will be further discussed in the second part of the chapter, 
which concerns the practices and procedures of the UNFCCC. For now, it is important to 
assess the manner in which the Kyoto Protocol attempts to include the concerns of the less 
developed countries as set out in the Convention. Article 3.14 of the Protocol states that 
the Parties of the Protocol must ‘consider what actions are necessary to minimize the 
adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on developing 
country Parties. Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, 
insurance and transfer of technology.’49 This relates directly back to the ambition set in the 
Convention concerning funding adaptation, which seems to imply that the Kyoto Protocol is 
attempting to institutionalize the ambitions of the Convention.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol establishes several ways in which funding for adaptation can be 
achieved. First, the Protocol is clear on the fact that the finance provided for adaptation 
must be separate to any other development financing. In Article 11.2, the Protocol 
establishes that developed countries must ‘provide new and additional financial resources 
                                                          
49 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol To The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, United Nations, 
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to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the 
implementation of existing commitments.’50 In addition, developed countries must ‘also 
provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the 
developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the 
implementation of existing commitments.’51 This is arguably in line with the Convention, 
because the Protocol establishes policies to ensure that finances and technology are 
transferred to help less developed countries. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol establishes 
specific mechanisms which serve to enable technological and financial transfer. One such is 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12. Under the CDM, 
developed countries are encouraged to help implement project activities which result in 
certified emissions reductions in less developed countries.52The CDM allows a country with 
an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment to implement an emission-
reduction project in less developed countries.53 Such projects can earn sellable certified 
emission reduction credits, each equivalent to one ton of carbon, which can be counted 
towards meeting Kyoto targets.54 In other words, developed countries can meet their 
emissions targets in part by implementing projects in less developed countries which help 
these countries lower their own emissions and develop more cleanly. The fact that the 
Kyoto Protocol establishes a specific mechanism to facilitate technological and financial 
transfer seems promising, and indicates that policies have been put in place to enable the 
first part of Demand Two, which requires that less developed countries’ concerns be taken 
into account. However, the CDM’s projects are not aimed at the most vulnerable 
developed countries, but have rather been implemented in advanced less developed 
countries.55 According to the CDM’s 2014 Annual Report, out of 7,772 projects registered in 
2014, 49.67% were registered in China, 20.23% in India, and 4.36% in Brazil. 56 These three 
countries, which are part of the BRICs group and have economic and political power far 
above other less developed countries as explained in Chapter Five, accounted for 74.26% of 
the CDM registered projects. This is problematic because other less developed countries, 
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let alone Least Developed Countries, are not included in technological and financial transfer 
under the CDM, and cannot be said to have their concerns taken into account by the CDM. 
In addition to the CDM, Kyoto Protocol sets up three specific funds to assist less developed 
countries: the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the 
Adaptation Fund. The Adaptation Fund is the first financial instrument under the UNFCCC 
that is not based solely on voluntary contributions from donor countries.57 It receives a 2% 
share of proceeds from project activities under the CDM and can also receive funds from 
other sources to fund concrete adaptation projects.58 The fact that the Kyoto Protocol 
includes policies such as the CDM and specific climate funds seems to indicate that actors 
under the UNFCCC fall under the second run of the four point hierarchy in terms of the first 
part of Demand Two: 
2. Actors in the institution are consistently working towards enabling the 
demand of justice – the demand of justice is not yet fulfilled, but there are 
policies in place which are consistently leading towards this goal.  
The Kyoto Protocol places responsibility on developed states, in line with the first concern 
of less developed countries, and enables financial and technological transfer which is in line 
with the second and third concerns of less developed countries. This indicates that the 
actors in the UNFCCC are working towards creating a context where the second part of 
Demand Two can be met, because less developed countries’ concerns are acted on. 
However, although the Kyoto Protocol has arguably put policies into place, it is 
questionable whether these are consistently leading toward a context where Demand Two 
of justice can be met. For example, the volume of the funds set up by the Kyoto Protocol is 
very small compared to the anticipated cost of adaptation in developing countries.59 It is 
estimated that global adaptation costs will be $125 billion in 2050.60 These costs are so far 
not predicted to be met by the funds set up under the UNFCCC.61 At the time of writing, the 
three funds mentioned above hold a total of $1.7 billion (the Adaptation Fund has pledges 
of $483 million, the Least Developed Countries Fund has $914 million, and the Special 
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Climate Change Fund has $347).62 In addition, less developed countries have complained 
that the complexity of current arrangements constrains their access to funds for adaptation 
project activities.63 For this reason, less developed countries have been consistently 
demanding the extension of the share of the proceeds from emissions trading and joint 
implementation for scaling up funding for adaptation.64   
As a result of these problems, Peter Lawrence argues that there has, so far, not been 
adequate financial or technological transfer.65 Lawrence is more optimistic about the 
‘Green Climate Fund’ established at Durban in 2011, which is supposed to finance agreed 
incremental costs for activities relating to adaptation, mitigation, technology development 
and transfer, capacity building and preparation of national reports by developing 
countries.66 Lawrence believes the Green Climate Fund presents progress towards an 
effective funding mechanism.67 However, the Fund’s potential effectiveness is weakened by 
financial contributions remaining voluntary.68 At the time of writing, the Green Climate 
Fund has received $10.2 billion in pledges by 33 countries.69 Although this is promising, 
because the Fund aimed to receive $10 billion by the end of 2014 and is therefore on target, 
not all countries are committed to assisting the Green Climate Fund.70 The current Prime 
Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, notably refuses to contribute, claiming that the fund is 
‘socialism masquerading as environmentalism.’71 The Green Climate Fund is seen as critical 
to securing less developed countries’ support for a successful deal on reducing emissions at 
COP21 in 2015. It is promising that the $10 billion goal set for the end of 2014 was reached, 
but nevertheless this does not come close to the $125 billion estimated to be required by 
2050 to meet adaptation costs. For the reasons above, actors under the UNFCCC cannot be 
said to have adopted policies which are ‘consistently leading’ to the fulfilment of the first 
part of Demand Two of justice, because the three concerns of less developed countries 
                                                          
62 Climate Funds Update ‘The Data’ http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/data accessed [10.04.2015] 
63 Möhner, A., and Klein, R. J. T., ‘The Global Environment Facility: Funding For Adaption, Or Adapting To 
Funds?’ Climate and Energy Programme, Working Paper (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2007), p. 2 
64 Shrivastava, M. K., and Goel, N., ‘Shaping the Architecture of Future Climate Governance: Perspectives from 
the South’ in Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: 
Architecture, Agency, and Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 121 
65 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  107 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Green Climate Fund ‘Pledge Tracker’ http://news.gcfund.org [accessed 09.04.2015]  
70 Paddy, A., ‘Countries Pledge $9.3bn for Green Climate Fund’ 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/20/countries-pledge-93bn-for-green-climate-fund 
[accessed 21.11.2014] 
71 Goldenberg, S., ‘G20: Obama to Pledge $2.5bn To Help Poor Countries on Climate Change’ in The Guardian 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/14/barack-obama-to-pledge-at-least-25bn-to-help-poor-
countries-fight-climate-change [accessed 21.11.2014] 
 219 
 
have not been adequately met by current financial and technological transfer policies. This 
indicates that a context in which the first part of Demand Two can be met has so far not 
been created by actors in the UNFCCC. For this reason, actors under the UNFCCC can only 
be said to reside on the third rung of the four point hierarchy: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
The potential for the creation of policy lies in the ambitions of the Convention, the 
established framework for policy creation that exists under the UNFCCC, and the fact that 
the existing ‘plan of action’ incorporates policies that, although inadequate, are attempting 
to meet the ambitions set out in the Convention. Of course, this potential does not imply 
that Demand Two will definitely be met, or even that it is likely that it will be met, but it 
does mean that it is not impossible for the UNFCCC to create a context where the demand 
can be met. What is important is that there is room, or scope, for enablement. 
Nevertheless, the limited nature of financial and technological transfer presents a key 
hindrance which must be overcome in future in order to bring about a more just response 
to climate change. 
The chapter now turns to the second half of Demand Two, namely that the distribution of 
responsibility should be allocated according to a PATP72 framework. This part of Demand 
Two is arguably supported by the Convention through its notion of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ (CBDR). The preamble of the Convention sets out CBDR by 
acknowledging that ‘the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate 
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.’73 CBDR, under the 
preamble, implies that the developed countries must be the first to act on climate change. 
The preamble of the Convention states that there is a ‘need for developed countries to take 
immediate action in a flexible manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards 
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comprehensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional 
levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due consideration of their relative 
contributions to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect.’74 The wording here is 
particularly interesting. Using the phrase ‘due consideration of their relative contributions 
to the enhancement of the greenhouse effect’ seems to indicate a polluter pays (PPP) 
based approach, outlined in Chapter Five, because referring to contributions to the 
greenhouse effect seems to point to levels of pollution, rather than financial capability.  
Interestingly, the Convention not only advocates a PPP approach, but also seems to hint at 
an ability to pay approach (ATP), outlined in Chapter Five, in Article 3.1 which states that 
‘the Parties should protect the climate system…. in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed 
country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.’75 The key point to note here is that the word capability is left ambiguous, and 
represents an example of a ‘constructive ambiguity’ which is put in place to accommodate 
the diverging positions of parties.76 The ambiguity of the term capability implies that the 
CBDR is open to interpretation in Article 3.1. This is different to the preamble, where 
contributions to the greenhouse effect are explicitly mentioned. As was explained above, 
interpretation is important in terms of enabling a demand, which is defined as creating a 
context where a demand can be met. If capability can include, for example, financial 
capability, this would place CBRD in line with the PATP model advocated in Chapter Five, 
which calls on states to be held to account for emissions in line with their per capita 
emissions and per capita wealth. Even though the Convention does not directly promote a 
PATP model, it seems that there may be some flexibility to accommodate this model, as the 
Convention mentions both historical emissions and capabilities as a reason for developed 
countries to be the first to act on climate change. To put it more simply, the CBRD is similar 
to the PATP in the following ways. First, both the PATP and the CBRD insist that duties fall 
on all, and yet both also insist that different demands can be made of different parties.77 
Second, the CBRD establishes that the duties to which a party is subject depend on (i) what 
they have done and (ii) what they are able to do,78 which is what the PATP establishes 
because the model incorporates both per capita emissions and per capita wealth. In other 
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words, the wording of the CBRD, at least in the Convention, seems flexible enough to 
accommodate the notion of a PATP distribution. This is important, because this flexibility 
allows for room for the creation of a context where Demand Two can be met. This does not 
guarantee that the demand will be met, or even that it is likely that it will be met. 
Nevertheless, it indicates that it is not impossible that Demand Two could be enabled 
through the actors in the UNFCCC. 
Nevertheless, this flexibility is also problematic in a sense, because developed countries 
and less developed countries see the CBRD to imply different types of responsibility and 
capability. When the Convention was written, the developed countries took the view that 
the CBDR reflects greater ‘financial and technical capacity’ and denied the suggestion of 
responsibility for historic emissions.79 The less developed countries on the other hand, took 
the CBRD to imply historical fault.80  Although this is problematic because there is 
disagreement of the meaning of CBDR, the flexibility of CBRD as defined by the Convention 
arguably allows room for the enablement of the PATP, as was explained above. For this 
reason, actors under the UNFCCC according to the third rung of the hierarchy in terms of 
the second part of Demand Two: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
The potential to create policy lies in the ambition of the Convention, the flexibility of the 
CBDR, and the fact that a framework for the creation of policy has been established under 
the UNFCCC. However, in order to ascertain where the actors in the UNFCCC currently 
enable the PATP model in practice, the Kyoto Protocol must be examined. If the Kyoto 
Protocol creates a context where the PATP model can be acted upon, then this would 
further indicate the potential of the CBDR outlined in the Convention. Interestingly, the 
Kyoto Protocol reaffirms the Convention - the Preamble of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates 
that the Protocol is ‘guided by Article 3’ of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which as explained above, outlines the CBDR.81 More importantly, the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ is explicitly affirmed in Article 10, 
which states that ‘all Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
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responsibilities’ shall act on climate change.82 This seems to indicate that the actors under 
the UNFCCC have implemented a policy which enables the PATP model, which would place 
them on the second rung of the four point hierarchy: 
2. Actors in the institution are consistently working towards enabling the 
demand of justice – the demand of justice is not yet fulfilled, but there are 
policies in place which are consistently leading towards this goal.  
However, as with the first part of Demand Two, the actors under the UNFCCC arguably fall 
short of adopting a policy which consistently leads towards creating a context where the 
second part of Demand Two can be met. Although the Kyoto Protocol institutionalizes the 
CBRD into policy, the CBRD, as currently executed by the Kyoto Protocol, does not fall in 
line with the PATP, as will be explained below. The PATP model requires that the 
responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions be based on both per capita 
emissions levels and per capita wealth. In terms of levels of emissions, the Kyoto Protocol 
does not hold some of the highest emitting states to account. The US, which is, at the time 
of writing, the second highest emitting country in the world, 83 never ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, and is currently not held to account by the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Canada, Japan, Russia (each top ten emitters), 84 and New Zealand have 
refused to participate in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 85 
Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol does not hold less developed countries with high 
emissions, such as China, India and Brazil, to account. China is now the world’s largest 
emitter in absolute terms, and also ranks on par with the EU in per capita terms.86 It would 
be unfair to criticize the Kyoto Protocol for not holding China, India or Brazil to account in 
1997 when the Protocol was first written, because these countries did not have high per 
capita emissions or a high level of wealth at the time, and the Kyoto Protocol captures this 
under the concept of CBDR. However, the Kyoto Protocol is now in its second commitment 
period, which is in effect until 2020, and these countries are still not held to account for 
emissions reductions. In addition, Canada, the USA, Japan, Russia, and New Zealand are all 
wealthy high emitting countries that are not currently held to account under the Kyoto 
Protocol because of their refusal to participate in the second commitment period. Not 
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holding some of the highest emitters and wealthiest countries to account is not in line with 
the PATP model, which calls for countries to be held to account in line with their emissions 
and/or level of wealth. For these reasons, the actors under the UNFCCC cannot be said to 
have put policies in place which are consistently leading towards a context where the 
second part of Demand Two can be met. Instead, actors under the UNFCCC fall onto rung 
three of the four point hierarchy, because they have made normative commitments but 
not adopted policy that lives up to these: 
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
The potential for the creation of policy to consistently work toward enabling Demand Two 
lies in the ambitions of the Convention, the flexibility of the CBRD and the fact that a 
framework for the creation of policy has been established under the UNFCCC. In addition, 
the Kyoto Protocol has created policies, which although not completely in line with the 
PATP, nevertheless indicate that there is an existing policy framework that can be built 
upon. However, the limited number of states currently held to account is a key hindrance 
that must be overcome in order to bring about a more just response to climate change. 
Importantly, there have been negotiations concerning which countries are held to account 
for emissions reductions and/or financial contributions since 2007, in the run up to the 
COP21 in Paris at the end of 2015. These negotiations have been incredibly complex and 
fraught with difficulties, but it is worthwhile to note that there has been some progress 
towards expanding the list of countries that are currently held to account for emissions 
reductions/financial contributions under the Kyoto Protocol.  
The process of renegotiating responsibilities initially began with the formation of the ‘Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action’ (referred to as the AWG-LC by the 
UNFCCC), which was created in Bali at COP13 in 2007, and aimed to work towards 
identifying a global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050.87 However, at 
COP17 in Durban in 2011, it was decided that this group would conclude its negotiations by 
the end of 2012, and a new, ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action’ (referred to as the ADP by the UNFCCC), would be set up.88 After five years of 
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negotiations, the AWG-LC agreed that parties under the UNFCCC will urgently work toward 
the deep reduction in global GHG emissions required to hold the global average 
temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to attain a global peaking of 
global GHG emissions as soon as possible.89 In order to achieve this aim, the ADP was set up 
and has been tasked with developing an agreement which will be implemented in Paris. 
The ADP is charged with negotiating mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology 
development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building.90 It is 
hoped that the ADP will provide a legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force at 
COP 21 Paris which will come into effect and be implemented from 2020, effectively 
replacing the Kyoto Protocol.91  
At the first meeting of the ADP at COP18 Doha in 2012, it became clear that the developed 
countries ‘increasingly envisage an evolving and dynamic framework that reflects current 
socioeconomic realities and definitively dismantles the ‘firewall’ between developed and 
developing country mitigation.’92 In other words, developed countries are keen to move on 
from the current dividing lines which exist under Annex I and Annex II. However, less 
developed countries, or non-Annex I and II countries according to the UNFCCC, have not 
been as enthusiastic about changing the definition of who is responsible. Since this first 
meeting in 2012, the ADP has met eight times, most recently in February 2015 in Geneva. 
Negotiations have not been straightforward, and the latest outcome document from the 
meeting in Geneva has not resulted in substantial decisions on the responsibilities of 
developed and less developed countries. In fact, the Geneva text clearly shows that all 
options on differentiation between countries remain on the table.93 Nevertheless, it is 
worth very briefly outlining what has happened since the establishment of the ADP, 
because this is relevant to the question of whether the PATP model can be enabled by 
actors under the UNFCCC in the future.  
As was mentioned above, the ADP has met eight times since its creation in 2011, at the 
time of writing. At the first meeting in Doha at COP18 in 2012, the ADP stated its aim to 
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advance efforts to bridge the current mitigation gap and deliver a new agreement by 
2015.94 Doha was about moving forward on a trajectory towards adopting a universal 
climate agreement by 2015, but not much was agreed at this meeting.95 The ADP met twice 
after COP18 in Doha in order to prepare for COP19 in 2013 in Warsaw. During their fourth 
meeting at Warsaw, Parties discussed the process for defining mitigation commitments.96 
There was disagreement over which countries should be responsible for how much, with 
some Parties keen on basing mitigation targets on historical responsibilities, and others 
arguing that historical responsibilities will not ensure achievement of the 2°C goal.97 
Discussions were polarized between various developing countries, which stressed 
continued application of the principles, provisions and annex-based differentiation 
arrangement under the Convention; and developed countries, which emphasized the need 
to continue but also update the application of the CBDR principle to reflect evolving 
circumstances.98 In the end, although the Parties agreed to encourage all member states to 
initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally-determined 
contributions (due by the first quarter of 2015), key questions on how to differentiate 
commitments of developed and less developed countries were left unresolved.99 
 
The ADP met three times after the COP19 in Warsaw in order to prepare for the most 
recent COP, COP20 at Lima in 2014. Negotiations in Lima focused on outcomes under the 
ADP necessary to advance towards an agreement in Paris at COP 21 in 2015, including 
elaboration of the information, and process, required for submission of Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) as early as possible in 2015 and progress on elements of 
a draft negotiating text.100 However, the negotiations did not make much headway, and at 
the end of lengthy negotiation, COP 20 adopted the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action,’ which 
sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015 agreement.101 The ‘Lima Call for Action’ is a 
33 page draft agreement, which was left open for further negotiation by the ADP. This draft 
agreement was difficult to put together, and saw Parties negotiating one paragraph of the 
agreement at time, with input from the President of the COP, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, 
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Minister of the Environment of Peru. Negotiations ended at 1:30 in the morning on the last 
day, with the president of the COP urging the ADP to agree.102 The negotiators could not 
come to an agreement on how to allocate responsibilities for mitigation. Japan, New 
Zealand, the US, Australia, Switzerland and Canada opposed creating binary divisions on 
commitments, based on annexes or the distinction between developed and developing 
countries.103 India with China, Brazil, Fiji, the Like Minded Group of Developing Countries 
(LMDCs), the Dominican Republic, Thailand and Venezuela, called for a clear reference that 
the draft was not just ‘guided by’ but is ‘in accordance with’ the principle of CBRD and 
provisions under the Convention, which indicates their commitment to existing categories 
of responsibility.104 Supporting Brazil, China opposed the introduction of new concepts, 
saying diverting from the principles and provisions of the Convention makes progress 
difficult.105 The final draft agreement, ‘Lima Call for Action’ did not fully address these 
differences, and left much more work to be done to find an agreement before Paris. 
Nevertheless, analysts at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
claim that the Lima negotiations shifted the wall of differentiation between countries, and 
the final agreement appears to open the door to new interpretation of differentiation in 
future.106 
 
The latest ADP negotiations, at the time of writing, took place in Geneva in February 2015. 
Here the 39 page ‘Lima Action Plan’ was once again negotiated, and lengthened to 88 
pages. The Parties worked through the elements of the text section-by-section proposing 
additions in places where they felt their views were not adequately reflected.107 The ADP 
closing plenary agreed that this longer text will be the basis on which the ADP will start 
substantive negotiations towards the Paris agreement at their next meeting in June 2015 in 
Bonn.108 However, although a text was agreed to, the text itself does not contain any 
concrete decisions, and rather outlines the positions of parties. This is largely because 
disagreements over how to classify countries and how much each country should 
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contribute were not resolved.109 There were many proposals on how to classify countries. 
For example, Iran, for the LMDCs, proposed noting that the largest share of current global 
GHG emissions originates from developed countries and that emissions in developing 
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.110 The EU proposed 
adding reference to different national circumstances wherever common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities appears.111 The US proposed a placeholder for a 
new ‘Annex X,’ to be agreed in Paris and updated regularly based on criteria relating to 
evolving emissions and economic trends, and for a new ‘Annex Y,’ agreed based on 
capabilities and evolving economic circumstances.112 Instead of agreeing on a proposal, 
each proposal was simply listed in the agreed text.113 Analysts at the IISD claim that this 
was a necessary precondition to generate a sense of ownership among parties and boost 
confidence that all parties’ views will be taken into consideration in the negotiations on the 
Paris agreement.114 However, this leaves the differentiation between Parties open, as it has 
been since the ADP was formed. The UNFCCC parties have now been debating 
differentiation since 2007, with positions ranging from a ‘static interpretation’ of CBRD to 
an evolutionary one, removing or shifting the so-called ‘firewall’ between developed and 
developing countries.115 
 
This leaves the question of whether the 2015 Paris Agreement will fall in line with the PATP, 
which calls for countries to be held to account in line with their level of emissions and/or 
level of wealth, unanswered. Which iteration of differentiation is adopted remains to be 
seen. What is clear from the recent negotiations is that all proposed options for 
differentiation currently remain on the table.116 This implies that there is room, or scope, 
for a policy that is in line with the PATP. Although this is not guaranteed, or even likely, the 
point is that there remains, at the time of writing, a space for the second part of Demand 
Two to be enabled by the actors under the UNFCCC. This will be further discussed in the 
second part of the chapter, which concerns the future of multilateral climate change 
governance. 
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Demand Three – Capable Actors 
Demand Three states that capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in, must 
be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate 
change cause, in line with their respective capabilities. Mirroring the assessment already 
conducted, the assessment below will first discuss to what extent actors under the UNFCCC 
enable Demand Three in theory by examining the Convention before exploring to what 
extent these actors enable the demand in practice by examining the Kyoto Protocol. It will 
be illustrated that the ambitions of the Convention do not enable Demand Three, and that 
the Kyoto Protocol accordingly does not represent a set of policies which enable Demand 
Three of justice as defined in this thesis.  
The preamble of the Convention ‘recalls that states have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and 
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.’117 This passage reveals that the UNFCCC is based on the norm of state 
sovereignty, as outlined in the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the wording in 
this passage places responsibility on states, in line with their sovereign right to exploit the 
environment. Holding states to account is unproblematic for the fulfilment of Demand 
Three, in the sense that capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, and 
international institutions can arguably be held to account within states. However, the 
preamble puts the burden of responsibility solely on a limited number of states. More 
specifically, the preamble places responsibility on developed nations, because ‘the largest 
share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in 
developed countries.’ 118  The preamble therefore urges developed countries to take 
‘immediate action.’119 This seems to imply that the Convention aims to hold only developed 
nations to account for climate change action. If this is the case, then any capable actor 
outside of these states, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, and international 
institutions, will not be held to account under the Convention. Why this is problematic will 
be further discussed below, after assessing the main, legally binding, body of the 
Convention. 
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The main body of the Convention is in line with the tone set in the Preamble. The 
Convention places primary responsibility on developed ‘Parties,’ or in other words, states. 
Although Article 4.1 stipulates that all Parties, ‘taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ keep track of their emissions, promote scientific and 
technological research, cooperate in facilitating adaptation, and take climate change 
considerations into account, among other tasks,120 the Convention only holds developed 
countries and any other ‘Annex I’121 countries to account for lowering emissions. Article 
4.2(a) holds Annex I countries responsible for taking ‘corresponding measures on the 
mitigation of climate change, by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and 
protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.’ In addition, the Convention 
only holds a certain number of states, namely ‘Annex II’122 countries, to account for 
financial contributions. Article 4.3 states that ‘the developed country Parties and other 
developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources.’  
Demand Three states that all capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, as well as states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in, 
must be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the 
climate change cause, in line with their respective capabilities. Contrary to this demand, 
the Convention limits actors responsible for lowering emissions to those within Annex I 
countries, which amounts to less than forty countries out of the 196 countries in the world. 
In terms of financial contribution, the Convention only holds Annex II countries to account, 
which amounts to less than thirty countries of the 196 countries in the world. This is 
problematic because the actors outside of these countries, including individuals, firms, sub-
state entities, international institutions and states are not held to account under the 
Convention. This is incompatible with Demand Three, which states that all capable actors 
must be held to account for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially. As was 
discussed in Chapter Five, there are rich individuals with high emissions living in countries 
such as India and China, states that are not held to account under the Convention. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, there are states which have high emissions, such as China 
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or Brazil, who are not held to account despite their capability to lower emissions. Finally, 
there exist international institutions and corporations that exist outside of Annex I and II 
countries, which are capable of financial contributions. For example, Petro China, or 
Telemar in Brazil, which earn billions in revenue every year. For this reason, the Convention 
cannot be said to represent ambitions in line with Demand Three, which implies that the 
actors under the UNFCCC do not enable Demand Three of justice, because these actors do 
not create a context where Demand Three can be met. In other words, according to the 
above assessment of the Convention, the actors in the UNFCCC fall under the fourth rung 
of the four point hierarchy:  
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the demand of justice – there has 
been no promise or attempt to enable the demand of justice and there are no 
policies in place. 
 
In order to investigate whether the actors under the UNFCCC make a radical departure 
from the Convention in practice, and put policies into place which enable Demand Three, 
the Kyoto Protocol must be assessed. Unfortunately, as will be illustrated below, the Kyoto 
Protocol reflects the Convention almost exactly. Although Article 10 stipulates that ‘all 
Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities… shall 
formulate programs to improve the quality of local emission factors and report on these,’123 
the Kyoto Protocol, in line with the Convention, exclusively holds developed countries to 
account for lowering emissions and financial contributions. Article 2.2 of the Koto Protocol 
states that ‘the Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions 
of greenhouse gases.’124 In terms of financial contributions, Article 11 states that Parties 
included in Annex II to the Convention shall: 125 (a) Provide new and additional financial 
resources126 (b) including for the transfer of technology.127 These two articles reflect the 
Convention above, which only holds Annex I 128  countries to account for emissions 
reductions, and only holds Annex II129  countries to account for financial resources.  
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This is arguably not in line with Demand Three, which states that all capable agents must 
be held to account. Furthermore, as was mentioned above, rich and high emitting states 
such as the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and Canada, Japan, Russia, and New 
Zealand have refused to participate in the second commitment round.130 This lowers the 
number of states held to account for financial contributions and emissions reductions 
under the Kyoto Protocol even further than in the first commitment period. In fact, the 
states held to account under the second period of the Kyoto Protocol only account for 15% 
of global GHG emissions.131 Although the states that are held to account under the Kyoto 
Protocol can hold individuals, firms, sub-state entities, and international institutions which 
exist within their borders to account, this still leaves well over one hundred states which 
are not held to account. Many of these states arguably have the capability to lower 
emissions and or contribute financially (for example the US, Canada, Japan) and many of 
the states which do not have the capability have capable (rich and high emitting) 
individuals, firms (Shell, Exxon for example), and sub-state entities (cities like Mumbai or 
Beijing) present within their borders. For this reason, it is possible to make the case that 
the Kyoto Protocol does not implement policies to hold all capable actors to account. 
Actors under the UNFCCC cannot be said to enable Demand Three of justice, because they 
do not create a context where Demand Three can be met, and therefore reside on the 
bottom rung of the four point hierarchy: 
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the demand of justice – there has 
been no promise or attempt to enable the demand of justice and there are no 
policies in place. 
It can therefore be said that the number of states currently held to account under the 
UNFCCC is a key hindrance which must be overcome in order to bring about a more just 
response to climate change. However, as was outlined above, the ADP is currently 
negotiating the number of states that are held to account, so there is some room for 
change in the future. This does not mean that the UNFCCC will definitely hold all capable 
actors to account for emissions reductions/financial contributions in future, but rather that 
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this is not impossible. Now that all three demands have been assessed, the chapter turns to 
summarizing what has been found so far. 
Summary of Findings 
The above exploratory assessment served to illustrate how the climate justice position in 
this thesis can be applied to assess to what extent actors under the UNFCCC meet their 
responsibilities to enable a condition of justice in the case of climate change. The UNFCCC 
was tentatively assessed both in theory and practice; the chapter assessed both the 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. The findings of this assessment are summarized in the 
table below. 
Demand 
Extent to Which the Demand is Enabled by 
Actors under the UNCCC 
One: The right to health132 of future 
generations must be considered to 
be equally as valuable as the right to 
health of current generations, and 
must therefore be protected. 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to 
begin working on enabling the demand of justice 
in the future – no policy has been adopted, but 
there is the potential for the creation of policy in 
order to consistently work towards enabling the 
demand of justice. 
Two: The concerns of less developed 
countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action. 
The distribution of benefits and 
burdens in global climate change 
action should be based in the 
PATP133 model. 
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to 
begin working on enabling the demand of justice 
in the future – no policy has been adopted, but 
there is the potential for the creation of policy in 
order to consistently work towards enabling the 
demand of justice. 
 
Three: Capable actors, including 
individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, 
irrespective of the country they live 
or exist in, must be held responsible 
for lowering emissions and/or 
contributing financially to the 
climate change cause, in line with 
their respective capabilities. 
 
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the 
demand of justice – there has been no promise 
or attempt to enable the demand of justice and 
there are no policies in place. 
                                                          
132 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
133 Polluter’s Ability to Pay model: the responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions is based on 
both per capita emissions levels and per capita wealth. To illustrate, countries which have high levels of 
pollution and high levels of wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for climate change action, 
and countries of low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best possible, as long as it 
does not push them under a threshold of a decent standard of living, and only when they rise in wealth will they 
have to pay more towards climate change costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low 
emissions and low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and high wealth may be 
asked to contribute financially but not lower their emissions.  
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What is interesting to note is that the first two Demands defended in the thesis are in line 
with the ambitions of the Convention, because as was illustrated above, the Convention 
arguably has ambitions that can be interpreted as in line with the demands of climate 
justice. This implies that the actors under the UNFCCC have to an extent, created a context 
within which the demands of climate justice can be met. Although the ambitions of the 
Convention do not guarantee that demands of justice will be met, or even that this is likely, 
especially because the Convention is constructed to be ambiguous, the fact that the 
Convention can be interpreted as in line with the climate justice position set out in this 
thesis implies that there is room, or scope, for these demands to be met. This is because 
the Convention sets out a context within which these demands could be met in future, and 
not one in which it could be said it is impossible to pursue the demands of climate justice 
defended here.  
This is a significant positive trajectory.  As Paul Harris eloquently puts it, ‘the climate 
change regime may be at or near the zenith of justice in international environmental affairs, 
demonstrating that most states recognize the need for justice in this issue area.’134 This 
seems promising in terms of future reforms, because the demands of justice explicated in 
this thesis are at least partially reflected in the treaty, which summarizes global consensus 
on action in the face of climate change. This indicates that any normative suggestions for a 
more just response to climate change which are based on Demands One and Two could 
potentially be used by the actors under the UNFCCC, because these Demands are reflected 
in the normative commitments made in the Convention. Overall, the assessment above 
indicates that the rhetoric of justice is inscribed in the framework of the UNFCCC, at least in 
terms of Demand One and Two. Unfortunately, as was illustrated above, practice does not 
yet live up to normative rhetoric. That said, it has been demonstrated that actors under the 
UNFCCC have implemented some, albeit inadequate, policies which attempt to fulfil the 
ambitions set out in the Convention, and that the negotiations in the run up to Paris 
indicate that there is scope for moving forward. Again, this represents a key positive 
trajectory or at least provides metatheoretical space for advancement. 
However, the fact that actors under the UNFCCC are failing to fully enable any of the three 
demands, and fail to enable Demand Three at all, represents a key hindrance which must 
be overcome in order to meet a condition of justice in the case of climate change. The 
actors under the UNFCCC must do more to live up to their responsibility for enabling a 
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condition of justice. This is an opinion shared by other climate justice scholars.  Peter 
Lawrence argues that the relatively robust, albeit vague, justice principles reflected in the 
UNFCCC contrast with the lack of effective and binding emission targets and other essential 
elements such as compliance mechanisms and funding necessary for an effective global 
regime.135 Similarly, Stephen Gardiner argues that the Kyoto Protocol is no more than a 
comfortable illusion that serious progress is being made.136 Paul Harris agrees, noting that 
while the UNFCCC regime may be considered an important step for international justice, in 
practice multilateral governance has not achieved the aims of preventing dangerous 
impacts on the earth’s climate system.137 These assessments are rather pessimistic, and do 
not imply much hope for the future.  
Multilateral Climate Change Governance: Current Practice and the Future of the UNFCCC  
The chapter will now turn to discussing whether actors under the UNFCCC have the 
capacity to enable a condition in the future by briefly commenting on the current 
hindrances and positive trajectories associated with the current practice of the UNFCCC, 
and discussing the present state of negotiations in the lead up to COP21 in Paris. If it can be 
illustrated that the UNFCCC can be said to have the capacity to enable a condition of justice 
in the future, this will provide a response to the pessimistic assessment made by Harris, 
Gardiner, and Lawrence above. It should be noted that capacity and probability are two 
different matters. As was discussed in Chapter Six, capacity implies responsibility, even if 
the probability of an action is low. In this sense, it is not morally relevant whether it is likely 
that actors in the UNFCCC will enable a condition of justice in the future, because these 
actors are morally responsible for doing so. However, it is still important to explore 
whether the capacity to enable climate justice will be affected by future climate change 
policy within the UNFCCC. If the actors under the UNFCCC are moving towards policies 
which create a context where demands of justice can be met, then this indicates that the 
actors of the UNFCCC remain capable of, and therefore morally responsible for, enabling a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change. If new policy directions are not in line 
with the demands of justice defended here, then it is questionable whether the actors in 
the UNFCCC are capable of creating a context where these demands can be met. 
                                                          
135 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  126 
136 Gardiner, S., ‘The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol’ in Ethics and 
International Affairs 18 (2004), p. 36 
137 Harris, P., World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010), p. 75 
 235 
 
Current Practice of the UNFCCC – Hindrances and Positive Trajectories 
The chapter now turns to commenting on the current practice of the UNFCCC, beginning 
with problems facing the actors under this framework. It would be difficult to cover all of 
the problems associated with the practice of the UNFCCC in full in the space of this chapter, 
as whole books have been written on the subject. Therefore only a few issues relevant to 
the demands of justice defended in this thesis, including lack of effectiveness, lack of 
inclusion, and focus on mitigation over adaptation, will be highlighted below in order to 
illustrate some of the main problems the actors under the UNFCCC face. Lack of 
effectiveness is perhaps one of the most pressing problems these actors face. As was 
explained above, the UNFCCC has not been able to halt emissions reductions, which 
jeopardizes the right to health of future generations. The UNFCCC is known for being 
ineffective,138 and the UNFCCC negotiations have been widely criticized for their lack of 
progress.139 This is in part because the UNFCCC ‘requires the impossible: consensus 
decision-making by 195 parties on every line of a complex and lengthy treaty.’140 Any party 
can object to any clause in any proposed agreement and this objection must then be dealt 
with, which appears to be a recipe for impasse.141 This may be why it is so difficult for the 
Parties to the Convention to agree on a new legally binding treaty which will take effect 
after the Kyoto Protocol, and why the lack of progress on emissions reductions outlined in 
this chapter is seemingly enduring. As was illustrated above, negotiating which countries 
are responsible for what has proven to be a fruitless venture over the past seven years. 
COP21 at Paris is drawing ever closer, and negotiations under the ADP have not yet 
resulted in a decision on allocation of responsibilities which will take effect in 2020. It is 
also not yet clear whether the Paris agreement will be a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties.142 The 
fact that a decision on what the Paris COP will result in has not been made after years of 
negotiations under the ADP is indicative of the slow nature of change within the UNFCCC. 
This has so far resulted in a lack of effectiveness of the framework, which can be seen in 
the large gap between the current and promised emission reductions, and the emissions 
reductions needed to ensure that the right to health of future generations is protected.  
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Another issue multilateral governance faces is the lack of inclusion and representation at 
the COPs.  Inclusion and representation issues mostly affect poorer less developed 
countries, particularly Least Developed Countries, as they typically have much smaller 
delegations and therefore cannot keep abreast of the myriad issues, meetings and side-
events at the COPs.143 During a typical two-week COP, dozens of meetings run in parallel.144 
Although simultaneous interpretation is provided in the six languages of the United Nations 
during formal plenary meetings, during informal consultations and working group meetings 
negotiators are left to rely on their own English skills for communication.145 It is at these 
informal meetings where most actual negotiation is known to take place.146 Furthermore, 
the most significant discussions are conducted in English (despite the fact that not all senior 
negotiators are proficient in this language), and more than two formal and informal 
meetings are frequently conducted simultaneously, which means that smaller, poorer, less 
developed countries cannot attend all meetings, as they do not have large enough parties 
to split into multiple meetings.147 Moreover, developed countries generally send large 
inter-ministerial delegations that can proficiently engage in the political, technical, and 
legal aspects of climate debates.148  
All of the above seems to indicate that the equality of states to participate in the UNFCCC 
negotiations is highly compromised. 149  Vanderheiden goes so far as to claim that 
multilateral negotiations are so exclusive that many less developed countries are usually 
offered a ‘take it or leave it’ deal after the United States and European Union have made 
decisions.150 This indicates that many, particularly poorer, less developed countries are not 
properly included in climate change action because they cannot express their concerns and 
are not fairly included in decision making. Currently these poorer countries have little 
capacity to shape or influence climate governance.151 This is problematic not only because 
this is contrary to Demand Two which calls for the proper consideration of less developed 
countries’ concerns, but because allowing such power disparities to permeate the climate 
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policy-making process virtually guarantees policy outputs that benefit the powerful and 
cost the powerless.152 If Demand Two is to be enabled beyond the third rung of the four 
point hierarchy, these procedural issues must be addressed. Less developed countries’ 
concerns cannot be properly considered if these countries are not heard and included. 
Including less developed countries may reduce effectiveness of decision making processes, 
but effectiveness is not the only important factor in action on climate change according to 
the climate justice position defended here: the climate response must also include less 
developed countries’ concerns, as was explained in Chapter Five. 
A third hindrance faced by the UNFCCC lies in the fact that mitigation seems to be the main 
focus of multilateral governance, with adaptation often occurring as an afterthought.153 
Adaptation has historically been seen as a marginal policy option, mitigation’s ‘poor cousin’ 
in the climate policy arena.154 The Kyoto mechanisms, for example, are primarily concerned 
with mitigation. Although the Kyoto Protocol has mechanisms for aiding adaptation, these 
are not adequate to meet the predicted costs of adaptation, as was explained above. It has 
been suggested that adaptation is not as supported as mitigation because the performance 
of adaptation options cannot be measured and expressed in a single metric, e.g. carbon or 
US dollars.155 This renders it difficult for decision makers to compare between alternative 
adaptation options and to consider potential trade-offs.156 However, it is clear that even in 
the face of these difficulties, changes need to be made to ensure that adaptation costs are 
met. This includes ensuring that financial and technological transfer occurs. The current 
climate governance architecture is not conducive for fair and effective action on adaptation 
for many less developed countries.157This problem needs to be addressed so that 
multilateral governance can adequately include the concerns of less developed countries in 
climate action.  
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In addition to these problems the chapter also discussed the following four hindrances in 
the assessment above: a) lack of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, b) weak targets set 
by the Kyoto Protocol, c) limited financial and technological transfer, and d) only a small 
number of states are currently held to account under the UNFCCC. These hindrances, and 
the three hindrances discussed above, namely  e) ineffectiveness, f) lack of accessibility to 
less developed countries, especially the poorest and g) a focus on mitigation in favor of 
adaptation, must be addressed in the future in order to bring about a more just response 
to climate change. 
Alongside these problems, there have also been some key positive trajectories in the 
practice of the UNFCCC. One is that the Convention appears to reveal that the actors under 
the UNFCCC treat climate change as a matter of global justice. More specifically, the 
Convention sets out ambitions which set a, albeit ambiguous, context which speaks to 
meetings Demands One and Two, as explained above. In addition, although policies which 
could set a context in which these demands could be met have so far been inadequate, 
there are nevertheless policies in place. This seems to imply that actors under the UNFCCC 
may be able to better enable a condition of justice in the future, by creating a context 
where these demands can be met. This is especially true if the UNFCCC sets renewed 
objectives or policies which are in line with the three conditions of climate justice defended 
in this thesis. 
There are two other positive trajectories worthy of mention. One is the very existence of a 
multilateral framework charged with the execution of global climate change policy. 
Although this framework has significant problems, some of which were discussed in this 
chapter, it is nevertheless promising that such a framework exists at all. The fact that the 
framework continues to exist and that actors within this framework are attempting to 
create a second binding treaty is a positive trajectory, because this indicates that there is 
an emerging context within which the demands of justice could be realized. The existence 
of the framework is especially important considering that it seems to be built on ambitions 
which are in line with Demands One and Two of justice.  
A second positive trajectory lies in the action taken since the UNFCCC has been established. 
There has been a creation of a legally binding treaty which is in force until 2020, namely the 
Kyoto Protocol. Despite its problems, the Kyoto Protocol has been a helpful first attempt at 
multilateral climate change governance. According to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol is 
seen as an important first step towards a truly global emission reduction regime that will 
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stabilize GHG emissions, and can provide the architecture for the future international 
agreement on climate change.158 According to the IPCC, the Kyoto Protocol offers lessons 
towards achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with respect to 
participation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and environmental effectiveness.159 
One of the most positive trajectories to stem out of the Kyoto protocol is European Union 
(EU) action on climate change. The EU’s members have taken the lead in global 
negotiations, and the continent has registered significant progress.160 In addition, 2014 saw 
unprecedented pledges to the Green Climate Fund.161 Furthermore, preliminary data from 
the International Energy Agency indicate that global emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
energy sector stalled in 2014 (compared to 2013), marking the first time in forty years in 
which there was a halt or reduction in emissions of the GHG that was not associated with 
an economic downturn.162 Finally, as will be explored in the subsequent chapter, some of 
the largest countries and territories, from China to California, and largest corporations, 
from PepsiCo to the Ford Motor Company, have implemented emissions-cutting actions.163 
Although not directly linked to the UNFCCC, networked climate change governance 
processes are influenced and reinforced by action taken by the UNFCCC.164 It seems that 
although multilateral governance still faces significant problems, there have been 
indications of small and occasionally even significant steps in the right direction.165 
Looking to the Future  
The key positive trajectories and current hindrances explored in this chapter leave open the 
question of what will happen next. A new climate treaty is scheduled to be written in Paris 
in late 2015. If this treaty is analogous to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, climate deterioration 
and intergenerational injustice will practically be guaranteed.166 However, there is hope 
that the new global treaty will set a departure from the Kyoto Protocol as a result of the 
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recent years of negotiations. Below is a brief overview of key decisions at recent COPs 
which will illustrate the potential of the future treaty. 
COP17 in 2011 in Durban set up the ‘Green Climate Fund’ which aims to finance agreed 
incremental costs for activities relating to adaptation, mitigation, technology development 
and transfer, capacity building and preparation of national reports by developing 
countries.167 This Fund is seen as crucial in terms of getting less developed countries on 
board with the new agreement, and has seen its 2014 targets met, as was discussed above. 
COP17 was also the first time China, Brazil, and India agreed that their own emissions were 
now a matter of legitimate concern.168 COP18 in 2012 in Doha launched the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, indicating that the actors in the UNFCCC remain 
committed to creating and maintaining treaties to manage climate change. Furthermore, as 
was discussed above, negotiations for allocating responsibilities to less developed countries 
have been underway under the ADP since Doha. At COP19 in 2013 in Warsaw, the required 
monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for domestic action were finalized for 
implementation, thereby providing a foundation for the 2015 agreement.169 In addition, all 
48 Least Developed Countries finalized plans to better assess the immediate impacts of 
climate change and enable countries to determine the support and actions they require to 
become more resilient at COP19.170 The most recent COP at the time of writing, COP20 in 
2014 in Lima, continued to pave the way for the 2015 legally binding agreement. 
Adaptation was arguably prioritized more than at any previous COPs. Pledges were made 
by both developed and developing countries prior to and during the COP that took the 
capitalization of the new Green Climate Fund past an initial $10 billion target.171  
In addition, states elaborated the elements of the new agreement, while also agreeing the 
ground rules on how all states can submit contributions to the new agreement during the 
first quarter of 2015.172 These Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) will 
form the foundation for climate action post 2020 when the new agreement is set to come 
into effect.173 At the time of writing, the European Union, Switzerland, Norway, Mexico, 
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Gabon, Russia, and the US have all submitted their Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions.174 The US has set out its intentions to achieve an economy-wide target of 
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28 per cent below its 2005 level by 2025.175 
Considering that the US is not part of the Kyoto Protocol, as was explained above, this 
intention indicates the potential of the new treaty to hold to account one of the highest 
polluting nations on earth, thereby creating a context which could lead to climate justice 
being realized. In addition, the EU has not only reconfirmed that its member states are 
committed to the 2°C target, but has also set emissions reductions in line with this target: 
according to the current submission, the EU plans binding target of an at least 40% 
domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990.176 This is a 
goal that is more in line with the recommendations of the IPCC to lower emissions by 40-70% 
by 2050 than the Kyoto Protocol commitments, which aim to lower emissions by ‘at least 
18% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2013 to 2020.’177 This further indicates 
that a new global treaty, which encompasses these goals, may create a context within 
which emissions are lowered so that Demand One can be met.  
Similarly, Switzerland intends to lower emissions by 50% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, 
and Norway is committed to a target of an at least 40% reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, targets which are more in line with IPCC 
recommendations than Kyoto Protocol commitments. Mexico and Gabon, who are both 
not held to account under the Kyoto Protocol, have also both set intentions. Mexico will 
aim to reduce their emissions by 50% in comparison to 2000 levels by 2050, and Gabon 
aims to reduce emissions by 50% in comparison to 2000 levels by 2025.178 This level of 
ambition by two less developed countries that are currently not held to account is very 
encouraging, and further indicates the potential capacity of the UNFCCC to enable a 
condition of climate justice by creating a context within which the demands of justice can 
be realized. Of course, these targets are not yet binding, and it remains to be seen what the 
2015 treaty will be able to achieve. A condition of climate justice is not guaranteed at this 
point in time, unless the 2015 treaty presents a significant departure from the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Climate Action Tracker, which produces independent scientific analysis 
                                                          
174 UNFCCC, ‘INDCs as Communicated by Parties’ 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx [accessed 10.04.2015]  
175 Ibid.   
176 Ibid.   
177 UNFCCC, Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations, Doha (2012), p. 4 
178 UNFCCC, ‘INDCs as Communicated by Parties’ 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx [accessed 10.04.2015]  
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produced by four research groups and provides an up-to-date assessment of individual 
national pledges, targets, and current policies, estimates that even with the pledges made 
so far, the current projections will only limit warming to 2.5 to 3.8°C by 2100, which is not 
sufficient to protect the human right to health.179 
Overall, the progress in negotiations seems to indicate movement towards increased 
mitigation efforts and increased funding for climate change action. This implies that the 
actors in the UNFCCC will continue to have the capacity to enable a condition of climate 
justice in the future, especially if the new treaty presents a significant departure from the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, it is difficult to predict whether the creation of a new legally 
binding treaty will be achieved, if this treaty will include all of the agreements made to date, 
and whether the treaty will make a significant impact on climate change action once 
implemented. The outcome of the next COP in Paris will be very important in terms of 
enabling a condition of justice. This will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of 
this thesis, Chapter Nine.  
Nevertheless, before this, the thesis must conduct an exploratory assessment which 
concerns to what extent actors involved in networked climate change governance enable a 
condition of justice in Chapter Eight. This is necessary due to the conception of 
responsibility outlined in Chapter Six, which argued that the actors under the UNFCCC have 
formal authority to act and are therefore more responsible for enabling a condition of 
justice in the case of climate change. However, it was explained that this does not diminish 
the moral responsibility of other actors, specifically those involved in networked 
governance processes, if the actors under the UNFCCC should fail to enable the three 
demands of justice explicated in this thesis. As this chapter has clearly illustrated, actors 
under the UNFCCC do not fully enable the three demands of justice. Therefore, the thesis 
now moves onto the assessment of actors involved in networked climate change 
governance.  
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to conduct a preliminary assessment into the extent to which actors 
under the UNFCCC enable the three demands of justice developed in this thesis. The 
assessment in this chapter is considered exploratory, and does not purport to make 
definitive claim about the practice of the actors under the UNFCCC. Rather, the chapter 
                                                          
179 Climate Action Tracker, ‘Effect of Current Pledges and Policies on Global Temperature’ 
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aimed to illustrate how the climate justice framework developed in Part II of this thesis can 
be used to assess current practice. This has the wider purpose of bridging the gap between 
climate justice literature and climate change governance research, as was explained in the 
Introduction of the thesis. It was argued that while the actors under the UNFCCC have 
made normative commitments that are arguably in line with two of the three the demands 
of justice explicated in this thesis, the practice of these actors does not match up to their 
commitments. In other words, political reality is not living up to normative rhetoric. 
However, it was argued that the fact that the ambitions of the actors under the UNFCCC 
can be interpreted as in line with two of the three demands of justice indicates that the 
UNFCCC has the capacity to enable a condition of justice, because the UNFCCC is setting 
out a context where demands of justice could be met. It was not argued that this is 
guaranteed, or even likely, but the assessment in this chapter has revealed that it is not 
impossible for the demands of justice set out in the thesis to be met. 
The second part of the chapter discussed whether actors under the UNFCCC have the 
capacity to enable a condition of climate justice in the future by briefly commenting on the 
hindrances and positive trajectories associated with the practice of the UNFCCC, and 
discussing the current state of negotiations in the lead up to COP21 in Paris. It was argued 
that the UNFCCC will continue to have the capacity to enable a condition of climate justice 
in the future, especially if the new global treaty presents a significant departure from the 
Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, the fact that the UNFCCC does not fully enable any of the 
three demands defined in this thesis indicates that a condition of climate justice has not yet 
been reached. For this reason, the thesis now turns to the assessment of networked 
climate change governance processes. 
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Chapter Eight – Assessing Networked Climate Change Governance 
Introduction 
This chapter makes up the third and final chapter which constitutes Part III of this thesis: 
‘Assessing Current Institutional Practice.’ Chapter Six argued that both actors under the 
United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and actors 
involved in networked climate change governance processes have a moral responsibility to 
enable a condition of justice, due to their capability of restructuring the context so that the 
three demands defended in this thesis can be met. The previous chapter, Chapter Seven, 
therefore aimed to assess to what extent actors under the UNFCCC enable a condition of 
justice in the case of climate change. It was put forward that actors under the UNFCCC fail 
to fully enable the three demands of justice set out in this thesis, which suggest that 
networked governance actors must act on their responsibilities because a condition of 
justice has not yet been achieved. In light of this, the current chapter concerns to what 
extent actors involved in networked climate change governance meet their institutional 
responsibility to enable a condition of justice in the case of climate change. 
 
The assessment in this chapter should be considered as exploratory. The chapter does not 
purport to make definitive claims about the practice of networked climate change 
governance actors. Rather, the chapter aims to illustrate how the climate justice 
framework developed in Part II of this thesis can be used to assess current practice. This 
has the wider purpose of bridging the gap between climate justice literature and climate 
change governance research by illustrating that climate justice theorists have the potential 
to provide normative insights into current practice, as was explained in the Introduction of 
the thesis. Furthermore, a comprehensive assessment of networked climate change justice 
is not possible within the scope of this thesis. The thesis places an emphasis on both the 
development of a climate justice position and the application of this position, which allows 
somewhat limited space for the assessment of current practice. In addition, networked 
climate change governance is a vast, ever expanding field. For this reason, it is difficult to 
discern the ‘total universe’ of networked climate change governance, or assess the 
processes that are occurring definitively or completely, especially within the space of one 
chapter.1 Nevertheless, the assessment conducted in this chapter aims to tentatively 
illustrate what the application of the climate justice position developed in this thesis can 
reveal about networked climate change governance practice. 
                                                          
1 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
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In order to overcome the difficulty of capturing networked climate change governance 
comprehensively or definitively, the chapter will rely on existing research on the subject of 
networked climate change governance, rather than attempt to conduct a systematic, 
independent empirical assessment of examples of networked climate change governance. 
Independently assessing examples of networked climate change governance processes 
would no doubt be valuable, but would provide limited insight into the broader picture of 
networked climate change governance, which is what the chapter is attempting to capture. 
Importantly, although the assessment relies on existing research, the chapter will use the 
framework of climate justice developed in Part II in order to analyze this research. In this 
way, the chapter presents a climate justice focused meta-analysis of the recent findings of 
networked climate change governance scholars. Through this meta-analysis, the chapter is 
able to provide insights into the extent to which networked climate change governance 
actors are enabling a condition of climate justice. These insights are valuable because there 
has to date been little analysis of the implications of networked governance initiatives on 
social and environmental justice.2 The existing networked governance research discussed in 
this chapter lies firmly outside of the climate justice literature, and does not concern itself 
with questions of what is just. By drawing on existing research on current practice, and 
analyzing this from a climate justice perspective, the chapter is able to provide unique 
climate justice based insight on processes of networked climate change governance.  
 
The chapter will be organized into two parts. The first part of the chapter will concern a 
climate justice focused assessment of networked climate change governance. The chapter 
will explain how the meta-analysis will be conducted, and what this can reveal in terms of 
climate justice. The chapter will then take each demand of justice in turn, and use existing 
research on networked climate change governance to provide climate justice specific 
insights into current practice. Each section will include illustrative examples of networked 
climate change governance, and focus on both positive trajectories and existing hindrances 
facing networked climate change governance actors. The aim of this first section is to 
tentatively assess to what extent actors involved in networked climate change governance 
can be said to be enabling the three demands of justice. After a brief summary of the 
findings made, the chapter will then turn to its second section, which concerns the future 
of networked climate change governance. This section will discuss why there is room for 
                                                          
2 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 68 
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cautious optimism regarding the capacity of networked climate change governance actors 
to enable a condition of justice in the future. Although networked climate change 
governance, as a whole, presents a space for continued action, innovation, and the 
potential for change, it also presents a business as usual approach, and faces many of the 
same problems as the UNFCCC. The chapter will conclude with a reflection on what has 
been found.  
Networked Climate Governance: A Justice Based Evaluation  
Assessing networked climate change governance actors is not as straightforward a task as 
assessing actors under the UNFCCC, who operate under a common framework and aim to 
create a global treaty. As was explained in Chapter Six, networked climate change 
governance actors are not focused on a single outcome and instead push the global 
response to climate change in a number of directions. In this sense, networked climate 
change governance is a collection of individual initiatives which are decentralized and self-
organized.3 This makes it difficult to ascertain what exactly is occurring within this type of 
governance. Furthermore, recent years have produced a ‘Cambrian explosion’ of 
networked climate change governance initiatives.4 It is therefore challenging to discern the 
‘total universe’ of networked climate change governance activities.5 In fact, the exact 
number of networked climate change governance initiatives is unknown,6 although it is 
estimated that the numbers of projects in existence is in the thousands.7 To make matters 
more complicated, most networked climate change governance initiatives are relatively 
new and are experimental in the sense that we cannot yet be sure how they will turn out.8 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that there has been limited systematic analysis of the ways in 
which climate change is addressed by networked climate change governance actors.9 
Examples of this type of analysis include Kenneth Abbott’s research, which mapped sixty-
                                                          
3 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
156 
4 Abbott, K. W., ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Environment & Planning C: 
Government & Policy 30(4) (2012) p. 571 
5 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
19 
6 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 25 
7 Stevenson, H. and Dryzek, J. S., Democratizing Global Climate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 87 
8 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. x 
9 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
11 
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seven transnational organizations,10 and Matthew Hoffman’s work, which provided an 
assessment of fifty-eight climate governance initiatives.11 Similarly, Harriett Bulkeley et al.’s 
research assessed sixty examples, and provides the most up to date comprehensive 
overview of this type of governance at the time of writing.12 This type of systematic analysis 
is not only rare, but also faces significant limitations. For example, Bulkeley et al. limit 
themselves to projects which were in existence between October 2008 – March 2010, and 
which have publicly accessible English language websites.13 This limits their research to a 
narrow time frame and sample. Furthermore, although Bulkeley et al. claim to provide a 
broad overview of the implications and significance of networked climate change 
governance,14 these scholars admit that it would be impossible to find a ‘representative’ or 
even ‘random’ sample of networked climate change governance.15 All of the above is 
indicative of the fact that networked climate change governance is an overwhelmingly 
complex set of processes, which are difficult to capture, let alone assess. 
 
For this reason, it is not possible within the scope and space of this chapter to 
independently analyze networked climate change governance. Nevertheless, the 
assessment conducted in this chapter aims to tentatively illustrate what the climate justice 
position developed in this thesis can reveal about networked climate change governance 
practice. In order to achieve this, the chapter will rely on existing research on the subject of 
networked climate change governance, rather than attempt to conduct a systematic, 
independent empirical assessment of networked climate change governance. Attempting 
such an assessment in the space of one chapter would necessarily require a focus on a very 
small number of examples of networked climate change governance, which would provide 
limited insight into the broader picture of networked climate change governance. For this 
reason, the chapter will rely on existing research in order to gain broader insight into the 
processes of networked climate change governance. This will arguably reveal more about 
the state of current practice than an analysis of a handful of examples, and will provide a 
broader scope for a climate justice based assessment.  
 
                                                          
10 Abbott, K. W., ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Environment & Planning C: 
Government & Policy 30(4) (2012) pp. 571 – 590 
11 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response After Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
12 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
13 Ibid., p. 23 
14 Ibid., p. 2 
15 Ibid., p. 19 
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It is worthwhile to reiterate that although the assessment conducted here draws on 
existing research, the chapter places this research under the framework of climate justice 
developed in Part II of this thesis. In this way, the chapter represents a climate justice 
focused meta-analysis of the most recent findings of networked climate change 
governance scholars. Through this meta-analysis, the chapter is able to provide insights 
into the extent to which networked climate change governance actors are enabling a 
condition of climate justice. This type of analysis has previously not been attempted by 
climate justice scholars.16 For this reason, although the thesis does not conduct an 
independent assessment of networked climate change governance processes, it still 
represents a significant amount of original research, and makes an important contribution 
to the climate justice field.  
 
The assessment will be structured as follows. The chapter will take each demand of justice 
in turn, and rely on existing research on networked climate change governance to assess to 
what extent actors within this type of governance enable the demand. Chapter Six 
explained that a demand of justice is ‘enabled’ when the context is structured so that the 
demand can be met. In addition to using existing research, the chapter will also draw on 
brief illustrative examples in order to clarify the claims that are made. These examples 
should not be seen as representative of networked governance as a whole. It was explained 
above that this is not possible, because the total number of initiatives under this type of 
governance is not known. Instead, the chapter will draw on ten examples that have been 
selected due to their relevance to the assessment, and their prominence within existing 
research of networked climate change governance. This ensures that the examples used tie 
in well to existing literature on the subject, which is important because the thesis aims to 
engage in this literature and contribute to it. The examples which will be used are: The C40, 
the Climate Group, the Global Methane Initiative, the Asian Cities Climate Change 
Resilience Network, the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, the 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the Verified Carbon Standard, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Carbon Trade Watch, and Transition Towns. Although the thesis 
has limited the number of examples in order to make analysis more manageable, these ten 
examples of current practice serve to provide an insight into the complexities of networked 
climate change governance. The examples include a wide range of actors, namely states, 
cities, corporations, and individuals, as well as a wide range of governance mechanisms, 
                                                          
16 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 68 
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namely information sharing, monitoring, reporting, market mechanisms, capacity building, 
and rule-setting. In this way, the examples, although not representative or all 
encompassing, serve to provide an overview of a range of actors, mechanisms, and types of 
initiative involved in networked climate change governance.  
 
Each demand of justice will now be examined in turn. In doing so, the chapter will make 
climate justice related insights into the positive trajectories and current hindrances facing 
networked climate change governance. The assessment will focus on the capacity of actors 
to create a context where the demands of justice can be met, and discuss what this implies 
in terms of climate justice. The chapter will make use of the four point hierarchy developed 
in Chapter Six, which is outlined below for the purpose of clarity: 
 
The Four Point Hierarchy 
 
1. Actors in the institution enable the demand of justice – the demand of justice is 
unequivocally fulfilled in its entirety.  
 
2. Actors in the institution are consistently working towards enabling the demand of 
justice – the demand of justice is not yet fulfilled, but there are policies in place 
which are consistently leading towards this goal.  
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the demand 
of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the potential for 
the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards enabling the demand 
of justice. 
 
4. Actors in the institution do not enable the demand of justice – there has been no 
promise or attempt to enable the demand of justice and there are no policies in 
place. 
 
Demand One – The Right to Health of Future Generations 
Demand One states that the right to health17 of future generations must be considered to 
be equally as valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must therefore be 
protected. The thesis has explained, in Chapter Four, that this requires that the change in 
global temperature is kept at or below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels. It was explained 
in Chapter One that this will require reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 40% 
- 70% by 2050 compared to 2010, and to zero or below by 2100. The previous chapter 
made the case that actors under the UNFCCC are not enabling Demand One of justice 
because the Kyoto Protocol only targets 15% of global emissions, and only aims to lower 
                                                          
17 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
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emissions by 18% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2013 to 2020.18 In addition, 
although new targets are currently being negotiated under the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in the run up to the 21st Conference of the 
Parties at Paris, it is not yet clear whether these targets will represent a significant 
departure from the Kyoto Protocol. When assessing actors involved in networked climate 
change governance, it is therefore important to assess whether these actors fare better 
than actors in the UNFCCC and create a context which allows for a lowering of global 
emissions in line with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recommendations.  
 
The impact of networked climate change governance on global GHG levels is subject to 
ongoing debate. So far, evidence is mixed in terms of impact and effectiveness.19 This is 
because measuring emissions reductions which result from networked climate change 
governance processes is extremely difficult. In fact, some scholars claim that the long-term 
effects of networked climate change governance processes on GHG levels are impossible to 
estimate.20 As Bulkeley et al. put it, ‘frustratingly, [GHG emissions] may be the worst metric 
to apply’ to assess networked climate change governance, for several reasons which are 
outlined below.21 First, many, if not most initiatives are not directly involved in emission 
reductions. Rather, most are focused on providing information, incentives and capacity 
building for others to reduce their emissions. It is nearly impossible to trace emission 
reductions from the activities that have the explicit goal of increasing the capacity for 
others to reduce their own emissions. Second, the scope of networked climate change 
governance initiatives, in terms of whose or which emissions are to be reduced are 
extremely unclear. In contrast, there is a clear scope of emissions under the UNFCCC: if a 
state commits itself to reduce emissions by a certain percent, this state is a defined entity 
whose emissions can in principle be measured. Tracing impacts of networked climate 
change governance projects is much more complex because these initiatives involve so 
many different actors and projects. In addition, unlike the UNFCCC, emissions reductions 
are not seen as the sole solution to the climate change problem within networked climate 
change governance. Actors within these processes work on energy efficiency, changes in 
transportation and infrastructure, or development and deployment of climate friendly 
technology, efforts that will have an indirect impact on emissions reductions, which are 
                                                          
18 UNFCCC, Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations, Doha (2012), p. 4 
19 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 66 
20 Pattberg, P., ‘Public–Private Partnerships in Global Climate Governance’, in WIRE’s Climate Change, 1 (2010), 
p. 281 
21 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
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difficult to measure. Furthermore, some projects may catalyze a change, for example by 
illustrating that a new technology is viable through a pilot project, which may lead to 
widespread adoption of this technology and result in emissions reductions which are 
difficult to attribute to the initial project. 
 
Even if initiatives specifically set targets for emissions reductions, it is difficult to measure 
whether these targets have been met. Networked climate change governance projects 
have only been in operation for a short time, lack common baselines and/or do not have 
strong monitoring mechanisms in place, which makes assessing their collective effect on 
GHG emissions nearly impossible.22 In addition, projects greatly differ in scale, scope, and 
ambition, which makes it difficult to compare these projects across the board. 23 
Establishing the basis upon which accomplishments might be measured and accruing 
substantial evidence on these remain challenging and relatively unexplored research 
tasks.24 For this reason, data on the level of emissions reductions resulting from networked 
climate change governance projects is almost non-existent. Beyond evidence of leadership 
on climate action, evidence of concrete measurable impacts is scarce.25 As can be seen 
above, existing research on networked climate change governance processes makes it very 
clear that it is problematic to measure the effects that networked climate change 
governance initiatives have on global emissions levels. This renders it impossible to 
definitively claim that actors within networked climate change processes enable Demand 
One by restructuring the context so that global emissions can be lowered to prevent a rise 
in temperature above 2°C.  
 
The lack of evidence on emission reductions has led some critics to claim that networked 
climate change governance activity is merely a distraction from the hard work that is 
occurring at the multilateral level.26 In addition, some skeptics of networked climate change 
governance claim that the initiatives are simply about ‘greenwashing:’ it is more important 
for actors to show that something is being done, rather than make an actual impact on 
emissions.27 However, this dismissal of networked climate change governance may be too 
                                                          
22 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
160 
23 Pattberg, P., ‘Public–Private Partnerships in Global Climate Governance’, in WIRE’s Climate Change, 1 (2010), 
p. 281 
24 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
158 
25 Ibid., p. 161 
26 Ibid., p. 158 
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hasty. Considering that many initiatives are still relatively new, it may be too early to tell, 
definitively, whether this type of governance represents a case of greenwashing, or 
whether actors within these processes are able to create a context which allows for 
significant emissions reductions. 
 
Since concrete evidence is somewhat lacking, it may, for the time being, be necessary to 
focus on the capacity of networked climate change governance actors to reduce emissions. 
Importantly, focusing on capacity leaves some room for optimism in terms of Demand One. 
It is clear from the discussion in this thesis that a climate regime that can limit warming to 
2°C or below will need broad participation within a relatively few-decades. Networked 
climate change governance actors have the capacity to create a context where this is 
possible, because these processes operate across multiple scales and engage a wide range 
of actors in the global response to climate change.28 This has allowed for pursuit of 
interests in climate change in a way that was simply not possible before.29 Unconstrained 
by the consensual decision making found in multilateral treaty making process, networked 
climate change governance initiatives have been free to pursue multiple kinds of responses 
to climate change - there are virtually no limits on what actors can do to respond to climate 
change.30 This has not only resulted in increased participation in climate change action, but 
also raised ambitions: many initiatives include targets and timetables for reducing 
emissions of GHGs that go far beyond those agreed under the UNFCCC.31 In addition, many 
projects target emissions of GHGs that are not covered by international and national 
climate policy, for example corporate emissions.32 In sum, existing research suggests that 
the nature of networked climate change governance processes allows for increased 
participation, makes it possible to target emissions outside of the UNFCCC, and raises 
ambitions for lowering emissions. All of the above tentatively suggests that actors in 
networked climate change governance have the capacity to create a context within which 
emissions can be lowered, which creates space for Demand One to be met. Broadening 
participation and raising emissions reductions targets implies a capacity to lower emissions 
outside of the multilateral process, which would add to global efforts of lowering emissions. 
 
                                                          
28 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
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29 Ibid., p. 164 
30 Ibid., p. 165 
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The capacity to create a context where Demand One can be met will now be further 
explored with reference to two illustrative examples: the C40, a public project which 
consists of a network of cities, and the Climate Group, a hybrid initiative which consists of 
public actors such as sub-state authorities as well as private actors such as corporations. 
Before these illustrative examples are very briefly explored, the chapter will note the 
importance of two types of actors within these projects which play a particularly important 
role in terms of emissions reductions: cities and corporations.  
 
Cities are home to half the world’s population, consume over two thirds of the world’s 
energy and account for more than 70% of carbon emissions.33 Cities will continue to play a 
significant role in terms of emissions, because by 2030, two thirds of the world’s population 
is predicted to live in urban areas.34 It is therefore crucial that cities are involved in the 
process of lowering global emissions, because they account for a majority of emissions and 
encompass a majority of the global population, implying a high capacity to influence 
emission levels. In addition, scholars who study networks of cities have found that cities 
who take ambitious action can act as a positive example and role models, and pressure 
their federal governments to take action on lowering emissions.35  Beyond lowering 
emissions, cities can also disseminate knowledge. City networks, such as the C40, can 
exchange best practices on issues ranging from energy-efficient buildings to water and 
waste treatment. As a result, they are key actors when it comes to disseminating applied 
knowledge and solutions to the challenge of climate change.36 Scholars researching cities 
argue that this may provide some of the momentum necessary to move toward de-
carbonization.37 For these reasons, cities can be said to be especially important in terms of 
creating a context where emissions can be lowered in order to protect the human right to 
health, and why the C40 presents a useful illustrative example. 
 
Similarly, corporations play a critical role in the production of global emissions. The private 
sector accounts for more than one third of energy consumed worldwide and corporations 
                                                          
33 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 104 
34 Ibid. 
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often emit significantly more GHGs than major cities.38 A Greenpeace study found that 
Shell emits more than Saudi Arabia, Amoco more than Canada, Mobil more than Australia, 
and British Petroleum, Exxon and Texaco more than France, Spain, and the Netherlands 
combined.39This indicates that corporations produce a high percentage of global emissions, 
and must necessarily be part of the global effort to reduce emissions, due to their capacity 
to influence the global level of GHGs. Beyond simply lowering emissions, scholars who 
study corporations argue that groups of corporations can effectively institutionalize new 
norms at the transnational level, for example the norm to disclose corporate carbon 
emissions.40 These emerging norms are expected to motivate and facilitate meaningful 
dialog among business actors, investors and the wider public to induce corporate responses 
to climate change.41 Furthermore, the United Nations estimates that 98% of global 
investment and financial flows required to tackle climate change will need to come from 
the private sector, because the private sector develops and disseminates most of the 
world’s technology.42 For this reason, the private sector will play a significant part in 
implementing and financing individual governments’ climate change policies.43 Although 
corporations are no doubt part of the problem, it seems that these actors are also a crucial 
part of the solution. It is for this reason that projects such as the Climate Group are so 
relevant and important to creating a context within which emissions can be lowered 
enough to protect the right to health of future generations. 
 
The C40 and the Climate Group will now be briefly discussed in order to further the 
argument that networked climate change governance actors have the capacity to enable 
Demand One. The C40 is a useful example of the capacity of networked climate change 
governance actors to lower emissions, because this initiative specifically aims to do so. The 
C40 is a network of the world’s largest cities, which aims to share best practices and 
develop collaborative initiatives on city specific issues in order to make implementing the 
global response to climate change more feasible.44 Through this, the C40 promises to have 
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43 Ibid. 
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‘a meaningful global impact in reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and climate risks.’45 
A table of the cities participating in the C40 can be found below.46  
 
East Asia Beijing, Changwon, Hong Kong, Seoul, Shanghai, Tokyo, 
Yokohama  
Africa Addis Ababa, Johannesburg, Cairo, Lagos 
Europe Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Basel, Berlin, Copenhagen, 
Heidelberg, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Milan, Moscow, 
Oslo, Paris, Rome, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Venice, Warsaw 
Latin America Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Curitiba, Lima, Mexico City, 
Rio de Janeiro, Santiago de Chile, Sao Paulo,  
North America Austin, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New 
York, Philadelphia, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, 
Toronto, Vancouver, Washington DC 
Southeast Asia and 
Oceana 
Bangkok, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, Melbourne, 
Singapore, Sydney  
South and West Asia  Delhi NCT, Dhaka, Karachi, Mumbai 
 
Importantly, only 19 out of the 70 participating cities (highlighted above) are held to 
account for emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. This is quite promising in terms 
of creating a context for lowering emissions because if the 51 cities not held to account 
under the Kyoto Protocol lower their emissions because of the C40, this will add to 
multilateral governance efforts (which currently account for 15% of global emissions) and 
contribute to lowering global emissions level by 40-70% of 2010 levels by 2050. In addition 
to holding new actors to account, the C40 also encompasses a large part of the global 
population: the cities involved in C40 account for one in twelve people worldwide, formally 
representing approximately 302 million people.47 The C40 therefore has the capacity to 
make a very real impact on climate change mitigation, by creating a broad network, or 
context, within which emissions can be reduced. 
 
The C40 currently has over 8,000 climate change initiatives in place.48 Projects run by the 
C40 fall into several categories, including adaptation and water, energy, finance and 
economic development, measuring and planning, solid waste management, sustainable 
communities, and transportation.49 This is quite a large distribution of activities, which is 
                                                          
45 C40, ‘C40’ http://c40.org/ [accessed 04.12.2014] 
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Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 151 
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promising because the C40 has the potential to help cities lower emissions in multiple ways. 
However, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the discussion above, there is a lack of data on 
the effect of the C40’s efforts. Although the C40 released a report in 2014 which claims to 
‘provide compelling evidence of the importance of the C40 network,’ this report does not 
make mention of emissions reductions.50 Nevertheless, it is arguable that the C40 has the 
capacity to create a context within which global emissions can be lowered, because it 
includes a broad range of cities, encompasses a large part of the global population, and has 
over 8,000 current projects which address a multitude of issue areas, ensuring that cities 
can pursue emissions reductions in a number of ways. In addition, Bulkeley et al., in their 
assessment of networked climate change governance, have found that the C40’s goals of 
information sharing and taking concrete action for reducing emissions has proven to be an 
effective tool for motivating cities to take action they likely otherwise would not have.51 
Therefore, although it is not possible to definitively claim that the C40 has had a substantial 
effect on global emissions levels, it is reasonable to argue that this initiative creates a 
context under which this is possible. This does not mean that emissions will definitely be 
reduced, or even that this is likely. Nevertheless, it is not impossible, due to the context 
that is being created by the C40. This will be further discussed below, after a brief insight 
into the Climate Group. 
 
The Climate Group is another useful example of the capacity of networked governance 
actors to lower emissions, because it aims to create a ‘prosperous, low carbon future for 
all.’52 More specifically, the Climate Group aims to create a clean revolution through the 
rapid scale-up of low carbon energy and technology.53 This is indicative of the project’s 
aims to lower global emissions. The Climate Group is made up of over one hundred major 
corporations, sub-national governments and international institutions. 54  These 
corporations and institutions are spread across the globe. For example, corporate members 
range from Ikea (Sweden), Dell (America) and Taobao (China), and public members include 
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California, South Australia, Rio Deja Nero, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Toronto.55 Importantly, 
out of the 81 cities, states and provinces participating in the Climate Group, only 18 are 
held to account for lowering emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. If emissions are lowered 
by the 63 cities that are not held to account under the Kyoto Protocol, this could contribute 
to the lowering of global emissions because this will add to multilateral governance efforts. 
In addition, as was explained in Chapter Seven, corporations are not held to any direct 
account under the Kyoto Protocol, because only states containing these corporations are 
held to account. Any corporations existing in states outside of Kyoto control reducing 
emissions as a result of the Climate Group therefore add to multilateral efforts to lower 
global emissions. In addition to representing a large number of cities and corporations not 
held to account under the Kyoto Protocol, members of the Climate Group represent a 
significant amount of wealth and global population. The Climate Group claims that the 
combined revenue of its corporate members is estimated to be in excess of US$1 trillion, 
while its city and regional partners represent almost half a billion people.56 This is 
promising in terms of possible financial contributions to the climate change cause, and for 
lowering global emissions, because the Climate Group encompasses a substantial part of 
the population and has wealthy corporate backers which can help implement its initiatives. 
This creates a context within which global emissions can be significantly lowered.  
 
In order to promote the scale up of clean technology, the actors in the Climate Group pilot 
solutions that can be replicated worldwide.57 For example, the LED Lighting Project, in place 
in major cities such as London, New York, Hong Kong, and Mumbai, has shown that 
switching to LED lights in cities can present energy savings as high as 80%.58 This is quite 
promising, especially if this kind of energy saving can be applied to all cities across the 
world. Street lighting account for 6% of global emissions levels, which is the equivalent of 
GHG emissions from 70% of the world’s passenger vehicles.59 If the LED Lighting Project is 
applied globally it would contribute to lowering the 6% of global emissions associated with 
streetlight down to 1.2%, because LED lamps are 80% more efficient than normal street 
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lamps. Through projects such as the LED Light Project, the Climate Group aims to ‘break the 
Climate Deadlock’ and advocate for stringent global action by demonstrating the 
availability of solutions.60 This indicates that the Climate Group is attempting to create a 
context within which emissions can be lowered, by demonstrating solutions that can make 
a difference to emissions levels. Unfortunately, there is not much concrete evidence 
available on whether the Climate Group is able to live up to its ambitions, which is perhaps 
unsurprising given that there is a lack of evidence across networked climate change 
governance projects. Nevertheless, it is evident from the above that the Climate Group has 
the capacity to create a context within which emissions can be lowered. Again, this does 
not indicate that the Climate Group will definitely lower emissions, or even that this is likely, 
but rather that this is not impossible. 
 
The discussion and examples above have served to illustrate that actors involved in 
networked climate are creating a context which allows for increased participation and 
increased ambition, thereby raising expectations about what is possible to achieve. As was 
explained above, this indicates that these actors have the capacity to create a context 
within which emissions can be lowered. Furthermore, the use of examples above illustrated 
that some initiatives, such as the C40 and Climate Group, explicitly aim to lower emissions, 
further indicating that networked climate change governance actors have the capacity to 
lower global emissions. Of course, this does not mean that networked climate change 
governance actors will lower global emissions, but rather that they have the capacity to do 
so. As was discussed in Chapter Six, capacity implies responsibility, even if the probability of 
an action is low. In this sense, it is not morally relevant whether it is likely that actors 
involved in networked climate change governance will enable Demand One, because these 
actors are morally responsible for doing so. In sum, although it is not possible to claim that 
networked climate change governance actors fully enable Demand One, it has been argued 
above that networked climate change governance actors have the capacity to create a 
context within which emissions can be lowered, and Demand One can therefore be met, 
and that some initiatives, such as the C40 and Climate Group, explicitly aim to lower 
emissions. In terms of the climate justice hierarchy, this tentatively places networked 
climate change governance actors on rung three of the four point hierarchy: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
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potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
Although it cannot be said that all actors within networked climate change governance 
have promised to begin working on enabling Demand One in the future, because this is 
impossible to claim due to vast amount of projects in existence, the discussion has served 
to tentatively illustrate the potential for policy which enables Demand One. The potential 
for policy lies in fact that there is a context under which policy for lowering emissions can 
be created, and that some initiatives, like the C40 and Climate Group, are already pursuing 
such policies. Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to suggest that these policies are 
consistently enabling Demand One. For this reason, networked climate change governance 
actors remain on the third rung of the hierarchy.  
 
Finally, although there is potential for policy, there is also room for pessimism. So far 
networked climate change governance has not delivered anything remotely close to 
matching the scale of the climate change problem.61 While it may be too soon to tell, 
current research confirms that networked climate change governance remains a long way 
from achieving significant emissions reductions.62 This lack of effectiveness in terms of 
emissions reductions therefore presents an existing hindrance faced by networked climate 
change governance actors. Furthermore, this apparent lack of effectiveness has led some 
critics to claim that networked climate change governance actors are merely pursuing their 
own interests, rather than making fundamental changes to the global response to climate 
change.63 This will be further discussed in the second part of this chapter. For now, it is 
worth reiterating that determining the effectiveness of networked climate change 
governance in terms of emissions reductions is very problematic, and could lead to a 
premature dismissal of governance initiatives as a serious part of the global response to 
climate change.64 For this reason, the chapter now moves on to exploring whether actors 
involved in networked climate change governance enable Demands Two and Three of 
justice, to get a better sense of the overall role of networked climate change governance 
actors can play in enabling a condition of climate justice. 
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Demand Two – Less Developed Countries 
Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action (this will be referred to as part one of Demand Two 
below, for the sake of clarity). In addition, the distribution of benefits and burdens in global 
climate change action should be based in the PATP65 model, defended in Chapter Five (this 
will be referred to as part two of Demand Two below). Chapter Seven made that case that 
actors under the UNFCCC make normative commitments to enable Demand Two, but fail to 
implement policy which ‘consistently works towards enabling’ Demand Two of justice. 
When assessing networked climate change governance actors below, it will therefore be 
important to ascertain whether these actors go beyond merely promising to properly 
consider less developed countries’ concerns and implement policies which enable the PATP 
model. This would set networked climate change governance actors apart from actors 
under the UNFCCC in terms of reshaping the context so that Demand Two can be met. 
Chapter Five explained that the category of less developed country is contested, and will be 
defined in this thesis in line with the categories of the UNFCCC, which refers to less 
developed countries under the categories of non-Annex I and Least Developed Countries. 
This is a broad category, and for this reason the differences between richer, larger less 
developed countries like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, and 
those countries which are very poor and vulnerable to climate change will be kept in mind 
and referred to in the assessment which follows. 
 
The general consensus in networked climate change governance research is that less 
developed countries are marginalized within this type of governance.66 Bulkeley et al. for 
example show that the majority of projects in their database (87%) were initiated by actors 
in developed countries.67 Phillip Pattberg has made a similar observation, noting that 
networked climate change governance seems to favor actors from a certain area of the 
world: namely Western, developed nations, primarily the United States (US), Canada, and 
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Australia.68 Furthermore, in Matthew Hoffman’s sample of 58 projects, only seven were 
initiated by a combination of actors in developed and less developed countries, and the 
rest were initiated by developed country actors.69 This lack of inclusion conflicts with part 
one of Demand Two, which states that less developed country concerns must be fully 
considered in climate change action. Chapter Five outlined three main less developed 
country concerns: 1) the acknowledgment that developed countries have contributed most 
to the climate change problem, 2) that less developed countries face greater immediate 
problems which must be addressed before they can act on climate change, and 3) that less 
developed countries have a right to develop before they must make contributions to 
climate change efforts.  It is difficult to fully consider these concerns if less developed 
countries are not included in climate change governance. If they are not included, they 
cannot contribute to decision making about what action to take on climate change, and the 
decisions made in their absence may not reflect their concerns. This may be why a ‘bulk of 
less developed countries’ continue to support multilateral climate change governance.70  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that networked forms of climate change governance are 
expected to broaden participation and increase the inclusion of otherwise marginalized 
actors.71 In this way, networked climate change governance actors may create a context 
within which the concerns of less developed countries can be fully considered over time. 
Interestingly, the newest study by Bulkeley et al. seems to indicate that networked climate 
change governance is moving in this direction. These scholars found that 77% of their sixty 
initiatives have at least one actor from a less developed country, and 67% have at least 
two.72 Importantly, out of the 46 projects that include less developed country members, 33 
involve non-BRICS participants, indicating that it is not only the richer less developed 
countries that are participating.73 As Bulkeley et al. note, if networked climate change 
governance were predominantly driven by what was occurring under the UNFCCC, BRICS 
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countries would be expected to be the primary participants because of their growing role in 
multilateral governance, but this appears not to be the case.74 In this way, networked 
climate change governance processes include a wider variety of actors from less developed 
countries than the UNFCCC. 
 
However, only 7% of the initiatives highlighted by Bulkeley et al. solely involve participants 
from developing countries.75  In addition, these scholars found a significant regional 
variation to participation, with the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Oceania, and the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remaining particularly underrepresented.76 Bulkeley 
et al.’s findings indicate that North America and Europe are at the core of the networked 
governance world, closely followed by Asia.77 Overall, these regional patterns mimic closely 
the way that diplomats from large parts of the developing world have less capacity to 
shape the multilateral regime.78 Importantly, underrepresentation can directly affect which 
interests are taken into account. 79 For example, for those actors most marginalized (SSA 
and Oceania), adaption is a key concern. Networked climate change governance actors 
appear to favor mitigation over adaptation, suggesting a hindrance to enabling the first 
part of Demand Two, since adaptation is a key concern of poorer less developed countries 
which is not being fully considered in climate change action. In Hoffman’s study, 40 out of 
58 projects focus exclusively on mitigation, and another 16 pursue a mix of mitigation and 
adaptation efforts.80 In the study conducted by Bulkeley et al., only 3% of initiatives focus 
solely on adaptation, 75% focus exclusively on mitigation, and 22% on both.81 Interestingly, 
when looking at those projects that involve less developed countries, the numbers vary 
only slightly:  64% of projects focus on mitigation alone, 4% on adaptation alone and 22% 
on both.82 This indicates that although networked climate change governance includes less 
developed country actors, the exclusion of countries from regions which are most 
concerned with adaptation is having an effect on networked governance project priorities.  
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And yet, there is some room for optimism. Hoffman argues that adaptation has only 
recently emerged as a key feature of networked climate governance.83 He hopes that 
adaptation will become an increasingly important component of the global response to 
climate change in the future, as networked climate change governance actors come to see 
adaptation as key to climate change governance.84 There is also room for optimism because 
of the high participation by less developed countries found in Bulkeley et al.’s study, 
especially as this finding was unexpected for the scholars. Their research indicates that 
networked climate change governance actors create a context where less developed 
country participation is more diverse than under the UNFCCC. This implies optimism in 
terms of taking concerns of less developed countries into account. To further illustrate why 
there is room for optimism in terms of the first part of Demand Two, the chapter will now 
turn to two brief illustrative examples: The Global Methane Initiative and the Asian Cities 
Climate Change Resilience Network.  
 
The Global Methane Initiative is a useful example of the capacity of networked climate 
change governance actors to create a context where the concerns of less developed 
countries are taken into account. It is a hybrid initiative involving both state and non-state 
actors, and is the only project within Bulkeley et al.’s sample whose founding members 
included more than two less developed countries.85 The founding members of the Global 
Methane Initiative are Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, 
Ukraine, the UK and the USA.86 Chapter Five defined China, Colombia, India, and Mexico as 
less developed countries, because these are outside of Annex-I under the UNFCCC.87 
However, none of these countries fall under the category of Least Developed, indicating 
that although the Global Methane Initiative has a high number of richer less developed 
country founding members, it still marginalizes the poorest. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
Global Methane Initiative is not concerned with adaptation, but prioritizes mitigation 
through methane abatement. It prides itself in being the only international effort to 
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specifically target methane abatement, recovery, and use.88 Nevertheless, this project 
illustrates that networked governance actors are capable of creating a context where less 
developed countries, at least richer ones, can come together in order to found initiatives 
which speak to their interests, in this case methane abatement. 
 
The Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN), on the other hand, presents 
a useful example of an initiative that takes a key less developed country concern into 
account, because it focuses solely on adaptation.89 The ACCCRN aims to strengthen the 
capacity of over 50 rapidly urbanizing cities in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam to survive, adapt, and transform in the face of climate-related stress 
and shocks.90 The ACCCRN focuses on helping individuals and organizations build climate 
change resilience for poor and vulnerable people by fostering partnerships and 
collaboration. The initiative aims to build a larger coalition to drive the capacity and action 
needed for climate change resilience in the region.91 Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are all considered less developed countries under the 
definition of this thesis, but none of these countries is part of the group of Least Developed 
Countries, the most vulnerable to climate change effects. Nevertheless, the ACCCRN 
provides an example of the role networked climate change governance actors can play in 
creating a context where the concerns of less developed countries are taken into account, 
because this initiative is solely concerned with adaptation. 
 
Overall, the discussion and illustrative examples above indicate that networked climate 
change governance processes are not entirely inclusive or representative of less developed 
country interests, particularly of Least Developed Countries. Nevertheless, networked 
governance actors can be said to have the capacity for creating a context where the 
interests of less developed countries can be taken into account, either through 
participation, founding of projects, or through projects which pursue these interests. 
Therefore, although networked governance actors undoubtedly face a hindrance of 
excluding less developed countries, there is capacity for inclusion of these countries and 
their interests. This is not to say that these countries will definitely be included in future, or 
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even that that is likely, but rather that the capacity for this exists. In addition, the examples 
above illustrate that some projects are initiated by less developed countries, indicating that 
these countries are acting on their concerns, and some projects promise to address 
adaptation, a less developed country concern. In terms of climate justice, this tentatively 
places networked governance actors on the third rung of the four point hierarchy:  
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
Although it cannot be said that all actors within networked climate change governance 
have promised to begin working on enabling the first part of Demand Two in the future, 
because this is impossible to claim due to vast amount of projects in existence, the 
discussion has served to tentatively illustrate the potential for policy which enables the first 
part of Demand Two. The potential for policy lies in fact that networked climate change 
governance actors have the capacity to create a context within which policy for including 
less developed countries’ concerns can be created. The Global Methane Initiative, which 
includes several less developed country founding members, and the ACCCRN, which 
focuses on adaptation, are indicative of this potential. Unfortunately, the discussion above 
also reveals that the wider trend within networked climate change governance is exclusion 
of less developed countries. This indicates that it cannot be said that there are policies in 
place which consistently enable the first part of Demand Two. For this reason, networked 
climate change governance actors remain on the third rung of the hierarchy in terms of the 
first part of Demand Two. 
 
The second part of Demand Two states that the distribution of benefits and burdens in 
global climate change action should be based in the PATP92 model. The previous chapter 
illustrated that the actors of the UNFCCC fail to enable this second part of Demand Two 
beyond making promises to do so, for two main reasons. First, wealthy and high emitting 
countries such as the US, Canada, Japan, and Russia have refused to participate in the 
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second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Secondly, the Kyoto Protocol does not 
hold richer less developed countries with high emissions, such as China, India and Brazil, to 
account for lowering emissions. The fact that the Kyoto Protocol does not hold some of the 
highest emitting and wealthiest states to account for reducing emissions and making 
financial contributions is not consistent with the PATP model. Nevertheless, Chapter Seven 
illustrated that new targets are currently being negotiated under the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in the run up to the 21st 
Conference of the Parties at Paris. Although these discussions, at times, indicate room for 
optimism, it is not yet clear whether these targets will represent a significant departure 
from the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, Chapter Seven argued that the actors under the 
UNFCCC do not fully enable the second part of Demand Two. It is therefore important to 
evaluate what role networked climate change governance actors can play in creating a 
context within which countries can be held to account in line with the PATP model, thereby 
enabling the second part of Demand Two. 
 
It is difficult to claim, with any certainty, that networked climate change governance actors 
create a context within which states are held to account according to the PATP model. This 
is for two reasons. The first is that states are not the primary actors within networked 
climate change governance, and the second is that even when states are the primary actors 
within a project, they are not often held to account more than voluntarily. In Bulkeley et 
al.’s sample of projects only 15% were initiated by national government actors.93 In 
addition, in their sample of public projects, only 22% had national government actors, 
compared to 38% that had regional actors, 31% that had local actors, and 9% that had 
multiple public actors.94 This is indicative of the low number of state actors within 
networked climate change governance. This low number is problematic in terms of 
enabling the PATP, because if states do not participate, they cannot be held to account.  
 
Furthermore, even when states do participate in initiatives, it is rare these actors be held to 
account more than voluntarily. There is a trend of not holding participating actors to 
account more than voluntarily within networked climate change governance processes. For 
example, in Bulkeley et al.’s analysis, they discovered that capacity building (88%) and 
information sharing (93%) are the most common functions among the initiatives in their 
                                                          
93 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
26 
94 Ibid., p. 82 
 268 
 
database, and there are a significant proportion of initiatives which undertake direct forms 
of action (60%) and involve setting some form of target for their constituents (60%).95 
However, initiatives which set mandatory rules (23%) are relatively rare.96 If states are not 
held to account more than voluntarily, then it is questionable whether it can be said that 
the PATP model of responsibility is being enabled by networked climate change governance 
actors. Nevertheless, a majority of projects within Bulkeley et al.’s sample have some form 
of ‘soft’ or ‘self’ regulation.97 This indicates that networked governance initiatives have 
ways to bind participants and hold one another to account. These strategies include: 
maintaining a registry of members (77%), asking participants to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (35%), chairing membership fee (37%), or requiring compulsory action 
(30%).98 Bulkeley et al. explain that 90% of initiatives undertake some form of function that 
goes beyond information sharing or capacity building to include certification or target 
setting, which indicates actors are being held to account, even if this is through soft, 
voluntary measures.99 Therefore, although it cannot be said that actors are held to account 
by a legal treaty such as the Kyoto Protocol, networked climate change governance actors 
have created a context within which actors can be held to account through soft regulation.  
 
Two examples of networked climate change governance initiatives will now be examined in 
order to illustrate how soft regulation works in practice. These two examples, the Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum, and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate, are both public initiatives which hold states to account for climate change 
action. Although these states are only held to account voluntarily, these examples illustrate 
the fact that networked governance actors have created a context within which rich and 
high emitting states can act on their responsibilities, and hold one another to account, 
albeit on a voluntary basis.  
 
The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) is focused on the development of 
improved cost-effective technologies for the separation and capture of carbon dioxide for 
its transport and long-term safe storage.100 The mission of the CSLF is to facilitate the 
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development and deployment of such technologies via collaborative efforts that address 
key technical, economic, and environmental obstacles.101 Membership is open to national 
governmental entities that are significant producers or users of fossil fuels and that have a 
commitment to invest resources in research, development and demonstration activities in 
carbon capture and storage technologies.102 This indicates that the CSLF specifically targets 
high emitting and/or wealthy countries, which can contribute to funding new technologies 
and are responsible to act on climate change under the PATP. The CSLF and the 
technologies it seeks to develop are identified by international bodies as pivotal in dealing 
with GHGs and their ultimate stabilization.103 This indicates that members under the CSLF 
are contributing financially in order to ultimately lower global emissions. Importantly, this 
project includes members from less developed countries which are widely regarded as 
significant in terms of their contributions to GHG emissions and as critical actors in the 
international climate change regime.104 These are richer less developed countries who fall 
under the BRICS category: Brazil, India, China, South Africa, as well as Russia and Mexico, 
which are sometimes included in the BRICS category (BRICSAM). The CSLF also includes the 
US, which never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, as well as Canada, Japan, Russia, and New 
Zealand, countries which have refused to participate in the second round of the Kyoto 
Protocol.105 In this way, CSLF is including actors which not currently held to account under 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
The PATP calls for high emitting and/or rich countries to contribute to the climate change 
solution, by lowering emissions and/or financing projects which seek to address the climate 
change problem. The CSLF is in line with these demands, because it allows high emitting 
and wealthy states to act on climate change, according to their responsibilities under the 
PATP model. Of course, these actors are not held to account on more than a voluntary 
basis, as is typical within networked climate change governance. Although the CSLF has a 
Charter, this is ‘does not create any legally binding obligations between or among its 
Members.’106 Furthermore, the Charter of the CSLF specifies that ‘a Member may withdraw 
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from membership in the CSLF by giving 90 days advance written notice to the Secretariat,’ 
indicating membership is not legally binding.107 Nevertheless, the CSLF provides a context 
within which these actors can act on their responsibilities, and hold one another to account 
for action on climate change, even if this is on a voluntary basis. This is indicative of the fact 
that networked climate change governance actors are capable of creating a context within 
which rich and/or high emitting countries can act on, and be held accountable for, their 
responsibilities under the PATP model, albeit voluntarily. 
 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Climate (APP) is another example of a networked climate 
change initiative which allows high emitting/rich countries to act on their responsibilities 
specified under the PATP model. Although the APP concluded its joint work 2011, the 
initiative still has ongoing projects, and is a frequently used example within the climate 
change governance literature – it is included in Hoffman’s,108 Bulkeley et al.’s,109 and 
Abbott’s110 research. It is therefore worth briefly discussing this example, because this will 
allow the current chapter to speak to existing literature. The APP accounted for 48% of the 
world’s GHG emissions, 48% of global energy production, 49% of global GDP, and 45% of 
the global population, making it a significant networked climate change governance actor, 
which is perhaps why it is commonly discussed.111 Like the CSLF above, the APP included 
members from less developed countries which are widely regarded as significant in terms 
of their contributions to GHG emissions and as critical actors in the international climate 
change regime, as well as members who refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol.112 The APP was 
a partnership between the governments of Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South 
Korea and the United States, and ran from 2005-2011.  Besides Australia, none of the APP 
member states are currently held to account for lowering emissions or financial 
contributions under the Kyoto Protocol. This is important, because it illustrates that the 
APP created a context under which rich/high emitting countries not held to account under 
the Kyoto Protocol can act on their responsibilities. 
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The APP aimed ‘to promote and create an enabling environment for the development, 
diffusion, deployment and transfer of existing and emerging cost-effective, cleaner 
technologies and practices, through concrete and substantial cooperation.’113 This indicates 
that the APP was concerned with investing in technologies which lower GHG emissions, 
similarly to the CSLF, and members of the APP contributed financially in order to ultimately 
lower global emissions. Over the course of its existence the member states of the APP were 
involved in hundreds of projects to fulfil this aim. For example, the APP oversaw the 
construction of high performance buildings in China, which aimed to reduce energy use and 
emissions.114 One of these buildings was the Olympic Village Micro-Energy Building, which 
housed 17,000 athletes during the 2008 Olympics. Through projects such as these, the APP 
allowed actors who are responsible under the PATP model to act on these responsibilities. 
However, members of the APP were not held to account beyond their voluntary 
commitment. According to the APP charter, the member states were operating under a 
‘voluntary, non-legally binding framework,’ and partners were allowed to terminate their 
membership ‘upon written notice 90 days prior to the anticipated termination.’115 In 
addition, although the APP enabled states to act on their responsibilities, the APP reflected 
a preference for an emphasis on reducing emissions intensity rather than cuts in carbon per 
se.116 In addition, the APP had a strong emphasis on clean coal technologies, which reflects 
the energy sector profiles of some of the countries involved.117 This indicates that the APP 
presented a ‘businesses as usual’ approach, rather than a radical departure from existing 
energy production. This is a wider problem within networked climate change governance, 
and will be further discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
For now, the chapter has aimed to demonstrate in the discussion above, as well as through 
the use of two illustrative examples, that networked climate change governance actors 
have the capacity to create a context within which rich/high emitting states can act on their 
responsibilities. Although there exists the hindrance of not holding these countries to 
account more than voluntarily, the discussion above served to illustrate that actors within 
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networked climate change governance are capable of creating a context which can 
accommodate the PATP model of responsibility. This does not mean that the PATP model 
will be realized through networked climate change governance processes, or that this is 
likely, but rather that this is not impossible. In addition, the two examples above served to 
illustrate that there are initiatives that involve rich and high emitting states acting to 
reduce emissions and fund climate friendly technologies, thereby setting a context where 
the PATP model of responsibility can be acted on. For this reason, the actors involved in 
networked climate change governance can tentatively be said to reside on rung three of 
the four point justice hierarchy in terms of enabling part two of Demand Two: 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
Although it cannot be said that all actors within networked climate change governance 
have promised to begin working on enabling the second part of Demand Two in the future, 
because this is impossible to claim due to vast amount of projects in existence, the 
discussion has served to tentatively illustrate the potential for policy which enables the 
second part of Demand Two. This potential for policy lies in fact that there is a context 
under which the PATP could be inscribed into policy. The Carbon Sequestration Leadership 
Forum and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Climate, both of whom enable states to act on 
their responsibilities, are indicative of this potential. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that 
networked climate change governance has policies in place which consistently enable the 
PATP, because in the rare cases where states make up actors within these processes of 
governance, they are not held to account more than voluntarily. For this reason, networked 
climate change governance actors remain on the third rung of the hierarchy in terms of the 
second part of Demand Two.  
Demand Three – Capable Actors  
Demand Three states that capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in, must 
be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate 
change cause, in line with their respective capabilities. Chapter Seven made that case that 
the Kyoto Protocol does not represent a set of policies which enable Demand Three of 
justice, because it does not create a context under which all capable actors are held to 
account. The Kyoto Protocol holds less than forty states to account for lowering emissions, 
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and less than thirty to account for financial contributions. This not only severely limits the 
number of states which are held to account, but also to the number of individuals, firms, 
sub-state entities, international institutions held to account. However, Chapter Seven 
noted that the list of states which are held responsible is currently being negotiated under 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in the run 
up to the 21st Conference of the Parties at Paris. Although these discussions, at times, 
indicate room for optimism, it is not yet clear whether they will lead to a significant 
departure from the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, Chapter Seven argued that the actors 
under the UNFCCC do not enable Demand Three. Therefore, when assessing to what extent 
actors in networked climate change governance enable Demand Three, it will be important 
ascertain whether these actors create a context within which individuals, firms, sub-state 
entities, international institutions, and states can be held to account for their 
responsibilities for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate change 
cause. 
 
Recent research on the networked climate change governance is indicative of the capacity 
of actors involved in these processes to create a context within which actors can act on 
their responsibilities. For example, Bulkeley et al.’s findings indicate that it is becoming 
increasingly common for subnational governments, non-governmental organizations, 
businesses and individuals to take responsibility into their own hands and experiment with 
bold new approaches to the governance of climate change.118 Their research revealed a 
clear increase in participation of non-state actors. 119  According to Bulkeley et al., 
networked climate change governance processes exercises authority over individuals, 
companies and even states and intergovernmental organizations.120 This is indicative of the 
fact that networked climate change governance actors have the capacity to create a 
context within which individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international institutions, and 
states can act on their responsibilities for lowering emissions and/or contributing 
financially to the climate change cause. 
 
Networked climate change governance processes provide scope and space for action which 
is broader than the space provided by the UNFCCC. In the UNFCCC, only particular actors 
(states) can directly pursue their interests in a particular way (relative to emissions 
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reductions). In contrast, networked climate change governance processes have allowed 
multiple actors to pursue diverse approaches to combatting climate change.121 In addition, 
networked climate change does not face the same constraints which may face decision 
making at the UNFCCC: if the interest and money is there, action can be taken without 
having to negotiate the consent of 180 states. This is indicative of the capacity of actors 
within these processes to shape the context at will, and thereby include a diverse range of 
responsible actors. Biermann et al. have come to similar conclusions. These scholars 
explain that networked climate change governance processes can circumvent negotiation 
stalemates among countries that might have been caused by the attempt of finding 
universal agreement.122 This, in turn, may make it easier to broaden the coverage of 
relevant sectors.123 Again, this suggests that networked climate change governance actors 
are able to shape the context in order to engage a wider variety of actors than the UNFCCC 
is able to engage. It seems that almost any actor can conceive of being a player in climate 
governance and seeking to influence responses to climate change.124 This has allowed for a 
wide variety of actors to participate in networked climate change governance, including 
those which are not interested in the multilateral process.125  
The discussion above suggests that networked governance actors have the capacity to 
create a context within which individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international institutions, 
and states can act on their responsibilities under Demand Three. Indeed, it seems that this 
context is well underway in being created. Nevertheless, as was explained above, actors are 
typically not held to account more than voluntarily within networked climate change 
governance. Of course, voluntariness does not suggest that implementing actors will not 
comply with the rules of initiatives or will fail to act out the initiatives’ core functions.126 
Even if an initiative is voluntary, it can still exert a degree of power over its members, in the 
form of ‘soft’ regulation, as discussed above.127 However, it is worth stressing that 
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networked climate change governance actors do not usually hold individuals, firms, sub-
state entities, international institutions, and states to account more than voluntarily.  
Two examples will now be used to illustrate the argument that networked climate change 
governance actors have the capacity to create a context within which individuals, firms, 
sub-state entities, international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live 
or exist in, can act on lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate 
change cause: The Verified Carbon Standard and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 
The Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) was founded by a collection of business and 
environmental leaders who saw a need for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon 
markets.128 The aim of the VCS is to implement a GHG reduction program that delivers 
‘massive emission reductions across the world.’129 The VCS is one of many similar carbon 
offset initiatives, but has captured the largest share of this market: it is the world’s most 
widely used voluntary GHG reduction program.130 The VCS does not buy and sell carbon 
credits, but rather facilitates this exchange by ‘eliminating the need for the purchaser to 
evaluate the merits of many different projects.’131 In other words, the VCS provides a 
common standard in the carbon trading market which enables corporations to buy and sell 
emissions and display their emission lowering efforts. Carbon offsetting occurs when a 
buyer invests in a project or mitigation measures which will result in fewer GHG emissions 
than would have occurred in the absence of that investment.132 Through this investment, 
the buyer is purchasing ‘carbon credits’ that may potentially be sold on to another buyer or 
cancelled so that they can no longer be used.133  
 
To establish some degree of structure and stability in the voluntary carbon offsetting 
market, a number of standards, included the VCS, were established to provide rules that 
assure buyers that their purchased credits are genuinely reducing GHG emissions.134 The 
role of the VCS is therefore to facilitate carbon trading, rather than to hold corporations to 
account for responsibilities. Nevertheless, the VCS, by providing a trusted standard of 
carbon trading, enables corporations to act on the responsibilities outlined in Demand 
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Three, by allowing these actors buy and sell emissions and display their emission lowering 
efforts. It is important to note that the VCS promises ‘massive emission reductions across 
the world.’135 This indicates that the VCS seeks to assist corporations in lowering their 
emissions. This enables Demand three because the VCS creates a context within which 
corporations are able to act on their responsibilities to lower emissions and contribute 
financially to the climate change cause. According to the VCS, over one thousand registered 
projects have collectively removed more than 130 million tons of emissions from the 
atmosphere, indicating that corporations are acting on their responsibilities on a large 
scale.136  
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is another example which illustrates that 
networked governance actors have created a context within which actors beyond the state 
can act on their responsibilities. The RGGI is comprised of ten states in the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic regions of the US: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These federal states aim to cap 
and reduce GHG emissions from the power sector.137 In order to achieve this, federal states 
sell their allowances through auctions and invest proceeds in energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and other consumer benefit programs.138 The RGGI is therefore creating a context 
within which sub-state entities, namely federal US states, can act on their climate change 
responsibilities by reducing GHG emissions and investing in climate friendly technology. 
This is especially important considering that the US is currently not held to account for 
emissions reductions or financial contributions under the Kyoto Protocol. The federal states 
participating in the RGGI are therefore sub-state actors which have so far not been held to 
account legally under the UNFCCC. Although the RGGI is a voluntary initiative, it is 
illustrative of the fact that networked climate change governance creates a context within 
which sub-state actors can act on their responsibilities under Demand Three, thereby 
enabling this demand. 
 
It should be noted that the six illustrative examples outlined under the heading of Demand 
One and Two also illustrate the fact that networked climate change governance actors are 
creating a context within which capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state 
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entities, international institutions, and states can act on their responsibilities for lowering 
emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate change cause. The C40 involves 
cities attempting to lower emissions, the Climate Group involves cities and corporations 
which are attempting to spread clean technology, the Global Methane Initiative involves 
states attempting to capture a specific GHG, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum is 
a group of national governments attempting to lower GHGs by capturing carbon, the Asian 
Cities Climate Change Group involves cities which are aiming to enable adaptation, and 
finally the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate was a group of states 
who attempted to facilitate technological innovation. From these examples, and the 
discussion above, it can be argued that networked climate change governance actors are 
capable of enabling Demand Three, by creating a context within which this is possible. It is 
worth reiterating that actors are not held to account in a legally binding manner, but rather 
voluntarily. Nevertheless, networked climate change governance actors are shaping how 
individuals, communities, cities, countries, provinces, regions, corporations and nation-
states respond to climate change.139 The examples discussed served to illustrate this, by 
outlining the activities of initiatives that are allowing these actors to act on their 
responsibilities. Therefore, actors in networked climate change governance can tentatively 
be said to reside on the third rung of the hierarchy in terms of enabling Demand Three: 
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to begin working on enabling the 
demand of justice in the future – no policy has been adopted, but there is the 
potential for the creation of policy in order to consistently work towards 
enabling the demand of justice. 
Although it cannot be said that all actors within networked climate change governance 
have promised to begin working on enabling Demand Three in the future, because this is 
impossible to claim due to vast amount of projects in existence, the discussion has served 
to tentatively illustrate the potential for policy which enables Demand Three. The potential 
for policy lies in fact that there is a context under which the responsibility of individuals, 
firms, sub-state entities, international institutions, and states to act on climate change 
could be inscribed into policy. The Verified Carbon Standard, which allows corporations to 
act on their responsibilities, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which allows 
federal US states to act on their responsibilities, are indicative of this potential. In addition, 
The C40, the Climate Group, the Global Methane Initiative, the Carbon Sequestration 
Leadership Forum, the Asian Cities Climate Change Group and the Asia Pacific Partnership 
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on Clean Development and Climate which all allow various state and non-state actors to act 
on their climate responsibilities outlined in Demand Three, are also indicative of the 
potential for policy. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that networked climate change 
governance has policies in place which consistently enable Demand Three, because actors 
are not held to account more than voluntarily. For this reason, networked climate change 
governance actors remain on the third rung of the hierarchy in terms of Demand Three. 
 
On a final note, it is worth stressing that participation of these actors should not necessarily 
be taken as a sign that these actors see themselves as responsible. In fact, there is concern 
within networked climate change governance research that the pervasiveness of market 
mechanisms and the lack of innovation beyond ‘business as usual’ calls into question 
whether actors are being held to account for their responsibilities or rather pursuing their 
own interests and agendas. The bulk of networked responses to climate change are market 
oriented, and the center of gravity of the global response is bound up with market 
mechanisms, including credit and allowance markets.140 This suggests that collectively, 
networked climate change governance projects are attempting to shift the focus of the 
discussion about the response to climate change from the costs of reducing emissions to 
the (economic) benefits of reducing emissions.141 This reinforces the notion that the 
transition to a carbon neutral world should and will take place through market-oriented 
means rather than through radical rethinking of social and economic structures.142  
 
This focus on the market is concerning, because it is not clear how effective the 
incremental changes that arise from market mechanisms can be.143 It could be argued that 
market mechanisms represent ‘business as usual’ rather than radical change which may be 
necessary to adequately respond to climate change. Policies that are relatively easy to 
implement (such as offsets) may be exactly the ones unlikely to make much difference.144 
Perhaps more troublingly, market mechanisms have been criticized for exacerbating the 
status quo. The emerging pattern implies that the rich buy credits from the poor, not vice 
versa, entrenching existing inequalities.145 This further adds to the idea that market 
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mechanisms replicate ‘business as usual’ rather than reflecting genuine structural change, 
which is necessary to combat climate change. Actors in networked climate change 
governance will need to address this problem if climate change action is to involve more 
than a very slight change in behavior which perpetuates existing inequalities and is does 
not present a departure from ‘business as usual.’ The pervasive nature of the market and 
‘business as usual’ present hindrances because they call into question whether actors are 
being held to account for their responsibilities or rather pursuing their own interests and 
agendas.  This will be further discussed in the second section of the chapter, after a brief 
summary of findings. 
Summary of Findings  
The above exploratory assessment served to illustrate how the climate justice position in 
this thesis can be applied to assess to what extent actors in networked climate change 
governance meet their responsibilities to enable a condition of justice in the case of climate 
change. Although the findings above are preliminary, the climate justice focused meta-
analysis above has revealed the importance of networked climate change governance in 
terms of creating a context within which the three demands of justice defended in this 
thesis can be met. Each of the three demands was argued to be enabled to the third rung 
of the hierarchy, as is illustrated in the table below. 
 
Demand 
Extent to Which the Demand is Enabled by 
Actors involved in networked Climate Change 
Governance 
One: The right to health146 of 
future generations must be 
considered to be equally as 
valuable as the right to health of 
current generations, and must 
therefore be protected. 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to 
begin working on enabling the demand of justice 
in the future – no policy has been adopted, but 
there is the potential for the creation of policy in 
order to consistently work towards enabling the 
demand of justice. 
 
Two: The concerns of less 
developed countries must be 
properly considered in climate 
change action. The distribution of 
benefits and burdens in global 
climate change action should be 
based in the PATP147 model. 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to 
begin working on enabling the demand of justice 
in the future – no policy has been adopted, but 
there is the potential for the creation of policy in 
order to consistently work towards enabling the 
demand of justice. 
                                                          
146 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
147 Polluter’s Ability to Pay model: the responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions is based on 
both per capita emissions levels and per capita wealth. To illustrate, countries which have high levels of 
pollution and high levels of wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for climate change action, 
and countries of low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best possible, as long as it 
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Demand 
Extent to Which the Demand is Enabled by 
Actors involved in networked Climate Change 
Governance 
Three: Capable actors, including 
individuals, firms, sub-state 
entities, international 
institutions, and states, 
irrespective of the country they 
live or exist in, must be held 
responsible for lowering 
emissions and/or contributing 
financially to the climate change 
cause, in line with their 
respective capabilities. 
 
3. Actors in the institution have promised to 
begin working on enabling the demand of justice 
in the future – no policy has been adopted, but 
there is the potential for the creation of policy in 
order to consistently work towards enabling the 
demand of justice. 
 
 
The assessment above has tentatively revealed actors involved in networked climate 
change governance processes have the capacity to create a context within which the 
demands of justice defended in this thesis can be met. It was illustrated that networked 
climate change governance actors have the capacity to lower emissions, to include less 
developed countries, and to hold individuals, firms, sub-state entities, international 
institutions, and states to account for their responsibilities to act on climate change. The 
chapter used examples to illustrate this capacity, and furthermore to show that there are 
initiatives which have put policies which enable the demands of justice into place. These 
findings present a significant positive trajectory in terms of enabling a condition of climate 
justice. Nevertheless, this does not indicate that it is likely that networked climate change 
governance actors will enable a condition of climate justice, but rather that it is not 
impossible. In other words, the assessment above has shown that that there is room, or 
scope, for the three demands to be met by networked climate change governance actors. 
For this reason, the chapter’s findings indicate that it is important and worthwhile for 
climate justice scholars to research networked climate change governance processes.  This 
will be further discussed in the second part of this chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that although networked climate change governance 
processes exhibit positive trajectories, namely a) there are networked governance 
                                                                                                                                                                    
does not push them under a threshold of a decent standard of living, and only when they rise in wealth will they 
have to pay more towards climate change costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low 
emissions and low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and high wealth may be 
asked to contribute financially but not lower their emissions.  
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initiatives which have goals in line with the three demands of climate justice, b) there is 
capacity for emissions reductions, c) there is capacity for less developed country inclusion, 
and d) there is capacity for responsible actors to be held to account, hindrances remain in 
place. The fact that actors involved in networked climate change justice fail to fully enable 
any of the three demands represents a key hindrance which must be overcome in order to 
meet a condition of justice in the case of climate change. The actors involved in networked 
climate change governance must do more to live up to their responsibility for enabling a 
condition of justice. In addition, the chapter pointed to the following hindrances in the 
discussion above: a) it is unclear whether networked climate change actors are effective at 
reducing emissions levels, b) there is a focus on mitigation over adaptation, c) there is a 
marginalization of less developed countries, especially the very poorest, d) actors are not 
held to account more than voluntarily, e) there is a focus on market mechanisms, and 
finally, e) networked climate change governance presents a ‘business as usual’ approach 
rather than a radical departure from current practice.  This leaves open the question of 
what will happen in the future, to which the chapter now turns. 
Networked Climate Change Governance: Looking to the Future  
This second part of the chapter concerns the future capacity of networked climate change 
governance actors to enable a condition of justice. It should be noted that capacity and 
probability are two different matters. As was discussed in Chapter Six, capacity implies 
responsibility, even if the probability of an action is low. In this sense, it is not morally 
relevant whether it is likely that actors involved in networked climate change governance 
will enable a condition of justice in the future, because these actors are morally responsible 
for doing so. However, it is still important to explore whether the capacity to enable 
climate justice will be affected in future. If the actors involved in networked climate change 
governance are moving towards creating a context where demands of justice can be met, 
then this indicates that these actors will remain capable of, and therefore morally 
responsible for, enabling a condition of climate justice. The discussion below will attempt 
to determine if this is the case. It will be put forward that there is room for cautious 
optimism regarding the capacity of networked climate change governance actors to enable 
a condition of justice in the future.  
 
There is room for optimism because networked climate change governance processes are 
flexible, innovative, and have the potential to catalyze change in the response to climate 
change. Networked climate change processes are flexible in the sense that there is no 
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particular pattern to how initiatives are put together, or by whom they are put together. 
Bulkeley et al.’s analysis reveals that there is no proclivity for specific types of actors (non-
governmental organizations, corporations, states, etc.) to engage with particular issues. At 
the same time, exclusive sets of interests do not cohere around particular actor types: 
particular types of actors may have divergent interests or diverse range of actors may share 
similar interests in the climate change field.148 This is indicative of the fact that networked 
climate change governance actors have created a flexible context within which multiple 
actors can pursue a myriad of interests.149 This flexibility is important, because this allows 
for networked climate change governance processes to continue to engage a variety of 
actors and combat climate change in a range of ways, which may prove effective in terms 
of emissions reductions, encourage the inclusion of less developed countries, and mean 
that a variety of responsible actors are held to account within these processes. 
 
Networked climate change governance processes are not only flexible, but provide a 
context for innovation. Networked climate change governance actors are innovative, 
pushing the envelope of what is possible, actively seeking out and creating gaps in the 
response to climate change and attempting to fill them.150 In this way, networked climate 
change governance initiatives promote experimentation and innovation.151 This innovation 
is important, because without numerous innovative technological and institutional efforts 
at multiple scales, it will not be possible to learn which combined sets of actions are the 
most effective in reducing the long-term threat of climate change.152 This innovation has 
potential to catalyze change, which may provide the momentum necessary to adequately 
respond to the climate change problem. Networked climate change governance actors may 
be able to provide a source of friction that catalyzes a demand for a broad transformation 
in the response to climate change.153 Friction is created by pushing the boundaries of 
traditional notions of which actors are responsible for making the rules, creating an uneven 
set of rules actors must follow, and generating new coalitions committed to climate 
                                                          
148 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
114 
149 Keohane, R. O., and Victor, D. G., ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Perspectives on Politics 9(1) 
(2011), p. 20 
150 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 78 
151 Abbott, K. W., ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Environment & Planning C: 
Government & Policy 30(4) (2012) p. 588 
152 Ostrom, E. ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, 5095 (2009), p. 4 
153 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 28 
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action.154 Through this, networked climate change governance processes may be able to 
create significant momentum for the global response.155 In fact, recent research suggests 
that the momentum within climate change governance processes is only growing.156 For 
this reason, it is possible to argue that networked climate change governance actors, by 
providing a context which is innovative, and ultimately looks to provide momentum for 
altering the global response to climate change, will continue to have the capacity to enable 
the three demands of climate justice by creating a context under which this is possible. 
Recent research indicates that networked climate change governance will continue to grow 
and expand, and thereby continue to provide a context within which global emission levels 
can be lowered, less developed country actors can be included, and where a variety of 
actors can be held to account. For this reason, networked climate change governance 
should be taken as a source of optimism at a time when the prospects for a just global 
response to climate change remain uncertain. 
 
Nevertheless, there is also room for caution. This is in part because there is a pervasive 
‘business as usual’ approach within networked climate change governance, which can 
especially be seen in the ubiquitous marketization of the climate change problem. Although 
networked climate change governance processes are flexible and innovative the actors 
within these processes have come to understand and act on climate change in a limited 
number of ways. The framing of the climate change issue is overall seen as a business 
opportunity rather than a critique of capitalism and growth within networked climate 
change governance.157 For this reason, some critical authors suggest that networked 
climate change governance initiatives simply help reproduce the norms and rationalities 
and further the interests of dominant political economic forces such as global finance.158 
Furthermore, some critics claim that networked climate change governance actors are 
merely pursuing their own interests, rather than fundamentally changing the response to 
climate change.159 This is a compelling argument, especially considering that there were no 
broad based anti-consumption movements or anti-consumerism movements and 
campaigns within Bulkeley et al.’s sample.160 Also absent were campaigns that demonize 
                                                          
154 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 28 
155 Ibid., p. 29 
156 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 110 
157 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
115 
158 Ibid., p. 59 
159 Ibid., p. p. 165 
160 Ibid., p. 101 
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and seek to eliminate coal use, punish those who invest in coal burning facilities or reward 
those that significantly reduce beef or meat consumption.161 Overall, it is clear from 
Bulkeley et al.’s findings that many of the actors that wield financial and political power in 
networked climate change governance initiatives have very little interest in fundamentally 
changing the global response to climate change. 
 
This is problematic, because a condition of climate justice cannot be reached under the 
scope of current networked climate change governance action. None of the three demands 
of justice are currently being fully enabled by networked climate change governance actors. 
In addition, Climate Change Action tracker estimates that current trends in governance will 
only reduce global rises in temperature 2.9 to 5.2°C by 2100, which is not sufficient to 
protect the right to health.162 In addition, if dominant interests continue to be perpetuated, 
this leaves open the question of whether the concerns of less developed countries will have 
their interests heard, and whether state and non-state actors will be held to account for 
their climate justice responsibilities beyond voluntarily. Current practice is therefore far 
from what is required in order to meet a condition of climate justice In addition, the 
assessment in Chapter Seven and the current chapter has revealed that networked and 
multilateral governance actors face similar hindrances, specifically: a) lack of effectiveness 
b) focus on mitigation over adaptation, and c) marginalization of less developed countries, 
especially the very poorest. This suggests that there is some continuity in global climate 
change governance, even though the processes of multilateral and networked climate 
change are quite different in their scope and ambition. For this reason, it is not possible to 
claim that multilateral governance has failed, and networked governance presents 
improvement and innovation: instead, these processes face similar problems. It is also clear 
that networked climate change governance is not an alternative to the UNFCCC – the 
landscape of networked climate change governance is fraught with its own contradictions, 
pitfalls and injustices.163 
 
However, it should be noted that there has been an emergence of critical networked 
climate change governance initiatives which represent a shift from ‘business as usual’ and 
provide further scope for optimism. These initiatives adopt a strong focus on green 
                                                          
161 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
101 
162 Climate Action Tracker, ‘Effect of Current Pledges and Policies on Global Temperature’ 
http://climateactiontracker.org/global.html [accessed 15.05.2015]  
163 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
185 
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ideology, social justice and the moral imperative of climate change.164 Two examples of this 
type of initiative are Carbon Trade Watch and Transition Towns. Carbon Trade Watch 
emerged as a critical non-governmental organization attempting to undermine the 
legitimacy of carbon markets as a credible response to climate change. The initiative works 
to expose the various political and environmental problems produced by such markets 
both in the intergovernmental and networked forms.165 Carbon Trade Watch exists directly 
to govern, via resistance politics, the activities of the carbon market certification 
organizations, challenging their claims of offering guilt free offsets through carbon 
emissions reductions or development benefits.166 Interestingly, one of the issue areas 
Carbon Trade Watch concerns itself with is climate justice.167 This suggests that there are 
initiatives that are actively seeking to enable a just response to climate change by creating 
a context where this is possible. Transition Towns are another example of a counter-status-
quo initiative. The Transition Town movement ‘explores and develops ways we can change 
from energy-hungry ways of living that are utterly dependent on oil and other fossil fuels, 
to ways of living that are significantly less so.’168 The Transition Town Movement calls for a 
fundamental shift in patters of transportation, energy use, food production and personal 
lifestyles, attempting to address some of the root causes of climate change rather than 
tinker at the margins.169 This is a critical approach, which does not simply perpetuate the 
status quo.  
 
The two examples above serve to illustrate that networked climate change governance is 
not as one sided as critics suggest. Interestingly, at the most recent Conference of the 
Parties, COP20 in Lima, the language used by networked climate change governance actors, 
and particularly among less developed country actors, is shifting towards a discussion of 
climate equity, or more specifically an ‘equity reference framework’ for determining the 
fair share of mitigation and financial contributions.170 This tentatively suggests a change in 
dialog away from market mechanisms and towards notions of climate justice, which is 
                                                          
164 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
130 
165 Ibid., p. 94 
166 Ibid., p. 130 
167 Carbon Trade Watch, ‘Climate Justice’ http://www.carbontradewatch.org/issues/climate-justice.html 
[accessed 15.05.2015] 
168 Transition Town Totnes, ‘What is Transition?’ http://www.transitiontowntotnes.org/about/what-is-
transition/  [accessed 15.05.2015] 
169 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
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170 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, ‘Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference’ 
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 286 
 
promising in terms of the future capacity of networked governance actors to enable a 
condition of justice.  
 
Overall, the discussion above has illustrated that networked climate change governance 
processes present a context where there is scope for continued action, innovation, and the 
potential for change. At the same time, these processes present a business as usual 
approach, with few exceptions. For this reason, it is difficult to argue with any certainty 
that networked climate change governance actors will enable a condition of climate justice 
in the future. All that can be said is that the assessment above has tentatively indicated 
that actors have the capacity to enable a condition of climate justice. Furthermore, the 
discussion in this second part of the chapter revealed that it appears that actors within 
networked climate change governance will continue to expand the remit of the climate 
change response, although to what degree this will move away from market mechanisms 
and business as usual is left to be seen. It is therefore not clear whether networked climate 
change governance actors will present enough of a shift in behavior to fully enable the 
three demands of climate justice defended in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is clear that it will 
remain important for climate justice scholars to study networked climate change 
governance processes. As Bulkeley et al. put it ‘all individuals concerned about climate 
change – academics, activists, citizens and policymakers – should be interested in how 
networked climate change governance works and how it might contribute to efforts to 
stave off the consequences of climate change.’171 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to tentatively illustrate what the application of the climate justice 
position developed in this thesis can reveal about networked climate change governance 
practice. The assessment in this chapter should be considered as exploratory. The chapter 
does not purport to make definitive claims about the practice of networked climate change 
governance actors. Rather, the chapter aimed to illustrate how the climate justice 
framework developed in Part II of this thesis can be used to assess current practice. This 
has the wider purpose of bridging the gap between climate justice literature and climate 
change governance research, as was explained in the Introduction of the thesis.  
The assessment in this chapter has tentatively revealed that networked climate change 
governance actors have the capacity to enable a condition of justice in the case of climate 
                                                          
171 Bulkeley et al. Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 
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change by creating a context under which this is possible. By taking each demand in turn, 
and using existing research on networked climate change governance as well as illustrative 
examples, the chapter was able to make the case that actors within these processes have 
the capacity to enable all three demands of justice. It was not argued that this is 
guaranteed, or even likely, but the assessment in this chapter has nevertheless revealed 
that it is possible that the demands of justice set out in the thesis may be met with the 
enablement of actors involved in networked climate change governance. The chapter also 
discussed the future of networked climate change governance. It was put forward that 
there is room for cautious optimism regarding the capacity of networked climate change 
governance actors to enable a condition of justice in the future. Although networked 
climate change governance, as a whole, presents a context where there is scope for 
continued action, innovation, and the potential for change, networked climate change 
governance actors mostly seem to follow a ‘business as usual’ approach. In other words, 
these actors do not stray far from what is currently being pursued under the UNFCCC, and 
in fact face many of the same problems as actors under multilateral governance. For this 
reason, it is not possible to claim that networked climate change governance processes will 
enable a condition of justice in the future. Nevertheless, the capacity to do so exists, and 
there are some promising developments, such a shift in dialog and the emergence of 
critical networked climate change governance initiatives which represent a shift from 
‘business as usual.’ The chapter therefore concludes that it will remain important for 
climate justice scholars to research networked climate change governance.  
The thesis has now completed Parts I, II, and II, and turns to the Chapter Nine, which will 
outline the main findings of the thesis, and furthermore discuss how the normative 
assessment conducted in this thesis can be used to underwrite future thinking about the 
global response to climate change.  
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Chapter Nine – Conclusion 
 
The thesis has now completed Parts I, II, and III. This final, concluding chapter will briefly 
discuss the main findings of the thesis and outline the limitations of the research. Following 
this, the chapter will turn to a discussion of what the main findings of the thesis imply for 
future research directions. The thesis aimed to explore why exactly global climate change 
action should be considered inadequate, and what normative principles must underwrite a 
more just global response to climate change. Furthermore, the thesis aimed to illustrate 
that climate justice theorists have the potential to provide normative insights into current 
practice. It is the purpose of this final chapter to discuss how the normative assessment 
conducted in this thesis can be used to underwrite future thinking about a more just global 
response to climate change. The discussion of future research will focus on continuing to 
bridge the gap between political theorists who study climate justice and scholars who focus 
on climate change governance. The thesis has attempted to illustrate that these two fields 
can be bridged by using principles of climate justice to evaluate current climate change 
governance practice. In this sense, the research conducted in this thesis should be seen as a 
starting point for a discussion between the fields of climate justice and climate change 
governance, and this final chapter aims to point to how this discussion can be continued in 
future. As Steven Vanderheiden explains, this may narrow the gap between justice in 
theory and practice by illustrating that these fields have something to learn from one 
other.1 In addition, the continued bridging of these two fields will hopefully contribute to 
bringing about a more just global response to climate change. 
Main Findings of the Thesis 
In order to normatively assess the climate change problem from a global justice perspective, 
and illustrate what this perspective can reveal about the current response to climate 
change, the thesis was split into three parts: Part I, ‘Defining the Climate Change Problem,’ 
Part II, ‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position’, and Part III, ‘Assessing 
Current Institutional Practice.’ Part I consisted of Chapters One and Two, and aimed to 
provide an overview of the climate change problem and the climate ethics literature which 
has emerged as a response this. Importantly, Part I also defended the use of the global 
justice position for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. The review of 
scientific evidence in Chapter One provided an insight into the main causes and 
                                                          
1 Vanderheiden, S., ‘What Justice Theory and Climate Change Politics Can Learn From Each Other’ in Political 
Science and Politics, 46 (2013), p. 22 
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consequences of climate change. This first chapter outlined the key features of climate 
change, using the latest scientific evidence on the subject. It was illustrated that climate 
change threatens human interests, that less developed countries and future generations 
will be the main victims of climate change, and that climate change requires sustained 
collective action to avoid irreversible damages. Chapter Two then provided a critical 
assessment of four approaches found within the climate change ethics literature: statist, 
pragmatic, utilitarian, and cosmopolitan. It was put forward that out of these four 
approaches, the cosmopolitan approach is the most useful for a normative assessment of 
the climate change problem because cosmopolitan theories of global justice can best 
address the complex issues which arise as a result of the empirical conditions of climate 
change. Cosmopolitanism involves thorough normative reasoning, takes morally equal 
human beings as a starting point, and is critical of the status quo, all of which make it 
especially suited for the normative assessment of the climate change problem. In addition, 
it was demonstrated that climate change is arguably a problem of global justice by its very 
nature. Once it had been established that the cosmopolitan approach is useful for the 
normative assessment of the climate change problem, the thesis moved onto Part II: 
‘Developing a Global Justice and Climate Change Position.’ 
 
Part II aimed to develop normative principles that can be used for the assessment of 
current practice, and consisted of Chapters Three, Four and Five. Chapter Three made the 
case for an approach which combines a non-relational and relational scope. It was argued 
that both relational and non-relational elements of global justice are necessary to fully 
capture and understand the normative demands that stem out of the special relationships 
created by climate change. Next, Chapter Four made the case that the right to health 
should ground the climate justice position, because this right encompasses the basic 
human interests threatened by climate change. Chapter Five used the scope and grounds 
of climate justice developed in Chapters Three and Four to take a stance on three broad 
issues: how much is owed to future generations, how to include less developed countries in 
climate change action, and who makes up the responsible ‘collective’ in collective action. In 
doing so, the chapter defended three demands of justice that are considered normative 
principles which must underwrite a more just global response to climate change. Demand 
One states that right to health2 of future generations must be considered to be equally as 
valuable as the right to health of current generations, and must therefore be protected. 
                                                          
2 Defined as the right to a standard of health which sustains life at a minimally decent level, and includes 
adequate sustenance to maintain this standard of health. 
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Demand Two states that the concerns of less developed countries must be properly 
considered in climate change action, and furthermore that the distribution of benefits and 
burdens in global climate change action should be based in the PATP3 model. Demand 
Three states that capable actors, including individuals, firms, sub-state entities, 
international institutions, and states, irrespective of the country they live or exist in, must 
be held responsible for lowering emissions and/or contributing financially to the climate 
change cause, in line with their respective capabilities. These three demands completed the 
development of the climate justice position, and the thesis moved on to Part III, ‘Assessing 
Current Institutional Practice.’ 
Part III of the thesis aimed to illustrate what normative principles of justice can reveal 
about current climate change governance processes. This final part of the thesis concerned 
assessing the global response to the climate change problem from a global justice 
perspective, and was split into three chapters. Chapter Six provided a conceptual 
introduction for the evaluation of current practice. This chapter clarified what is meant by 
current institutional practice, and outlined how current institutional practice can be 
assessed. Chapter Six put forward that both actors under the United Nations Framework 
for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and actors involved in networked climate 
change governance processes have the institutional responsibility to enable a condition of 
justice in the case of climate change, due to their capability of creating a context where the 
three demands of justice defended in Chapter Five can be met. Chapter Six also explained 
that the actors under the UNFCCC have formal authority to act and are therefore most 
responsible for enabling a condition of justice in the case of climate change. However, it 
was explained this does not diminish the moral responsibility of other actors, specifically 
those involved in networked governance processes, if the actors under the UNFCCC should 
fail to enable the three demands of justice explicated in this thesis. It was illustrated that 
actors under the UNFCCC and within networked governance processes will remain morally 
responsible for enabling a condition of justice until this is achieved. In addition to outlining 
the responsibilities of actors in the UNFCCC and networked climate change governance, 
                                                          
3 Polluter’s Ability to Pay model: the responsibility to contribute finances and lower emissions is based on both 
per capita emissions levels and per capita wealth. To illustrate, countries which have high levels of pollution and 
high levels of wealth will be asked to reduce their pollution and pay for climate change action, and countries of 
low wealth and high pollution will have to reduce their emissions as best possible, as long as it does not push 
them under a threshold of a decent standard of living, and only when they rise in wealth will they have to pay 
more towards climate change costs and further emissions reductions. Countries which have low emissions and 
low wealth will be excluded from action, and those with low emissions and high wealth may be asked to 
contribute financially but not lower their emissions.  
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Chapter Six developed a four point hierarchy to aid the assessment of current practice in 
Chapters Seven and Eight.  
 
Making use of this hierarchy, Chapter Seven and Eight assessed to what extent actors 
under the UNFCCC and within networked climate change governance enable the three 
demands of justice developed in this thesis. The assessment of the UNFCCC, in Chapter 
Seven, and networked climate change governance, in Chapter Eight, is considered 
exploratory, and does not purport to make definitive claims about the practice of the 
actors within these processes. Rather, the thesis aimed, in these chapters, to illustrate how 
the climate justice framework developed in Part II of this thesis can be used to assess 
current practice. A comprehensive assessment of the UNFCCC and networked climate 
change governance is not possible within the scope of this thesis, which places an emphasis 
on both the development of a climate justice position and the application of this position. 
This allows somewhat limited space for the assessment of two complex processes of 
governance. Nevertheless, the assessment conducted in these chapters aimed to 
tentatively illustrate what the application of the climate justice position can reveal about 
current global climate change governance practice. 
 
Chapter Seven found that while the actors under the UNFCCC have made normative 
commitments which are arguably in line with two of the three the demands of justice 
explicated in this thesis, the practice of these actors does not match up to their 
commitments. In other words, political reality is not living up to normative rhetoric. 
However, it was argued that the fact that the ambitions of the actors under the UNFCCC 
can be interpreted as in line with two of the three demands of justice indicates that the 
UNFCCC has the capacity to enable a condition of justice, because the UNFCCC is setting 
out a context where demands of justice could be met. It was not argued that this is 
guaranteed, or even likely, but rather that this is not impossible. Chapter Seven also 
commented on the progress of recent negotiations, and argued that there seems to be 
movement towards increased mitigation efforts and increased funding for climate change 
action. This tentatively implies that the actors in the UNFCCC will continue to have the 
capacity to enable a condition of climate justice in the future, especially if the new treaty 
presents a significant departure from the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Chapter Seven highlighted the following positive trajectories: a) a framework for policy on 
climate change exists and continues to exist, b) the existing framework is arguably based on 
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normative commitments analogous to Demands One and Two of justice as explicated in 
this thesis, c) actors under the UNFCCC have attempted to put, albeit still inadequate, 
policies into place to live up to their normative commitments, and d) these actors are 
continually attempting to move forwards. In addition to suggesting that the actors under 
the UNFCCC arguably do not enable any of the three demands of justice, the chapter also 
pointed to the following key hindrances faced by multilateral climate change governance: a) 
lack of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, b) weak targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, c) 
limited financial and technological transfer, d) only a small number of states are currently 
held to account under the UNFCCC, e) ineffectiveness, f) lack of accessibility to less 
developed countries, especially the poorest and g) a focus on mitigation in favor of 
adaptation. The positive trajectories and current hindrances point to areas that need 
further exploration in future, especially once the Conference of the Parties (COP21) at Paris 
has occurred. This will be further discussed below, when considering future research 
directions.   
 
Overall, Chapter Seven illustrated that actors in the UNFCCC fail to enable the three 
demands of justice set out in this thesis, which suggests that networked governance actors 
must act on their institutional responsibilities because a condition of justice has not yet 
been achieved. For this reason, Chapter Eight concerned to what extent actors involved in 
networked climate change governance meet their institutional responsibility to enable a 
condition of justice in the case of climate change.  Making use of existing research on 
climate change governance, Chapter Eight conducted a climate justice focused meta-
analysis of climate change governance. By drawing on existing research, and analyzing this 
from a climate justice perspective, the chapter was able to provide unique climate justice 
based insights on processes of networked climate change governance. The chapter pointed 
to the following positive trajectories: a) there are networked governance initiatives which 
have goals in line with the three demands of climate justice, b) there is capacity for 
emissions reductions, c) there is capacity for less developed country inclusion, and d) there 
is capacity for responsible actors to be held to account. Chapter Eight argued that overall, 
the actors involved in networked climate change governance have the capacity to create a 
context within which the three demands of justice can be met. This does not guarantee 
that the demands will be met, or even that this is likely, but rather that networked climate 
change actors can play an important role in realizing a just condition in the case of climate 
change. For this reason, Chapter Eight concluded that the further study of networked 
 294 
 
climate change governance actors was important for climate justice theorists who are 
concerned with a more just response to climate change. 
Although Chapter Eight found networked governance actors to be important in terms of 
climate justice, the chapter also made the case that several problems within these 
processes of governance prevent the three demands of justice from being fully enabled at 
present. Although there is continued space for action, flexibility, innovation, ambition, and 
momentum present within networked climate change governance, the marketization of 
the climate change problem, as well as the lack of radical or innovate changes in practice, 
indicate that networked climate change governance processes largely represent ‘business 
as usual.’ Networked climate change governance actors are not straying far from the action 
being conducted under the UNFCCC, and can therefore not be said to represent a more just 
response to climate change. Indeed, Chapter Eight pointed to several hindrances which 
face networked climate change governance actors, including a) it is unclear whether 
networked climate change actors are effective at reducing emissions levels, b) there is a 
focus on mitigation over adaptation, c) there is a marginalization of less developed 
countries, especially the very poorest, d) actors are not held to account more than 
voluntarily, e) there is a focus on market mechanisms, and finally, f) networked climate 
change governance processes present a ‘business as usual’ approach rather than a radical 
departure from current practice. Nevertheless, the chapter concluded that the counter-
examples of Transition Towns and Carbon Trade Watch, as well as the continued growth 
and development of networked climate change governance, leaves some room for cautious 
optimism, and perhaps more importantly, further climate justice related research into this 
type of governance. 
On top of these findings specific to networked climate change governance and multilateral 
governance, the thesis has also made several observations on what these processes have in 
common. For one, networked climate change governance actors and actors under the 
UNFCCC face similar hindrances, specifically a) lack of effectiveness b) a focus on mitigation 
over adaptation, and c) the marginalization of less developed countries, especially the very 
poorest. This suggests that there is some continuity in global climate change governance, 
even though the processes of multilateral and networked climate change are quite 
different in their scope and ambition. The apparent continuity of existing hindrances may 
imply that future research into effectiveness, lack of accessibility to less developed 
countries, and the focus on mitigation over adaptation may be useful.  
 295 
 
In addition, because networked and multilateral climate change actors face similar 
problems, it may be too simple to say multilateral governance has failed, and that 
networked governance processes presents innovation towards a more just response to 
climate change. Instead, these processes are both problematic in terms of climate justice. 
Thomas Weiss has suggested that although networked climate change governance 
processes are not directly linked to the UNFCCC process, these processes are influenced 
and reinforced by action taken by the UNFCCC.4 This may be why multilateral and 
networked climate change governance actors face similar hindrances, and why networked 
climate change governance processes have not yet resulted in an innovative and radical 
shift in practice.  
Overall, the assessment of actors in the UNFCCC and actors involved in networked climate 
change governance has aimed to illustrate that normative principles of justice can be used 
to assess current practice. The exploratory and preliminary nature of the research into 
current practice leaves scope for future research, which the chapter will discuss after brief 
outline of the limitations of the research conducted in this thesis. 
Limitations of the Thesis 
This thesis has several limitations which are important to outline in order to explain what 
the thesis has not attempted to achieve, or cannot achieve due to focus, space and time. 
First, the thesis takes a very specific approach to climate change: the normative assessment 
of the climate change problem from a global justice perspective. This is a limitation in the 
sense that there are many other approaches which could be taken in order to normatively 
assess the climate change problem. The thesis does not attempt to claim that the global 
justice approach is the only approach that can be taken, or that there are no other 
approaches that can be useful for the assessment of the climate change problem. Instead, 
the thesis has attempted to illustrate, particularly in Chapter Two, that the use of the 
cosmopolitan approach is warranted. In this way, the thesis does not aim to represent the 
‘best’ approach for the assessment of the climate change problem, but rather one viable 
approach which has been illustrated to be highly useful for this assessment.  
A second limitation of the thesis is that the global climate change governance has 
necessarily been simplified in order to be assessed. The thesis does not claim to paint an 
exhaustive picture of climate change governance, but rather aims to provide an overview 
of what is occurring under the UNFCCC and within networked climate change governance. 
                                                          
4 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 166 
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It would not be possible to capture the full reality of climate change governance, because 
the processes involved are extremely complex and ever changing. This is especially true in 
the case of networked climate change governance, as was explained in Chapter Eight. 
Instead, the thesis has provided a broad insight into how climate change governance fairs 
in terms of enabling a condition of justice in the case of climate change. 
A third limitation of the thesis is that the assessment conducted in Chapters Seven and 
Eight is not conclusive or comprehensive. Rather, the thesis aimed, in these chapters, to 
illustrate what application of the climate justice position can reveal about current global 
climate change governance practice. This fits with the wider aim of bridging the gap 
between global justice theorists and climate change governance scholars. Although there is 
more work to be done, the thesis has attempted to illustrate that these two fields can be 
successfully bridged by using principles of climate justice to evaluate current climate 
change governance practice and to provide normative principles form which considerations 
of reform could be based. In this sense, the research conducted in this thesis should be 
seen as a starting point for a discussion between the fields of climate justice and climate 
change governance, and this final chapter aims to point to how this discussion can be 
continued in future.  
Future Research Directions 
This thesis has aimed to illustrate that climate justice theorists have the potential to 
provide normative insights into current practice, which can inform the field of climate 
change governance. This final chapter will now discuss how the normative assessment 
conducted in this thesis can be used to underwrite future thinking about the global 
response to climate change. The discussion of future research will focus on continuing to 
bridge the gap between political theorists who study climate justice and those scholars 
who focus on climate change governance. The thesis has demonstrated, through the 
normative assessment of current practice, that this not only possible, but presents a 
worthwhile endeavor. The continued linking of these two fields will hopefully contribute to 
bringing about a more just global response to climate change. With this aim in mind, the 
chapter will now outline four areas of possible future research that speaks to further 
bridging the gap between climate justice theory and climate change governance research.  
 
First, the thesis has revealed three hindrances faced by both multilateral and networked 
climate change governance actors: lack of effectiveness, the exclusion of less developed 
countries, and a focus on mitigation over adaptation. These hindrances require further 
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exploration. Although the UNFCCC and networked climate change governance faced some 
differing hindrances, it may be especially worthwhile to explore the hindrances these two 
processes have in common. This is because although networked climate change 
governance is not directly linked to the UNFCCC process, networked climate change 
governance processes are influenced and reinforced by action taken by the UNFCCC.5 At 
the same time, networked climate change governance initiatives influence the shape and 
evolution of the global response to climate change.6 If these two processes of climate 
change governance influence one another, it may be worthwhile to explore the problems 
they have in common, in order to ascertain what can be done to overcome these common 
hindrances so as to bring about a more just response to climate change. If a hindrance can 
be overcome at the UNFCCC, then this may be influential for overcoming the same 
hindrance in networked climate change governance, and vice versa. In addition, it may be 
interesting to explore what overarching factors are causing both types of governance to 
face similar problems – perhaps there are other influencing factors that have remained 
undiscovered in this thesis or within the current literature. 
 
Second, it may be worthwhile to explore hindrances which only face multilateral or 
networked governance actors alone, and see whether there are factors within the other 
type of governance which may have influenced this hindrance. For example, scientists and 
scholars working for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have argued that one 
reason networked climate change governance actors have a preference for market 
mechanisms is because climate change governance as a whole has evolved in a way which 
has made market mechanisms the dominant solution to the climate change problem.7 This 
indicates that networked climate change governance actors are influenced by what occurs 
in the UNFCCC. According to Peter Lawrence, it is vital that ethics and justice discourses 
become more prominent in climate policy making, so that the dominant discourse of 
growth and markets may be countered.8 Interestingly, at the most recent COP, COP20 in 
Lima, networked governance actors, particularly less developed country actors, focused on 
discussion of climate equity, or more specifically an ‘equity reference framework’ for 
                                                          
5 Weiss, T. G., Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 166 
6 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 9 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group III ‘Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate 
Change’ http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf [accessed 12.02.2015] p. 
1031 
8 Lawrence, P., Justice for Future Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014), p.  140  
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determining the fair share of mitigation and financial contributions.9 This may represent a 
shift in dialog away from ‘business as usual’ and towards a discourse of justice. It may be 
worthwhile to observe whether this has any effect on the dominance of market 
mechanisms, or whether the UNFCCC will continue to influence the shape and direction 
networked climate change governance takes. 
 
Aside from researching hindrances, a third possible avenue for future research on climate 
justice and climate change governance is research into whether multilateral and networked 
climate change governance processes should become more integrated, or whether it is 
more useful, in terms of enabling a condition of justice, to leave these as separate 
processes. This links to existing research on fragmentations vs. integration of climate 
change governance, a debate that is becoming increasingly important within the climate 
change governance literature. This debate concerns whether the UNFCCC and networked 
climate change governance processes should work more closely together with the help of 
rules and regulations (integration), or whether these two processes should remain 
independent from one another (fragmentation). Global climate governance can currently 
be characterized as fragmented, because although there is one core actor (the UNFCCC), 
there are multiple other avenues of climate change action being pursued.10 As a result of 
this, it is difficult to argue that climate change governance is likely to become integrated 
without some intervention. Interestingly, there is currently no agreement in climate change 
governance literature on whether the regime should remain fragmented or become more 
integrated.11 The main arguments in favor of integration are that an integrated regime is 
more effective both in terms of lowering emissions and costs, and that an integrated 
regime avoids overlap because roles can be more clearly defined.12 The main arguments in 
favor of fragmentation are that the world is better off pursuing a multitude of small-scale 
solutions rather than waiting for an unobtainable global solution, that fragmented 
                                                          
9 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, ‘Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference’ 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12619e.pdf [accessed 10.02.15], p. 37  
10 Biermann, F. Pattberg, P. Zelli, F., and Van Asselt, H., ‘The Architecture of Global Climate Governance’ in 
Bierman, F., Pattberg, P., and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency, and 
Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 22 
11 Ibid., p. 15 
12 See for example: Hof, A., Den Elzen, M., and Van Vuuren, D., ‘Environmental Effectiveness and Economic 
Consequences of Fragmented Versus Universal Regimes: What Can We Learn From Model Studies?’ in 
Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency, 
and Adaptation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate 
Change (London: Routledge, 2010), or Hale., T., Held, D., and Young, K., Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is 
Failing When We Need it Most (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) 
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governance is more effective, innovative and ambitious, and that there will be greater 
participation and diversity of action because of the flexibility fragmentation allows for.13  
 
The debate concerning integration vs. fragmentation is important for future research on 
climate justice and climate change governance, especially pertaining to the concern of 
bringing about a more just response to climate change. Andries Hof et al. have studied 
fragmented regimes, and make the case that it is in general more cost-effective to reduce 
emissions in an integrated regime than in a fragmented regime.14 The main reason for this 
is that high participation is required for an emissions reducing regime to be effective.15 
Harriet and Bulkeley make a similar case for integration, explaining that action on many 
scales and through many dispersed but overlapping networks can be ineffective.16 In 
addition, Thomas Hale et al. point out that coordination of efforts may be difficult in a 
fragmented regime, which could undermine effectiveness. 17  This indicates that an 
integrated regime results in more effective emissions reductions, which is important in 
order to protect the right to health of future generations. However, although it is clear that 
these scholars believe coordination between the UNFCCC and networked climate change 
governance processes could result in a more effective regime, there is an important 
argument against integrating these two processes: the current climate change governance 
regime is fragmented and thus it is important to find workable solutions within this ‘real’ 
context.  
 
Since the regime is currently fragmented, attempting to coordinate integration is risky, 
because this will necessarily take time. For this reason, it may be better to pursue 
overlapping small-scale solutions than to wait for an unobtainable global solution. As Elinor 
Ostrom explains, given the decades-long failure at an international level to reach 
agreement on efficient, fair, and enforceable reductions of emissions, continuing to wait 
                                                          
13 See for example: Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global 
Response after Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Abbott, K. W., ‘The Transnational Regime 
Complex for Climate Change’ in Environment & Planning C: Government & Policy 30(4) (2012), pp. 571 – 590, 
Ostrom, E. ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
5095 (2009), or Keohane, R. O., and Victor, D. G., ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ in Perspectives on 
Politics 9(1) (2011), pp. 7 – 23  
14 Hof, A., Den Elzen, M., and Van Vuuren, D., ‘Environmental Effectiveness and Economic Consequences of 
Fragmented Versus Universal Regimes: What Can We Learn From model Studies?’ in Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., 
and Zelli F., (eds.) Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency, and Adaptation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 55 
15 Ibid. 
16 Bulkeley, H. and Newell, P., Governing Climate Change (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 106 
17 Hale., T., Held, D., and Young, K., Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need it Most 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 47 
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may defeat the possibilities of significant adaptations and mitigation in time to prevent 
tragic disasters.18 When considering the severity of the threat of climate change, simply 
waiting for resolution of these issues at a global level, without trying out policies at 
multiple scales because they lack a global scale, is not a reasonable stance.19 This calls into 
question whether it is worthwhile to pursue an integrated regime, especially when 
considering how long this may take to be achieved. Furthermore, Ostrom asserts that 
without numerous innovative technological and institutional efforts at multiple scales, it 
will not be possible to learn which combined sets of actions are the most effective in 
reducing the long-term threat of massive climate change.20 In other words, the more actors 
working on the problem, the more likely it will be to find an effective solution. According to 
Hoffman, networked climate change actors are innovative, pushing the envelope of what is 
possible, actively seeking out and creating gaps in the response to climate change and 
attempting to fill them.21 If these processes were reigned in by global rules of an integrated 
climate governance regime, then this innovation may be stifled, which could slow the 
process of finding effective solutions to the climate change problem. It is clear from the 
above that future research on climate justice and climate change governance would benefit 
from engaging with this existing debate, in order to explore whether an integrated or 
fragmented regime speaks represents a more just response to climate change, particularly 
in terms of effectiveness, flexibility, and innovation. 
 
A fourth and final avenue for future research lies in exploring how the inadequacies of the 
climate change response compare to the governance of other global problems. There has 
recently been some research into the wider problems of global governance, conducted by 
Thomas Hale, David Held, and Kevin Young. These scholars assess the failure of global 
governance to address urgent problems, including growing economic imbalances within 
and across countries, proliferation of nuclear arms, and basic insecurities that persist from 
violent conflicts.22 Hale, Held, and Young refer to the failure of global governance as 
‘gridlock:’ a breakdown in global cooperation which has resulted in the growing gap 
between our need for global solutions and the flagging ability of multilateral institutions to 
                                                          
18 Ostrom, E. ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, 5095 (2009), p. 4 
19 Ibid., p. 28 
20 Ibid., p. 4 
21 Hoffman, M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 78 
22 Hale., T., Held, D., and Young, K., Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need it Most 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 2 
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meet that need.23 Their research examines three issue areas: the governance of security, 
the economy, and the environment, and they argue that these issue areas face similar 
problems of gridlock. It is important to explore if these issue areas also face similar 
problems in terms of enabling a condition of justice. If they do, then perhaps a normative 
recommendation for a more just response to climate change could also be applied to other 
global governance problems. 
For now, although it is difficult to determine what has been achieved overall and what will 
be achieved in the future, the thesis has revealed that there has been some progress made 
in terms of creating a just response to climate change. Although climate change 
governance faces many hindrances, there have been some positive trajectories, and, 
importantly, promises made which are in line with the demands of justice outlined in this 
thesis. Of course, progress does not guarantee eventual success. Nevertheless, the thesis 
has illustrated that both actors under the UNFCCC and within networked climate change 
governance have the capacity to enable a just response to the climate change problem. It 
may not be probable, or even likely, for a just global response to climate change to emerge. 
Yet, it is also not impossible – the capacity for change exists, as has been demonstrated in 
this thesis. This is important, because as Hale, Held, and Young argue, a single 
breakthrough in climate change negotiations could catalyze a paradigm shift in the way the 
world community conducts the business of governance; a single successful act of reform 
could become a model for the resolution of other pressing global governance issues.24 The 
aim of bringing about a more just response to climate change is therefore important not 
only to those who will be affected by climate change, but also for those who are victims of 
wider failures of global governance, threatened by nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and 
continued economic inequality. By providing an insight into the injustices of the current 
response to climate change, this thesis has hopefully provided a step in the direction 
towards more just global governance in the future. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Hale., T., Held, D., and Young, K., Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need it Most 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 3 
24 Ibid. 
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